p. 267claims thereto, as they should be advised. The decree was afterwards affirmed on a rehearing before Chancellor Sanford. After the rehearing, Harvey Elliott died, and in May, 1824, the decree was revived against the complainant in this suit, who is his executor.
In July, 1824, the complainant filed his bill in this cause, setting forth the above facts, and the proceedings and decree in the former suit, and praying that the part of the farm of 201 acres, which had been incumbered since the registry of the mortgage to Harvey Elliott, should be first sold, and applied to satisfy the amount due to A. Pell and wife, with their costs, and that the deficiency only, be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the 26 acres.
The complainant subsequently amended his bill, suggesting the invalidity of the Pugsley mortgage, and praying leave to take proofs to establish such invalidity, and if the same '^should be decreed invalid, that then the proceeds of the sale of the 26 acres be first applied to the payment of the Elliott mortgage and costs. To this part of the bill, the defendant A. Pell and wife put in a demurrer, which, on argument before the late Chancellor, in November, 1827, was allowed without prejudice to the relief sought by the bill, in the matters not demurred to, and with leave to the complainant to file a bill of review upon the usual deposit in such cases.
No bill of review being filed, the defendants A. Pell and wife and Mitchell and Hinman, put in their answers to the bill in this suit as originally drawn; to which answers the complainant filed replications, and proofs were taken on the part of the defendants Mitchell and Hinman, which were read at the hearing, de bene esse, subject to the objection of the other parties to the suit.
J. Wallis, for complainant:
All the defendants in the former suit are bound by the decree in that suit. A decree is equally binding between co-defendants as between the
p. 268complainant and the defendants. (Chamley v. Lord Dursany and others, 2 Sch. & Lef. 710.) A decree may be made in this suit founded upon the former decree. The complainant has a right to compel A. Pell and wife to resort first to that part of the property included in their mortgage, and which is not covered by the mortgage of the complainant. (Evertson v. Booth, 19 John. R. 492.)W. Silliman, for the defendants Mitchell and Hinman:
The complainant having by his bill in the former suit, and by Ms replication to the answers of, the defendants A. Pell and wife, in that suit, and by his replication to the answers of the defendants in this suit, insisted that the mortgage of A. Pell and wife was invalid, he is precluded from now asserting its validity. 1 Phil. Ev. 245; 2 Jac. L. Dic. 441; 1 Phil. Ev. 242.) No replication having been filed to the answers of Mitchell and Hinman in the former suit, no proofs could be taken by them, and they are therefore not concluded by the decree in that suit. The mortgage of A. Pell and wife is only a mortgage for one year. It is not an equitable mortgage *in fee. The registry of this mortgage is only constructive notice of what appears on its face. The registry of equitable mortgages not being sanctioned by law has no effect as a notice. (Pow. on Mort. 739, 748; 1 John. Ch. R. 273; 1 Brown’s Ch. Cas. 93.)W. T. McCoun, for A. Pell and wife:
The decree in the former suit as to the validity of the mortgage of A. Pell and wife is binding as well upon the defendants as the complainants. (Cha mley v. Lord Dunsany and others, 2 Sch. & Lef. 710.)The Chancellor :—By the decision of the late Chancellor upon the demurrer in this cause, it is settled that the decree in the former suit, so far as relates to the lien of the Pugsley mortgage upon the twenty-six acres, which was the subject of litigation there, is binding and conclusive, and can
p. 270any of them, to any other land. Neither did the answer of A. Pell and wife set up the Pugsley mortgage as a valid and subsisting lien upon any other land than the twenty-six acres. After setting out the mortgage, and the agreement of C. Pell and wife respecting the same, they charged and insisted, and submitted to the court, that the said mortgage was a valid and subsisting lien or incumbrance upon the premises mortgaged to the complainant, as in his bill was mentioned and set forth; and that they were entitled to a preference and priority of payment out of the said mortgaged premises. The decree made upon that bill and answer must be taken with reference to the matters then in litigation before the court, and cannot be construed to affect the rights of any of the parties as to the other lands which were not the subject matter of litigation in that suit. If A. Pell and wife had actually released all the lands covered by the Pugsley mortgage, except the twenty-six acres, from the lien thereof, the other defendants could not have given such release in evidence in that suit, because no question as to any other lands was in litigation. If the complainant in the first suit had set out all the facts, as his executor now has done, and claimed to throw the Pugsley mortgage, if it shordd be declared valid, upon the lands of the other defendants, he would then have given them an opportunity to litigate their rights. But even in such a case it is doubtful whether he could have effected that object without filing a replication to their answer, and thus giving them an opportunity to contest the validity of the Pugsley claim.
The prayer of the complainant’s bill in this suit, seeks directly to alter, in two very material respects, the decree in the former suit. As no such relief can be granted, the bill must be dismissed. But even if there had been a prayer for substitution, or for relief generally, the defendants Mitchell and *Hinman would have been permitted to show that the Pugsley mortgage was not a valid and subsisting lien upon the lands not affected by the decree in the former suit. And the evidence taken in this cause, and admitted on the hearing to be read, de bene esse, as I understand it, abundantly establishes the fact. The complainant’s bill must therefore be dismissed; but as he has prose-outed this suit as executor, in good faith, he is not to be charged with costs.