Majority
Headnote
1. What right of property there may he in what is commonly denoted the “good will” of a business, is not fully determined; but such property, whatever it is, has never been protected, except where it has been made the subject of some expres’s covenant between the parties. It may be sold by private agreement, and the stipulations of the parties in respect to it will be enforced; but in the absence of any covenant, and upon a purchase at an involuntary sale, the vendee is not subrogated to all the rights of the original owner. Per Monell, J.Eo evidence was given or offered on the trial of this action, proving or tending to prove that any portion of the material used in printing the paper called La Crónica, and claimed to have been purchased by the plaintiff, was in the possession of the defendant at the commencement of the suit. Such property, if it existed, had previously gone into the possession of DePena’s widow, who claimed it under the Spanish law, as the heir-at-law of her husband; or it was being administered by her as administratrix de son tort. In either case she alone could be called to account for it. But there was evidence that the type and material used in printing the paper, the publication of which is sought to be enjoined, was pur
The plaintiff’s claim to the restraint'was founded upon his purchase, at the public administrator’s sale, of the interest of DePena in the newspaper called La Crónica, which the plaintiff claimed embraced, not only the type, cases and presses used in printing, but also the exclusive right to the name and the good will connected therewith; and that, therefore, the publication by the defendant of a newspaper bearing the same name, or of any name, so similar in its appearance to the eye or in its sound to the ear, as was calculated to deceive the public into the belief that they were the same, was an invasion and infringement of his proprietary right in the former paper.
It was not disputed that DePena, at the time of his death, was the sole proprietor of La Crónica ; nor that the plaintiff acquired all the interest of DePena in such publication. And it was conceded that Mrs. DePena and the defendant, under a copartnership agreement, continued the publication of the paper from the period of DePena’s death, until the 4th of May, 1867, without any material change, either in the name or in the typographical or general appearance, or in the size and form of the paper. On that day, however, the publication of La Crónica ceased, and with its cession, the joint interests of Mrs. DePena and the defendant in such publication also ceased. Thereupon, and before the public administrator’s sale, the publication of El Cronista was commenced by the defendant as its editor and sole proprietor.
I need not stop to ascertain what proprietary interest,
If this case was to be determined solely upon whether the similarity, if it could be established there was any, of the names La Crónica and SI Cronista, could mislead the public into the belief that they were the same, and hence that the latter was a mere simulation of the former, I should have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion, upon the evidence, that no such effect would or could result. An inspection of the several issues which were produced before me, disclosed such marked differences in the size, heading, typographical and general appearance of La Crónica, as published by DePena in his lifetime, and the paper of the same name, issued by his widow and the defendant afterwards, that the issues of the later period, would
The case, however, in my judgment, is relieved of all difficulty, inasmuch as it clearly appears that upon or prior to the publication of El Cronista the publication of La Crónica had ceased. For, I think, it cannot be successfully claimed that one was merged in or was even a continuation of the other. La Crónica was printed with .the type and upon the presses of the original proprietor, under a copartnership arrangement between Mrs. DePena and the defendant, whereas El Cronista was the sole property of . the defendant, both in the adoption of its name and in the type used in its printing. Unless therefore it can be sustained that the proprietorship of a newspaper is so exclusive and comprehensive that its rights would be invaded by a publication of another newspaper bearing a different, title órname, the defendant’s publication cannot be claimed-to be an infringement of any of the plaintiff’s rights. I do not understand that theprotection which the law affords to “trademarks,” even assuming the name of a newspaper to be a trademark, goes so far as is claimed in this case. The protection" which has been granted .to that species of property has never, I believe, been extended over any thing that was the subj ect of a patent or a copyright, but is confined to appropriations of names designating some
. I do not mean to say that a newspaper proprietor cannot appropriate, and by long use, acquire a property in a name, which the courts will protect against piracy. In this respect the analogy of the rules of trademark would apply, (Dayton v. Wilkes, 17 How. Pr. 510 .) And “I have no doubt that the names, so long appropriated and used, of the New , York Herald, or ■ The Sun, would be protectéd as trademarks, against the assumption of those names by another proprietor. But that I understand to be the extent of the rule, and that any mere assimilation of the name, unless it was very clearly calculated to deceive the public, would not be unlawful.
There was not sufficient evidence on the trial that the public had been deceived. The plaintiff’s evidence, and that of his only witness, was of too general a character to establish so important a fact. Besides, it was more than" balanced by the evidence on the part of the defendant before alluded to, that the names of the two papers were so dissimilar in signification, that no one acquainted with the Spanish language could be decoyed into purchasing the one for the other. And the inspection which I have given of the several papers which were made exhibits before me, has confirmed me in the same'belief. Upon the whole case, therefore, l am of opinion that the defendant is entitled to judgment dissolving the injunction, and dismissing the complaint, with costs.
Cases cited
- Stephens v. Cady 14 How. 528 p. 347
- McCardel v. Peck 28 How. Pr. 120 p. 347
- Dayton v. Wilkes 17 How. Pr. 510 p. 349