Hyperlawhypertext legal databasebeta Phillips v. Wright 7 N.Y. Super. Ct. 342

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Phillips v. Wright

7 N.Y. Super. Ct. 342 5 Sandf. 342 Court N.Y. Super. Ct. Decision date 1852-01-10 English

Delivered by Sandford, J.

Contents

Majority

p. 342
James W. Phillips, Respondent, v. Horace Wright, and Freeman Hiscox, Appellants.

Headnote

The builder of a vessel, -which is in the progress of construction, is presumptively the owner.
The presumption is not rebutted merely by proof that he was building the vessel, under a contract, in writing, for another person.
To enable the court to judge of the relation between the parties, under the contract, the instrument must be produced.
To give effect to the statutory lien, in favor of those who furnish materials towards the building of a ship, or vessel, it'is not necessary that the vessel shall be completely finished and equipped.
The lien attaches as soon as the structure, although still on the stocks, assumes the form or shape of a vessel.
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The lien of a material man, is not affected by the fact, that he did not rely exclu sively upon the lien, but looked also to the personal credit of the builder or owner, and considered him as his debtor.
To create the Hen, however, it is not sufficient to prove, that the materials were purchased for the declared purpose of being used in the building of the vessel. Their positive application to the intended use must be shown.
The whole theory of a lien for labor and materials, rests upon the basis that they have entered into, and contributed to the production or equipment of the thing, upon which the lien is imposed.
When it appears that all the materials, in respect to the cost of which, the lien is claimed, were not applied to the building of the vessel, the burden of proving what portion of them was so applied, rests upon the material man.
Upon the ground that this necessary proof had not been given, judgment, at special term, in favor of the plaintiff reversed, and the report of a referee, upon which it was founded, set aside.
(Before Oakley, Cu. J., Sandford and Duer, J. J.)
(Nov. 24, 1851 ;
Jan. 10, 1852.)
. This was an appeal, by the defendants, from a judgment for the plaintiffs, rendered at a special term, upon the report of a referee.
The action was for a breach of the condition of a bond, given by the defendants to the plaintiff, in order to discharge an unnamed and unfinished ship or vessel, from a warrant of attachment, issued undér the provisions of the revised statutes (2 R. S. part 3, chap. 8, title 8). The breach assigned, was that the defendants had refused to pay certain debts due to the plaintiff, which were a subsisting lien upon the vessel, when the attachment was issued. The complaint charged, that the debts in question, were contracted by Joseph Bishop and Jeremiah Simonson, ship builders, under the firm of Bishop & Simonson, and were due to the plaintiff for certain materials and articles, furnished by him towards the building of the vessel attached, of which the said Bishop & Simonson, were averred to be the owners. It then set forth the issuing of the attachment, upon the plaintiff's application, and the bond for discharging it, executed by the defendants, and after assigning the breach of its condition, demanded payment, for $458 27, with interest.
The ansjver denied that Bishop & Simonson were the owners of the vessel attached, and averred that the title, when the material or articles in respect to which the lien was claimed were furnished, was in an association called the Mechanics’ Mining
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Association. It denied that these materials and articles were delivered to he used and employed in and towards the building of the vessel, and averred that they were sold and delivered to Bishop & Simonson generally, and upon their personal credit, and without any view to the reservation of a lien. It also averred that the plaintiff had received from Bishop & Simon-son their draft, or check, in full payment of his claims.
The reply took issue upon the alleged payment, and averred that the materials and articles furnished by the plaintiff were delivered to be used and employed in and towards the building of the vessel, and were, in fact, so used and employed.[2]
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Upon these pleadings an order was made by consent, referring the cause to Alexander S. Johnson, Esq.,[2] as sole referee.
The referee, in April, 1851, made the following
REPORT.
The undersigned, to whom, by an order of this court, bearing
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date on the seventh day of June, eighteen hundred and fifty, this action was referred to be heard and determined, respectfully reports: that in addition to the facts admitted by the pleadings in this cause, he, in deciding and determining the said cause, found the following facts, and decided the questions of law, hereinafter stated, in the manner hereinafter mentioned, viz:—
That Bishop and Simonson were the owners of the ship
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“Mechanics’ Own” at the time of the several purchases of timber in the complaint mentioned; that being such owners, they purchased within this state of the plaintiff for cash, the two bills of timber, in the complaint mentioned, at the times, and for the prices therein mentioned; that the said two bills of timber were purchased by said Bishop and Simonson and furnished by the plaintiff to them within this state, as materials for or towards the building of the said ship, and were delivered at the yard where the said ship was building.
