p. 155vised statutes in such cases, and the complainant was appointed such receiver. He thereupon filed the bill in this case against Whitlock, to obtain satisfaction of the stock note which had been given up to him under the arrangement with Brown. The vice chancellor came to the conclusion | that the arrangement by which that note was given up was | illegal and unauthorized, and was a fraud upon the credi- J tors of the company and the stockholders who had paid for their stock. He therefore decreed payment of the note deducting therefrom the amount of the §4500 given to Brown, the avails of which had actually gone into the funds of the company.
J. Anthon G. Griffin, for the appellant.
The only question presented by the bill in this cause is, whether, at the time it was filed, the defendant was indebted to the Mohawk Insurance Company, for the whole or any part of r the debt of $20,840, for which he gave his note to the company on the 1st of May, 1824. Any supposed fraudulent organization of the company, or any of its transactions in relation to other matters except the alleged indebtedness of the defendant, can have no legitimate influence upon the decision of the cause. The complainant having been appointed receiver of the company, at the suit of a judgment creditor, and the bill having been filed by him as such receiver, against the defendant as a debtor of the company, presupposes a due organization of the company under its charter. The bill does not attempt to charge the defendant upon any other ground than that of his alleged indebtedness to the company. A different bill and different parties are necessary to charge the defendant for any improper conduct as a director. The complainant as receiver of the company has no power or authority to question its due organization, or to investigate the conduct of the board of directors, or to disavow' or annul any of the proceedings of the company. As such receiver, the complainant can maintain no suit at kw or in equity for the recovery of any estate, debts or things in action, where the corpora
p. 157Law, 198. 4 Burn. § East, 217. 4 Bing. R. 722. 22 Wendell, 341, 342. 8 John. R. 202.)
F. B. Cutting, for the respondent.
The appellant, William Whitlock, jun. being justly indebted to the Mohawk Insurance Company in the sum of $20,840, either for the amount of his subscription to the capital stock thereof, or for money lent and advanced by the company to him on the first day of May, 1824, gave his promissory note to the company, payable on demand, with interest at the rate of six per cent, and as collateral security transferred to the company, in its corporate name, 1042 shares of the capital stock thereof. This note, together with the collateral security, became part of the capital of the company, and was in equity held by the directors in trust for the payment of the corporate debts and for the benefit of the stockholders. (Scott v. The Eagle Fire Company, 7 Paige, 198. Depeyster v. The American Insurance Company, 6 Id. 486. Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308. 2 Story's Eq. 9, § 1252. 6 Paige, 340. 4 Id. 127, 134.) Isaac Webb & Co. were creditors of the company, and entitled to payment out of its capital and effects. Brown had no right, either in his official or private capacity, to surrender to Whitlock his note for $20,840. The bargain between them (they being directors and trustees of the company,) was a fraud upon the company, its creditors and stockholders. (Reed v. Bank of Newburgh, 6 Paige, 337,) The abstraction by Brown of Whitlock’s note being fraudulent, the Mohawk Insurance Company had a valid claim against Whitlock for the amount due by him, with interest and the receiver, Seixas Nathan, is authorized to sue for and collect the same for the benefit of the creditors and stockholders of the said company. Neither the Mohawk Insurance Company nor its board of directors ever authorized the arrangement betwmen Brown and Whitlock. Even if the board of directors had assented thereto, such assent could not have validated the transaction. An assent, with a knowledge of the insolvency of Brown, would have been a fraud upon
p. 158the bona fide creditors and the innocent stockholders of the company. If the directors had authorized the consummation of the bargain in ignorance of the insolvency of Brown, such an assent obtained through and in consequence of such ignorance, would not have validated the transaction. The committee on finance had no authority to authorize the transaction. (Act incorporating the Mohawk Ins. Co., Sess. Laws of 1824, ch. 154,§4,7,8. Hosack v. College of Physicians of N. Y., 5 Wendell, 547,550. Bank Commissioners v. Bank of Bufalo, 6 Paige, 497, 504.) That committee never did authorize or assent to that arrangement.
