Hyperlawhypertext legal databasebeta Kramer v. Board of Police Department 53 N.Y. Super. Ct. 492

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Kramer v. Board of Police Department

53 N.Y. Super. Ct. 492 21 Jones & S. 492 Court N.Y. Super. Ct. Decision date 1886-07-02 English

Delivered by Ingraham, J.

Contents

Majority

p. 492
WILLIAM KRAMER, Respondent, v. THE BOARD OF POLICE OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant.

Headnote

Police department.—Injunction against arrests by, for claimed violation of law forbidding sale of wine in auditorium or lobbies of places where theatrical, etc., performances are given—Equity jurisdiction as to.
An action in equity will not lie to determine the question of the guilt or innocence of one charged, with an offense against the criminal law.
Therefore, where from the complaint in an action for an injunction, it appears that the acts sought to be restrained consisted in. the arrest by the police department, of persons claimed by it to be engaged in the selling of wine, etc., in the auditorium or lobbies of places where theatrical, minstrel, equestrian, circus, acrobatic, juggling or rope dancing performances are given, contrary to § 2010 of chapter 410 Laws 1882 (the Consolidation Act), which makes such selling a misdemeanor, and its interference with a business claimed by it to consist in part of such sale, and that the injunction is asked for on the sole ground that the plaintiff violates no law, but that nevertheless the police under such claim threaten to arrest the plaintiff and his employees, and to interfere with his business, whereby he will sustain irreparable injury which cannot be estimated or ascertained in an action of law,—a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant the injunction. A fortiori, it has no jurisdiction to generally restrain the arrest by the police for any cause or offense whatever, of any person while engaged on. the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of any business with him.
Before Trtjax and Ingraham, JJ.
Decided July 2, 1886.
Appeal from order granting injunction.
p. 493
The defendants in this action are sued as “a body duly created by law specially charged "with enforcing the laws of this state and preserving the peace of the city,” and the complaint alleged that the defendants by their servants and policemen have threatened to arrest the plaintiff and all his employees, and to interfere with plaintiff’s business and prevent him from carrying on the same at his place of business in the city of New York, claiming that the plaintiff violates the law, and further alleging ‘1 that plaintiff violates no law whatever, and unless the defendants are enjoined from interfering with plaintiff’s business and making the threatened arrests, the injury plaintiff will sustain will be irreparable which cannot be estimated or ascertained in an action at law and the complaint demanded judgment, “ that the defendants, its superintendent, inspectors, captains, sergeants, rounds-men, patrolmen, &c., be enjoined and restrained from arresting or taking into custody, any person engaged upon the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of the business of the plaintiff, and from interfering with or hindering any such persons in the transaction of said business, and from in any manner proceeding against such persons by arrest, or otherwise, in the conduct of said business on plaintiff’s premises, and from in any manner interfering with or hindering plaintiff or such person or persons authorized in carrying on the business as aforesaid.”
On this complaint and the affidavit of the plaintiff, which it was claimed tended to show that the business carried on at the premises described in the complaint, was not in violation of law, and that he and his servants were not guilty of the crime charged, an order was entered which provided, “that the said defendants and all persons acting under defendants’ authority or by its direction, desist and refrain until the final determination of this action, from arresting or taking into custody any persons engaged upon the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of any business with the plaintiff, and from
p. 494
interfering with or hindering any such person in the transaction of said business, and from in any manner proceeding against any such person by arrest, or otherwise, in the conduct of said business upon the plaintiff’s premises, and from in any other way interfering with or hindering plaintiff or such person or persons as may be authorized by him in carrying on his business as aforesaid.”
E. Henry Laeombe, counsel to the corporation, and Francis M. Scott and D. J. Dean, of counsel for appellant,
on the questions considered in the opinion, argued : —I. The plaintiff fails to make out any case for the equitable action of the court. His plea is, that the police accuse him of committing a misdemeanor by selling and furnishing wine, beer and strong and spirituous liquors in the auditorium of a place of amusement, contrary to the provisions of section 2010 of the Consolidation Act, whereas, he asserts, on his part, that the place in which he carries on his business is not a place specified in the section last quoted, and, therefore, that he does not fall within the provision of that section; and he, therefore, asks the court to restrain his arrest, until it shall have determined whether or not he has been guilty of a misdemeanor. It seems to be well settled that an injunction will not lie to restrain an arrest under circumstances such as are disclosed by the papers in this case (Birch v. Cavanagh, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 415 ; Murphy v. Board of Police, 11 Ib. 351; Finck v. Police Comm’rs, 66 How. Pr. 318 ; Davis v. The American Society, &c., 15 N. Y. 362 ).
Howe & Hummel, attorneys and of counsel for respondent.

