p. 316.ant was to gain time to raise money and means to replace his misappropriations).
“ As to his notion of an arbitration, he may as well throw aside this worn-out side play, together with some of • his worn-out sins. After choosing the arbitrament of the court, he now shrinks from it. He prefers a private arbitration because then he is not sworn, nor held to the rules of evidence (meaning that the plaintiff’s motive in proposing an arbitration of the disputes aforesaid was that his testimony, being without the sanction of an oath, he could testify falsely, and without risk of the consequence of perjury). He has admitted openly that he has no defense to my claim for the repayment of the money he borrowed, and as a last desperate resort found this the most plausible plea for delay, but there is nothing to arbitrate. I am reminded of the sentence from I)e Quincy: ‘ If once a man indulges in murder, very soon he becomes to think little ■of robbing; from robbing he comes next to drinking, and from that to ill manners and procrastination. Once enter the downward path, and you know not where you will stop.’ ”
A. II. Holmes, for the appellant.
M. II. JRegensburger, for the respondent.
So far as the appellant has appealed from the order or decision of •the court directing the entry of an interlocutory judgment, the appeal must be dismissed, with ten dollars costs.
It has been held by the Court of Appeals that such an order is not appealable, which rule has been followed by this court. It is true that different decisions have been made by the Superior Court of this city, but it is manifest from the decision of the Court of Appeals in Cambridge Valley Bank v. Lynch ( 76 N. Y. 514 ) that the only appeal is from the judgment. ( Wright v. Chapin, 26 N. Y. Supp. 825 .)
The appellant claims that no sufficient cause of action is set out in the complaint upon the ground that the alleged libelous matters must be read without the innuendoes, and that without resort to such innuendoes no cause of action is set- out. In this we are of opinion that he is clearly mistaken. The rule is well settled that defama
p. 317tory words, in common parlance, are such as impute, some moral delinquency Or some disreputable conduct to the person of whom they are spoken; and that even actions for slander may be founded .upon such imputations; and that such action lies in some cases where the words impute no criminal offense, where no attack is made upon the moral character, nor any charge of personal dishonor. It has been said that the first and larger class of actions are those brought for the vindication of reputation in its strict sense, against damaging and caluminous aspersions; and that the other class for the most part are those brought for the purpose of recovering damages for words which tend to injure one in his trade or occupation.
(Moore v. Francis, 121 N. Y. 199 .) And it has been further held that whatever words have a tendency to hurt, or are calculated to prejudice a man who seeks his livelihood by any trade or business, are actionable. And the rule seems to be well stated by the learned judge in the court below that publications which tend to diminish the respectability of the person to whom they relate, and to expose him to disgrace and obloquy, although they do not impute the commission of a crime, are libelous and actionable,, although no special damages are alleged or proved.
In the case at bar the words of the publication in question clearly tend to affect the credit and standing of the plaintiff, and impute not only disreputable conduct but moral delinquency to him.
"We think, therefore, that a cause of action is set out in the complaint, and that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed,, with costs, with leave to the defendant to withdraw his demurrer and to answer over on payment of costs of appeal and of the court, below.
O’Brien and Follett, JJ._, concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs, with leave to the defendant to withdraw his demurrer and to answer over on payment of costs of: appeal and of the court below.