Fry v. Bennett

By the COURT.

Strakosch was examined de bene esse as a witness in this action, and the plaintiff offered his deposition in evidence, after having proved by Sheridan Corbyn, that he knew Strakosch, and last saw him in this city about six weeks previously. That on the morning of that day he called at the house of Strakosch, and the wife of the latter told him that Strakosch had gone to Cincinnati.

The defendant objected to the reading of the deposition of Strakosch, on the ground that his absence had not been proved. The court admitted the evidence, and the defendant excepted.

The right to read 'this deposition, depends, in this case, upon' the question whether it was “ satisfactorily proved that Strakosch had continued absent out of the state, so that his attendance at the trial could not be compelled by the ordinary process of law.”

By satisfactory proof, must be meant evidence recognized by law as competent in its nature to prove the fact, and sufficient prima fade to establish it.

The witness Corbyn, does not state where he lived, how often he had been in the habit of seeing Strakosch, nor that his relations with him were such, nor that his own business was such, that he would have been likely to have seen him, had be been in the city during the two or three weeks preceding the trial.

He does not appear to have even inquired when Strakosch left for Cincinnati. Eor aught that the wife of the latter is testified to have said, and assuming what she said to be true, he might as well have left the previous day, as before the cause was noticed for trial.

The statute requires proof of more than the actual absence of the witness from the state, on the day the action is tried. SucÍl a continued absence must be proved, that ordinary diligence to procure his attendance by process of law, would be ineffectual.

The evidence to give a right to read the deposition must be such, as would make it erroneous to reject the deposition.

Giving to the declarations of Strakosch’s wife the fullest effect, no one can conjecture from it, when Strakosch left the state. No good reason can be assigned for receiving her declarations as proof, when she might have been called to testify to the fact, if it was as she is represented to have stated it.

The statute, by requiring the fact to be “ satisfactorily proved,” should not be construed to admit of mere hearsay evidence, when direct and competent evidence appears to have been easily attainable.

That was held sufficient. In Jackson v. Rice, ( 3 Wend. 180 ,) a deposition of Richard Harrison, taken under the act to perpetuate testimony, (1 R. S. 455,) was offered in evidence, and rejected. The preliminary proof was, that of a witness, who proved that Mr. Harrison was between seventy-five and eighty years of age, and that the witness believed from the ill state of his health, and the infirmities consequent upon his advanced age, he was unable to attend at the circuit as a witness. He had not, however, seen Mr. Harrison in several years, and did not personally know the state of his health. The deposition was rejected. The court said, “ For aught that appeared, he might, although eighty years of age, have attended the court. At all events, the Judge was not bound to presume him unable to attend. The plaintiff should not rely upon presumption where it was his duty to produce proof.”

In Jackson v. Perkins, ( 2 Wend. 308 -315,) a deposition of Mrs. Yischer, taken under the same act, was offered in evidence. It was allowed to be read on a stipulation of the plaintiff’s counsel, that a judgment of nonsuit might be entered if the Supreme Court on a case made, should be of the opinion that the deposition ought not to have been received.

The evidence of her inability to attend was, that she was over seventy-four years of age, and one of the witnesses testified that from his knowledge of her situation and infirmities, he believed she could not endure a journey from Albany to Ogdensburgh, without the most serious injury to her health. This was held to be sufficient. (See Clarke v. Dibble, 16 Wend. 601 ; The People v. Hadden, 3 Denio, 225 .)

I think the spirit of these decisions requires legal proof, as

Allowing such testimony would furnish opportunity for collusion, and violate the rule that mere hearsay evidence is inadmissible, without the slightest necessity for it, in a case in which it was just as feasible, to call the party who made the declaration, as some one who heard it made. Testimony by his wife, that Strakosch left the city, avowedly to go to Cincinnati, stating when — that she had not seen or heard from him since; or, had received letters from him bearing the Cincinnati post-office stamp, would undoubtedly be satisfactory proof. We are all of the opinion, that on the evidence given, the plaintiff was not entitled to read the deposition.

The defendant is therefore entitled to a new trial, on account of the admission of this deposition in evidence. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to pass upon any of the other questions argued on the appeal, except such as we can see, must arise upon a second trial, and in respect to which, the ruling of the court, on such trial, may properly be required.

