Majority
Headnote
Check ■ — presumption as to its condition when signed — name of a real person, when used as a fictitious payee, when not so used.This action was brought to recover the amount of a check which was drawn upon the plaintiff by one of its customers and paid by it to tbe defendant, tbe indorsement thereon being claimed to be forged. Tlie check as presented upon the trial was made payable to the order of B. A. & G. N. Williams, Jr., and purported to be by them indorsed. There was no dispute in tlie evidence that such indorsement had never been made by them or by their authority, and the sole question which was litigated upon the trial was whether the check had been drawn in blank or to a fictitious jmyee so that it might be considered as a check payable to bearer. The drawer of the check was illiterate and could not read or write except for the purpose of signing his own name, and all his checks were filled out by a bookkeeper in whom he had confidence and who presented them
It is clear, therefore, that the case is utterly devoid of any proof as to the circumstances of the signing of this check. In the absence of proof the presumption is that the check, when signed, was filled in as it is at the present time. The proof also shows that the maker of this check did not intend to make the same payable to bearer or to a fictitious payee; and in this respect the case differs radically from those which are cited upon the part of the defendant, of which Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank ( 140 N. Y. 556 ) is the latest illustration. In that case the cashier of the defendant bank had authority not only to fill out checks but to sign them, and he made the checks in question in that case payable to persons who were dealers with the bank, but without their knowledge, and then indorsed them in the names of the payees for the purpose of converting the funds of the bank to his own use. Under such circumstances the court held that, so .far as the defendant was concerned, the intent of the cashier was the intent of his bank, that the payees were to be considered as fictitious persons, and that the bank was so far concluded by the acts of its cashier as to be estopped from denying the validity of the check. In other words, that where the maker of a check uses as payee the name of an existing party, but does not intend that such party shall indorse the check, but indorses it himself, it is the same as though the name of a fictitious payee had been used, the intent being not to issue the check to the payee. In the case at bar there is no such proof. There was no intent upon the part of the maker to sign the check to a fictitious payee. The only construction
In this respect tbe case at bar is similar to the case of Shipman v. The Bank of the State of New York, ( 126 N. Y. 318 ), and differs from tbe case of Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank (supra). In tbe case of Shipman, although fictitious names were used by tbe clerk, tbe checks were signed by tbe firm in the belief that tbe names of the payees represented real persons entitled to receive tbe amount of tbe checks and with tbe intention that they should be delivered to real payees, and should not go into circulation otherwise than through a delivery to and an indorsement by tbe payees named.
In the case at bar, as already stated, there is no evidence but that tbe drawer of tbe check intended that it should be delivered to tbe payees, and there was no intention upon bis part to make tbe same payable to a fictitious payee.
Attention might be called to other cases similar to that of Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, but tbe case cited sufficiently illustrates tbe rule and points tbe distinction between it and tbe case at bar.
Tbe exceptions should be overruled and tbe plaintiff have judgment upon the verdict, with costs.
Follett and Parker, JJ., concurred.
Exceptions overruled, judgment ordered on verdict for plaintiff, with costs.
Cases cited
- Phillips v. Mercantile National Bank 140 N. Y. 556 p. 560
- Shipman v. Bank of New York 126 N. Y. 318 p. 561