Hughes v. County of Monroe

This action was commenced on the 31st of August, 1892, against the board of supervisors of Monroe county, to recover damages for ' personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while she was employed at the Monroe County Insane Asylum, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, on the 11th of February, 1891.

After the commencement of the action, by virtue of an order, the summons and complaint were amended by striking out the “ Board of Supervisors of Monroe County ” as defendant, and inserting as defendant “ The County of Monroe.”

The plaintiff was engaged, at the time of receiving her injuries, in removing wax from the main cylinder of a steam ironing machine belonging to the defendant, and being used in said asylum, and which was at the time in motion. Her hands and arms were drawn in between the rollers of the machine and were quite seriously injured.

The plaintiff’s contention is that the negligence of the defendant -consisted in the fact that those in charge of the asylum did not give her proper instructions as to the management of the machine. It is a question of considerable doubt whether the plaintiff succeeded in showing herself free from negligence contributing to her injuries.

The position of the rollers of the machine, and their manner of operation when in motion, were plainly visible to the plaintiff, and the danger of her hands being caught between the rollers when they were in motion must have been apparent to her; she testified that she saw the position of the rollers, their distance from each other; that if she had stopped to think she would have known that if anything got into the machine that was thicker than the space between the ■ rollers it would get pinched. She was, at the time, twenty-four or twenty-five years of age, and had lived nearly all her life in the country upon a farm, and must be assumed to

But,- from the view we have taken of this case, it will not be necessary to consider the question of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence, for we are of the opinion that the defendant was not liable to the plaintiff for the negligence of those in charge of the asylum.

It is provided by chapter 82 of the Laws of 1863 that the insane asylum of the county of Monroe shall, after the passage of the act, be a separate and distinct institution from that of the Monroe county poorhouse; the board of supervisors was authorized to elect a warden and such other subordinate officers as the board deemed expedient, and appoint three persons who should constitute the board of trustees of the asylum; the warden was to be the chief officer of the asylum and to have the general management thereof under the supervision of the trustees.

The board of supervisors was required to cause to be levied and collected upon the taxable property of the county a sufficient sum annually to defray the expenses of the asylum ; the money raised was required to be paid to the county treasurer to be used for the support of the insane of the county, and for no other purpose whatever.

The warden was given power to enter into contracts with any town or city in the county for the support of any insane person at. the asylum, and to demand and receive from the State lunatic asylum any insane person who was then, or thereafter should become, chargeable to the county of Monroe, or to any town in said county, or any ward in the city of Rochester. The managers of the State lunatic asylum, upon such demand, were required to surrender to the board of supervisors any and every person who, at the time of making such demand, is in anywise chargeable to such city or town. By chapter 633 of the Laws of 1870, it was made the duty of the trustees of the said asylum, and they were empowered thereby, to hear and determine all questions and inquiries in relation to indigent lunatics and pauper insane who may be committed to said asylum, as to whether the maintenance of such lunatic and pauper insane is properly a charge on a specified town of Monroe county or upon the city of Rochester, or upon the county of Monroe, and

The board of trustees was given power to charge tbe estate of any lunatic who was not indigent or a pauper, or tbe person legally responsible for bis maintenance, and collect tbe same and apply it to. tbe maintenance of such lunatic.

It was conceded upon tbe trial that tbe asylum charged to tbe county, tbe city of Rochester and tbe several towns of tbe county, respectively, the year preceding tbe time of tbe accident, various sums for tbe board of patients, and that there was due from tbe State for that year moneys for tbe care of insane' persons cared for by tbe institution who were chargeable to tbe State, and that there was due to tbe county moneys for tbe care of other insane persons,, and that it received during said year for tbe price of articles produced upon tbe farm belonging to tbe asylum and sold, about $800.. Tbe defendant is one of tbe divisions of tbe State.