A Hew York Herald, of the date of December 15, 1851, purporting to state its average daily circulation from 1842 to 1851, inclusive, and the annual receipts for it in 1835, the first year of its existence, and also in the year 1851, was offered in evidence, “for the purpose of showing the circulation of the Herald in the years 1848, 1849, and the income of the office.”

It was objected to, “on the ground that the defendant was in no way connected with it by proof, and that it was irrelevant.”

The objection was overruled, and the defendant’s counsel ex cepted.

The paper was “ relevant,” and was competent evidence, to show the circulation of the Herald, and of the extent to which the libellous matter had been published. So much of the extract read, as related to this point, was proper evidence.

The objection was not taken, that the passage relating to the receipts of the Herald should not be read, but the objection was to the whole article. In not attempting to discriminate between the different parts of it, the objection seems to have assumed, that as a whole, it was not admissible for any purpose, and the ground of objection taken was, that it was irrelevant.

Whether the part relating to the receipts of the office, if specially objected to should have been excluded, or whether its admission can be seen to have so prejudiced the defendant, that, treating this as a motion for a new trial on a case, as well as an appeal from the judgment, a new trial should be granted, will depend upon considerations connected with the charge on the subject of damages, and exceptions taken by the defendant to the refusal of the court, to charge on that branch of the case as requested.

The defendant requested the court to charge the jury — “ that if the jury should find any ground in this case for giving damages to the plaintiff against the defendant, their verdict should be for such sum only as would compensate the plaintiff for the injury he has sustained therefrom, and that the jury are not at liberty to give to the plaintiff any further sum by way of punishment of the defendant, or by way of vindictive damages, or as smart money.”

The court refused to so charge, and the defendant excepted.

It is not contended that the terms of the charge, as given, are particularly exceptionable.

The jury were instructed that the plaintiff had not proved any specific loss to his business as an opera manager. “ In estimating the damages, they were to look at the character of the libels, and the business of the plaintiff, not giving way to any feelings of prejudice, but examining the whole matter like business men, and so drawing their inference as to damages. That the court

If the charge, as given, was not erroneous, and was as favorable to the defendant as Re could properly require, then the question arises whether there was any error in refusing to give the instruction sought, or whether the not giving of it may be reasonably inferred to Rave been a substantial prejudice to the defendant. I state the latter alternative, because the action is before us upon a ease, as well as upon exceptions to the decisions of the court.

TRe case does not show, nor state any thing to justify, legally, ’ the inference, that the plaintiff urged the jury to apply any other considerations in estimating the amount of damages, than those, which the charge, as given, approved, or insisted to the court, that any instructions sRould be given variant from those which the defendant specially asked the court to give, unless it is to be inferred from the fact of the request itself.

I cannot believe, that when a charge, unexceptionable in itself, has been given, it is error not to go further, and charge a proposition which, as an abstract one, is sound, when the converse of it has neither been asserted by the adverse party, nor its application invoked to the disposition of any part of the case.

Unless the defendant in Ris request to the court to charge, that in addition to compensating the injury, the jury were not at liberty “ to give any further sum by way of punishment of the

We do not understand the learned counsel for the defendant to deny, that in estimating damages, in an action of libel, the jury are not only to consider and compensate any actual pecuniary loss, but if the injury was wilful, or intentional, they may consider the mental sufferings of the plaintiff, the circumstances of indignity and contumely under which the wrong was done, and the consequent public disgrace to- the plaintiff, together with any other circumstances belonging to the wrongful act, and tending to the plaintiff's discomfort.

But he insists, that when the jury, in the exercise of a sound discretion, have arrived at what, in their judgment, is a proper compensation, having reference to all these circumstances, their duty and power end, and they can add nothing to such compensation, to punish the defendant for the public good, by deterring him from doing similar wrongs to the same plaintiff, or to others.

One consideration naturally suggests itself upon the mere statement of these propositions. A plaintiff who has been injured by a tort, or wrong of a defendant, is entitled, in all cases, to his actual damages. If these include compensation for mental suffering, and a consideration of the circumstances of indignity under which the wrong was done, the public disgrace inflicted, and other actual discomfort produced, the plaintiff should be compensated at all events, whether the wrong was wanton, or was done believing the charges published to.be true.