That no credit was given to said Bishop and Simonson for the price of said timber, and that the price still remains wholly unpaid. That some part of the said timber was not in fact actually employed in the building of the said ship, but was applied by Bishop and Simonson to other purposes.
That the plaintiff did not in any manner assent to such use of said timber as is last mentioned, nor was he aware thereof;
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that the plaintiff had not in any way given time of payment to Bishop and Simonson, nor in any manner waived or discharged his right of lien upon said vessel.
Upon the foregoing facts, the undersigned held as matter of law, that the claim or demand of the plaintiff for' the whole price of the said two bills of timber was a subsisting lien upon said vessel, pursuant to the provisions of Part 3, Chap. 8, Title 8, of the Revised Statutes, at the time, the said claim or demand was exhibited, in pursuance of the said provisions of the revised statutes, to the officer who issued the warrant in the complaint mentioned.
The undersigned further reports, that in the progress of the said trial, he made several decisions upon questions of evidence, and a decision upon a motion for a non-suit, -which decisions necessarily require the statement of the testimony had before him upon the said trial, in order to present them for examination ; and that the said testimony and the said decisions are correctly stated in the cape hereunto annexed, and which is made part of this report.
New York, April 8,1851.
Alexander S. Johnson.
Referee.
CASE.
This was an action upon contract brought, to trial, before Alexander S. Johnson, sole referee, on the 11th day of December, 1850. The ■ pleadings are to be deemed a part of the case.
Plaintiff’s counsel produced, and read in evidence, the bond mentioned in the complaint, and called Philip Bennett, who was sworn and testified as follows :—
I know the plaintiff and Bishop and Simonson. I knew them in February and March, 1849. I inspected all the timber that came to the plaintiff, and sold it. It is cedar timber; the yards for it were in Cherry and Henry streets." Bishop and Simonson were ship-builders then ; .their yard adjoined Mr. Webb’s between Lewis, 5th and 6th streets, and East River. There was a ship about being built in their yard, at that time not com
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menced. Bishop and Simonson came to me to buy cedar, and I sold them a bill on the 14th of February, 1849, of $330 53. I understood from the person who purchased the timber, it was to build a ship for the Mechanics’ Mining Association. I understood it was to be called “The Mechanics’ Own.” Whether it was Bishop or Allaire his clerk who came when the first bill was sold, I can’t remember. March 2d. Bishop himself came and purchased a bill of $127 74. I asked Bishop how he was getting along with the ship; he said he wanted some larger logs to finish up the frame. The person who made the first purchase told me the ship was for the gold country. Bishop and I talked about the shares in which she was to be owned or was owned. I was in the yard frequently. I saw her a dozen times while she was building. I saw the men chopping up the timber bought of the plaintiff to go into the frame, and I saw it in the frame. Cedar is used for the top timbers of a ship. I saw it used in this vessel—as in all others—for the top timbers. The Ohio had been built there, and we furnished timber for that ship. She was fit to launch, or nearly so, when this suit was commenced. She may have been launched, but I don’t precisely remember. The frame is the early part of building before planking. I can’t tell whether any other vessel was building or not in that. yard at that time. The terms of sale were for cash.
Being cross-examined, witness testified as follows :—
I had sold Bishop and Simonson before for two or three ships, I think. I know I sold them for the Ohio and this ship. I was the only person who sold any cedar or timber for Phillips to Bishop and Simonson. I sold them for the Ohio, and the “ Mechanics’ Own.” I am an inspector of timber. I make the sale and inspect the timber, and make a return to Phillips. He enters it on his books. I deliver the bill and he collects the money. I enter in my books so many logs sold. February 14, I sold Bishop and Simonson 69 logs. I delivered the timber to Bishop and Simonson ; having reported to Phillips that I had sold the timber. Then I made my returns to Mr. Phillips of the sales of the day, among which was this, “ sold Bishop and Simonson the amount of the bill,” &c. I had sold them once before. I am not sure as to more. The Ohio was all planked
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up before this ship was commenced. The Ohio may have been launched before this one was begun, but I cannot sa.y positively. I never saw any of this timber used in any other ship. I know none of it was used aboard the Ohio. For a vessel of this size I generally sell one hundred and fifty logs. I do not mean to say I saw all this timber in this ship. I can recognise this timber when I see it. I cannot say how many logs I saw, but I should think I saw about the same we sold—about the usual quantity. I can tell the difference between our timber and Florida and Texas timber with certainty. This is Tennessee cedar. I can tell Tennessee from Arkansas cedar. I never saw any bill made out by Phillips for-this timber.
This paper is a copy of the bills from Phillips’ books, made for me, but not by me. Defendant offers it in evidence.
