p. 23not say anything about the indebtedness; that was the amount for which I was to draw the notes; how much my father owed him I did not know.”
Christopher Keyes, on being recalled, testified :
“At the time these notes were drawn, signed, and indorsed no bill of Murphy & Kesbit, nor any receipt was given to me.”
On cross-examination, he testified ;
“Mr. Nesbit did not have any bills at the time the notes were given there ; I am positive of this.”
Testimony was then closed.
Plaintiff’s counsel then asked the court to direct a verdict for the plaintiffs on the evidence.
Defendant’s counsel insisted that the case should go to the jury, but the court ruled that there was no question for the jury and refused to permit the case to go to the jury, and defendant’s counsel then and there excepted. The court ordered a verdict for the plaintiffs, to which the defendant’s counsel then and there excepted.
The jury, under the direction of the court, found a verdict for the plaintiffs.
Defendant’s counsel moved for a new trial on the minutes, which motion was denied. ■
Judgment having been entered, the defendant, James F. Keyes, appealed therefrom, and also from the order denying the motion for a new trial.
J. F. Malcolm, attorney, and John E. Burrill, of counsel for appellant, urged;
I. The evidence clearly established that the defendant James F. Keyes received no consideration for the notes. If it be claimed that there was any doubt on that point, the defendant was entitled to have the cause submitted to the jury (Stone
v. Flower, 47
N. Y.
R. 566; Buckman
v. Jenks,
55 Barb. 468 , 473).
II. The claim of the plaintiffs that they had paid
p. 24value for the note by receiving it in payment of the debt due by Christopher Keyes to them was disputed by defendant, and there was a direct conflict on this point which entitled the defendant to have the case submitted to the jury. Same cases.
III. If it be claimed that for any other reason the plaintiffs could recover against the defendant, James F. Keyes, although Christopher Keyes could not, then we submit there was evidence sufficient to go to the jury on the question whether the note was made by James F. Keyes at the request and for the accommodation of the plaintiffs, and also on the question whether-it was not made and delivered on the faith of the representations of the plaintiff that it was a mere matter of form. Same cases.
Nelson Smith, attorney, and of counsel for respondent, urged;
I. The defendant’s exception to the direction, by the court, for the jury to find a verdict for plaintiff, is not well taken. The defendant, James F. Keyes, was,
prima facie, liable on the notes as maker,, and he had shown nothing which released him from his-liability (
Schepp v. Carpenter, 51 N. Y. 602 , and cases there cited). The question here presented is a simple, although an important one. Simple, as involving but one principle of law. Important, because a decision adverse to thp plaintiffs will unsettle great numbers of transactions in commercial paper. It is an every-day occurrence, in business, for a creditor to take his debtor’s paper with a “good indorser,” to such an extent, that almost the first question which a creditor asks of a debtor who is desirous of not being pressed for a cash payment of his debt, is about: the security. “ Can you give me a good indorser? ” It was so in this-case where James F. Keyes himself says : “ My father said ‘ (Nesbit) said he wanted your notes so that he could raise money on them,’ because he could not raise-
p. 26or showing anything to defeat plaintiffs’ prima facie right of recovery. It shows nothing, except that plaintiffs simply wished to do all they could to get their money.
If the evidence given on the part of the defense had simply showed that the appellant made the note in question for the accommodation and general benefit of his father, Christopher Keyes, that it was delivered to the latter without restrictions as to the manner of its use, and that thereupon the latter indorsed and delivered it to the plaintiffs, the appellant was clearly liable on it, though he had. received no consideration for making it (Schepp v. Carpenter, 51 N. Y. 602 , affirming S. C., 49 Barb. 542 ; Cole v. Saulpaugh, 48 Barb. 104 ). But the evidence went beyond this, it tended to show, and if credited by the jury, would have authorized the jury to find that the note was made at the request of, and for the accommodation of the plaintiffs, and without any consideration whatsoever as between them and the appellant. This the appellant had a right to prove, for the consideration of a negotiable paper is examinable as between the original parties to that paper, and hence it may always be shown, as between such parties, that there was no original consideration, or that the original consideration has wholly failed.
The appellant was, therefore, entitled to have the case submitted to the jury, and the direction of a verdict against him constituted error.
The judgment and order appealed from should be severally reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Curtis and Speir, JJ., concurred.