In either case the mental suffering must be as great, the circumstances of apparent indignity are the same, and his disgrace will be absolute and mortifying in the one case as the other, until his character has been vindicated by a verdict, establishing the falsity of the calumnies charged against him.

If such considerations are not constituent elements of damage, and if a person who has been injured in these respects is not to

. If the right to them does not result from the fact of the wrong, and the suffering and disgrace caused by it, then they are not given to compensate for such injuries, as a matter of course, merely because he wrongfully caused them, but because he caused them from a deliberate purpose to inflict them, without any thing to palliate or mitigate his conduct.

Logically speaking, such damages when given, are awarded full as much to punish a defendant as to compensate a plaintiff, and they are given as much by way of smart money, as because the plaintiff is entitled to them as an indemnity, inasmuch as they are given in consequence of the wantonness of the wrong, and not merely on account of the sufferings, discomfort, and disgrace, caused by them to- the plaintiff.

A reference to some of the cases, will show that the decisions in the courts of this state,, on this point, have been uniform. Tillotson v. Cheetham, 3 J. R. 56, was an action for a libel. No plea was put in, and a writ of inquiry was executed before Chief Justice Kent and 'a jury.

The Judge charged the jury, that the case “ demanded from the jury exemplary damages; that he did not accede to the doctrine that the jury ought not to punish the defendant, in a civil suit, for the pernicious effect a publication of this kind was calculated to produce -in society.”

The defendant moved to set aside the inquest, and insisted that the “charge of the Judge was incorrect in stating that the plaintiff was entitled to exemplary damages, on account of the injurious tendency of such publications to the community. In a private action, the party can recover only for the private wrong; he has no concern with the public offence, for which the defendant must atone on the indictment.”

The motion was denied.

Kent, Ch. J., after citing cases, which, in his view of them, sanctioned the doctrine contained in this part of the charge, remarks that: “ It is too well settled in practice, and is too valuable

This decision was made in 1808, and seems to be a direct adjudication of the question, presented in the request to charge.

In Hoyt v. Gelston, et al., (18 J. R. 141-151,) which was an action of trespass for seizing a vessel, &c., the plaintiff’ scounsel admitted, “ that the defendants had not been influenced by any malicious motives in making the seizure, and that they had not acted therein with any view or design of oppressing or injuring the plaintiff. The presiding Judge held that such admission precluded the plaintiff from claiming any damages against the defendants by way of punishment, or smart money, and that after such admission, the plaintiff could recover only the actual damages sustained, and he gave that direction to the jury.”

In Wory v. Jenkins, (14 J. R. 352,) being an action of trespass for beating the plaintiff’s mare, by reason whereof she died. The mare was proved to be worth $50 or $60. The Judge told the jury the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of the mare, and “ if they believed, as he did, that the defendant had whipped her to death, it was a case in which, from the wantoness and cruelty of the defendant’s conduct, the jury had a right to give smart money.” They found a verdict for $75.

A motion was made to set aside the verdict for excessive damages and misdirection of the Judge. The court said, “We think the charge of the Judge was correct; and we should have been better satisfied with the verdict if the amount of damages had been greater and more exemplary.”

In Woodward v. Paine, (15 J. R. 494,) the same instruction was given to the jury, and the correctness of the decision affirmed.

In Root v. Wing, ( 4 Wend. 113 ,) which was an action for a libel, the presiding Judge, after giving his views of the evils of a bitter and unmitigated aspersion of private character through the medium of newspapers, stated in his charge that, “ in a fitting case, a jury could render no more meritorious service to the publics

No exception was taken to this part of the charge.

The Chancellor, in his opinion, stated the rule to be that, “ the jury may not only give such damages as they think necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his actual injury, but they may also give damages by way of punishment to the defendants. This.is usually denominated exemplary damages, or smart money.”

In Fero v. Ruscoe, (4 Coms. 162,) which was an action for slander, the Judge charged “ that the failure to establish a justification, was in law an aggravation of the slander, and that the defendant was not entitled to any benefit from the evidence given to make out a justification, if the jury believed that it failed to make out a full justification.”

An exception was taken to this charge.

The Court of Appeals held the charge to be correct, and said that an attempt to justify, though honestly made, was an aggravation of the original wrong. If the defendant makes a mistake, it is at his own peril.

