p. 305Headnote
Words imputing insolvency, when spoken of one “ engaged in the wooden ware business,” are actionable.The principle is, that words spoken of a merchant, trader, or person engaged in business, in which credit is usual, making imputations against his credit, are actionable, and it is not confined to merchants and traders exclusively.
An allegation in a complaint, that the plaintiff is “ engaged in the wooden ware business,” is equivalent to an averment that he is a buyer and seller of wooden ware. (Before Oakley, Ch. J., and Vandeefoel and Sandford, J.J.)
Motion in arrest of judgment, in an action of slander. The complaint stated that the plaintiff was “ engaged in the wooden ware business, in the city of Hew York,” and that the defendant had published concerning him, the following slanderous words : “You are a cheat: you always was a d—n cheat: you came some of your d—n cheating tricks the other day about that check, when you bought some brooms of us, and then kept out of the way. I have got you just where I want you; but there is no bottom to you. I would put you through, but you won’t stand. You will burst or fail, before I have a chance.” The complaint also contained other allegations of a similar character, in which the defendant was charged with having cautioned persons against trusting the plaintiff, and that he would soon break.
The defendant did not answer the complaint. The cause came on before the chief justice and a jury, on the 27th June, 1849. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, of $75. After the verdict, the defendant’s counsel moved in arrest of judgment, which motion was denied, and the defendant appealed to the general term.
N. B. Blunt, for the plaintiff.
E. Sandford, for the defendant,
referred to Rathbun v. Emigh,
p. 3066 Wend. 407 ; Ostrom v. Calkins, 5 Ibid. 263; Southam v. Allen, T. Raym. 237; also 3 Wils. 177, 183, 186; 4 Wend. 537 ; 1 Denio 250 ; 1 Ad. & Ell. 2; 1 John. Cas. 129.The slander, as alleged in the complaint, undoubtedly consisted in a charge of insolvency against the plaintiff, who is engaged in the business of vending wooden ware in the city of Hew York, and a distinct intimation that he was unworthy of credit. It is well settled, that such allegations spoken of a merchant engaged in business, constitute an abundant cause of action. But it is contended, that the rule is not applicable to dealers like the plaintiff. We think, however, upon examination, that the principle is not so narrow as was insisted by the defendant’s counsel. Starkie, in his Treatise on Slander, at pages 117 and 118, lays down what we conceive to be the true rule, that imputations upon the credit of merchants and traders, which, if believed, must necessarily operate to their serious prejudice, are actionable; and he cites instances in which the rale has been applied to a great variety of trades and employments, in which credit is usual, and to some which were much less like the business of merchants, than the occupation of the plaintiff. The description in the complaint, of the plaintiff’s employment, in its ordinary meaning, does not, as was said by the defendant’s counsel, imply of itself merely that he was a turner of wooden bowls. It means a buyer and seller of wooden ware, and as such, he is within the established principle by which such words are held to be actionable without proof of special damage.
Judgment affirmed.