Majority
Headnote
Examination of a non-resident party plaintiff befoi'e action — relative rights of a resident and non-resident party — power of the court to extend the time to ansioer where a non-resident plaintiff will not submit to an examination.It is conceded that plaintiff did not move to vacate; that its president did not appear for examination, and that the order of June first, as subsequently amended, was in full force and vigor at the time the motion was made to dismiss tire complaint. Upon this appeal, however, it is insisted that such order is void, because providing for the examination of the plaintiff’s president in New York city, while the papers show that he resided in Annapolis, and that he could not be served within the State. And this proposition is seemingly supported by the case of Witcher v. Tribune Association ( 14 N. Y. Supp. 291 ). In the opinion in that case it is said : “ If it (the order) had been made ex parte, and the plaintiff had mbved for its vacation upon affidavit showing that he is a non-resident and that service cannot be made upon him in this State, the court would have been bound to vacate it under the decision of the General Term of this court in Dunham v. Insurance Co. ( 44 N. Y. Super. Ct. 387 ; 6 Abb. N. C. 70 ). There is no power in the court to require the plaintiff, as a resident of another State, to come to New York from such State for the sole purpose of being examined.” Without expressing assent to these views we do not think such question is involved, the order
Although differing in its facts, the principle here involved is somewhat analogous to that in tlie cases of Dudley v. Press Pub. Co. ( 53 Hun, 347 ; 58 id. 181). In the former, plaintiff moved to vacate extensions of time granted to defendant, and, it appearing that efforts to serve an order for plaintiff’s examination were unsuccessful, because plaintiff had left the State, it was held that so long as the order for the plaintiff’s examination remained in force it must be held to have been regularly made, and that it entitled the defendant to an examination of the plaintiff as a witness under its direction before the defendant could be compelled to serve an answer in the action. As therein said: ££ And if he fails to comply with the order legally and properly made, after being, by its service, bronght to the knowledge of himself or his attorneys, lie may forfeit his right to proceed in the action, and even entitle the defendant to a dismissal of his complaint.” And in 58'Hun, 181, where the plaintiff moved to vacate the order for his examination, it was said : “ No opportunity, therefore, was afforded to the defendant to make a personal service of this order upon the plaintiff. But from the other circumstances in the case * * * it is evident that the 'plaintiff has been actuated with the intention when he has visited this city of evading the service of the order and practically declining to obey its mandate; and, under these circumstances, the court could not, with any just respect for its own proceedings, listen to his appl.'cation to vacate either of these orders. It is liis duty as a suitor in court to obey the direction given by its justices for the purpose of promoting tlie proceedings in the litigation, and, as long as he intentionally avoids placing himself where he may be personally served witlytlie order, he cannot consistently expect to be heard in an application to vacate it.”
It is true that in both these cases the relief was denied upon the ground that the plaintiff was guilty of misconduct and ivas contumacious, in that, being a resident of tlie State, lie refused to obey an order served upon him within the State, and, as to another order, absented himself so that service could not be obtained. They are
The regularity and sufficiency of the papers upon which the order of June first was granted having never, therefore, been called in question, it must be assumed that the order is a proper one and made upon proper application. And the order for the ex-amination of the plaintiff’s president being in full force and effect, the defendant was entitled to the benefit of such examination, and, failing to obtain the same by the default or disobedience of the plaintiff, he was seemingly entitled to some relief, for which he applied to the court.
The suggestion that, with regard to obeying orders, there is a distinction between those made as against a resident and those made-against a non-resident party, if recognized, would present an anomaly in our practice; because in effect it would be according to a nonresident, rights and juivileges which are denied to our own citizens. It would in effect be holding that while in an action brought against a resident he must submit to all the orders and mandates of the court, a non-resident can choose this forum and proceed in utter disregard of the court’s directions. We do not think a non-resident, plaintiff can claim rights and immunities denied to a resident party and ignore orders and directions of the court brought to the actual knowledge of his attorney or himself. Non-residence does not-enlarge his rights or diminish those of the defendant. If such a rule were to prevail, it would be easy to have claims assigned to-non-residents, or in cases where they had claims in their own right, to place themselves just outside of the jurisdiction of the court and proceed against our citizens without being amenable to the orderly procedure which in actions affords to a defendant certain rights as-against the plaintiff.
It may be, since the Code of Civil Procedure provides (§ 873) that service of the order “ must be made within the State,” that tlie> court is without power by service without the State to require a nonresident party to come into the jurisdiction and submit to an examination, or punish him for contempt should he disobey such an order.. But this is an entirely different thing from saying that the court has. not the power to direct, upon a proper showing being made by a
We think, therefore, that so much of the order as requires the appellant to serve his answer should be reversed, and that relief should be accorded to the appellant by extending his time to answer until such time as the plaintiff submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court or applies for and secures a vacation of the order for the examination of its presilent.
Order accordingly reversed, with ten dollars costs of the motion below and ten dollars costs on this appeal and disbursements.
Yan Brunt, P. J., concurred.
Order reversed as directed in opinion, with ten dollars costs and disbursements of appeal and ten dollars costs of motion in the court below.
Cases cited
- Dunham v. Mercantile Mutual Insurance 44 N. Y. Super. Ct. 387 p. 344