In Allen v. Addington, ( 11 Wend. 380 ,) an action for falsely representing the credit of one Baker, whereby the plaintiff was induced to sell him goods to the value of $2,000, the Judge instructed the jury that, “ if they should consider the plaintiff entitled to recover, he would be entitled not only to the amount of the goods sold, with the interest of the same, but also to exemplary damages.” The defendant excepted to the charge, and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $2,564.84 damages.

When the cause was before the Supreme Court for a new trial, that court held that the rule of damages laid down by the jury was not objectionable. A writ of error was brought to the court for the correction of errors, ( 7 Wend. 9 , 26.

The judgment was reversed on the sole ground that the second count was bad in substance, but the third count being deemed sufficient after verdict to sustain the judgment, the record was remitted to the Supreme Court, with liberty to the plaintiff to apply there to amend the postea, so as to apply the verdict to the third count, (the first count not having been proved,) and to render judgment thereon, and if such relief was refused, to apply

Application was made to tbe Supreme Court for leave to amend tbe postea, and enter judgment on tbe third count, wbicb was granted, ( 12 Wend. 215 .)

This seems to be a direct affirmance of tbe proposition that, in an action of tort; although it affects property only, and tbe actual damages can be ascertained, exemplary damages may be given in a case in wbicb tbe tort resulted from a purpose deliberately and intentionally to injure tbe plaintiff.

Although tbe doctrine that exemplary or vindictive damages may be given in actions of tort, when tbe wrong was wantonly or. maliciously committed, has been uniformly acted upon at nisi prins, and sanctioned both by tbe Supreme Court and tbe court of last resort of this state, its justice, or any direct authority for it, has recently been denied in Dain v. Wykoff, (3 Seld. R. 193,) by an eminent Judge of tbe Court of Appeals.

We have also been favored with tbe opinion of Mr. Justice Jewett, and that of Mr. Justice Mason, in tbe case of Taylor, Hale & Murdock, v. Church. That was an action for libel. Tbe Judge charged that “ if tbe jury were satisfied that tbe defendant was influenced by actual malice, or a deliberate intention to injure tbe plaintiffs, they might give such further damages (in addition to a flail compensation for tbe injury) as are suited to tbe aggravated character wbicb tbe act assumes, and as are necessary as an example to deter from tbe doing of such injuries.”' To this there was an exception. Mr. Justice Jewett held this part of tbe charge to be correct, and Mr. Justice Mason held' ⅛ to be clearly wrong. A note of tbe reporter states that- five members of tbe court did not express a concurrence witli either Judge on tbe question now under consideration. All tbe Judges agreed with Mr. Justice Jewett in granting a new trial on another ground, stated in bis opinion.

How many of the Judges were present on tbe argument of that case, or took part in tbe decision of it, tbe réporter’s note does-not state.

' If tbe Court of Appeals has not directly affirmed tbe contrary of tbe instruction sought on tbe trial of this action, neither has it affirmed that such an instruction would be proper.

Under such circumstances, we do not feel at liberty to disregard a rule so long and uniformly held, and directly affirmed by the Supreme Court of this state half a century ago, and if not expressly decided, at least clearly approved by the court for the correction of errors, in Allen v. Addington, and in Root v. King. (See Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. U. S. R. 371-2; Austin v. Wilson, 1 Cash. R. 273, and the cases cited by counsel in Kendall v. Stone, 1 Selden, 18.)

If in actions of libel and slander, and in other actions of tort for injuries to the person or to character, damages may be given when the act was wanton, or actually malicious, which would not otherwise be allowed, although in each case the actual pecuniary injury, the extent of personal- suffering, the attendant circumstances of contumely and indignity, and the public disgrace, be precisely the same in the one case as in the other, it is of no practical consequence whether such damages be termed punitive, vindictive or compensatory. By whatever name they may be designated, they are manifestly given on account of the wantonness or malice of the defendant’s conduct, and the very rule which determines whether they may be given, or must be withheld, has no real principle on which it can stand, if it be conceded that they cannot be given by way of example, or to punish atrocity of conduct.

While such damages are allowed to be recovered, it cannot be an indifferent consideration whether a defendant is rich or poor. Damages which would be exemplary, when inflicted upon a person in moderate circumstances, would be trivial, and in no practical sense exemplary, when imposed upon a person whose property and income were very much larger.