The plaintiff here rested, and defendant moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that there was no proof of a subsisting lien on the vessel, as the proof showed the parties selling gave exclusive credit to Bishop & Simonson, and the sale was made to them in no capacity, either as master, owner, agent, or consignee, as required by the statute, and the mere fact that they being shipbuilders, were about building a ship for the Mechanics’ Mining Association, gave persons selling them no lien under this sta
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tute, so none was given by Bishop & Simonson to the plaintiff, nor did he intend to reserve the lien on any vessel. That plaintiff’s books make no mention of any vessel, but only charge the articles to Bishop & Simonson individually, and the idea of any lien was an after thought. The referee, however, refused to nonsuit, to which decision the defendants excepted.
The defendants’ counsel then called
Robert TL Allaire, who was sworn, and testified as follows: In February and March, 1849,1 was clerk for Bishop & Simon-son, and had been for some time. I don’t know plaintiff. I know last witness. I know of Bishop & Simonson buying cedar logs of Bermet, half-a-dozen times, I suppose at Phillips’ yard. I did not purchase any of this timber. I have an indistinct recollection of helping pick out the timber. I have done so several times, but whether in this case I can’t say po.-itively. We had the Mechanics’ Own on the stocks building, and no other vessel at that time, and I think we were repairing the Isthmus in the yard, and other vessels along the shore, not in the yard. We sent timber from the yard for repairs of vessels not at the yard. These bills were furnished to us from Phillips, and this is the receipt:
“Rec’d, New York, 24 March, 1849, from Messrs. Bishop & Simonson, four 'hundred and fifty-eight 27-100 dolls, in .full for bills cedar of 14 ult. and 2d inst.
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New York, February 14,1849.
Messrs. Bishop & Simonson
Bot. of James W. Phillips,
44 Logs Cedar, meas. 212 ft. 10 in., at 45c., $122 18 25 “ 11 “ 211 ft, at 15c., 201 15 $330 53
Defendants’ counsel then offered to show previous transactions between Bishop & Simonson and James W. Phillips, and what those transactions were, and that this transaction as to the purchase, credit, manner and time of payment, was no other or differdlit from any previous transaction.
The plaintiff’s counsel thereupon objected to the proof so offered, and the referee excluded the same, and the defendants’ counsel excepted.
The witness then further testified as follows: A check was given, dated 5th April. Bishop had not the money to give him. Young Phillips came, the one who came with the bill. He had been there before, and had seen him sign as' in this case.
The bills had been left some time before. He found Bishop at last, and said he wanted it settled in some shape. Bishop said he had not the money to give him. He asked him to give him a due bill that could be-settled down town. Bishop said he would give him a check dated ten days ahead. The check was taken, and the receipt given. All this timber was not used on the Mechanics’ Own. Some of it was too small, and the second lot had to be bought.
There was some of this timber sold by Bishop & Simonson’s assignees, and not used on board of this vessel at all. Some of the cedar that was left from the Ohio was used on board of this vessel and helped to make it up.
On his Cross-Examination, he stated : That, Bishop & Simon-son failed about April 1st, 1849. The keel of the vessel was laid in November, 1848, perhaps later. She was launched the latter part of May, or first of June. When bill was presented, nothing was said about ihe lien on the vessel, the demand was made only against Bishop & Simonson.
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Joseph Bishop was then sworn on the part of the defendants, and testified as follows :—
I am of the firm of Bishop & Simonson, named in the pleadings. I purchased cedar of plaintiif, for my firm, on the 14th February, and 2d March, 1849. The articles charged in the bills marked 3 and 4, are of the same description as what I purchased, and the bills are for the articles purchased. I made the bargain with Mr. Bennet. I asked him the price of cedar timber of certain sizes, and got his answer, and engaged to take what we should require for a vessel which we were about to build. These things were bought upon our own credit, no credit was given to any one else. The principal part of the timber was used in the Mechanics’ Own. As to the quantity, I told him as near as I could judge, and we were to take as many as we wanted, and as we wanted them, within or about the range of the quantity spoken of. The bills made out were sent us, and are there marked 3 and 4. Phillips took a check dated some days ahead, and gave the receipt. I don’t know when the ship was named. She was called in the yard Mechanics’ Own, at an early stage, but I don’t know at what time.
Being Cross-Examined, the witness testified as follows :—
We had no other vessel in the yard for which we had occasion to buy cedar at the time of this purchase. We were not building any other. Her keel was 'laid about the date of the first of the bills, but I think a little after. We failed entirely, I think some time after the check fell due. I don’t know when we made an assignment. I think it was in April. We were to take the timber as we should want it and send for it. He was to select out certain sized timber and put it in a pile. The only use for which we wanted it was for the vessel. The statement to him was made that we might get it without delay when we sent for it. The vessel I speak of is the one attached in this suit.
Being Re-Examined by defendants’ counsel, the witness testified as follows:—
