Majority
Headnote
Action on a promissory note — proof sufficient to establish that the payee is the agent of the maker.This action was brought to recover the amount of two promissory notes, one for $3,000, dated July 30,1889, and the other for $1,000, dated September 25, 1889. Inasmuch as the allegations of the complaint and the evidence given upon the trial are substantially the same in reference to each note, we shall consider that only which pertains to the first note. The instrument is as follows :
“ Gowanda, July 30, 1889.
“ On demand I promise to pay to F. Monson Three Thousand Dollars, with interest, for value received.
“$3,000.00. H. F. HENRY.”
The complaint in substance alleges in reference thereto that at the time of the making of the note Monson was the agent of the defendant, and had been such agent for some time theretofore, and continued to be such agent for some time thereafter, in the financial affairs and business of the defendant; that the defendant, at the time of making the note, desired Monson to procure for him the sum of $3,000, and, to enable him to do so, he made, executed and delivered to Monson the note in question; that he delivered the note to Monson, who received it as such agent, for the purpose and with the authority to sell and transfer it to whosoever would pay him for it the sum of $3,000. The complaint further alleges that Monson on the same day did sell, transfer and assign the note to the banking firm of N. M. Allen & Son, who were co-partners and doing business as bankers; that N. M. Allen & Son drew their draft for the sum of $3,000, upon the Seaboard National Bank of New York, payable to the order of Monson, and delivered the same to him for such note, and Monson thereupon indorsed the said draft and delivered it to the defendant, who subsequently indorsed the same and drew the money thereon.
The answer admits that from time to time before and after the making of the note Monson had been authorized to do and perform certain acts for the defendant, but denies that Monson was ever the general agent in the financial affairs of the defendant, or that he
The nonsuit appears to have been ordered upon the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish that Monson was the agent of the defendant. . It is now contended that the court erred and that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. If the allegations of the complaint, of agency, can be treated as surplusage, -the plaintiff’s claim must be sustained. But this question we do not at this time determine.
As to whether Monson was an agent, it appears that a former action had been tried between the parties, based upon the checks set forth in the counterclaim, in which it appeared that the defendant transmitted money and drafts to Monson to take and deposit the same with Allen & Son; that he did so, procuring checks therefor which he indorsed over to the defendant, and upon that trial defendant testified that he had consulted lawyers in reference to them and was firmly convinced that they were safe and certain, and then remarked: “ But I suppose that Mr. Monson from the first to the last was a middleman between us. He received my money and sent it on.” It is claimed on behalf of the appellant that this admission shows that the defendant regarded Monson as his agent and that the note was transmitted to him in the same way that he had transmitted money and drafts for deposit. On behalf of the respondent it is contended that the admission only had reference to the checks and did not include the notes. But to our mind the transaction itself speaks louder than words. The facts are undisputed. The defendant drew the note and delivered it to Monson. There is no pretense that Monson paid anything therefor. Monson took the note to N. M. Allen & Son and transferred' it to the firm by an assignment upon the back thereof. He did not in any manner indorse it so as to become liable thereon. N. M. Allen & Son drew their draft for the amount upon their correspondent in New
The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Dwight, P. J., and Lewis, J., concurred ; Bradley, J., concurred in the result.
Judgment and order appealed from reversed and new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.