Majority
Headnote
jNegligent hilling — action for damages — absence of contributory negligence — may be shown from circumstances in the absence of direct proof.This action is brought for the recovery of damages for the death of Margaret Pitts, the wife of the plaintiff, Charles A. Pitts, by a collision between a passenger train of defendant and the carriage in which the deceased was riding at about eleven o’clock in the evening of November 30, 1892, at a railroad crossing on Pennsylvania avenue in the city of Elmira. The claim of the plaintiff is that the collision and death were occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in the management of its train. The evidence is, we think, sufficient to support the conclusion of the jury in' this respect.
The main question here is whether the evidence justified the submission to the jury of the question of contributory negligence. The deceased lived with her husband a short distance outside of the city, and upon the evening in question they, with some of their friends, had been in attendance at a play at the opera house in the city. Shortly after eleven o’clock they started for home. One William Conklin, who was a nephew of the deceased, asked her to ride with him, and she did so, her husband riding with another party. Conklin had an ordinary platform spring wagon with two seats and drawn by one horse. There were five in his party. Conklin was the driver, and he, with another man, occupied the front seat, and the deceased, with two other ladies, were on the back seat, the deceased sitting between the other two. They drove along Pennsylvania avenue in a southerly direction, and the train with which they collided came from the easterly direction and was on the northerly or west-bound track. TJpon the easterly side of the street, as they approached the crossing, there were some obstructions to an easterly view. There was a building occupied as a lumber office, there were a number of lumber piles and there were a box car and some flat cars on a switch or side track that was laid for the benefit of the lumber yard and reached to the street. There is evidence that the box car was close to the street. This switch or side track was about thirty-three feet from the west-bound track in a direction at right angles with it, but, by reason of the railroad running at an oblique angle with the street, the distance one would travel in driving on the street from the line of the switch to the same track was about forty-five feet, and there was a rise of about two feet as the main track was there higher than the ordinary line of the street.
The absence of contributory negligence may be shown from circumstances. (Hoag v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 111 N. Y. 199 ; Chisholm v. State, 141 id. 249 ; Johnson v. Hudson R. R. R. Co., 20 id. 65.) The fact that no one can testify that he saw the deceased look both ways and listen does not necessarily show that she did not do her duty in that regard. (Massoth v. Del. & Hud. Canal Co., 64 N. Y. 524 ; Beckwith, Administrator, v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 54 Hun, 446 ; affd., 125 N. Y. 759 ; Sherry v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 104 id. 652.) In Tolman v. Syr., Bing. & N. Y. R. R. Co. (98 id. 198) it is said that if such facts and surrounding circumstances are shown as reasonably
The distance at which the deceased or the driver could see the headlight of an approaching engine, under the circumstances then existing, was indefinite. There were other lights in the vicinity. If no signals were heard or given, and the wind blew briskly from the other direction, and the train came on silently, so far as they were concerned, at forty miles an hour, it should not be said as matter of law that they could have seen it when they stopped or should have seen it in time to have avoided the collision. In the Massoth case it is said that “ it does not necessarily follow from the fact that a skilled engineer can demonstrate that, from a . given point in a highway, the track of a railroad is visible for any distance, that an individual in charge of a team approaching the track is negligent because he does not from the same point see a train approaching at great speed in time to avoid a collision.” (See, also, Puff v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 71 Hun, 577 ; Parsons v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 113 N. Y. 364 .)
We think that the question of contributory negligence was properly left to the jury. It follows that the judgment should be affirmed.
Hardin, P. J., and Martin, J., concurred.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- Hoag v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad 111 N. Y. 199 p. 548
- Massoth v. President of Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. 64 N. Y. 524 p. 548
- Greany v. Long Island Railroad 101 N. Y. 419 at 427 p. 549