Hyperlawhypertext legal database Robertson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 47 N.Y. Super. Ct. 377

← Cases

Robertson v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

47 N.Y. Super. Ct. 377 15 Jones & S. 377 Court N.Y. Super. Ct. Decision date 1881-06-06 English

Contents

Majority

p. 377
LOUISE ROBERTSON, Respondent, v. THE METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO., Appellant.

Headnote

Insurance policy—waiver of forfeiture.
A statement made by a duly authorized agent of an insurance company, to the assured, who called the next day after the semi-annual premium upon her policy fell due, for the purpose of paying the same, that “Mr. R. (upon whose life the policy was given, and who was the husband of the assured) had attended to it himself,” furnishes sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question whether the company thereby intended to waive the forfeiture incurred by the non-payment of the premium upon the day it fell due.
Before Speir and Freedman, JJ.
Decided June 6, 1881.
Appeal from a judgment for $4,191.48, entered on a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and also from an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
In 1868, the defendant issued to the plaintiff a policy of insurance for $5,000, on the life of her husband. The premium was made payable semi-annually, one-half in cash and one-half in a loan, with thirty days’ grace. On February 9, 1877, when the thirty days’ grace expired, the plaintiff did not pay the half-year’s premium then due. Upon the trial plaintiff gave evidence tending to prove that on the following day, plaintiff’s agent went to the company’s office prepared to pay the pre
p. 378
mium, and was told by an authorized agent of the •company that the insured had “attended to that himself.” The court submitted to the jury the question whether there was a waiver of the forfeiture, and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff.
Arnoux, Mitch & Woodford, attorneys, and Wm. Henry Arnoux, of counsel, for appellant.
Goodrich, Beady & Platt, attorneys, and Wm. W. Goodrich, of counsel, for respondent, cited:
Insurance Co. v. Wolff ( 95 U. S. 329 ); Goit v. National Ins. Co. ( 25 Barb. 189 ); Carroll v. Charter Oak Ins. Co. ( 38 Barb. 407 ); Shearman v. Niagara Ins. Co. ( 46 N Y. 526 ); May on Insurance, § 143; Titus v. Glenns Falls Ins. Co. ( 8 Abb. N. C. 315 ); Insurance Co. v. Norton ( 96 U. S. 234 ); Prentice v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. ( 77 N. Y. 483 ), and the cases there cited.

Upon full examination, I have arrived at the conclusion that under the doctrine of waiver, as applicable to insurance companies, to prevent the strict enforcement of conditions contained in their policies, and especially in view of the principles laid down in Insurance Co. v. Norton ( 96 U. S. 234 ); Prentice v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. ( 77 N. Y. 483 ); and Titus v. Glenns Falls Ins. Co. ( 81 N. Y. 410 ), the plaintiff made a sufficient case to entitle her to go to the jury upon the question whether or not the company had elected to treat the policy as in force on February 10, 1877, and by such election had waived the forfeiture. If I am correct in this, no ground for reversal exists, for the question was fairly submitted to the jury and their finding should not be disturbed.

The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.

Speir, J., concurred.

Cases cited