Majority
Headnote
Parent and child — negligence of the parent imputed to the child — not in case of a voluntary injury — it must concur with negligence on thepan't of the child — walking on railroad tracks — engineer of a locomotive, when not bound to stop his train.This is an action for the recovery of damages for causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, who was his own son, about four years and four months old.
The plaintiff resided at New Windsor, on the.west side of a public road leading from the city of Newburgh to Cornwall, and about 600 to 700 feet from the place where the accident occurred. He had a wife and two children residing with him, his son John, the deceased, four years and four months old, and a daughter Mamie, aged seven years. The children were playing near the house with Annie McCullough. The mother saw them all playing about 140 feet from the house at half-past two o’clock in the afternoon. The father saw them playing within about fifty feet of the house an hour before the accident. That is the last that either father or mother saw of the children until after the occurrence. The mother had seen Anna McCullough playing, with her children on one or two occasions previous to this. On the afternoon of November 13, 1892, which was Sunday, Anna McCullough started with the other two children down the highway, and after passing some brickyards they started and walked up the track of the West Shore road toward Newburgh. They passed over one culvert or trestle above the Gillie’s yard and passed the Walsh yard, and were walking over the second culvert or trestle opposite the Christie yard. When upon the culvert they heard the locomotive whistle blow, looked back and saw the cars coming. John, the deceased child, then tripped and fell upon the trestle, and was still down when the engine reached him. After the train passed, the boy was found under the culvert, about the fourth tie from the north end, dead. Across the culvert or trestle were square ties or timbers, about eight or ten inches apart, upon which, the track was laid, the stringers running at the side of the track about six inches in height. The boy was struck by the Newburgh local, which was running north. There were no highways crossing the tracks of the railroad between Cornwall and the city of Newburgh, a distance of about four miles, and the accident occurred within those limits south of the city. The track is straight for three-quarters of a mile or more south of the culvert. The train consisted of three coaches and a
The nonsuit was based upon the failure of the proof to establish negligence against the defendant, but the question of the contributory negligence of the deceased is also presented upon this appeal, and both questions are, therefore, to be examined.
While the deceased child was non sui juris, and was incapable of forfeiting his legal rights by his own negligence, yet, if his parents were negligent, their carelessness may be imputed to him. They were his keepers, to whose exclusive care and custody he is confided in contemplation of law. If, therefore, they allow him to be heedlessly instrumental in his own injury they cannot recover damage therefor. Such a rule would permit them to recover for injury resulting from their own misconduct. While the rule, however-, will not excuse a voluntary injury or a grossly negligent act, it has
The child was unlawfully upon the railroad track with two other children, one nine and the other seven years of age. They had been away from their parents over one hour; they were near a railroad which was in full operation, and, therefore, palpably a place of danger. • The father and mother were both at home, and knew their children were out on the street near a place 'of great danger. They must be: deemed to have ’possessed knowledge that such children were prone to wander'into by and-forbidden places.
We think it was negligence per se to have allowed those children to wander away as-they did.
In relation to the negligence of the defendant, it is’ to be said that there are no highway crossings for several miles below the city of Newburgh, and, therefore, there was no reason why the train should have diminished its speed. There is no proof that the track or any of the appliances of the train were in disorder. The engineer was on his guard, and his testimony is all we have to prove what he saw. He did see the children and* sounded the alarm, but he was not then bound to stop his train, as it was light and there was no noise to "drown the blast of the whistle; he had- a right to assume that the children would hear the alarm and leave the track, as there was no difficulty in their so doing. They had only to step aside a few feet upon the other track, and he could not assume that either of them would fall.
“ All the engineer was bound to do after the discovery of the peril was to irse reasonable diligence and care to avoid it.” (Chrystal v. Troy & Boston Railroad Company, 105 N. Y. 164 ; 124 id. 519.)
We find the evidence insufficient to sustain a finding that he did not use reasonable care or was guilty of negligence.
Upon the trial the testimony to show that people about New Windsor were in the habit of going up and down the railroad track at the point in question was excluded, and that exclusion is now
Our conclusion is that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Pratt, J., concurred; Brown, P. J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- Chrystal v. Troy & Boston Railroad 105 N. Y. 164 p. 251