p. 110to be placed by the plaintiffs would not exceed $5000, but admitted that such representations were made in good faith, and disclaimed all idea of offering the evidence for the purpose of showing any actual fraud in the transaction. This evidence was overruled by the presiding Judge. Upon this statement of facts it was agreed that a verdict should be taken for the plaintiffs for the nominal sum of $2500, subject to the opinion of the Court, on a case to be made and subject to an adjustment of the amount which the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, to be ascertained according to the principles which the Court should adopt. Either party had leave to turn the case into a bill of exceptions, and it was stipulated, that the Court might, in their discretion, direct a non-suit, or a new trial.
The cause was now argued by Mr. Slosson for the plaintiffs, and by Mr. Jay and Mr. D. B. Ogden for the defendants.
Mr. Slosson observed that there were two points to be considered. The first related to the construction of the contract, and the second, to the admissibility of the parol evidence. The first question was, whether the gas-meters placed after the date of the policy were insured at all. Upon that point, the words of the policy (he said) were plain and explicit. The very subjects of insurance were gas-meters and fixtures placed, or to be placed, and it matters not whether they were established before the date of the policy or afterwards. The plaintiffs wished to insure a certain sum for a length of time on their property, and as it was of a changing and shifting kind, the defendants used words broad enough to cover the intention of the parties.II. Parol evidence to explain a contract so explicit, was clearly inadmissible. The policies speak their own language and the defendants cannot make them speak another by the mouths of witnesses. [Phil. on In. 117, 118. Thompson v. Ketcham 8. J. R. 189.]Mr. Jay and Mr. Ogden contended that the policies were satisfied when gas-meters to the amount of $3000, and fixtures to
p. 111the amount of $2000 were erected. That the risk attached to the subjects of insurance then established and not to any thing erected afterwards. Suppose fixtures and gas-meters to the amount of $100,000, to be erected subsequently to the date of the policy and then a loss,—what sum must the defendants pay % Not the whole $5000, but such a pr oportion of that sum, as the fixtures and gas-meters actually insured bear to the $100,000. The construction contended for on the other side, is against the grammatical meaning of the words of the policy, and would lead to absurd conclusions. It ought not therefore to be adopted.II. As to the parol proof, it ought to have been admitted, because its object was to show an incorrect representation ; and a false representation whether fraudulent or not, avoids the policy.We think that by the true constitution of these policies, they were intended to cover and did cover all the “fixtures” mentioned therein, to the amount of $2000; and this, whether they were “ placed” before or after the date of the policy. There is an exception it is true, as to losses occasioned by fire, proceeding from gas ; but that does not apply to the-case now before the Court.
As to the parol proof offered by the defendants, it was clearly inadmissible. The contract is to be construed by its own terms plainly expressed in the policies, and it cannot be varied by the proof rejected at the trial.
Judgment for the plaintiffs.