Majority
Headnote
A testator, having real estate with a trifling personal property, devised and gave the whole to trustees in trust, to receive the rents and profits, to sell the real estate in their exclusive discretion, and to invest, &c. Out of the income, they were to pay an annuity to his mother for her life, and one-third of the net income to his wife during her life. The residue of the income was to be divided into three equal parts ; one of which the trustees were to pay to his son J. during his life, and if J. died childless, then his share was to vest in the testator’s surviving children. Another third of the two-thirds of income, was in like manner to be paid to his daughter A. yearly, for life, with a like provision on her death, childless. The remaining third was to be paid to his daughter M., in case she survived his wife, but not otherwise; and until the wife’s death, was to be paid yearly to her. If M. died first, the income was to go to her children after the wife’s death, and if childless, then to the testator’s surviving children. At any time after the real estate w.as converted, J. and A. were to be permitted to draw out their shares absolutely ; but the time of conversion was to be exclusively in the trustees discretion. At the death of his wife, the third, of which the income was first given to her, was to fall into the residue of his estate; and tfie residue he gave to his children who might be living at the time the same should become payable, and if either were then dead, his share to go to his issue.The whole real estate is devised in trust, and if, by the limitations grafted upon the trust, the absolute power of alienation may be suspended for more than two lives in being at the testator’s death, the devise is void. (Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 ; Thompson v. Carmichael’s Executors, 1 Sandford’s Ch. R. 387.) The validity of the trust will therefore be properly tested by the inquiry whether, on any supposable contingency, it may continue beyond two such lives.
The first gift from the trust fund, is the annuity to Mrs. Brown for life. This is an inalienable trust interest, and requires the estate to continue in the trustees while she lives. (Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 117 to 119 ; 121, 122 ; 164, 165; 173, 174.)
Next in order, is the devise of one third of the net rents to the testator’s wife for life. As she is the trustee, as well as the beneficiary, she must be deemed to take an absolute legal estate in this provision. (Mason v. Mason’s Executors, 2 Sandf. Ch. R. 432. But this does not affect the question, because her life is to elapse before it can be ascertained who will be entitled to the residuary estate. Her life, is therefore, to be taken into the account, and with that of Mrs. Brown, it exhausts the limit which the law has assigned to the suspense of the power of alienation.
Then, as to the remaining two thirds of the rents and profits, after paying the annuity. The testator divides this remainder into three equal parts. One part of the income is to be paid to Joseph, during his life.
Now, let it be supposed that Joseph has survived both Mrs. Brown and Mrs. Wilson. The trust must still continue while he lives, unless the trustees, who are, in that respect, vested with an uncontrollable discretion, (Bunnerr v. Storm, 1 Sandf. Ch. R. 357;) shall have sold the real estate, and Joseph received the two ninth parts, absolutely, as permitted by the will. But, inasmuch as he could not receive any part of the estate, absolutely, until
The remaining two ninths, is subject to the same observations, in the event of Mrs. McSorley surviving Mrs. Wilson. She would, then, receive the income during her life, and the trust would continue for that purpose.
Thus, it appears, that as to two thirds of the trust estate, the absolute power of alienation may be suspended, and, on the most probable contingencies must be suspended, for more than two lives in being, at the death of the testator.
The third part, out of which Mrs. Wilson’s income is made payable, is, upon her death, devised directly and absolutely ; so, that the suspended power revives after the lapse of the two lives first named. The trust, in respect of this portion of the property, is, therefore, unobjectionable; but the remaining trusts being void, it cannot be upheld without doing injustice to the parties, and must fall with the principal devise.
There must be a decree, declaring the will void as to the real estate, and directing the usual reference in partition cases.
Cases cited
- Hawley v. James 16 Wend. 61 p. 524