p. 616although repaired by the defendant at the time of finding the indictment, yet they should find them guilty under the third count; and so.in respect to that portion of the road described in the fourth count.
The counsel for the defendant excepted to so much and such part of the charge as instructed the jury that the defendants were bound to keep that part of their road, which remained laid with plank, substantially as required by the first section of the statute read to them.
And the counsel for the defendant excepted to the refusal of the court to charge and instruct the jury as requested by the defendant’s counsel.
The defendant also excepted to all that part of the charge of the court given after the request and refusal to charge.
The jury found the defendant guilty as charged in the third and fourth counts in the indictment, and not guilty as to the other counts.
The proceedings were removed to this court for review by certiorari.
David B. Prosser, for the defendant.
I. The court erred in charging the jury that the defendants were bound to keep that part of their road'remaining laid with plank substantially as required by the statute read, and that it was not sufficient for them to keep that part of their road a good and substantial road, &c. Because,
1st. The act of 1855 expressly authorized the defendants to relay their road, or any part thereof, with broken stone, gravel, or other hard substance, so as to keep a good and substantial road, and changed the rate of tolls. It is supposed the plank would come within the term, “ other hard substance,” and the defendants might use plank, or any other hard substance, provided they keep a good and substantial road.
2d. If the road was a good and substantial one, the allegation in the indictment' that the road was ruinous, &c., was negatived, and the defendants should have been acquitted. All. that the defendants were required to meet, was the charges'
p. 618the time of finding the indictment, the road was in perfect order.
John D. Wolcott (District Attorney), for the People.
I. There was no error in the charge “ that the defendants were bound to keep that part of the road, which remained laid with plank, substantially as required, by the first section read to them.” (The People v. Kingston & Middletown Turnpike R. Co., 28 Wend. R., 205, 211.)
The public had a right to require something more of the defendants than that the portion of the road remaining laid with plank should be merely á good and substantial road, as required by the last section read to the jury.
It might be both a good and substantial road, though the defendants'had contracted its width one-half, and might be so, though not so constructed as to make secure and maintain a smooth and permanent road, with a hard and even surface; and might also be a good and substantial road, though so constructed as not to permit carriages and vehicles conveniently and safely to pass on and off, where the road intersects other roads; but it would cease to be the road which the defendants were bound to furnish the public, and would be far less commodious. To constitute a nuisance, it is not necessary that the road should be unsafe or impassable. Any contracting or narrowing of a highway is a nuisance. (1 Buss, on Cr., 350.)
Any obstruction left in the road, or omission to repair it, whereby it is less convenient for public use, falls within the same category. The public had a right to have that part of the road remaining laid with plank, continued substantially in the same manner,' as to width and safety, which the charter required at its first construction, until the defendants should relay the same with broken stone, gravel, shell or other hard material, whereby they keep a good and substantial road.
If the court' should not concur in the law of that part of the charge, it does not necessarily follow that it must set aside the verdict. The evidence did not make a case for laying down the law as to the manner in which the defendants were bound
p. 619to keep that part of the road which remained laid with plank; and an error of the court, concerning an abstract proposition, having nothing to do with the matter in hand, is not sufficient ground for reversing a judgment. (Shorter v. People, 2 Comst. R., 202; People v. Wiley, 3 Hill R., 194, 213, 214.)
The law concerning bill of exceptions is the same in criminal as in civil cases. (The People v. Wiley, 3 Hill R., 194, 214.)
IL The request to charge does not state correct law. When a cause of forfeiture has once arisen, whether by non-feasance or otherwise, no case nor dictum can be found that it shall be legally atoned for by subsequent good behavior. The argument goes to prove that a corporation may practice all manner of abuse, by commission or omission, if it be careful to stop before the People can institute a prosecution. (The People v. Hillsdale & Chatham Turnpike R. Co., 23 Wend. R., 258.)
III. To sustain a general exception to a part of a charge, the whole part thus excepted to must be shown to be erroneous. I cannot see that any part of the charge, given after request and refusal to charge, contains error.
A bill of exceptions only raises questions of law. (15 Wend. R., 581.)
The defendants were convicted on the trial under the third and fourth counts of the indictment, and acquitted under other counts. The third and fourth counts were counts at common law, for a nuisance, in suffering their road to be out of repair. These counts both alleged that the defendant’s road was, and had been, and still was, at and until the finding of said indictment, out of repair, to the damage and common nuisance of the citizens of the State, so that they cannot go, return and pass over the same, without great trouble, annoyance and inconvenience. On the trial the defendant’s counsel requested the presiding judge to instruct and charge the jury that before they would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty under either the third or fourth count in the indictment, they must find from the evidence that the defendant suffered and permitted some par
p. 620ticular part of their road to be out of repair at some time laid in the third and fourth counts in the indictment, and that such part so found to be out of repair, continued and remained out of repair down to the time of finding the indictment. The court refused to charge and instruct the jury as requested. by the counsel, but, on the contrary, charged them that it was not necessary for them to find that the defendant’s road was out of repair at the time of the finding of the indictment in order to warrant a conviction, and that if the defendant had suffered their road to be out of repair, although it may have been repaired before the finding of the indictment, they should find the defendants guilty. To the charge as made, and to the refusal to charge as requested, the defendant’s counsel duly excepted. These exceptions, I think, both well taken. The request to charge was nothing more than a request to the court to require the People to sustain by proof the material allegations of the indictment, or allegations without which the indictment would have been clearly demurrable. The object of the prosecution by indictment for nuisance to highways, is not for the punishment of the defendant, but the,repair of the highway, when it is out of repair, or the removal of the nuisance when the highway is obstructed. (3 Chitty's Cr. L., 575; 1 Russ, on Cr., 355.) The judgment in such oases is that the defendant pay a fine and abate the nuisance. (Id.; Bac. Abr., Nuisance, 49, and Term R., 142, 143.) In 1 Russ, on Cr., 356, it is said: “ In order to warrant a judgment for abating a nuisance, it must be stated in the indictment to be continuing, as otherwise such judgment would be absurd.” It follows, if such allegation was essential to maintain the indictment, it was error in the court below to hold that it need not be proved when contained in the indictment. The exceptions to the refusal of the judge to charge as requested, and to his charge in distinct conflict with such request, were, therefore, well taken, and the conviction below must, for that reason, be reversed, and a new trial directed in the Court of. Sessions of Yates county, and the case remitted for that purpose.