By the Court.

—[After stating the facts as above.}—By section 250 of chapter 410 of the Laws of 1882, known as the Consolidation Act, it is provided that the government and discipline of the police department of the city of Hew York shall be such as the

p. 495
board of police may .from time to time, by rules and regulations prescribe, and by section 277 of the said act, “The several members of the police force shall have power and authority to immediately arrest, without warrant, and to take into custody any person who shall commit, or threaten, or attempt to commit, in the presence of such member or within his view, any breach of the peace, or offense directly prohibited by act of the legislature, or by any ordinance of the city. The members of the police force shall possess in the city of blew York, and in every part of this state, all the common law and statutory powers of constables. . .”

By section 2010 of the said act it is provided : “It shall not be lawful to sell or furnish any wine, beer or strong or spirituous liquors to any person in the auditorium or lobbies of any place of exhibition or performance mentioned in section 1998, or in any apartment connected therewith by any door, window or other aperture and by section 2012 it is provided, that any person violating any of the provisions of section 2010, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.

The selling or furnishing of any wine, beer or liquor in the auditorium or lobby of a place of exhibition or performance having been made a misdemeanor, it became the duty of the members of the police force to arrest the plaintiff, if he sold or furnished wine or liquor in the place prohibited by the statute, and the ground upon which the plaintiff requested the court below to grant the injunction was that the acts of the plaintiff and his servants were not in violation of the section referred to ; or, in other words, that they were not guilty of the misdemeanor for which the police threatened arrest. This was the only question discussed in the opinion below and in the briefs submitted by counsel for respondent on this appeal.

The court below held that the plaintiff was not guilty of the crime, thus trying in a court of equity the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a crime on affidavit. There was no charge in the complaint that the police had

p. 496
threatened to make the arrest without a warrant or the authority required by law. The allegations are that plaintiff was accused of a crime ; that the police threatened to arrest him for committing such crime ; that he was innocent of the crime charged, and did not want to be arrested because it would injure his business ; and whether or not a court of equity has jurisdiction to determine such a question in this action, is presented.

It is clear that the assumption of such jurisdiction by a court of equity would entirely subvert the method provided by law for the trial of criminal cases. If such jurisdiction should be upheld, every person accused of crime would have the right to apply to the court for an injunction restraining his arrest, and the court would be bound to entertain the application and to try the question of his guilt or innocence upon affidavits. Upon no principle could the jurisdiction be restrained to a particular class of crimes, and a person charged-with the crime of murder would be as much entitled to the remedy as a person charged with a violation of the section of the statute referred to.

The tendency has been to greatly extend the remedy by injunction in civil cases, but certainly such remedy should be limited to civil cases, and criminal cases left to be disposed of in the criminal courts.

The question was presented to the court of appeals in the case of Davis v. The American Society, &c. ( 75 N. Y. 362 ), where, as in this case, the plaintiff claimed that his acts were not in violation of the statute under which the officers of the defendant claimed the right to arrest, and it was there held that the action was absolutely without sanction in precedent cr principles of equity. The court say: “The only question for contestation was whether, as matter of fact, they were guilty or innocent, of such violation, and the determination of that question could not by such an action as this be drawn to a court of equity. Whether a person accused of a crime be guilty or innocent, is to be determined in a common law court

p. 497
by a jury, and the people as well as the accused have the right to have it thus determined.”

But the order granted in this case went further than to restrain the arrest of the plaintiff and his employees. The defendants are “ enjoined from arresting or taking into custody any person engaged upon the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of any business with the plaintiff, and from in any manner proceeding against any such person by arrest, or otherwise, in the conduct of said business upon plaintiff’s premises.”

Such an injunction would give any person engaged upon the premises of the plaintiff in the transaction of any business, immunity from1 arrest for any crime, and practically nullify the statute which gives to the members of the police force power and authority to arrest and take into custody any person who shall commit or threaten or attempt to commit in the presence of such officer any offense prohibited by law.

We do not decide whether or not the acts of the plaintiff were in violation of section 2010 of the Consolidation Act, but we are of the opinion that such questions cannot be determined by this court in this action.

The order appealed from should therefore, be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion for injunction denied, with ten dollars costs.

Truax, J., concurred.

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