Majority
Headnote
Where the testatrix, a German, was able to speak broken English, and one of the subscribing witnesses testifies that he was unacquainted with German, that he asked tiie decedent in English whether the instrument was her last will, and she answered " Ja,” in German, and Unit he had previously been requested by the decedent to become a witness to her will, Ilakl, to be a sufficient request to sign as a. witness and a sufficient publication of the will.The Surrogate.—There are but two questions to be considered, as the result of this testimony. The first is whether the subscription to the will by the witness Dubois, nnable to understand German, and to whom, the declaration and request of the testatrix had to be translated by the other subscribing witness, was a compliance with the statute. The object of requiring two subscribing witnesses is undoubtedly to guard against imposition upon, or mistake of, the testator, and in a case where one of the witnesses must depend upon the statement of the other as to what is said by the testator, he would appear to be a witness only as to the act of signing, and if that were literally true in this case, I should certainly hesitate in holding it sufficient proof.
Suppose, for example, both subscribing witnesses had been incapable of understanding a word of what the decedent said, and an interpreter had stated to them, respectively, that the decedent declared to them that the instrument was her last will and testament, and that she requested them to subscribe their names as witnesses thereto. They would have no assurance of the fact, except the statement of the interpreter, and the verity of the act would seem to be entirely dependent upon his . testimony, as to the truthful interpretation. And it seems to me that it would fall short, altogether, of the
The second is whether the testimony of the proponent’s counsel is sufficient to justify its rejection, on the ground that the instructions were received through the principal beneficiary, there being no satisfactory proof that the decedent ever gave any such instructions.
It has been held, in repeated cases, that where a person, occupying a fiduciary relation to the testator, receives a legacy, and has a controlling agency to the execution of the will, the circumstances are deemed suspicious, requiring the fullest explanation, such as proof of capacity and free exercise of voluntary choice. (1 Reelf. on Wills, 515, &c.; Id., 122.)
But if this will came within the definition of an in-officious testament, it seems to be relieved from suspicion by the fact, well proved, that there was an understanding between decedent, the principal beneficiary, and the testatrix’s husband, before his death, that after his death decedent should become a member of the
\ But while the civil law defines an inofficious or undutiful will to be such as substantially departs from the disposition of the estate, as it would be distributed in case of intestacy, I am of the opinion that such a definition is entirely inconsistent with the law of wills, as recognized and established in this country. For the authority to make a will implies the power to discriminate between, or disinherit, next-óf-kin ; and the fact of such disinheritance or discrimination raises no presumption of undue influence.
I am of the opinion that the instrument propounded is proved to have been executed in conformity to the statutes of this state, by the decedent, when she was of sound and disposing mind, free from restraint, and should therefore be admitted to probate.
Ordered accordingly.