Van Rensselaer v. Albany & Stockbridge Railroad — 8 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 507

Majority

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CORNELIUS VAN RENSSELAER, Respondent, v. THE ALBANY AND STOCKBRIDGE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.

Headnote

Easemmt—what constitutes—may he imposed hy covenant—Negligence.

The owner in fee of land may impose upon it any burden, however injurious or destructive, not inconsistent with his general right of ownership, if such burden be not in violation of public policy and do not injuriously affect the rights or property of others. And where the nature of the charge is such that it may be made by grant, it may be equally imposed by covenant.

In 1859, the plaintiff’s father was the owner of land, through which the defendant’s road was built, on the side of a steep hill. In that year, the embankment for the road slipped out upon the adjoining land, causing damage which was settled between the plaintiff’s father and the defendant. At the time of the settlement, a writing under seal, executed by the plaintiff’s father, was given to the defendant, by which he released the defendant from all claims for the damage already occasioned, and agreed that, if in consequence of the peculiar construction of the embankment, or of the nature of the soil at the point where the embankment joined his land, land-slides should thereafter occur, that he, his heirs and legal representatives, should consider the money then paid, as compensation in full for all past and future damage, and that the instrument so signed should be a bar to all future claims.

In 1869, another land-slide occurred, occasioning damage to the land, which had descended to the plaintiff, as heir-at-law of his father, to recover for which damage, this action was brought. Held, that by virtue of the covenant contained in the agreement, the defendant acquired an easement in the land, which was bound thereby in the hands of the plaintiff; and that, as the negligence of the defendant, if any, was not willful or permitted with any hostile or offensive purpose, the plaintiff could not recover.

Appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, entered upon the report of referees.

In 1859, the father of the plaintiff was the owner of land, through which defendant’s road was built, on a steep hill-side. The embankment for the road having slipped down upon the adjoining land, causing damage, such damage was settled between plaintiff’s father and the defendant, in January, 1859, and a writing given hy the said plaintiff’s father to defendant, under seal, first, releasing and discharging the defendant from such damage, and second, as follows: “I do also, for the same consideration, and for myself, executors, administrators and assigns, hereby agree with said cor

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poration, that if in consequence of the peculiar construction of said embankment or of the nature of the soil at the point where said embankment adjoins my land, land-slides shall hereafter occur from said embankment, whereby earth or other material shall be deposited on my lot, that I will make no claim for damages therefor, and that I will, and my heirs and legal representatives shall consider the money this day paid by said corporation, compensation in full for all past and all future damage to my land, which has happened, or may hereafter occur in consequence of said embankment, and this instrument, a bar to all future claim.” Plaintiff, upon the death of his father, succeeded to the title to his lands, by inheritance, in 1868. In 1869, during a heavy storm, another slide from such embankment came down upon plaintiff’s land, to his damage, for which this action was brought. The referees found that the embankment was improperly and negligently constructed, and that the injury complained of, was caused by the carelessness of the defendant.

George W. Miller, for the appellant.

George 0. Genet, for the respondent.

If the instrument executed by plaintiff’s father, bars the plaintiff’s right of action, it will not become necessary to consider the question of negligence raised upon the hearing. It can scarcely be denied, that such a burden as that contemplated in the contract, can be imposed by grant upon one’s realty. It is very like a grant of the right of drip from eaves ; or the right to flood lands or to discharge water, with or without refuse matter, upon lands of another;^[5] or the right of support to the soil or buildings of one party, by the property of another; or the right to change the course, impede the flow, or increase or diminish the quantity of water in a stream through adjoining lands. All these are familiar cases of easements, known and recognized by the law. The right to maintain such embankment, to the detriment or damage of the adjacent land, was a right which plaintiff’s father could con