Tbe obligation of caring for its insane was imposed upon it by law. It could have its insane cared for at tbe State asylum, or at an institution of its own, but under all circumstances it was required to bear tbe expense of caring for them. Tbe expense thereof was paid by taxation. If any revenue wTas derived from tbe product of' tbe farm, or from tbe patients who, in whole or in part, contributed to tbeir own support, the amount collected by taxation was accordingly lessened by tbe amount of tire sums thus received, but in no event was it contemplated that tbe county would derive any revenue from tbe asylum.

"Wliat it did in caring for its insane was for the benefit of its; citizens as well as for all tbe other citizens of tbe State. Tbe control and restraint of tbe insane and criminal classes are equally necessary for tbe welfare and safety of tbe community.

Restraining tbe insane of tbeir liberty can only be justified as an exercise of police power. Tbe laws authorizing such interference are classified among tbe laws concerning tbe internal police of tbe State. (R. S. part 1, chap. 20, tit. 3.)

Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th ed., § 963) states tbe raleas to liability of counties for torts to be: “ According to tbe pre

“ They are political divisions of the State, created for convenience.”

A county was accordingly held not liable for an injury suffered by the plaintiff, ~who, when in attendance at court as a witness, was precipitated into the cellar of the court house in consequence of the negligent omission of an agent, or officers of the county, to guard or light a dangerous opening leading into the cellar.

Addison on Torts (Banks & Bros.’ ed., p. 1298, § 1526) states the rule as follows: “ A plainly marked distinction is made and should be observed between municipal corporations proper, as incorporated villages, towns and cities, and those other organizations, such as town•sliips, counties, school districts and the like, which are established without any express charter or act of incorporation, and clothed with but limited powers.

“ These latter political divisions are called quasi corporations, and the general rule of law is now well settled that no action can be maintained against corporations of this class by a private person for their neglect of public duty, unless such right of action is expressly given by statute.”

Ensign v. Board of Supervisors of Livingston Co. ( 25 Hun, 20 ) was an action brought to recover damages sustained by injuries received in crossing a defective bridge over a river crossed by a public highway. The bridge was erected under an act of the Legislature, which declared that it should, when constructed, become a public bridge and be maintained at the expense of the county of Livingston.

It was held that the county was not liable, and the court stated the rule as follows: “ There is a distinction in this respect between municipal corporations created by charter and vested by the government with a portion of its sovereign power for their peculiar benefit, and counties and towns which, like assembly and senatorial districts, are mere political divisions organized for the convenient exercise of portions of the political power of the State.”

Allamango v. Board of Supervisors of Albany Co. ( 25 Hun, 551 ) was an action brought by the plaintiff, an inmate of the Albany County Penitentiary, to recover damages for an injury received to 0his hand while working with a circular saw. It was held that the

The same rule is stated in Hollenbeck v. The County of Winnebago ( 95 Ill. 148 ).

It was held in Summers v. Board of Commissioners of Davies County ( 103 Ind. 262 ) that where the duties delegated to officers elected by public corporations are political or governmental, the relation of principal and agent does not exist; that the maxim of respondeat superior does not govern; that counties are mere instrumentalities of government and are not liable for an injury caused by the negligence of its commissioners in the selection of an unskilled or incompetent physician for the care of the poor.

Judge Elliot in his opinion says: “¥e have many cases holding that counties, townships and cities are instrumentalities of government, and it must, therefore, be true that where they act simply as the local government they act for the State. As the State is not liable for the acts of its officers, neither can the public corporations be held liable for the acts of its officers in the exercise of political powers. * *

“ There is no more reason for holding counties liable for the negligence of the commissioners in the exercise of the governmental functions delegated to them, than there is for holding cities liable for the acts of their firemen or police officers, or for holding counties and towmships responsible for the torts of sheriffs and constables. In providing for the care of the poor, a police power which resides primarily in the sovereignty is exercised, and neither the sovereign nor the local governing body to whom such a power is delegated is responsible for the misfeasance of its officers.”

He refers with approval to the case of Ogg v. City of Lansing ( 35 Iowa, 495 ), which held that a city was not liable for the negligence of persons placed in charge of a small-pox hospital which the city had established.

