p. 211oath touching the said offence and accusation, and it appearing to us from such examination, that such offence has been committed. You are therefore hereby commanded, in the name of the people of the state of New York, forthwith to apprehend the said Warren Benjamin and bring him before the said justice, to be dealt with according to law.
Witness the said Daniel C. Stewart at West Troy in said county, this 16th of February, 1854.
Daniel C. Stewart, Justice,
Peter Johnson for the defendant.
I. The proceedings of a Justice’s Court may be proved by the justice, who is a competent witness to verify his minutes, which must be produced and can not be proved by parol. Though not technically a court of record, the proceedings are in the nature of a record. (11 John. R. 166.) The proceedings in any cause had before a justice may be proved by the oath of the justice. (2 R. S. 456, 4th ed; 15 Wend. R. 237.)
II. The judgments and proceedings of inferior courts, not of record, may be proved by the minute book in which the proceedings are entered. So an examined copy of the minutes will be sufficient. If the proceedings of an inferior court are not entered in the books, they may be proved by the officer of the court, or some person conversant with the facts. (Roscoe Cr. Ev., 204; 2 Ohio R. 17; 1 Starkie Ev. 303, 3d ed.) A Justice’s Court is not a court of record. ( 23 Wend. 374 .)
III. The former trial and sentence might be proved under the plea of not guilty. A former recovery may be proved in trover under the general issue. ( 6 Hill 114 , 2 ib. 478.)
IV. A magistrate’s warrant continues in force until fully executed, during the term of office of the magistrate granting it. (1 Ch. Cr. L. 46 50; Peake’s N. P. Cases, 234.)
H. Harris (District Attorney,) for the people cited, 2 R. S. 804; 3d ed. § 45; 1 Green. Ev § 513..
It is apparent in this case that
p. 212the trial before Esquire Winne, was carried on more for the benefit of the defendant than of the public. The injured person was not complainant, but was a very reluctant witness, and his counsel objected to the whole proceeding. It was evidently an attempt to get off the defendant with a very light punishment for a very atrocious offence. But it failed of its object.
Under the plea of not guilty, the defendant had no right to prove a former trial and sentence, nor even that a proceeding was then pending before a different tribunal for the same of-fence. (Arch. Cr. Pl. 92, 94.) The rule is that under a plea of not guilty, the defendant may give in evidence everything which negatives the allegations in the indictment or complaint and all matters of excuse or justification. Where a defendant wishes to avail himself of a former trial and judgment, he must plead auterfois acquit or auterfois convict, as the case may be.
In this case the defendant pleaded not guilty, and the cause was tried upon that issue alone. If, after the joining of issue, any thing occurred which might be available as a defence, the defendant could only avail himself of it by a subsequent plea, and by presenting a new issue for trial. That was not done, and the evidence of the trial and sentence before Esquire Winne, was properly excluded upon the merits.
We think the objection to the species of evidence, by which the facts were offered to be proved, was also well taken. The record of conviction, if it had been filed, or a duly certified copy of it, would have been the proper evidence. (2 R. S. 717, § 38,39, 40.) If it had been shown that no record of conviction had been filed, the secondary evidence might have been received. (2 R. S. 739, § 10: Barb. Cr. L. 407, 2d ed.)
The judgment must be affirmed.