Majority
Headnote
Contract to hold property as security — secret contract as a defense thereto — waiver of a covenant in a contract, an estoppel — informality in the execution of a guaranty"When this action was before this court on the appeal from the first* interlocutory judgment sustaining a demurrer to the matter pleaded in avoidance in the original answer, it was held that the facts so pleaded were insufficient to constitute a defense, but leave was given to serve an amended answer. ( 69 Hun, 264 .) Subsequently the Atlantic Trust Company served an amended- answer pleading further facts by way of avoidance, to which the plaintiff demurred on the ground that they were insufficient to constitute a defense. The demurrer was sustained and an interlocutory judgment entered which granted leave 'to the defendant to plead anew; of which privilege the defendant availed itself and filed and served a second amended answer. Upon the issues so joined, the action was tried and a judgment ordered for the plaintiff.
A demurrer runs through all the pleadings, and the effect of the interlocutory judgments is that the facts alleged in the complaint, unless successfully controverted or avoided, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and that the facts pleaded in the original and first amended answer by way of avoidance are insufficient to constitute a defense. The facts alleged in the complaint were proved on the trial, and thus, under our former decision, a cause of action was established, unless a valid plea in avoidance was proved.
The Atlantic Trust Company, by way of a defense, proved that April 28, 1890, the United Electric Traction Company pledged to
By reference to the contract of guaranty it will be seen that it contains this covenant: “ And the United Electric Traction Company aforesaid does hereby, for itself, its successors and assigns, covenant, stipulate and agree that the United Electric Traction Company aforesaid will not make, nor allow to be made or issued, any mortgage, mortgage bonds, debentures or any preference securities other than the $2,000,000 in preferred stock provided for in the said the United Electric Traction Company’s articles of incorporation, until all of the said 102 bonds above referred to, both principal and interest, shall have been paid or redeemed pursuant to the terms of said bonds.”
December 8, 1890, the United Electric Traction Company mortgaged its property to the Mercantile Trust Company (the plaintiff), as trustee, to secure the payment of 1,800 bonds, amounting to $700,000. As a defense the Atlantic Trust Company alleges that the execution of the mortgage was a violation of the above covenant, and that the plaintiff, being a party to the mortgage, cannot compel the defendant to deliver the 30,000 shares, which it alleges
As a ground of error, the learned counsel for the appellant insists that the execution by the United Electric Traction Company of the-'guaranty was not legally established. It is urged that this contract is one which the officers of the corporation could not execute without the authority of the board of trustees. On this trial it was proved and not denied, that the contract was executed by the president of the corporation, and that its corporate seal was affixed. This the defendant insists was not sufficient, and asserts that the plaintiff should have gone further and proved that it was executed by the authority of the board of directors. ¥e think the defendant is not in a position to raise this question. It is not a surety nor guarantor, but a mere depositary of the shares under an agreement that it. would hold them as security for the performance of the-contract of guaranty. The fact that there may have been some informality in the execution of the contract of guaranty, is not available as a defense to this defendant. It is in the same position as an agent who collects money for his principal which the principal could not have collected in an action against the person who pays it. In such a case the agent cannot interpose as a defense, when called on to pay over the money to his principal, that he could not-have enforced the demand as against the person from whom collected. It is like the case of a public officer who collects money upon an execution or a warrant which could not have been enforced
Yan Brunt, P. J., and O’Brien, J., concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- People ex rel. Martin v. Brown 55 N. Y. 180 p. 219