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vey to defendant, and, by such conveyance, deprive himself and his heir of any recovery for damages contemplated by the parties. Such a grant would have created an easement upon plaintiff’s land in favor of the defendant. It relates directly to the land; the right is a burden upon it. The owner may thereby be deprived of its full use. The land may be incumbered in a manner inconsistent with the general right of ownership in the plaintiff. Nor is it, in this view, inconsistent with the case of Keppell v. Bailey.^[5] In that case, the covenant was held to be personal, not running with the land, nor binding assignees. That case lias not been overruled as a decision of the questions before the court; but certain dieta of the lord chancellor have been condemned and rejected. The subject is very fully considered in Spencer’s Case and the notes thereto.^[6]

It results from the cases, that the owner in fee of land, may impose upon it any burden, however injurious or destructive, not inconsistent with his general right of ownership, if such burden is not in violation of public policy, and does not injuriously affect the rights or property of others.

But the instrument under consideration is not, in terms, a grant or conveyance, but rather an agreement or covenant not to sue for any damages thereafter occurring ; in effect giving to defendant the right to the use of plaintiff’s land, as and when it should become necessary, by reason of defects in the building up and sustaining of its track and embankment. Upon such a construction of the contract, no reason is apparent why the burden should not be imposed by the covenant, since, by its nature, it could have been given by a grant.^[4]

If we are right in holding that such a servitude can be imposed upon land, and that, when the nature of the charge is such that it might have been made by grant, it may be equally imposed by covenant, it follows that the covenant of plaintiff’s father runs with the land, and subjects the same in the hands of his son, to all the conse

‡ ‡ Carr v. Lowry, 3 Casey, 257; Barrow v. Richard, 8 Paige, 351; Gibert v. Peteler, and Rowbottom v. Wilson, ante; 1 Smith Lead. Cases, 144, 165, 166, 178, 179, and cases there cited.

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quences that would exist against the father. Such would he the case even against an assignee.^[5]

The idea of a perpetuity in a vested right to maintain a negligent structure, is well answered by the lord chancellor, in Keppell v. Bailey,^[6] wherein he shows that the principle of a perpetuity is not involved in the case.

Nor is there anything in the novelty of such an easement, as suggested in the opinion of the referees, which should lead to its rejection. That siich charges upon land have hitherto been unknown to the law, or unnecessary in experience, cannot destroy the power of creation. The arts and sciences are constantly developing new industries and new necessities for subjecting realty and population to strange burdens of a novel character. It is the province of the law to adapt itself to such wants. In this particular case, it may be, and probably is, a necessity .that the defendant’s roadway should pass along that side-hill; that the formation of such hill is such that an embankment cannot be built, except at extravagant expense, which shall be free from the chance of sliding down upon the lower land; that thus the defendant needed to own such lower lands, or else the right to subject them to the possible injury from land-slides from said embankment. What more reasonable than that defendant should desire to acquire such right, thus preventing plaintiff or his ancestor, from making valuable improvements upon the lands liable to injury ? What more natural than that the plaintiff’s father should be willing to accept óf a compensation for such risk, agreed upon between the parties, and still own and enjoy the ordinary use and profits to be derived therefrom % Such seems to have been the conduct of the parties. Though it may have become an unfortunate contract for the plaintiff, it cannot alter the result. The extent of the inj ury may be due to an indiscreet use and improvement of the lands, in view of their exposure— a use not contemplated when the contract was made.

Entertaining such views, after a careful examination and study of the law applicable to the case, it is unnecessary to discuss the subject of negligence as developed by. the evidence. It is not claimed that such negligence, if it existed, was willful or permitted

* Holmes v. Buckley, 1 Eq. Cases, p. 27, F. 4; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend., 136 .

† † Ante.

Dissent

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with any hostile or offensive purpose, It could not, therefore, furnish a ground for action, in spite of, and notwithstanding the covenant.

