Majority
Headnote
Will— bequest to executors, who promise to give it to certain corporations — the executors become trustees — the promise can he enforces, — hequest to educational corporations in excess of the amount allowed by statute — who may contest the will — waiver by the widow of the right to object.The testator, by his will and codicils, disposed of his estate as follows:
By the first clause he revoked all former wills. By the second he directed the payment of Ids debts, funeral expenses and the expenses of settling the estate. By the third, fourth and fifth clauses he devised and bequeathed to Lucy Fayerweather, his wife, $10,000; his residence, No. 11 East Fifty-seventh street, with all the household furniture and effects therein, together with the horses and carriages and personal effects in the stable connected with the house, and a net annual income of $15,000 during her life, payable quarterly, which provisions were in lieu of dower. By the seventh elause of the will and the fifth clause of the third codicil he bequeathed $100,000 to Lucy J. Beardsley, $20,000 to Mary W. Achter, and $20,000 to Emma S. Drury, three nieces, who were his only heirs and next of kin. By the sixth clause of the will and the third clause of the third codicil he bequeathed to Anna Amelia Joyce (now Reynolds) a life annuity of $4,000, provided she remained unmarried. By the seventh clause of his will and by the second and third codicils thereto he bequeathed $32,600 to the various
“ All the rest and residue of my estate, of whatsoever character and wheresoever situated the same may be, of which I shall die possessed and remaining after all the specific legacies in my said will and the several codicils thereto have been paid and. all the provisions of said will and codicils have been fully complied with and carried into effect, I give, devise and bequeath to Justus L. Bulkley, íhomas Gr, Bitch and Henry B. Yaughan, to them and their heirs forever.”
The testator’s estate amounted at his death to upwards of $6,000,000, and after providing for all of the annuities and the specific devises and bequests, the residuary estate passing under the clause last quoted amounted to upwards of $3,000,000.
The Special Term found the following facts:
“That the defendants Thomas Gr. Bitch and Henry B. Yaughan, for themselves and on the part of Justus L. Bulkley, promised Daniel B. Fayerweather, now deceased, and induced him to believe that if he would make them and the defendant Justus L. Bulkley residuary legatees of his estate, as provided in the codicils to his will, dated December 13, 1884, and November 15, 1890, the said residuary legatees would sell and convert said residuary estate into cash and divide the same equally, share and share alike, among the twenty corporations mentioned in the ninth paragraph of the said Daniel B. Fayerweather’s will, dated October 6, 1884, including the plaintiffs, after paying $100,000 to the Northwestern University, and that the said Daniel B. Fayerweather made the said Bitch, Bulkley and Yaughan his residuary legatees in and by the said codicils in reliance upon'the said promises and inducements, and died leaving the said Bitch, Bulkley and Yaughan his residuary legatees in the belief so induced by them that they -would sell, convert and distribute the residuary estate as aforesaid, and that the said Bitch, Bulkley and Yaughan have attempted to dispose of the said residuary estate in violation and disregard of the said promises.”
This brings the case within the rule laid down in O’Hara v. Dudley ( 95 N. Y. 403 ). The residuary legatees acquired no personal interest in the residuum, but took it as trustees.
The executors of the testator’s widow and two of his heirs at law and next of kin seek to have the residuary clause declared invalid, under chapter 360 of the Laws of 1860, which provides : *
“Section 1. No person having a husband, wife, child or parent, shall, by his or her last will and testament, devise or bequeath to any benevolent, charitable, literary, scientific, religious or missionary society, association or corporation, in trust or otherwise, more than one-half part of his or her estate, after the payment of his or her debts, and such devise or bequest shall be valid to the extent of one-half, and no more.”
The difficulty with their contention is that the widow and heirs released all of their interest in the estate, for valuable considerations paid to them. This statute was designed for the protection of husbands, wives, next of kin and heirs at law, but it does not in any wise prevent them from releasing to educational corporations the benefits which they might have secured by resisting wills made in contravention of the statute. It is urged that these releases were procured by fraud and undue influence. There is no evidence in the record justifying this contention. The terms of settlement were
No pei’son or corporation, except the State in certain cases, can impeach the validity of the disposition of property by will, unless the contestant, if successful, will acquire some interest under the statutes of descent or of distribution, or as devisee or legatee, in the property attempted to be disposed of by the will; and if the person entitled to contest a will, or some one ór more of its provisions, voluntarily and for a valuable consideration, received after the testator’s death, with full knowledge of the invalidity of the will, divests himself of all interest in the property attempted to be disposed of by it, he cannot impeach its validity.
The judgment should be affirmed, with separate bills of costs in favor of the respondents payable out of the estate.
