Majority
Headnote
Agency — declarations of the alleged agent as to payment of the cost of procuring a patent — change of the ownership — payment of prior legal expenses — a bill rendered is not conclusive as to the amount changed.Tbis action was brought by tbe plaintiffs, wbo were solicitors in . patent cases and attorneys and counselors at law residing and doing business in tbe city of Washington, D. C., to recover from tbe defendant the sum of $8,555.44 and interest, tbe balance alleged to be due for certain professional services which they alleged that they bad rendered to tbe defendant relative to applications for and tbe obtaining of certain patents and matters relating thereto.
Annexed to tbe complaint was a bill of particulars setting out tbe services rendered and tbe charges made therefor in detail.
The answer of tbe defendant admitted tbe performance of certain of tbe professional services mentioned in tbe bill of particulars annexed to tbe complaint, and in respect to these denied, upon information and belief, their value. Tbe answer further alleged payment for said services, and denied that any other of tbe services or disbursements described in tbe bill of particulars annexed to tbe complaint were rendered to or paid for him, or at bis request, and also denied all liability therefor.
An amended and supplemental answer was served by tbe defendant, in which be repeated tbe allegations of bis original answer, and alleged certain payments which were in full of all services up to certain dates. Tbe answer further admitted tbe rendition of certain
The case coming up for trial at a Circuit Court for the city and county of New York, a motion was made upon the pleadings that the same be referred, and a reference was ordered and a trial had before the referee, who reported in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum of $7,885.44, with interest. A judgment having been entered upon said report, from such judgment the present appeal is taken.
The only question which is presented upon this appeal is whether the conclusion at which the referee arrived is against the weight of evidence. It is admitted that the tender made^pon the part of the defendant was insufficient to liquidate all the claims which the plaintiffs had against the defendant, and that the referee was justified in finding that a considerable amount was due from the defendant for professional services rendered by them to him. But it is claimed upon this appeal that there was no evidence justifying the greater part of the recovery allowed, such services having been rendered to a company who had become the assignee of the defendant in respect to the patents which formed the subject-matter of the original retainer of the plaintiffs by the defendant.
A record has been presented upon this appeal of over 3,500 folios, and so-called briefs .have been submitted upon the part of the appellant 119 pages in length, and upon the part of the respondents fifty-seven pages in length. In view of this plethoric condition'of the record, it is manifest that within the limits of this opinion mere general statements only can be indulged in tending to disclose the reasons which bring the court to the conclusion at which it has arrived. There is, comparatively speaking, very little oral testimony contained in this record, the most of it being made up of correspondence between the defendant and the plaintiffs and the defendant’s alleged agent, and the dignity of the contentions of the appellant almost necessarily depends upon the conclusions arrived at from a reading of this correspondence.
It is to be observed that the referee has without doubt based his judgment very largely upon the fact that he considered that the evidence established that W.
It may, perhaps, be not without profit that we should consider a little more in detail a few of the peculiar features of this case. It appears, as has been above stated, that the plaintiffs were co-partners doing business as solicitors in patent cases and counselors at law in the city of Washington, and had, prior to May, 1888, been employed by the defendant to secure patents for various inventors, the services being charged to him personally and paid by him, and that the transactions out of which this action grew commenced with a contract dated the 19th of March, 1888, but executed prior to that time, between the defendant Bookwalter and Lown and Norris, whereby they undertook to secure and develop certain inventions of which the defendant Bookwalter and one Robert were the owners, an interest-in the inventions owned by Robert having been assigned by him to a French corporation. This agreement also contained a provision that they were to organize a corporation for the purposes above mentioned and for carrying on the business of manufacturing iron and steel under these patents. And Bookwalter agreed, “ without express consideration other than the several provisions of this contract, to convey and assign to said company, to be incorporated
Following this agreement, on the 12th of March, 1888, these three gentlemen upon the one part made a contract with Robert and the French corporation upon the other part, by which the latter, upon certain conditions, granted to the former the right to certain improvements for the United States in the art of making and manufacturing iron, steel and castings, and agreed to convey to a person to be nominated by the defendant, letters patent to be issued in the United States upon them; and the defendant Bookwalter agreed to grant to Robert and the French corporation the exclusive right to use in continental Europe certain improvements in the art of making iron, steel and castings patented by him.