I did not consider we were bound to put this timber to any particular use. There was some of this tiniber sold at auction when our things were sold under the assignment. I attended to the out-door business. My partner and Allaire attended to
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the yard more. I know nothing about the size of the timber being inappropriate.
It was then admitted that the check to Phillips was never paid.
The witness Allaire, was then recalled for defendants, and testified as follows :—
The amount of the indebtedness of Bishop & Simonson when they failed, to the Mechanics' Association, was either $1,200 or $1,800. I got once $700 of Wright, and once $500. Wright is the defendant, and was treasurer. The ship in question was built for the Mechanics’ Mining Association. She was built by Bishop & Simonson, under the superintendence of a committee of the Association. Bishop & Simonson made a contract with a committee of the Association, in relation to the building for the Mechanics’ Mining Association, a ship of certain dimensions, &c., for a certain price. It was in writing, under seal. Hiscox is President, and Wright is Treasurer, or they were, of the Mechanics’ Mining Association.
Defendants then offered to prove at whose instance the bond in suit was given. Plaintiff’s counsel objected to the question, and it was excluded by the referee, and the defendants excepted.
The witness then further testified as follows :
The sheriff seized the vessel, about the 12t,h of April, 1850. I knew it at the time. The Mechanics' Mining Association were in possession at that time completing the vessel. The Board of Superintendents of the Association were in possession. When attached she was over three-fourths completed, when the attachment was issued.
Being Cross-Examined, the witness testified as follows :
The Mechanics’ Mining Association was composed of about one hundred men. They had an article of association, but were not incorporated. They were in writing and printed. One copy was signed and sealed, and put in the register's office. Two copies were executed, one was to be deposited as aforesaid, and the other was retained by the officers of the Association. When Bishop & Simonson failed, the Association took the ship and went to work- finishing her.; in fact they were in possession of her before, for they were putting other work in her. There W.ere four superintendents, Wright, Lugar, Rowland, and I think
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William Bennet, and Hiscox, I rather think too. Some of the five were at work, and Rowland was actually at work, and the others were superintending.
Being Re-Examined, the witness further testified as follows :
As soon as the vessel had progressed far enough—had her decks laid, and they could commence putting in her joiner of the cabin, which is. not the ship builder’s work, they did so.
Being Re-Cross-Examined, the witness testified as follows :
This working upon her was the way in which they had possession. Bishop & Simonson were going on with their work till they failed. She remained in the yard till it was bought and taken possession of by Webb—till she was launched.
• The defence was here rested, and the plaintiffs called Orvill M. Phillips, who was sworn, and testified as follows :
I am plaintiff’s brother, and was in his office all last year and am still. I presented these bills to Bishop & Simonson. (3 and 4.) I went repeatedly for the money. Each time payment was deferred temporarily. I received, finally, this check.
“New York, April 5, 1849.
“Cashier of The New York Dry Dock Company, corner of Avenue D and Tenth street.
“ Pay James W. Phillips, or order, four hundred fifty-eight 27-100 dollars.
“ $ 158 27-100. “ Bishop & Smoxsov.”
And gave a receipt, of which I suppose this (the receipt above-contained) is a copy. On this or some previous occasion, a note or credit was spoken of by Bishop I think. He proposed a note, which I refused, as the sale was cash. I said so to him. The sale was made to him for cash, for the reason, that we would not have sold them on time.
It- was - then admitted, by defendants' counsel', that the check was presented for payment, April 5,1849, and not paid, and has not yet been paid.
Being Cross-Examined, this witness testified as follows :
Those entries (contained in the bill marked 1), are, I believe, copies from plaintiff’s books of this transaction.
p. 356
It was then admitted, by defendants’ counsel, that the last deposit to the credit of Bishop & Simonson in the Dry Dock Company, was made January 16,1849, the last draft, January 29,1849, and that this left a balance of only about §>6.00.
And thereupon the evidence was closed.
And thereupon the referee reported that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the defendants, and assessed the plaintiff’s damages at five hundred and sixteen dollars, and thirty-five cents.
In June term, 1851, this report was confirmed by the chief justice, and judgment for the plaintiff ordered thereon, with liberty to the defendants to appeal to the general term without security. The judgment including interest, and costs, was for $762 70. The appeal was now heard.
H. S. Dodge, for defendants (appellants), made and argued the following points.
The referee’s decision on the motion for a non-suit, -and on the whole evidence, was that Bishop & Simonson, having contracted to build the vessel for the Mechanics’ Association, were the “ owners ” of the materials until the completion and delivery of the vessel, and therefore could and did create a lien on the vessel, and in this he erred.
I. The answer denies that Bishop & Simonson were the owners of the vessel, or agents, or that the demand against them was a subsisting lien on the vessel, and the onus lay upon the plaintiff, affirmatively, to prove that this debt was a lien. (Wakeman v. Newton, 21 Wend. 206 .)
