Cyrenius v. Mutual Life Insurance

The main questions litigated at the trial were (1) whether the cause of action, if any, belonged to the estate of Alvin Cyrenius, and (2) whether there was a valid extension of time for the payment of the premium that became due on the 18th of June, 1876.

The court left it to the jury to say, first, whether or not the policy was received by Alvin in his lifetime as a policy insuring himself for the benefit of himself and of his estate, and was so held by the parties up to the time of his death, and, second, whether in 1876, before June eighteenth, George Cyrenius paid fifty dollars upon an agreement that that should be received as part of the premium, and that he should have túne, a month or more, for the payment of the balance, and thereafter, in accordance with the agreement, did pay the balance. The court charged that if both these propositions were found in favor of plaintiff he could recover, otherwise not. So we must assume that the jury found both of these questions in favor of plaintiff.

The appellant claims that upon the uncontradicted evidence the plaintiff, as administrator, has no interest in the policy, and that the question of ownership should not have been submitted to the jury.

The policy is dated June 18, 1873, and by its terms it is provided as follows:

“The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, in consideration of the representations made to them in the application for this policy, and of the sum of one hundred and ninety-eight dollars and eighty-seven cents, to them duly paid by George A. Cyrenius, son of Alvin Cyrenius, and of the annual payment of a like amount oii or before the 18th day of June in every year during the continuance of this policy,

“ Do insure the life of the said Alvin Cyrenius of Scriba, in the county of Oswego, State of New York, in the amount of three

thousand dollars for the term of his natural life. And the said company do hereby promise and agree to pay the amount of the said insurance at their office in the city of New York, to the said assured, his executors, administrators or assigns, in sixty days after due notice and proof of the death of the said person whose life is hereby insured, the balance of the year’s premium, if any, being first deducted therefrom.

“ This policy is issued and accepted by the assured upon the following express conditions and agreements: 1st. * * * or if any of the statements or declarations made in the application for this policy, upon the faith of which this policy is issued, shall be found in any respect untrue, then and in every such case this policy shall be null and void.”

■The application for the insurance bears date June 14, 18Y3. It is signed by George Arthur Cyrenius and by Alvin Cyrenius, the signature of the former being opposite the expression “ signatures of the applicants or the persons for whose benefit the assurance is applied for,” and the signature of the latter being opposite the expression “ signature of the person whose life is proposed for asssurance.” Upon the face of the application it is stated that the particulars therein called for are mutually agreed to form a part of the contract with the company; that the person for whose benefit the assurance is to be effected is George Arthur Cyrenius; and it is declared “ by George Cyrenius, the applicant above named, and also by the person whose life is proposed for assurance,” that the answers made to the questions are correct; “ that the abo.ve-named applicant has an interest in the life of the said person whose life is proposed for insurance to the full extent of the amount of insurance above applied for.” And it is therein “ expressly stipulated and agreed that the above application and this declaration shall form the basis of the contract between the above-named persons and the said the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.”

It is to be observed that in the policy the amount is payable “ to the said assured, his executors, administrators or assigns.” The question is, does the term “ assured ” refer to George A. Cyrenius, who is recited to have paid the consideration, or to Alvin Cyrenius, whose life was the subject of the insurance ? In determining this question the application may properly be referred to. That was executed by

Reading the policy and application together, it appears that George A. Cyrenius was the applicant for the insurance, and was the person for whose benefit it was to be effected. The policy recites that the money consideration is received from him, and in the complaint it is alleged that he paid it. Such being the case, according to the doctrine laid down in Smith v. Ætna Life Insurance Co. ( 5 Lans. 545 ), the assured would be deemed to be George A. Cyrenius. A similar view is taken in Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs ( 108 U. S. 498 ).

But it is suggested that the policy was received by Alvin Cyrenius as a policy insuring himself for his own benefit, and so held up to his death, and the jury have so found. The business in regard to the policy with the agent of the company at Oswego ivas transacted by George A. The policy, -when issued, was delivered by the agent to George A. The latter testifies that when he received the policy he delivered it to his father ; that his father furnished the money for the payment of the first premium, and the larger portion of the subsequent premiums that were paid in 1874, 1875 and 1876. He does not, however, testify that there was any arrangement by which the name of the beneficiary should be changed, or by which the-policy should be transferred to the father. On the contrary, George, A., on the 18th of June, 1874, signed an order to the defendant to apply the dividend on the premium due at that date, which was an act for the owner of the policy to do, and the dividend was so. applied. On the 10th of August, 1874, he assigned the policy with warranty of title to his brother, Frederick H. Cyrenius, and of this assignment the company was notified. On the 18th of June, 1875,. Frederick H. gave an order to the defendant to apply the dividend on the premium due at that date, and it was so applied.

The case of Bickerton v. Jaques ( 28 Hun, 119 ) does not apply,, as there has been here no attempt to change the beneficiary. As to:

The fact that the father furnished the money for the first premium and the greater part of the other premiums is entirely consistent with the idea that George A. was the beneficiary. The delivery of the policy by George to hie father, in the absence of any evidence showing an intent to transfer the title, is not sufficient to show that George A. parted with his rights. No assignment is alleged in the complaint.

There is, it seems to me, an entire failure on the part of the plaintiff to show that Alvin Cyrenius or liis estate is the owner of the policy, or of any right of action under it. The question was raised by the defendant on its motion for a nonsuit, and exception duly taken. The exception is, I think, a good one.

In this view of the case it is not important to consider the question as to the extension of time of payment of the premium due •June 18, 1876. The case shows that another action is pending for the same claim brought by Frederick H. Cyrenius individually as the assignee of George A. Cyrenius.

Martin, J., concurred.

When this case was before us upon a former appeal there was a division in the court. A majority of the' court seemed to be of the opinion that Alvin Cyrenius was not the owner of the policy, and that his estate was not entitled to recover thereon. In the course of the opinion then delivered by me, it was suggested that the evidence given upon the trial was sufficient to warrant a finding that George A. had given the policy to his father, Alvin Cyrenius, and, therefore, the action could be maintained by the administrator of Alvin Cyrenius; and that view was stated, among others, for dissenting from the opinion of a majority of the court then delivered. The evidence in the case now before us does not seem to warrant the conclusion that George A. had transferred his title and interest in the policy to his father, and the judgment recovered by the plain

Judgment and order reversed upon the exceptions, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide tbe event.