Majority
Headnote
Town board — consent to the construction of a bridge — the highway commissioner has exclusive control after it is ordered — the court on certiorari may determine the amount due the contractor —1890, chary. 568, §§ 10, 11; Code Civil Proe. § 3140.The town board of the town of Campbell, at a- special meeting thereof, held on the 10th day of November, 1894, passed the following resolution:
“ County of Steuben, )
Town of Campbell, )
ss.:
“Whereas, the highway bridge, known as the Cohocton river-bridge, in the village of Campbell, has become damaged and unsafe for travel, and there not being sufficient moneys in the hands of the commissioner of highways to rebuild the same, therefore, be it
uBesol/ued, that we do hereby consent that the commissioner of highways of the town of Campbell cause said bridge to be immediately rebuilt, and we do hereby empower the highway commissioner to employ an engineer to receive proposals from responsible contractors for the superstructure and substructure of said bridge, and to let the same to the lowest bidder at a cost not to exceed $8,000 for the completed bridge and approaches. Said bridge to be built of iron or steel.”
The resolution was signed by the members of the town board.
John King, the commissioner of highways of the town, thereafter entered into a written contract with the relator to construct-the bridge according to the plans and specifications annexed to and forming part of the contract, for the price of $5,400, to be paid upon the completion and acceptance of the bridge, the payment
Section 10 of the Highway Law reads as follows : “ Extraordinary repairs of highways or bridges.— If any highway or bridge shall at any time be damaged or destroyed by the elements or otherwise, the commissioner of highways of the town in which such highway or bridge may be situated', may, with the consent of the town board, cause-the same to be immediately repaired or rebuilt, although the expenditure of money required may exceed the sum raised or authorized.
Section 11 provides for the convening of the town board in special .session by the supervisor, upon the request of the commissioners of highways, and the bills and expenses incurred in the erection or repairs of bridges may then be presented to and audited by the town board.
The consent of the board was a necessary prerequisite to the right •of the commissioner to construct the bridge. The duties of the board, so far as the construction of the bridge was concerned, ended when such consent was given. The work of constructing the bridge then devolved upon the highway commissioner, the official who had been selected by the electors of the town to take charge of such matters. The resolution of the board was unquestionably sufficient to authorize the commissioner to construct a new bridge. (The People ex rel. Slater v. Smith, 83 Hun, 432 .) It was too late to • raise the question as to the necessity of building the bridge, after such con.sent had been given, and the contract made and the bridge constructed. The town board -assumed, in their resolution, to direct the highway commissioner as to the course he should pursue in constructing the bridge. They incorporated in their resolution a direction, that the commissioner should employ an engineer to receive proposals from responsible contractors for the superstructure and substructure, and to let the same to the lowest bidder.
All this was surplusage, for the manner of constructing the bridge was entirely within the jurisdiction of the highway commissioner. Whether he would build it by contract or employ his own men, or whether he would invite competitive bids, and whether he would let the contract to the lowest or highest bidder, were questions for his decision. It migh£ well be that the best interests of the town would be subserved by not letting the contract to the lowest bidder. The conduct of the commissioner in letting the contract to the relator is impugned by the respondents. They charge him with having acted corruptly and collusively with the relator in accepting the .highest bid, when there was a lower one from an equally responsible
We fail to find any competent proof that the contract made with the relator was not a proper and judicious one. The relator having fully performed its contract, there does not seem to have been any good reason for the refusal of the board to audit the claim at its full amount, and when the board refused so to do, and assumed conditionally to audit the claim for a less amount than was the relator’s just due, a rule of law was violated to the prejudice of the relator. In such a case the court has the power to amend or modify the determination of the body reviewed, and like power is possessed by the court when the determination is against the preponderance of proof to such an extent that if it were the verdict of a jury it would be set aside as against the weight of evidence. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2140.) This, we think, is such a case.
The determination of the board should be so modified as to allow the claim of the relator at the sum of $5,400, with interest thereon from the 5th day of June, 1895, with fifty dollars costs and disbursements.
Ward and Adams, JJ., concurred; Bradley, J., not voting.
The determination of the board of audit so modified as to allow the claim of the relator at the sum of $5,400, with interest from June 5, 1895, with fifty dollars costs and disbursements.