II. The statute (2 R. S. 493) does not contemplate or create a lien upon materials for a ship, or upon an incomplete vessel, but on a complete ship, ready for use and capable of sailing from the port (Id. §§ 1,2,9,) and the “ owner,” in § 1, means the person who is, or is to become the “ owner” of the complete vessel, as distinguished from the builder or owner of the materials. And this has been so held in a case where the property in the materials did not pass until completion and acceptance. (Hubbell v. Denison, 20 Wend. 182 ; Van Pelt v. The Ohio, U. S. Dis
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trict Court, Judson, D. J.; Udall v. Ohio, same court (April, 1851), Betts, D. J.; Reed v. Hull of a New Brig, 1 Story C. C. R. 244; Harper v. a New Brig, Gilpin, 536, 540, 550).
III. But in this case the evidence showed that the vessel was built for the association under their superintendence, and was in their possession, so as to belong to them as fast as completed, at the time the plaintiff’s demands accrued, and that Bishop & Simonson had been paid in advance. (Wood v. Russell, 5 B. and Ald. 942; Clark v. Spence, 4 Ad. and Ellis 448; Addison on Contracts, pp. 45 and 762.)
IY. The materials furnished by the plaintiff were not furnished “ towards the building of this vessel.”
1. The demands were not “ contracted for this vessel,” but the materials were furnished without any designation of their purpose, or reliance on the credit of the vessel. And the plaintiff ought to have been non-suited for this reason. (Van Pelt v. the Ohio, ubi supra, and the Statute, 2 R. S. 494, § 4.) And the referee erred in excluding the further evidence offered. (Ante, p. 352.)
2. A part only of these materials went into this vessel. If the materials had been sold expressly for and charged to this vessel, the plaintiff could not have had a lien for the part not used in the vessel. (Udall v. the Ohio, ubi supra; Johnson v. the Sandusky, 5 Wend. 510 ; Crooke v. Stack, 20 Wend. 177 ; Veltman v. Thompson, 3 Comst. 438.)
3. But in the present case the only evidence that the plaintiff furnished to show that the debt was “ contracted for this vessel,” was that some of them were used in this vessel.
The plaintiff was bound to show affirmatively how much went into the vessel.
Y. The plaintiff, if he ever had any lien, discharged it by looking to Bishop & Simonson’s individual credit, and giving them time by taking their post dated check. (Myers v. Welles, 5 Hill 463 ; Bailey v. Adams, 14 Wend. 201 .)
The judgment of the special term ought to be reversed with costs, and the referee’s report set aside.
Wm. M. Evarts, for plaintiff, argued as follows :
. I. The facts necessary to constitute a lien under the statute
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in this case, were (1,) that a debt of fifty dollars or more should have been contracted in this state by the owner of the vessel, (2,) on account of materials furnished in this state, for or towards building such vessel.
These facts the referee found in favor of the lien, and in pursuance of the 18th section of the title referred to, reported for the amount of the plaintiff's claim (2 R. S. p. 496, § 18).
II. That there was substantial evidence in support of these facts, appears on the face of the case; and there being such evidence, the court will not review the referee’s finding of matters of fact upon such evidence.
III. The evidence fully sustains his finding of facts, and admits of no other result.
IV. Bishop & Simons on buying materials in their own name, and upon their own liability, and therewith building a vessel, in their own yard, with their own labor, are, in law, owners of such vessel.
That they were thus building such vesseljfor others upon contract is immaterial. If there existed a special contract, upon which the legal ownership of the vessel at the time, of these purchases from plaintiff could be brought into question, it should have been produced and proved. Such special quality or effect of the contract cannot be inferred (Abbott on Sh. p. 5; Laidler v. Burlinson, 2 M. & W. 602).
Y. If the legal ownership of the vessel were in the purchaser or employer, yet the ship-builder in possession, buying materials for it, is to third persons in that behalf the agent of the owners, and a debt thus contracted by him, is contracted by the owners, his principals.
YI. The fact of the non-application of a part of the materials bought for the vessel, to the building of the same, is immaterial. The furnishing of them for building the vessel is the foundation of the lien. The seller is not bound to look to their application, nor can the lien be impaired, by any subsequent act of the purchaser.
If material, the defendants gave no evidence upon which any abatement, on this account, from the plaintiff's claim, could have been made by the referee.
VII. Who was owner when the attachment was levied, or at
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any time subsequent to the contract, is immaterial; the lien ceases, or is divested, twelve days after the vessel’s leaving the port, or immediately after its leaving the state, and not from change of ownership (2 R. S. p. 493, § 2).
VII. The giving of credit to the purchaser does not prevent nor supersede the lien. The terms of the statute import a personal liability, and add a lien from the nature of the consideration of such liability.
Much less can a sale for cash impede or impair the lien.
IX. The post-dated check, drawn upon a bank without funds, given to the plaintiff, was a mere sham or fraud, and no more discharged the lien than it satisfied the debt.
X. The report of the referee should be confirmed, with costs.

