p. 551Ms part, he was entitled to hold it (Welch v. Sage, 47 XT. Y. 143).
‘‘ Both the parties to this action having acted in good faith, it may be difficult to say which should suffer the loss ; but the defendants having so far clothed the defaulting broker with the indicium of ownership of the check, by giving him possession of it without any sufficient notice to the plaintiff that it had not been paid .for, or that Robinson or his principals, Bishop & Co., had no funds in their hands against which the check had been drawn, must be held liable to the plaintiff for the amount with interest (Barnard v. Campbell, 55 JY. Y. 456; Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 Id. 521; Weaver v. Barden, 49 Id. 286 ; Moore ». Met. Nat. Bk., 45 Id. 41; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bk., 46 Id. 325).
“Henby E. Howland, Referee.”
F. F. Marbury, Jr., attorney, and F. F. Marbury, of counsel for appellants, urged:
I. The check of the defendants was given to Robinson at his request, to be used in the conversion of gold into currency, in a transaction between the plaintiff and R. M. Bishop & Co., of Cincinnati. It was to be paid for in its equivalent in currency, by the check of the plaintiff to the order of the defendants. Defendants’ check was drawn to the order of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, in paying for it, should have drawn his check or checks to the order of the defendants. The checks were negligently drawn to the order of Robinson.
II. If the defendants had intended to trust Robinson, or his firm, the gold check would have been drawn to his or their order, but this was intentionally avoided. The delivery to Robinson of certificates or of gold, was expressly refused, and to prevent any loss, the precaution was adopted of drawing the check to plaintiff’s order.III. The defendants did not owe plaintiff anything,
p. 552and when the check was delivered to him, payable to his order, it was notice to him, that the check back should be drawn to defendants’ order. ,The slightest caution or consideration on the part of Davis would have prevented any loss.IV. If, instead of drawing two checks to the order of Robinson, one of the members of the firm of Robinson & Rockwell, to accommodate him, as Mr. Davis states, he had drawn the check to defendants’ order, or even taken the trouble to send or go up to their office, and inquire whether he was doing right, all this trouble would have been avoided. But he made the mistake of yielding to Robinson, who was just getting ready to abscond. It was an additional impropriety to draw a check to the individual order of Robinson, one of the members of a firm.V. Mr. Davis had no right to draw these checks to the order of Robinson. When Robinson went to plaintiff’s office, he did not bring a check payable to the order of himself or his firm, but to the order of the plaintiff. Plaintiff knew defendants owed him no gold, and the first idea which would occur to any prudent person would be, “I must pay defendants Sor this gold, or get their consent to the paying for it to any one else.”VI. Where one of two innocent persons mast suffer from the fraud and misconduct of a third, he who enabled the wrong-doer to perpetrate the wrong must bear the loss. Plaintiff, through Davis, was the approximate cause of loss.VII. Robinson did not have some, or the usual evidence of title. The check was not payable to his order, but to plaintiff’s, and that for a reason and to exclude the idea that it was Robinson’s property,VIII. The title to the check was not in Robinson’ s, but another payee’s name—the plaintiff’s was expressly inserted. Robinson had no control over, nor could he
p. 553use the gold check. It was drawn to the order of the plaintiff, and by him only could be used.IX. Mere possession of a check, drawn to the order of a third person, does not clothe the person having possession, with the indicium of ownership.X. The rule in regard to the discount or sale of negotiable paper cannot control this case. It rests upon its OAvn peculiar facts and circumstances. If Robinson had taken a check payable to his own order, and negotiated it to a bona fide holder for value, the rule Avould apply.XI. As to the relations between defendants and R. M. Bishop & Co., there was no credit given or expected, except to the extent of the fluctuations in the premium of gold. On all these conversions of gold accounts into currency ones, the giving of the gold and the taking back of the currency were to be simultaneous. The inode of conversion is referred to in Davis' testimony. Robinson & Rockwell or Robinson were only to arrange for the conversions.XII. The preponderance of evidence as to usage is decidedly in favor of defendants, and this must be so from the nature of the case. The usage as testified to by defendants’ witnesses is, that where gold is delivered to a party in the form of a check, payable to his order, the currency check in payment for it is returned payable to the order of the party who drew the gold check. It would add frightfully to the risks of business if checks could be drawn to the order of any one who delivers gold or stock, instead of to the order of the parties from whom the stocks or gold in point of fact came. In this case there was express and distinct notice that gold came from defendants, Avho alone Avere the parties entitled to receive payment therefor.Joseph A. Welch, attorney, and of counsel for respondent, urged:
I. The defendants wholly failed to
p. 55521 Id. 531 ; Clothier v. Adriance, 51 Id. 322; Crocker v. Crocker, 31 Id. 507; Driscoll v. W. B. &c. M. Co., 59 Id. 97; Porter v. Parks, 49 Id. 565; Weaver v. Barden, Id. 286 ; Moore v. Met. Nat. Bk., 55 Id. 41; McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bk., 46 Id. 325; Seybel v. Nat. Cy. Bk., 54 Id. 288; Ledwich v. McKim, 53 Id. 307; Turnbull v. Bowyer, 40. Id. 456 ; N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 Id. 59, 60 ; Preston v. Mann, 25 Conn. 118 ).After a full and critical examination of the whole evidence, I am unable to see how the judgment can be disturbed. The cause has been fully and fairly tried. The findings of fact made by the learned referee, are supported by an overwhelming preponderance of the evidence ; his conclusions of law are a correct determination of the rights of the parties arising from the facts as found, and the opinion delivered with his report is such a complete and correct exposition of the law of the case, that in my judgment, it is unnecessary to add anything to it.
The exceptions to the referee’s findings and his refusals to find are clearly untenable, and the exceptions to his rulings, on questions of evidence,, appear to be equally so.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Curtis, Ch. J., and Sandford, J., concurred.