Who the parties to a controversy of such a character as this are, what are their pursuits and positions, and what the influence resulting from them by a libel published by either of the other may be, are not unimportant parts of the transaction itself. Such

In considering the question raised by the exception, to the refusal to charge as requested, we have not referred to the decisions of the courts of any other state. We have forborne to make such a reference, for the reason that the decisions of the courts of this state have been uniform, and reach back to a period so remote that we do not feel at liberty to treat the question as an open one in this state, notwithstanding the doubts recently expressed by some members of our Court of Appeals, in relation both to the justice of the rule, and the existence of any authority by which it can be upheld.

A new trial is granted, on the ground that the deposition of Strakoseh was improperly admitted. A new trial being granted on that ground, it must be with costs to abide the event of the action.

As I concur with my brethren in their conclusions upon every point of the cause, and consider the reasons assigned by Mr. Justice Bosworth sufficient to sustain such conclusions, it might appear needless to add any thing to the opinion delivered. But the leading question in this case — the right to give vindictive damages in a libel suit, where actual malice is found by the jury — receives great importance from the opinions of some Judges of the Court of Appeals, which question that right. The doubt thus thrown upon a rule which I have received from my professional teachers as unquestioned law, has made me feel it a duty to add something to the reasoning and authorities upon which the opinion of my brother is founded. The twenty-ninth exception taken by the defendant’s counsel upon the trial, involves the point in controversy.

The Judge was requested to charge as follows: — “ That if the jury should find any ground for giving damages to the plaintiff, their verdict should be for such sum only as would compensate him for the injury he had sustained therefrom; and that the jury were not at liberty to give him any further sum by way of

The observations of my brother Bosworth, in contrasting this -request with the charge actually made, and his conclusion that the refusal is not, when the whole is considered, ground of exception, appear to me unanswerable. But I am desirous of expressing my own opinion upon this great point, when placed in the strongest form in which it can be presented for the defendant. I shall, therefore, consider it as if the Judge had expressly charged the converse of the proposition to be the law, and had employed the language of the request, varying it only by omitting the word “not” in the latter part, and inserting the same word after the word “ should” in the first clause. In determining whether this would be ground of exception, the court is justified in connecting it with portions of the charge actually made, pertinent to the same question. It may, therefore, be viewed in conjunction with the instruction, “ that an actual malicious intent in making the publication might be proven, and the jury was to judge by the evidence whether such an intent was made out. If such was the case, and the defendant had not proven his allegations to be true, he should not escape with nominal damages.”

I shall treat the question, then, as the counsel insists it must be treated, under the refusal and the actual charge; and shall suppose that the Judge had added, after what I have quoted from the charge, the converse of the proposition contained in the request, as I have stated it.

It is to be noticed that this proposition does not involve, but may be entirely consistent with, the exclusion of the idea of punishment for the injury done to society. It is punishment of the defendant for the wrong done to the plaintiff. It is punishment for an injury attempted or designed as well as for one inflicted. It is punishment for the intent to injure in numerous cases, where no injury can probably arise; and it is consistent with the assumption that the offence cannot be penally visited by the state; or if it can be, that the penalty is inflicted on a different ground.

I am unable to see any logical contradiction in holding, that the same person may be compelled to atone for the same offence to an individual for a wrong done or menaced him, and to society for his aggression upon her peaoe; nor again, that the mode of

In this connection I may advert to the point taken by the counsel, that this doctrine of punishment inyades the provision of the present constitution, that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence. That precept is found in the early ages of the common law in the maxim, nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto, and was applicable to criminal prosecutions, and when one judgment or sentence had been perfected. Another maxim, perhaps more pertinent, is, that no one should be twice vexed, if it appears to the court, that it is for one and the same cause. (Shawe’s Case, 5 Rep. 61.)

It has never been imagined that either of these precepts interposed an objection to the institution of proceedings by the state, simultaneously with an action by an individual for a libel. It has become settled law in England and in this state, that the existence or determination of the one is no bar to the other, although it may bear upon the question of the suspension of proceedings, or mitigation of punishment, in the criminal court. That court will postpone sentence or the proceedings, until the result of the civil suit is known, with a view to the extent of punishment; but the civil action is not stayed or affected by the criminal prosecution. (Cook v. Wilis, 6 Hill, 466 , and cases.) I am informed by two gentlemen, who have each filled the office of district attorney, that the practice is as frequent to stay proceedings before as after conviction, until the result of the civil suit is ascertained.

