p. 490days from the making of the first contract, that unless the work was delivered within the time, he should proceed to get the work from other parties ? which was denied, and defendant excepted.
Defendant also asked that the whole case should be submitted to the jury, which was denied and defendant excepted.
The court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for one thousand two hundred and forty-seven dollars and seventy cents ; to which defendant excepted.
The court directed the exceptions to be heard in the first instance at the general term ; all proceedings on the part of the plaintiff under .the judgment to be stayed in the mean time.
James N. Culver, attorney and counsel for plaintiff,—Urged :
First. From the testimony of Banta & Brinkerhoff, it appears that Banta & Brinkerhoff employed one Charles Hamilton to make the carved wooden figures, and Yoorhies knew it, mentioned in the complaint, and deliver the same when completed to John D. Yoorhies. The evidence further shows that the figures contracted for were furnished by Hamilton; and they were delivered by Hamilton to Yoorhies, and accepted by him; and that some were finished in February, and they were afterward seen on the chariots in the circus company, where they were designed to be used.Second. It appears from the evidence that the first of said contracts was made on the 24th day of January; ' that it was to have been finished and delivered within thirty days—what number of the figures does not appear. Yoorhies himself testifies that on the 12th of February, eleven days before the expiration of the time limited in the contract, he, Yoorhies, said he would give two days longer to have the figures delivered; and
p. 491that in a day or two after the two days had expired, he made an arrangement with Hamilton. That is, seven or eight days before the expiration of the time agreed upon, Yoorhies assumes to repudiate his agreement and make a new arrangement with Hamilton; and he now asks this court to sanction that transaction. When called upon to pay the bill to Banta & Brinkerhoff, defendant said he had settled the bill or the matter. He did not say he did not owe the bill. Banta bought Brinkerhoff out 1st February, 1868.Third. The denial of defendant’s motions and the refusals to submit to the jury as requested, were fully warranted by the facts of the case as proved. There was no question of fact to go to the jury. What Banta and Brinkerhoff swore to was not contradicted by Yoorhis, nor was Yoorhies contradicted.Wm. S. Hascall, defendant’s attorney, and Francis Lynde Stetson, counsel, urged :—
The plaintiff failed to prove a delivery under the contract, which it appears was rescinded and revoked, and the evidence to this effect should have been allowed to go to the jury. Of course, a failure to prove such a delivery is fatal to the plaintiff’s supposed right of action. 1. The contract called for a delivery of the first work within thirty days. The work was not forthcoming at the expiration of that time. 2. Upon this failure of Banta to deliver his work in accordance with the contract, Yoorhies elected to rescind the contract; which was also a question to be passed upon by the jury. Yoorhies, after the expiration of the contract time, gave notice to Brinkerhoff (who swears that he communicated it to Banta) that unless the work was delivered within two days, he would have to resume it himself, and that he should make a contract with other parties to deliver ; the work was not forthcoming, and' he made such a contract. Hot only was there a failure to show a de
p. 492livery within the fixed time, but it was presented as a question for the jury, whether Banta ever made any delivery at all. The plaintiff claimed that if Voorhis ever received the goods of Hamilton, he received them of Banta, as principal of Hamilton. This could b.e, only if the relation of principal' and agent continued to exist between these parties down to the time of delivery by Hamilton. The law and the facts both leading to the conclusion that the contract between Banta and Hamilton was rescinded, no claim can be made that any subsequent delivery by Hamilton was made under Ms contract with Banta.The law does not hold itself out as a means of profit to litigants, for this would encourage litigation, which it is the interest of the State should cease. Yet, according to the Chief Justice, the plaintiff is to recover all the contract price for the work, and to escape all-the charge and burden of furnishing it. If the plaintiff was entitled to recover anything, it was only the difference between the' price which Banta had agreed to pay Hamilton, and the price which he was to receive from Yoorhies. This was the anticipated profit which induced Banta to make the contract, and there is no reason that the court should increase it.I think the notice given by the defendant to the plaintiff’s assignors, to the effect, that if the manufactured articles were not delivered within two days thereafter, he would make a contract with other parties, operated, after the expiration of the limited time, as a rescission by the defendant of the contract; and thereafter, the only remedy upon it, was an action for damages for the breach The delivering by Hamilton to the defendant, was not intended to be, nor was it, a delivering by the plaintiff’s assignors. It was made under a new contract, between Hamilton and the defendant, after the defendant had
p. 493rescinded the previous contract. Hamilton’s relation to the plaintiff’s assignors, was, in the first instance, that of an employee to do the work. He was not bound to deliver without payment, and he accordingly refused to deliver. Thereupon he made a new contract with the defendant, and the only delivery was under that contract.
Whether Hamilton rendered himself liable to the plaintiff’s assignors for any supposed breach of his duty towards Ms employers, it is not necessary to inquire. He saw fit to make a new contract with one of the original contracting parties, and to fulfill that contract; and, it seems to me, the plaintiff’s assignors cannot claim that such fulfillment enured to their benefit, and gave them a right of action for the price of the articles.
Whether the defendant could wholly rescind the first contract, is not material. They did so far rescind, as to amount to a réfusal to accept any delivery under it; and the acceptance afterwards, under the new contract, was not an acceptance from the plaintiff’s assignors.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the action for the price of the goods failed, and that the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that no delivery under the contract had been proved, should have been granted.
The exceptions should be sustained, the verdict 'Set aside, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the defendant to abide the event.