Lawson v. Pinckney

The admissibility of the notarial certificate as evidence, depends upon the construction of the act of 1865 (Laws of 1865, ch. 309), concerning proof of the protest of notes, which are payable out of this state.

That act provides that presentment pf such notes, and notice of protest may be made, “ according to the laws of such other state, &c. And in any action in any of the courts of this state . . . such proof of such presentment . . . and notice thereof, may be made, as is authorized and required by such laws. And on such proof being made, the . . . note shall be deemed to have been duly and sufficiently presented and protested, and notice of all thereof duly given.”

The construction and application of this statute would be very plain, if there were no other statutes to be considered.

In respect to the specification of the facts or acts of the notary, the statute of Pennsylvania differs from ours. Their statute provides that the official acts, protests, and attestations of notaries public, certified .according to law under their hands and seals, may be received and read in evidence as proof of the facts therein stated. There is nothing in that statute, which, like ours, prescribes the manner of serving notice; nor was any other statute, fixing the mode, proved on the trial; and it is understood there is no such statute.

That, however, does not affect the question of the application of the act of 1865, • which, apparently, makes any certificate under the hand and seal of a notary, evidence of the facts certified.

There is no repealing clause of the previous statute, but there is enough in the act of 1865, I think, to work a repeal by implication of so much of such previous statute as limits the certificate as presumptive evidence, to cases where the defendant fails to annex an affidavit to his answer. The policy of a rule of proving notice of the protest of foreign bills and notes, different from that which is required in respect to domestic paper, is a matter for the legislature, and not for the courts.

Thecompetency of this kind of evidence was decided in the supreme court of this department, in Fassin v. Hubbard ( 61 Barb. 548 ), but it does not appear in that case, that the defendant had annexed an affidavit to his answer, and no question, therefore, was presented of the effect of the acts of 1833 and T835, upon the act of 1865.

But the latter act contains no exception. The certificate of a foreign notary is made evidence in all cases, and it is not, by anything contained in the act, limited to cases where the defendant has omitted to make the affidavit.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the certificate was competent evidence, and the objection to its admission was properly overruled.

But the objection to its sufficiency remains.

The act of 1865 provides, that notes made payable in any state other than this state, may be presented for payment, and protested for refusal to pay, and notice of such presentment, and refusal may be made according to the laws of such other state. And in an action in the courts of this state upon such note, such proof of presentment, &c., may be made as is authorized and re quired by such laws.

The statute of Pennsylvania makes the official certificate of a notary public evidence, and meets or covers that part of the act of 1865, in respect to the proof authorized and required by such laws,” but does not provide, nor was any other statute or law given in evidence, which provides or shows that the presentment, refusal to pay, and notice thereof was made “ according to the laws ” of that state.

To make the certificate evidence at all, under our act it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the presentment and notice of protest was made in accordance with the law of the State where the presentment is made and notice given.

In that respect there was a failure of proof. The certificate was deficient in not stating the facts, showing that the protest and notice was made in the manner provided by law, and the plaintiff offered no other evidence that it was so done.

In the case of Fassin v. Hubbard (supra), it was proved that notaries public in Louisiana were required, by statute, to keep a record of the protests made by,them, together with mention of the notices given by them, and the manner in which they were served.

It can not be successñilly contended, I think, that after reciting the presentment of the notes, and the refusal to pay, it is enough for the notary to certify, “of all which I duly notified the endorsers unless it is shown that by the law of Pennsylvania, the certificate is not required to state anything more or further. If there is any manner of giving such notices prescribed by statute in Pennsylvania, as there is in this State, then such mode must be followed, and it must be specially stated in the certificate. To certify that it was duly done is not sufficient.

Independently of any statute, the law provides the various modes of giving notice according to the exigencies of every case. Thus it may be either personal, or at the domicil or place of business of the party; or

In meeting the denial of notice by the endorser, enough must be shown to answer the law. It must ¡appear that notice was given in one or other of the prescribed modes ; and if by the post, that it was addressed to the proper post-office. It is no part of the duty of a notary public to notify the parties entitled to notice, of the non-payment of a bill or note unless required to do so by statute (Bank of Rochester v. Gray, 2 Hill, 227 ). And when his certificate, for ■convenience or economy, or otherwise, is allowed to be substituted in some cases for oral proof of the protest and notice, it must contain as much, at least, as would be required in his oral testimony. It was not •intended, I think, that it might contain less facts than would be required in the oral proof; and the statement •of the notary on the stand, that he had “ duly notified Ihe endorsers,” would not be regarded as sufficiently •describing the manner of notifying. He would be asked, and required to answer, how, and in what form ¡and particular manner he had given or served the notice.

The presumption which arises in favor of the per-' formalice of official duty is confined to the act itself. "Thus where an officer is required to do a certain thing, -'it will be presumed that he has done it, and his certifying he has done it, will be taken as true. But when the officer certifies to the doing of the act, he must certify to having done all that the law requires him to •do; and there is no presumption that will supply .any omission in that particular.

