Bennett v. Le Roy

Headnote

No court in this state can rightfully enjoin a party from proceeding in a suit in another court of the state, having equal power to grant, in such suit, the relief sought hy the complaint on which such injunction is asked.

If, in such a ease, a party who has brought an action in one court be enjoined from proceeding further therein by an injunction issued from another court of co-ordinate powers, and if he proceed, notwithstanding such injunction, his proceedings will not be set aside for that cause, as irregular.

But, in furtherance of justice, the party prejudiced by them will be relieved on such terms as may be just, but only upon consenting to a dissolution of the injunction, so far as it may interfere with the further prosecution of such action.

This case is reported in 5 Abb. Pr. R. p. 55, and in 14 How. Pr. R. 178. Bosworth, J., made an order on defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment in this action, that he be allowed to answer in this action in twenty days, on his paying within that time the costs of entering the judgment, and of subsequent proceedings thereon, including the sheriff’s fees on the execution issued on such judgment, and $10 costs of opposing the motion, and on serving with the answer a stipulation that an order be entered in the action in the Supreme Court, (the court which had enjoined the plaintiff in the above action from proceeding further therein,) so far modifying the said injunction, as to leave the plaintiff in this action at liberty to proceed therein, and also providing that if the defendant did not avail himself of such conditions by complying therewith that this motion be denied with $10 costs. The order so made was served on the 3d of July. On the same day, the defendant obtained from a Justice of the Supreme Court, an order in the action in that court, requiring the plaintiff and her attorneys to show cause why they should not be punished for a contempt of that court, by reason of having entered up judgment in the action in this court, and issued execution thereon.

The plaintiff, by her counsel, claiming that the motion thus about to be made in the Supreme Court, is a virtual refusal to accept, or an election not to accept the relief granted to the de-. fendant by the order made by Justice Bosworth, upon the conditions annexed thereto; or that a motion to punish the plaintiff

and her attorneys for the alleged contempt, is inconsistent with the spirit and intent of such order, and that the twenty days allowed to the defendant to stipulate and answer herein, were not given to enable him to take other measures in the mean time which might render the conditions, upon which the indulgence was granted to him, of no avail; subsequently, on notice, and on affidavits, showing the proceedings before Justice Bosworth and the proceedings taken by the defendant subsequent to the above-mentioned order, applied to Mr. Justice Woodruff for an order vacating the order vacating the judgment, and for other relief.

Mr. Justice Woodruff, after hearing the parties, held, 1st. That the Superior Court would not require the defendant to waive his motion in the Supreme Court, as the condition on which he would be allowed to come in and answer in the action in this court. The question, whether any contempt of the Supreme Court had been committed by the plaintiff, must be left to be adjudicated in that court.

2d. That the order of the Superior Court, holding the judgment regular, yet allowing the defendant to come in upon terms, did not impair or affect the right of the defendant to pursue the proceedings instituted by him in 'the Supreme Court on the alleged contempt. When a court of equity has restrained a party from proceeding at law, and he, notwithstanding, proceeds, it is discretionary with the court of law, to sustain or vacate his proceedings therein. But the exercise of this discretion does not preclude the court of equity from inquiring into the contempt.

3d. That the former order of the Superior Court should he so modified as to require the defendant to elect instanter, instead of within twenty days, whether the judgment in this action should be continued in force, or opened on the terms specified. (Reported in 5 Abb. Pr. R. 156.)