By the Court.

The proof that Bishop & Simonson built the vessel, established presumptively the fact, that they were her owners. The evidence that she was built by them, for the Mechanics’ Mining Association, under a contract, does not go far enough to rebut the presumption thus established. In the cases cited on this point, the contracts were produced, and the payments made from time to time to the builder, were fully shown. There is nothing in the evidence before us incompatible with the idea that Bishop & Simonson were to continue the owners of the hull of this vessel, until their work was completed, and the price fully paid. As we cannot anticipate what the case will be when the contract is introduced and evidence given of the payments made by the association, we forbear expressing any opinion as to the question Of ownership, beyond that already stated upon the facts as they now appear.

The defendants contend that the statute does not create a lien upon an incomplete or unfinished ship ; that she must be complete, ready for use, and capable of sailing from port, in order to be a ship or vessel, within the meaning of the act.

We cannot accede to this proposition. The occasion for enforcing a lien for work and materials towards the building of a vessel, arises quite as frequently before she is finished, as it does after that event, and a construction, limiting the lien to the case of vessels completed, would deprive of its benefit a large

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class of cases, as deserving of protection as any provided for in the act. Indeed, the effect would be to defeat the statute in respect of the building of vessels, for it would become a general practice, to transfer and remove a ship before she was finished, whenever the builder is likely to stop payment, or is embarrassed in his affairs.

The practice under the statute has long proceeded on the assumption that it contemplated unfinished, as well as complete, vessels ; and we believe that, in the ordinary use of the word, the term ship or vessel is applied, and properly applied, to the structure or frame, as soon as it assumes the shape or form of a ship or vessel. We hear the expression, ‘‘ a ship on the stocks,” constantly applied to ships, in all stages of their construction, and we think the statute intended to adopt the common meaning of the words used in it. Therefore, the fact that the ship in question was unfinished, when the attachment issued, does not affect the plaintiff’s claim for a lien under the act. .

