p. 541agreement had been entered into, limiting defendant’s liability to $5.
The defendant’s counsel requested the court to charge “that if the jury believed the testimony as to the utter incapacity of the package to contain the sworn contents, it will discredit all the testimony of the plaintiff, and authorize a verdict for nominal damages.”
The court refused so to charge, and defendant’s counsel excepted.
The court, in one part of the charge, instructed the jury, that if the special agreement were not made, the defendant “was liable for the amount of the goods shipped.” And in another part, “for the actual value of these goods.”
The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff for $482.
B. C. Chetwood, attorney, and of counsel for appellant, urged:
I. The verdict is clearly not only against the evidence, but also in the teeth of the judge’s charge. 1. By the evidence uncontradicted the plaintiffs should have recovered $741, or thereabouts. 2. If they failed to recover that amount, the only other sum mentioned was, “ five pounds sterling.” 3. If the jury believed the testimony of defendants, they could find only nominal damages.II. The judge charged them in terms to find, if they found at all for plaintiffs, either, 1. Amount claimed in complaint with interest; or, 2. The equivalent of five pounds sterling, in United States currency. The jury set at naught the evidence, and turned a deaf ear to the instructions of the court, and found an utterly unsupported verdict for $482.16.
‘ ‘ Where the amount of a verdict is determined by mere conjecture, and is not based upon any calculation warranted by the testimony, it will be set aside as unsupported by sufficient evidence” (Bauder v
. Lasher,
5 Lans. 335 ). “To justify
p. 542a verdict, the law requires such proof as will leave no reasonable doubt of the existence of the fact upon which it must rest ” (Sheldon v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 29 Barb. 226 ; see also Lough v. Romaine, 4 J. & S. 332 ; McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551 ).III. Apart from all mistake on the jury’s part, we conceive the appellants have a good exception to the judge’s refusal to charge as requested. It is entirely within the principle of the charge, and undoubtedly defendants were entitled to have it charged, as requested. If explicit instructions are refused when asked to be given * * * * it is a cause for a new trial (Green v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 33 Barb. 25 ).John M. Bowers, attorney, and of counsel for respondent, urged:
I. As to the claim that the defendants over valued their goods, and that such articles could not have been contained in the lost cask. The plaintiffs were Germans, and innocently speak of the package lost as a “barrel;” and the defendants seek to prove that the plaintiff Albert Zimmerman spoke of it to the witness Losee as an “ ordinary flour barrel,” seven cubic feet in size, and then called several witnesses, Bogers, Noonan and Alcock, to prove that such a barrel could not have contained all the articles testified by the plaintiffs to have been in the package lost. Bach of these witnesses, however, states that casks are very much larger than barrels, and one of them, Noonan, says that a cask would have contained all the articles named. Bach of them also states that if they had seen the package lost, they could have at once said whether it was a barrel or a cask. There can be no question but that it was a cask. It was so spoken of by Boumphrey, one of defendant’s witnesses, who says it was a cask ; and by Titherington, another of defendhnt’s witnesses, who says it was a cask. Both these witnesses resided at Liverpool, and both saw the lost package. The cargo
p. 543book of the defendant also speaks of it as a cask ; and in the parcel receipt counterpart it is also spoken of as a cask. Both these exhibits were written by parties who saw the parcel. No other person who ever saw the cask gave testimony at the trial. The whole matter was properly submitted to the jury as a question of fact, and this court will not interfere with their verdict.II. The verdict could not, in any event, be set aside as against the weight of evidence, as the defendants made no motion for judgment (Peake v. Bell, 14 N. Y. S. C. R. [7 Hun] 454, and cases cited).The request to charge implied that in the case specified, the jury would have no right to say that there was any credible testimony as to what the package contained. This- is not a necessary result, for the jury had the right to perceive that the plaintiffs’ testimony was in part true, and the defendant’s testimony did not go the length of showing that the package could not have contained china of some value, to more than a nominal amount.
The judge instructed the jury (after leaving the question of liability of only £5, to them properly) that if that special agreement were not made, the defendants “ were liable for the amount of the goods shipped,” and in another place “the actual value of these goods.” The learned counsel for appellant supposes that this charge strictly held the jury to find a verdict in the amount sworn to by the plaintiffs’ witnesses, which was materially greater than the verdict. If it be the case, that the only error is that the jury did not find an amount as great as the evidence indisputably shows, then the verdict might be increased to the proper amount. The finding of the jury jvas not hurtful to the appellant, and cannot be complained of by it. The fact that the jury did not find the larger amount, shows that in their discrimination, they believed that the
p. 544quantity was less than the witnesses testified to, from a mistake, a miscalculation of the fullness of the sets of china, or from excusable exaggeration, but not necessarily from intentional falsehood.
I am of opinion the judgment should be affirmed with costs.
Speir, J., concurred.