p. 42The amended complaint averred, as to the contract, that Hayward was constructing houses at St. Paul for the defendant; that on that account the defendant was, or was about to become, indebted to Hayward, and then had funds payable to Hayward; that it was mutually agreed between the plaintiff’s firm, the defendant and Hayward, that the firm should send the goods, and that the defendant would pay to the firm so much of his then or prospective indebtedness to Hayward as was necessary to discharge the claim of the firm ; that relying on this promise, the goods were sent to Hayward, at St. Paul; and the goods were received and used by the defendant in the construction of his houses.
The defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint, on the ground that it was not sustained by the evidence. The motion was denied, and exception taken to the ruling.
The defendant gave evidence.
It appeared in evidence that Hayward had died before he could give notice of the arrival of the goods, if they in fact had arrived.
The referee directed judgment for the plaintiff.
A. J. Dittenhoefer, attorney, and C. A. Runckle, of counsel, for appellant.
Sidney T. Harris, attorney, and of counsel, for respondent.
The plaintiff clearly could not recover upon any contract testified to in the case, excepting that one which the plaintiff stated in his testimony. He swore that the money was to be paid by defendant out of funds due to Hayward, when the goods arrived in St. Paul, and when Hayward had notified him of their arrival. If such was the con
p. 43tract, even if its terms were not reasonable, the defendant’s liability arose only from it. In fact, if the debt was to be paid out of Hayward’s money, it was a reasonable and probable provision in favor of Hayward that the defendants should pay only after it was certain that Hayward had received the mantels. The notice by Hayward, perhaps, might be dispensed with, he having died before he could send the notice. This, however, did not dispense with the obligation on plaintiff’s part to prove that the goods had in fact arrived in St. Paul’s. This was one of the conditions, on the happening of which the defendants were to pay out of Hayward’s funds. There was evidence that the goods were sent from the city of Hew York, but not that they arrived at St. Paul’s. There was no presumption against the defendants, that because they were sent by railroad or by steamer they reached the city of St. Paul’s.' For failure to prove this, the referee, in my opinion, should have granted the motion to dismiss the complaint.
It is unnecessary to go further, although I think that the promise of the defendant was evidence of an independent obligation on his own part and not simply a promise to answer for the debt of Hayward. In view of our conclusion, it would be of no practical importance to determine whether the referee had power to amend the complaint.
I am of opinion that the judgment should be reversed, a new trial ordered, the order of reference discharged, with costs to appellant, to abide the event.
Curtis, J., concurred.