Majority
Headnote
Will — requesting a subscribing witness to sign — will of a married woman, not ' revoked by her remarriage — courts will not enlarge the effect of statutes.We are asked to reverse the decree of the surrogate on two^ grounds: (1) That there is no evidence that the testatrix requested the subscribing witness, Philip Furlong, to sign as a witness; (2) that the will was revoked by the testatrix’s subsequent marriage to the contestant. The witness Furlong testified that he was asked to' become a witness to the will by Mary Ann Murphy, who was an attendant of the testatrix, then ill. lie testified that he saw tlietestatrix sign the will,' that he signed immediately after, in her presence, pursuant to the request of Miss Murpliy made in the room and in the presence of the testatrix. He also testified that he did not hear the testatrix request hini to sign as a witness, nor did he recollect that he heard her speak on that occasion. The witness-testified that he was quite hard of hearing.' The contestant called as a witness Michael F. Phelan, who testified that he heard testatrix twice ask Philip Furlong to become a witness to the will, and that the 'testatrix said that it was her last will and testament, and she wished him (Furlong) to sign as a witness, and that she said the same thing tó Jane Farrington, the other subscribing witness. Jane Farrington testified that the testatrix requested her to sign as a witness, that she did so, and that she saw Philip Furlong sign. The evidence is uncontradicted that the testatrix and the two witnesses saw one another sign their names. This witness (Farrington) testified that she heard the testatrix ask Philip Furlong to sign her will, that he did not hear her, and she asked him a second time, and then he came forward and signed it. This was a sufficient publication
Was the testatrix’s will revoked by her subsequent marriage ?
The following are the provisions of the Revised Statutes relating to the powers of married women to devise and bequeath their property as originally enacted, and as now in force :
“Sec. 1. All persons, except idiots, persons of unsound mind, married women and infants, may devise their real estate by a last will and testament, duly executed according to the provisions of this title.” (§ 1, art. 1, tit. 1, chap. 6, part 2, R. S.; 2 R. S. p. 56.)
“Sec. 21. Every male person of the age of eigliteeen years or upwards, and every female, not being a married woman, of the age •of sixteen years or upwards, of sound mind and memory, and no others, may give and bequeath his or her personal estate by will in writing.” (§ 21, art. 2, tit. 1, chap. 6, part 2, R. S.; 2 R. S. p. 60.)
“ Sec. 44. A will executed by an unmarried woman shall be deemed revoked by her subsequent marriage.” (§ 44, art. 3, tit. 1, •chap. 6, part 2, R. S.; 2 R. S. p. 64.)
These provisions remained unchanged until the passage of chapter 375 of the Laws of 1849, which empowered married women to “ devise real and personal property and any interest or estate therein, •and the rents, issues and profits thereof in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried.” By chapter 782 of the Laws of 1867 the Revised Statutes were amended by striking from section 1 above quoted the words “ married women,” so that the section now reads:
“ Sec. 1. All persons, except idiots, persons of unsound mind and infants, may devise their real estate by a last wall and testament duly executed according to the provisions of this title.”
The 21st section above quoted was amended by striking out the words “not being a married woman,” so that the section now reads:
“Sec. 21. Every male person of the age of eighteen years or upwards, and every female of the age of sixteen years or upwards, ■of sound mind and memory, and no others, may give and bequeath his or her personal estate by will in writing.”
This brings us to the question whether a will executed by a woman during coverture is revoked by her subsequent marriage. The statute does not so declare, which relates simply to the wills of unmarried women. It is not the duty of the courts to enlarge the effect of statutes by importing into them words and provisions not contained in them.
"We think that the will was rightly admitted to probate by the surrogate, and that his decree should be affirmed, with costs. (Matter of Burton's Will, 4 Misc. Rep. 512 ; S. C., 25 N. Y. Supp. 824 .)
Wan Brunt, P. L, and Parker, L, concurred.
Decree affirmed, with costs.
Cases cited
- In re Burton's Will 4 Misc. Rep. 512 p. 365