p. 333that charge, as there was no intention manifested by the defendants, or either o' ¡them, to set Windsor at large, or to liberate him from the power or custody of Carr, nor was there any attempt made to separate them. The captain, it was true, refused to permit Windsor to continue on board, and insisted upon putting him on shore ; but he did not prevent Carr from going with him, and Carr actually accompanied Windsor on shore. That if the captain’s refusal to carry Windsor to New-York, and the act of putting him on shore, exposed the captain to any action, (concerning which he expressed no opinion,) still the facts disclosed would not sustain an action for a rescue. That if the views taken by him of the evidence should be embraced by the jury, their verdict would be for the defendants; but if they should be of opinion from the facts disclosed, that Windsor was set at large from the arrest, or was taken out of the power of Cair, or if the latter was prevented from exercising his lawful authority over him by the defendants, or either of them, then their verdict ought to be in favour of the plaintiff for $75.50, and such part of the forty dollars as they judged proper—they being at liberty to convict one defendant and acquit the other, if they thought the evidence would support such a verdict.
The jury, without leaving the box, found a verdict in favour of both defendants.
Mr. Geo. Sullivan, for the plaintiff, now moved for a new trial, on the following grounds:
I. That the verdict was against the evidence and against law. The Chief Justice mis-directed the jury, by instructing them that the evidence was to be applied to the issue, as if the plaintiff in his declaration had counted on a technical rescue ; whereas the action was in truth brought for an unlawful interference on the part of the defendants, with the plaintiff’s custody of the person of the debtor, for whom he was bail.
II. There was sufficient legal evidence of an unlawful interference on the part of the defendants with the plaintiff’s right of^
p. 334custody over the person of the debtor : but the presiding Judge informed the jury that there was no such evidence. Even if there was no evidence to support the first count, still the second count was fully sustained. Windsor, in contemplation of law, was in the custody of the plaintiff, through the intervention of his agent^ Kinney. For although the deputation was to Carr, that did not take away from the agent the right to represent his principal, and to detain Windsor himself. The Chief Justice put the defendants’ liability exclusively upon the ground of their intention to set Windsor at large, or liberate him from the power or custody of Carr; whereas, the liability of the defendants in law, rests upon the fact of their interfering with the plaintiff’s controul over the person of the debtor, whereby he was prevented from surrendering him to the sheriff.III. The presiding Judge, by omitting to direct the jury as to the right of the plaintiff to bring the debtor, by the steam-boat, to New-York, under the circumstances of the case, left the jury in ignorance of the plaintiff’s legal rights, and gave them ground to infer that the defendant, Coggeshall, could not have brought Windsor to New-York in his boat, without subjecting himself to damages for a false imprisonment; whereas Windsor having made no application to the captain before the vessel left the wharf could not have recovered against the captain or the owners of the boat, even if he had been brought to New-York.IV. The direction of the Chief Justice was uncertain in respect to the ground on which the jury were required to return their verdict, so that they could not distinctly understand whether they were to return a verdict for the defendants on the ground, that no technical rescue was sufficiently proved, or because Windsor was not in fact liberated from the plaintiff’s custody, or upon the ground that the defendants did not intend to set him free. The jury were in fact left to infer that the captain and owners of the boat had a legal right to put Windsor and Carr on shore, and that therefore the defendants could not be liable in this action, and it is not clear
p. 335from the charge but what the jury returned their verdict upon this ground.Mr. Greenwood and Mr. W. T. McCoun, the counsel for the defendants, were stopped by the court, in their reply.
It is very clear that this motion cannot prevail. The plaintiff, in both counts of his declaration, has brought his action against the defendants for having rescued Windsor out of his power. The first count alleges that the debtor was in the custody of Carr, a special agent deputed by the plaintiff to arrest him, and that he was taken out of the custody of Carr. The second count differs in no respect from the first, except by alleging that Windsor was in the custody of the plaintiff, and was rescued out of his hands and control by the defendants. Now the plaintiff’s own evidence shows that there was no rescue whatever, no separation of the parties, no sundering of the debtor from the party having charge of him. If the plaintiff was represented by Carr, then the debtor was left under his controul; for both went on shore together, and so far from being separated, they were in fact kept together. If, however, Kinney was the representative of the plaintiff still there was no rescue, because Kinney was expressly requested to retain the custody of Carr, by going into the small boat with him. If the plaintiff himself, through his agent, voluntarily abandoned the debtor, he surely cannot charge the defendants with having rescued him.
The plaintiff, if he has any cause of action against the defendants, has manifestly mistaken his remedy. He should have framed a count to correspond with his proof, and if the captain was bound to bring Windsor to New-York, and refused to do so, he should have been charged with the act, which he in fact committed. If we treat the second count as a declaration in case, for sending Carr and Windsor on shore, that will not assist the plaintiff ; for the proof shows no damage from that act, and therefore the gravamen of the declaration would not be supported.
p. 336The Judge charged the jury expressly to say by their verdict, whether Windsor was
in truth set at large or not, and they have found, upon that point, against the plaintiff. Their verdict is fully supported by the evidence, and the motion must be denied.
Motion denied.
[F. S. Kinney, Att'y for the plff.