Parker, J., concurred.
The facts upon which the controversies in this case arise are not disputed, and, as I understand them, are briefly these: On the 6th of October, 1884, Daniel B. Eayerweather made a will by which in the ninth clause thereof he bequeathed certain sums of money to twenty educational institutions, and then by the tenth clause he devised all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate to his executors in trust to sell and convert into cash, and to divide the same equally among the several corporations mentioned in said ninth paragraph, share and share alike.
Fayerweather was advised by his counsel that the provisions of his will contravened the restrictions of the law of this State relative to benevolent corporations. Upon the execution of the will he delivered it to one of the executors with a certificate stating that he had been so advised and expressing the trust that his “ heirs ” would permit the provisions of the will to be carried into effect.
On the 13th of December, 1881, Fayenveathcr, having become suspicious as to the forbearance of his widow and next of kin in the assertion of the rights conferred upon them by the statute above mentioned, executed a codicil to his will by which he revoked the tenth clause and bequeathed all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate to the persons named in the eleventh paragraph of his will as his executors. Upon the execution of said codicil the testator delivered it with a memorandum to Mr. Hitch, one of his executors, in which he stated that he had made these executors his residuary legatees in the confidence that thereby his intentions as expressed in his will would be carried into effect, and without litigations on the part of any person or persons interested.
On the 7th of January, 1888, the testator executed a second codicil by which he gave certain additional legacies, named a third person as executor of his will and trustee of his estate, and conferred the same powers on the three executors as had been conferred by the will on the two.
On the 19th of March, 18S9, the testator executed a third codicil, by which he ratified his will and codicils, except as. therein modified. He made some changes and gave some additional legacies. Upon the execution of this codicil he delivered it with a memorandum to one of his executors for safe-keeping. The memorandum related to sums to be giren to certain charitable institutions, and also some small gifts to divers persons.
On the 13th of November, 1890, this executor, upon the testator’s order, delivered his will and the first, second and third codicils to the executor whom the testator had last named, who delivered them to the testator. On the next day the testator sent a letter to one of his executors, calling his attention to the revocation of the tenth clause of the will by the first codicil, and the devise of all the rest, etc., of his estate to the executors named in the eleventh clause, and asked : “ Please advise me at once, in writing, what is the legal effect of this clause, and to whom and how would my residuary estate
To this letter the executor Mr. Ritcli replied : “The intention of the change in question was to enable Messrs. Bulkley and myself to carry out the intentions of the will, as modified by the various private memoranda in my possession. Neither Mr. Bulkley nor myself would have any moral right to treat any portion of your estate otherwise than as we know would conform to your wishes. I suggest that I call on you with these, and, if still approved by you, that they be left in a sealed package with Miss Joyce, or any one named by you. The legal effect of the clause in question is to vest the title to the residuary estate in Messrs. Bulkley and myself, but, as I have said, neither Mr. Bulkley nor I would wish to derive any personal benefit under the codicil.”
On the 15th of November, 1890, the testator executed a fourth codicil by which he ratified and confirmed his will and codicils, and especially confirmed the revocation of the tenth clause and changed the third clause of the first codicil so as to devise the residue, etc., of his estate to his three executors, instead of two.
On the same day the testator died, leaving said will and four codicils unrevolced. This will and codicils have been admitted to probate.
By these instruments it is clear that the executors and devisees took the rest, residue and remainder of the estate as trustees, the corporations named in the ninth clause of the will being the cest/iois que trust, which trust can be enforced by the cestuis que tncst, unless the rights of some parties secured to them by law will be thereby contravened.
It is clear that these executors could not put this residuary estate into their own pockets and apply it to their own uses, the testator having made this disposition of his estate upon their promise to apply it in the manner provided for by his will.
The tenth clause of the will, although revoked by the codicils, still existed for the purpose of defining the trust.
The testator left him surviving a widow, who was the only })erson who could call into operation for her protection the statute which wo have quoted. The widow, however, has released to the executors all claims to the estate, which release cannot bo successfully
No rights of heirs and next of kin have been infringed upon, because the trust does not contravene any statute for their benefit and is not the subject of attack by them. If it were, they have also executed a release of their interest in the estate in the same manner as the widow.
We have, therefore, the case of a trust established which would be valid as against all the world but for the statute in favor of the widow, and the widow having released all her rights in the estate, how can her representatives claim the invalidity of a trust as to property in which she had no interest.
The widow was not aggrieved, and under such circumstances the trust must be executed.
Judgment affirmed, with separate bills of costs in favor of the respondents, payable out of the estate.
Cases cited
- O'Hara v. Dudley 95 N. Y. 403 p. 531