On the 26th of May, 1888, the plaintiffs received a letter from Thompson & Boult, of London, with drawings on an application for a patent in the name of Robert, and also for an application in the names of Walrand & Delattre, with a request to get the applications on file with the least possible delay, and that Mr. Bookwalter, upon his return to the United States, would call and settle with them directly for their fees. These instructions were confirmed by the defendant in a letter to the plaintiffs dated New York, June 21,. 1888; and the plaintiffs proceeded to carry them out, and rendered sei’vices in connection therewith. On the 6th of December, 1888, in pursuance of the agreement of the 12th of March, 1888, above-referred to, Robert and the French corporation conveyed to the defendant Bookwalter, who was his own nominee, the interest in Robert’s inventions described in the foregoing contract. On the 18th of December, 1888, in pursuance of the provisions of the contract of March 19, 1888, the Bookwalter Steel and Iron Company was organized, of which the plaintiffs had notice. During all this period of time the plaintiffs had been rendering services toBookwalter in reference to these applications for patents. On the-22d of March, 1889, Norris assigned one-tenth of his interest in the-enterprise to the plaintiffs; and on the ninth of April all of those-interested in these patents and inventions, to wit, the defendantBookwalter, Lown, Norris, and the plaintiffs Foster & Freeman, made a proposition to convey to the Bookwalter Steel and Iron Com-
It is to be observed that the assignment to the Bookwalter Steel and Iron Company simply covered the American patents, the foreign patents still remaining the property of the defendant Book-waiter ; and it is conceded upon the part of the defendant that all services rendered by the plaintiffs in respect to those patents were properly chargeable to him. It also appears from the evidence that during all this time the defendant was corresponding with the plaintiffs in respect to the question of these patents, urging diligence on their part and substantially calling the business his own, and as late as the áth of September, 1889, urging them to “ Lay aside at once all other of my matters,” and proceed with the one referred to in the letter. Prior to the 7th of October, 1889, and to the assignment of the patents to the corporation by Bookwalter, certain interferences had been declared by the patent office in respect to the Robert patent and services had been rendered by the plaintiffs in relation thereto. On said last-mentioned day the plaintiffs wrote a letter to W. E. Lown inclosing bill against Bookwalter for all these services which had been rendered up to date of the bill in respect to those patents and interferences, in which they stated : “We presume that the charges for the interference should be made against the company, but we have had no authority to do so. Please advise us whether the company assumes the charges for the applications to be made hereafter as well as for the interference business.” On the 9th of October Bookwalter wrote to the plaintiffs: “ Mr.
It is claimed on the part of the defendant that Bookwalter was not responsible for any of the services rendered subsequent to the transfer of the patents on the 22d of June, 1889 ; also, that he was not liable for any services ordered by Lown; that he was not liable for the plaintiffs’ charges in respect to the interferences, and that he certainly was not liable for any services rendered subsequent to the 9th of October, 1889, when the agency was expressly terminated by the defendant. Yarious other points are made which it is not necessary, now to consider.
In respect to the charges for services ordered by Lown, it seems to us that they cannot be at all sustained, because, as has been already observed, there does not seem to be sufficient evidence going to show that Lown bore such relations to the defendant as authorized him to bind the defendant by any order or contract which he might make.
It is not necessary in this connection to discuss the question as to the charges for the interferences. But it is apparent that from the 9th of October, 1889, the plaintiffs had notice from Bookwalter that their relations towards him in respect to those patents in which he had a personal interest were different from those which existed in respect to the patents which he had assigned to the company. They were distinctly notified - by Bookwalter at this time that he considered those charges as against the company; although he apparently did not notice the fact that the bills were made out to him. He returns them as bills made out to him against the company, and states that his personal matters have been mixed up with the accounts rendered against the company — not that the company’s accounts have been- mixed up with those which had been rendered to him — and he requests a separation, and when separated he pays his personal account and leaves the other in the office of the company, of which these plaintiffs have notice. It seems to us, under these circumstances, that if the plaintiffs went on rendering these services they did so at their peril. They knew that Bookwalter
It is urged upon the part of the plaintiffs that in the contract of the 12th of March, 1888, Mr. Bookwalter agreed to assign to the company to be formed in pursuance of that agreement, all letters patent for the United States for his discoveries and inventions, together with all improvements he might thereafter make or discover, and that he thereby undertook to assign letters patent for those improvements, and that as there was nothing to show that any other person than the defendant was to pay the expenses that necessarily preceded the granting of these letters patent, it is to be presumed that he was to pay for the same. We think this is a very forced construction of the language of the agreement. lie agreed to assign the letters patent for his discoveries and inventions, and also to assign all the improvements which he might thereafter make or discover. Tie was not interested in the question- of letters patent; he agreed to make over the improvement, and although the inventor may have to make the application for the patent, yet there was no undertaking on his part that any letters patent should be procured at his expense.
And furthermore, throughout all the correspondence, even before the /7th of October, 1889, and noticeably in the letter of that date where they admit that the interference charges should be made against the company, the plaintiffs are continually referring to the company and they are corresponding with Lown, the representative of the company, in reference to the services to be performed by them, and when they want money for the purpose of prospective disbursements they apply to Lown as the representative of the company, and they get money loaned by Bookwalter to the company and are notified by Lown that the company is short of money in consequence of the condition of the money market and that he hopes it will let up. And in the course of his examination Mr. Freeman testifies: “ I said one after another, throughout a long list of items, which Mr. Chappell read to me, that they were rendered
There are circumstances in this case which do not tend to impress the court with the entire ingenuousness of these plaintiffs. We find that for a number of services they had rendered bills for certain amounts. When they come to sue, they double each one of these items, and the referee finds that the original amount was a fair compensation for these services. Although a party may not be bound by a bill rendered in respect to the amount of charges therein when he brings suit, yet, unless it is plainly apparent that the services were worth the sum sued for in excess of that charged in the bill, it certainly shows a discreditable motive in enlarging the amount for the purposes of the suit.
But there is another feature in this case which certainly shows
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered before another referee to be appointed in the order to be entered thereon, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
"We should not, however, dispose of this appeal without a word of commendation as to the manner in which the appellant has made up the case. He has presented to us an intelligible index — a rarity in our experience where there are any number of exhibits. He has also indicated at the top of each page the nature of
Follett and Parker, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed, new trial ordered before another referee to be appointed in the order to be entered hereon, with costs to appellant to abide event.