If the views taken of this contract, he not correct, the result must follow, that the defendant acquired thereby nothing but a release and discharge, arising from the damages caused in 1859. Such a construction would be a plain contradiction of the language and apparent intent of the parties to the agreement. It would leave the plaintiff the same right to recover for ordinary neglect that he'would have in the absence of the agreement. The defendant, by the agreement and the consideration paid, has acquired no right which the law did not give without such an agreement.

Believing that this contract had a purpose beyond the mere settlement of the damages of 1859 ; that such purpose is justified in the law, as proper and legal; and that the effect of such contract is to exempt the defendant from liability for ordinary or casual negligence, I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.

(dissenting) :

The question in this case is, whether the instrument, executed by the father of the plaintiff, on the 20th of January, 1869, was a bar to a recovery.

By the instrument referred to, the plaintiff’s father released all claims for damages, by reason of any land-slides from the embankment of the defendant, and agreed that if any land-slides should afterward occur, that he would make no claim for damages; and that he and his heirs and representatives would consider the money, paid by the defendant at the time of the execution of the agreement, in full for all damages to his land, and a bar to all future claim. I am inclined to think that the instrument, executed by the plaintiff’s father, was not of such a character as to prevent a recovery under the circumstances presented, and I am brought to this conclusion for the following reasons:

First. There was evidence upon the trial to show, and the referees found, that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, in allowing the embankment to remain in the condition in which it was at the time of the injury complained of, and had

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been, ever since the agreement was executed. Under ordinary circumstances, there would be no question that the defendant would be liable for negligence, even although the right to claim damages had been discharged. The instrument, I think, does not relieve the defendant from such liability. Although it provides against damages in consequence of the peculiar construction of said embankment, or the nature of the soil, it must be held, I think, to require of the defendant, the exercise of reasonable care to prevent its sliding, and imposes upon the defendant the duty of guarding against negligence and "carelessness. Even if it may be considered as excusing the construction, at the time when the agreement was executed, it cannot protect the defendant, as the proof shows that after the writing was executed, no steps were taken to protect the embankment, the ditches being filled up, and the water being allowed to collect, so as to affect the soil and cause it to slide.

Second. Even if the right claimed by the defendant may be considered as analogous to an easement, which I very much doubt, as no such easements have ever yet been recognized in land, I am inclined to think that the writing does not contain language which creates an easement. It does not, in appropriate phraseology, grant the privilege of allowing the embankment to slide on the land, or create a servitude in regard to the land for any such purpose. It only provides for exemption from the payment of further damages, which is a personal covenant and nothing more. .

Third. If an easement was properly created with a covenant which bound the heirs and the land itself, it might be regarded as a covenant running with the land, and binding on the defendant for that reason: But there are no terms employed, which invest it with any such character. Although it may bind the party or his lawful representatives, when a proper action is brought, it cannot, I think, be obligatory upon the owner of the land, as such. If the owner was a stranger without notice, and there was no instrument or record showing such a lien upon the land, clearly, he would not be bound; and, in principle, it seems to me that the heir-at-law takes the land without any other incumbrances upon it, except such as appear from instruments which show on their face an intent to bind the land, and clearly do so bind it.

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Fourth. I am inclined to think that a release of damages before they have occurred, is not binding, because it is based upon some event which may never happen, and therefore is not a promise for a valid consideration. It is in mere anticipation of some possible future injury, which is a mere naked possibility which can never be the subject of a release.^[1]

For the reasons stated, I am of the opinion that the judgment was right and should be affirmed, with costs.

Present—Miller, P. J., Bocees and Boardman, JJ.

Miller, P. J., dissented.

Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.

* Edwards v. Varick, 5 Denio, 691 .

Footnotes

* Bushnell v. Proprietors, etc., 31 Conn., 150 .
* 2 Mylne & Keene, 517.
† † 1 Sm. Lead. Cases part 1, pp. 115, 129 ; Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 Ell. & B., 123 ; 92 Eng. C. L. R., 122; Gibert v. Peteler, 38 Barb., 488 ; affirmed, after new trial, in Court of Appeals, 38 N. Y., 165 .