In Maxmilian v. Mayor ( 62 N. Y. 164 ) Judge Folger points out the distinction between municipalities organized as a political division .pf the State for the purpose of discharging duties for the benefit of

In the former the agents are servants of the corporations and act for the public at large, and the corporation is not responsible for their acts or omissions, or the actions or omissions of the subordinates by them appointed, lie refers, as authority for the rule, to Eastman v. Meredith ( 36 N. H. 284 ); Fisher v. Boston ( 104 Mass. 87 ); Hafford v. New Bedford ( 16 Gray, 297 ).

Howard v. City of Worcester ( 153 Mass. 426 ) was an action to recover damages for injuries received by the plaintiff through the alleged negligence of the city. The city was engaged in the construction of a school house. It had let the contract for removing a ledge of rocks, and the plaintiff was injured by the blasting of rock by the contractor.

Judge Allen says that the service in which the city was engaged was purely for the benefit of the public, and that the case falls within the general rule which exonerates it from responsibility for the consequences of its servants’ negligence, and refers to Neft v. Wellesley ( 148 Mass. 487 ); Kern v. City of Boston (151 id. 505 ), and Bates v. Westboro (Id. 174).

The same rule is stated in the cases of Buttrick v. City of Lowell ( 1 Allen, 172 ); Wheeler v. City of Cincinnati ( 19 Ohio St. 19 ); Brinkmeyer v. City of Evansville ( 29 Ind. 187 ); Toomey v. City of Albany ( 38 N. Y. St. Repr. 91 ); Smith v. Rochester ( 76 N. Y. 506 ); McKay v. City of Buffalo ( 9 Hun, 401 ).

In Benton v. Trustees of the City Hospital of Boston ( 140 Mass. 13 ) the action was against the trustees of the city hospital for injuries received through the negligence of its superintendent.

Judge Field, in stating the reason why the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, says: “ But we think, that this is a hospital maintained by the city with such aid as may be derived from donations and the sums received from paying patients, and that the trustees are, in a sense, managing agents only in maintaining the hospital, subject to the laws and to the ordinances of the city. * * * The sums received from paying patients are by the ordinance to be credited to the account of the hospital and are, as stated in the exceptions, used in the support of the hospital.

K The trustees are a body created for the performance of a duty

There are many other authorities sustaining the same doctrine, but it is not necessary to refer to more of them.

Plaintiff’s counsel concedes the correctness of the general rule as above stated, but he seeks to distinguish this case from the cases cited; he claims that the defendant was managing this asylum for its own benefit and advantage, and calls our attention to the case of Hannon v. The County of St. Louis ( 62 Mo. 313 ) as an authority sustaining his contention. In that case the city of St. Louis had contracted with one Lukan to lay a water pipe along certain streets through the grounds of the county insane asylum, in order to supply the same with water; and the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the defendant while in the employ of the contractor.

In discussing the case the court affirmed the doctrine that quasi corporations, created by the Legislature foi’ the purpose of public policy, are not responsible for the ‘neglect of duties enjoined on them unless the action is given by statute, but held that it had no application to a case where a special duty is imposed upon the quasi corporation with its consent, express or implied, and stated that, “ In the case at bar the county of St. Louis was not engaged in the discharge of duties imposed alike by general law on all counties; duties whose performance, if neglected, might have been enforced by appropriate procedure for that purpose, but in the discharge of a self-imposed duty not enjoined by any law. And the test of the mattei is this: that the county could not have been compelled to enter on the work for whose performance it. contracted.”

That case, we think, can be distinguished from this. Here the defendant was engaged in the performance of a duty imposed upon it by statute, to wit, the support and care of its insane, a dirty imposed upon every county in the State. It could discharge that ■duty either by employing the State to care for its insane, or care for them in an asylum within its own borders.

In either case it was' discharging a duty imposed upon it by law.

Dwight, P. J., Haight and Beadley, JJ., concurred.

Defendant’s motion for a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.