The next ground of defence is, that the materials furnished by the plaintiff, were not furnished “ towards the building” of this vessel, but were furnished to Bishop & Simonson, generally, for their business, without any designation of their purpose, or reliance upon the credit of the vessel. Also, that a part only of his materials, went into this vessel.

As to the first branch of the objection, the referee has found that the timber, for which the plaintiff claims, was furnished by him to Bishop & Simonson, as materials for, or towards the building of this ship, and that no term of credit was given to Bishop & Simonson, for the price. The evidence fully sustains the fact, that the timber was furnished for this particular ship ; and, although, as in every case, the material man charged the price to Bishop & Simonson, looked to them for payment, and thus gave them credit for the same, this does not conflict with his also looking to the vessel, and relying uporn the statute lien as his security.

But it does appear, and so the referee states, that a part of tlie timber so furnished, was not used in this vessel ; some of it was sold by Bishop and Simonson’s assignees, and it is probable some went for the repair of other vessels. The plaintiff insists that this non-application of the timber to the building of this ves

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sel, for which it was bought, is immaterial; that the statute confers the lien when it is sold and delivered for building- the vessel, without regard to its actual application for that purpose.

We do not think that this position is a sound one. The whole theory of a lien for labor and materials rests upon the basis, that such labor and materials have entered into, and contributed to the production or equipment of the thing upon which the lien is impressed. This imposes on the material man the necessity of seeing to it, that his materials are applied to the purpose for which they are procured, if he design to rely upon a lien given to him, by reason of such purpose. The laborer makes the application himself, and hence the difficulty does not extend to'hia case. If the law were, as the plaintiff contends, it would produce inextricable confusion. A ship builder, in doubtful credit, would buy lumber and materials sufficient for building a ship, from several distinct persons. He would buy them for a particular ship designated, and each material man would sell to' him “ for or towards the building” of that ship. He would sell some of the materials thus acquired, and use some in building or repairing other ships. Which of these material men is to have a lien ? Or are all entitled to a lien, amounting in the aggregate, to several times the value of the materials which actually entered into the construction of the ship ; thus, probably, totally displacing, or reducing to a small proportion, the lien of laborers, sail makers, &c., whose work and supplies were used in the building of the ship ?

It is very apparent that such an interpretation of the statute would lead to its complete defeat, as far as any praiseworthy object is to be effected by it.

Under the act of 1198, (1 R. L. 130,) which, among other things, gave a lien for supplies, furnished for, or towards the fitting, furnishing, or equipping of a ship or vessel, the late supreme court, in deciding that fuel supplied to a steamboat did not come within the act, placed it on the ground that the supplies contemplated by the act must be such as enter into the construction or equipment of a vessel, and become a part of her, as distinguished from such articles as are daily consumed, and constantly replaced. The court apparently assume that to con

p. 362
stitute a lieu, the articles must, at all events, go into the vessel, or. be used in or about it, and not merely be furnished for that object, although used for some other purpose.

It may well be doubted, whether a literal interpretation of the words of the statute (2 R. S. 493), confer a lien, unless the articles furnished are actually used in the building, &c., of the vessel against which it is claimed. Can it be said that materials are furnished for, or towards building a ship, when no part of them enter into, or become a part of, the ship ? They may be furnished for the purpose of being thus applied, but is that the same thing as being furnished for the ship ? In other words, does not the idea of furnishing an article for, or towards the building of a ship, embrace as well its application‘to, or in the ship, as its procurement for that object ? I may buy an article of furniture, for the purposes of my library, and with a full intention of placing it there, and then change my mind, and sell it to another. Can it be said that such article was bought for, or towards furnishing my library ?

This doubt, and our conviction that the spirit of the act does not warrant its extension to materials bought for, but never used, in the building of a designated vessel, make it our duty to hold, that for the timber which did not enter into the construction of the ship in question, the plaintiff had no lien.

This interpretation of the statute imposes no undue hardship upon material men. The act gives them a privilege over all general creditors, on 1he footing, that the articles furnished by them, have contributed to the making of the ship, against which it is claimed. It is certainly not asking too much, that they shall look to the application of what they furnish, if they intend to create the statutory lien.

It was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove the extent of his lien. He did not prove it to the amount allowed to him by the referee, and we must therefore set aside the report, and order a new trial.

Cases cited