Where proof by certificate is substituted for common-law evidence, all the forms directed by the statute, whether preliminary or substantial, must be strictly -complied with (Rogers v. Jackson, 19 Wend. 383 ).

The language of the act of 1865, is to me very plain. It does not absolutely render a foreign notarial certificate sufficient, unless the notary certifies to enough. If there is a statute prescribing the manner of notifying endorsers, the certificate must state the mode of service. If there is no statute, then the common-law mode must be followed, and the certificate must state the facts.

The act allows presentment and notice to be made and given, according to the laws of such other state, and proof thereof to be made as is authorized and required by such laws. On such proof, i. e., that the presentment and notice was according to the laws of such state, being made, it shall be held to have been duly done, and such a certificate would be enough.

So far the lex loci will control. If the protest and notice is in accordance with the laws of the state where the note is payable, it will conclude the courts here. But the proof and its sufficiency is governed by the lex fori, unless it is shown that the proof is of all the facts required by tjhe laws of such foreign state, or by the common law. And the burden of showing that rests upon the holder of the dishonored paper.

If these views are correct, then the notarial certificate should have been excluded from the jury, as not containing or being any evidence whatever of the service of notice upon the defendant; and the learned justice erred in refusing so tó charge.

Therefore, the submission of the question of notice to the jury as a fact to be found upon somewhat conflicting evidence, does not cure or remove the objection to their finding it upon improper evidence.

The judgment will be modified by deducting therefrom the sum of three thousand and fifty-one dollars and fifty cents, being the amount of the notes and interest, and as modified, affirmed, without costs of the appeal.

And as to the notes mentioned and described in the complaint, the judgment must be reversed, and a new-trial granted, upon the pleadings applicable thereto, without costs of the appeal to either party.

Our statute of 1865 called for proof upon the trial of what was notice of presentment and non-payment, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, and what proof of such notice was authorized and required by such laws. This was a matter of fact to be governed by the common-law rales of evidence, and our statutes. The evidence must be given upon the trial (§ 486 of 1 Or. Bn. and note of editor referring to a new section, § 688a, added by him to his edition of Story’s Cortf. of Laws). | 426 of the Code of Procedure enacts that printed copies of statutes of any state, &c., purporting to be published by authority, shall be admitted on all occasions as presumptive evidence of the laws of such state, and the unwritten or common law of any other states &c., may be proved as facts by parol evidence, and the book of reports of cases adjudged in these courts, may also be admitted as presumptive evidence of such laws.

In Cutter n. Wright ( 22 N. Y. 472 ), one of the judges considered that on the question of usury raised

In the present case the Pennsylvania statute, on which the plaintiff relies, was duly proven at the trial, and under this the notary’s certificate was admitted.

There was no proof, however, of what notice of presentation and non-payment of a promissory note, the laws of Pennsylvania required to make an endorser liable. On this point, for the reasons stated in respect of statutes, the books of reports of cases adjudged in the court of Pennsylvania, were not evidence when cited in the case for the first time on this appeal, nor were they evidence to show that the language of the certificate, “ of all which I duly notified the endorsers,” were by the laws of that state, prima, facie evidence of the existence of the fact of sufficient notice. By the common law, to which we are left in construing the certificate, the phrase quoted does not state facts, but a declaration that some unstated facts were sufficient in the notary’s opinion to constitute the notice to be by law given to the endorser to make him liable.” It is therefore not proper to examine if the present certificate' has the effect claimed by plaintiff, under the reported cases cited from the Pennsylvania Reports.

We are not, then, called upon to give a more particular construction of the statute of 1865, of this state. There is a question as to the meaning of fhe provision,

“ The word evidence, in legal acceptation, includes all the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved. This term, and the word proof,\ are often used indifferently, as synonymous with each other, but the latter is applied by the most accurate logicians to the effect of evidence, and not to the medium by which truth is established (1 Gr. Ev. § 1). If the word “proof,” in the statute designates the means of establishing the facts, the effect of the evidence would be left entirely to our courts, to be applied to the law of Pennsylvania, as to what notice was necessary to be given to an endorser. This construction would agree with the general, useful, and easily-applied rule, that the weight and sufficiency of testimony is controlled by the lex fori."

On the other hand, if the word implies the means of proof, and its sufficiency to establish the existence of the fact under investigation, the broader rule would be recognized as the object of the statute, that the obligations of parties to a contract made and to be performed in another state, are governed by the laws of such state. And if it appeared, in a case like the present, that the obligations of the defendant were such as were created by the laws of Pennsylvania and that there an endorser would be liable, prima facie, so far as notice was concerned by the production of a notary’s certificate like the one here, the statute of our state would provide for such a case. I am inclined to the latter construction, because the statute ends with the words, “And on such proof being made, the said bill of exchange or promissory note or bank check, shall be held to be, and deemed to have been duly presented, &c., and notice of all thereof duly given.” This can not mean that if the same kind of evidence is used here

But for the reasons stated in the learned Chief Justice’s opinion, as well as here, I concur in the conclusion arrived at by him.

Monell, Ch. J., concurred in this opinion.