If any person, who was a director of the company, expressed any opinion in relation to the matter, it was in his individual and not in his official capacity. (National Bank v. Norton, 1 Hill’s R. 579. Fulton Bank v. N. York and Sharon Canal Co. 4 Paige, 127, 136. 2 Phil. Ev. note 174, p. 169.) If any director did express an opinion favorable to the substitution of Brown’s note for Whitlock’s, it must have been in ignorance of the insolvency of Brown. Whitlock and Brown being directors, were trustees for the stockholders and creditors of the corporation, and had no right to traffic with the trust funds for their own benefit. The transaction between them ought for that reason to be annulled. (3 Vesey, 740, note 1. 2 Story’s Eq. Pl. 502, 506, 510,524,752.) It was unlawful for Whitlock to withdraw any part of the capital stock, or for Browm to pay or surrender any part of the capital to Whitlock. (Laws cf 1825, p. 448, § 2,6. The complainant was the proper person to bring this suit. (2 R. S. 464, § 42. Idem, 469, § 67, 68. Idem, 42, § 7. 1 Anstr. R. 109,113. 12 Vesey, 136,158. 4 Dessaus. 651,677,702, 705, 715. G John. Ch. R. 132, 137. 1 McCord’s Ch. R. 156, 161. 3 Paige, 231, 2. 9 Mass. R. 423 . 2 R. S. 383, § 67—469, old ed. Story’s Eq. PL 191,2, § 216, 217. Id. 145, § 149.)
I entirely concur in the conclusion at which the vice chancellor arrived in this case, that the giving up of the note, and the transfer to Browm of the stock which had been hypothecated for its security, wras
p. 159illegal and a fraud upon the creditors of the corporation. Whitlock, as a director of the corporation, who had from the beginning taken an active part in the transactions of the company, must be presumed to have known its situation
¡ and that neither Brown nor even the directors of the company7 had the right to make such an arrangement with him. It was in fact an arrangement to enable Whit-lock to withdraw a part of the capital stock of the company ; this note being the substitute for the money paid in, or which should have been paid in, on his stock. Such arrangement was therefore in direct violation of the provisions of the second section of the act of April, 1825, to prevent fraudulent bankruptcies by incorporated companies.
(Laws of 1825, p. 448.) The vice chancellor is right also in supposing that the board of directors of the company never assented to this
arrangement; even if their assent to such a fraud upon the creditors of the company, and upon the law, could have validated the transaction. And certainly could be no implied assent in such a case, which would e the effect to discharge Whitlock from his liability to creditors of the company for the amount of his stock
standing the note was given up without authority. (2 R. S. 42, § 7.) This is not a proceeding to charge the defendant as a director or stockholder of the corporation on the ground that he has, as such director or stockholder, made himself personally7 liable to the creditors ; so as to make it necessary for Webb & Co., to proceed against him under the provisions of the 43d, 44lh, and 45th sections of the article of the revised statutes relative to proceedings against corporations in equity. (2 R.. S. 464.) But it is a suit to receiver is the proper person to bring the suit, as the legal title to all the property of the company ; , by the revised statutes, with all the rights ;law to trustees or assignees of insolvent debtors. 464, ^ 42. Idem, 469, ^ 67, 68.) He is thereby authorized to sue in his own name for this which debt is still due to the corporation, notwithcollect a debt; which is still due from him to the corpo
p. 160ration, notwithstanding the fraudulent and unauthorized agreement under which the note, which was once the evidence of such indebtedness, had been given up. It is therefore a case in which the innocent stockholders of the corporation would have an interest in the recovery of the amount of the note, even if there were other funds of the corporation sufficient to pay its debts. For where there is a loss upon the stock, such of the stockholders as have paid for their stock have a right to insist that those who have given stock notes only shall pay such notes to the receiver ; so that all may share rateably in the loss which has fallen upon the stockholders generally.
I have no doubt that the decree appealed from was right; and it must be affirmed with costs.(a)