pledged the said chattel with the defendants, and the said defendants wrongfully detained the said diamond necklace fi*om these plaintiffs, to the damage of these plaintiffs in the sum of one thousand dollars.”
The answer denied the allegation in the complaint, and alleged that said Eustice was, at the time of the pledging of the chattel, the owner thereof, and that such chattel was pledged by him as security for money advanced to him which had never been paid.
In pursuance of an order of the Supreme Court the plaintiffs delivered a bill of particulars to the defendants as follows:
c< First. That the day of May, 1891, on which the plaintiffs claimed to have delivered to one James A. Eustice the diamond necklace referred to in the complaint, was on or about the 26th day of May, 1891.
“ Second. That the agreement under which said diamond necklace was delivered to said James A. Eustice was that the plaintiffs delivered to the said James A. Eustice the necklace for the purpose of being shown to a proposed customer, the necklace to be returned if not sold to the customer then and there mentioned by him; and if sold, the price fixed by plaintiffs thereon to be paid.”
Thereafter a further order was made directing the plaintiffs to furnish a further bill of particulars, which should state whether James A. Eustice gave to the plaintiffs any description of the proposed customer, and which should also state his name, address, description, business, trade, occupation, ■ financial standing or responsibility.
Joseph Fettretch, for the appellants.
George G. GomstocJc, for the respondents.
The name, address, business and financial standing of the proposed customer are not particulars of the plaintiffs’ cause of action, but are merely evidentiary facts which the plaintiffs should not be required to disclose by a bill of particulars. The plaintiffs’ right of recovery would not be defeated or affected by the fact that Eustice gave the name of some person as a proposed customer who had not in fact proposed to purchase the necklace.