The punishment upon conviction for a libehin our state, is a fine not exceeding $250, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both such fine and imprisonment. (2 R. S., 697.) This is the reparation to the public, which the Legislature has deemed sufficient for the vindication of public justice. And that offence which is thus punished, is the tendency of the libel to provoke to a breach of the peace. (1 Haw. Pl. C., 73; 2 Kent, 17.)

This tendency is so essentially the ground of the criminal prosecution, that it lay at the root of the rule so long prevalent in our own country, that the truth upon an indictment for a

When, then, the terms, vindictive damages or exemplary damages, are employed in a civil action for libel, they mean, in my opinion, the atonement which the law demands shall be made to the libelled party by the offender; and such atonement involves essentially his puhishment. It is a condemnation and infliction for traducing the individual — not for provoking him to break the peace.

It would be objectionable in this view of the case, to instruct a jury to give damages, on the ground that the interests of society required the defendant’s punishment, or that they could consider the offence to the state as a reason for increasing the damages. It must be admitted that this idea has, in some cases, been loosely and partially presented. It does not belong .to that idea of punishment now sought to be developed.. That'is consistent with the supposition, either that there, is .no penalty on behalf of the state, or that such penalty is for another cause, and with a different object. ■

The moment we admit of any exception to the naked rule of compensation, measured by an accurate, or approximate computation of actual pecuniary loss, we admit .the idea of a reparation for something indefinite, and the. adjustment of which must be indefinite.

It is stated that the Lord Commissioner (Adam), of Scotland— the most earnest advocate of the most restricted rule — said, in an action for defamation of a professional man, “that the question of damages must always include both a question of loss and sola- tium.” (Quoted by Mr. Sedgwick, 465, N.) The allowance of any sum for solatium, is an allowance-for something beyond'positive loss, and for reparation distinct from restoration; It seems difficult to separate this idea of reparation from that of. punishment. What is taken from the offender beyond what is'Tost and can be restored to the party injured, partakes of. the nature of a penalty.

But again, there is a class of libel cases in which the character and situation of the person assailed, preclude the possibility, not merely of a pecuniary loss, but of an injury to his reputation,

When the justice of the country is invoked to deal with a libeller in such' a case, on what ground can any damage be awarded but upon that of atonement for an attempted offence, and punishment as the absolute foundation and object of the verdict? Civil actions for libels must be abandoned, and in cases where the just indignation of an honest community demands their enforcement, if such a principle must be surrendered.

With these views, I have examined the leading English cases, and those of our sister states, which are cited by Mr. Sedgwick in his able work upon damages, and in the comments of Mr. Greenleaf and Mr. Metcalf upon them. A few others may be added. (Cole v. Tucker, 6 Texas Rep., 268 ; Fleet v. Hollerheep, 13 B. Monroe, 225; Stout v. Prad, Coxe’s N. J. Rep., 79; Trabrue v. Mays, 3 Dana, 138 .) It appears to me, that the great body of these authorities sanction the rule as I have attempted to express it.

It is superfluous for me to notice the decisions in our own state, after the critical and ample examination of them by my associate. I content myself with adverting to that of Tillotson v. Cheetham, in 1808, (3 Johns. R. 56,) and those of Collins v. The Albany R. R. Company, in 1852, (12 Barbour, 495,) and Taylor v. Church, in 1853. (Selden’s Notes of Appeal Cases, July, 1853, 50.)

In 1808, Chief Justice Spencer stated, “that it had always been the practice to instruct the jury in vindictive actions, such as libels, that they are to inflict damages for example’s sake, and by way of punishment to the defendant.” The rule thus declared to have always prevailed before 1808, has prevailed ever since, and has been recognized, or assumed to exist, in a long series of decisions in our state. It has become consecrated as an enduring maxim of our laws, by a perpetual tribute to its legal truth, offered by the illustrious judges of our tribunals, from the day of Spencer and of Kent to the charge of the Chief Justice of this

Eor these reasons I consider tbe refusal of tbe Judge to charge tbe jury as be was requested in tbe 29th exception, to be unobjectionable, and bis actual charge correct.

A new trial must, however, be granted, on account of tbe admission of tbe deposition of Strakosch.