Joyce v. Hart

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JANUARY SESSIONS, 1877.

ALFRED JOYCE, - --- -- APPELLANT; DAME CONSTANCE H. HART,

DAME

E VI-,- RESPONDENTS. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE.)

the judgment of the Court below, and did not exceed $2,000.

In support of his motion he cited : McFarlane v. Leclaire (1); Cuvillier v. Aylwin (2)

and Stats. L. 0. (3).

Mr. L. H. Davidson, Q. C., contra, referred to Richer v. Voyer (4); Buntin v. Hibbard (5); and In re Louis larois (6).

The Court reserved judgment on this point until after the argument of the appeal on the merits.

20, 22, 1877.

No action en demolition de nouvel acuvre lies when works are completed. It is only necessary to refer to the f6llowing authorities to establish the truth of this proposition. Carou Actions Possessoires p.p. 30, 31, 88, 40; Daviel, " Cours d'Eau," Du Domaine Public, par. 471; Ferridre (Dict.) Verbo Denonciation de nouvel auvre. Brown v. GugJ shows that authorities commenting the French code are -inapplicable to this case. The French code is different from what the old French law was, and it is that law which prevails in Canada.

Appellant contends that in this action the conclusions of the declaration ask for the demolition of the whole wall, from top to foundation, end are strikingly like those given by the authors as conclusions in an action en denonciation, and dissimilar to those of an action possessoire. In a possessory action it is necessary to allege expressly, and prove positively, Plaintiff's possession for a year and a day before the trouble. Cardinal v. Belanger (2); 0. L. C., Art. 946 ; 2 Doutre Proc. Civ., p. 268, Art. 1468; Tourdain v. Vigereux (8).

Nor can the Plaintiff's demand be maintained as one in the nature of an action petitoire. In that case the plaintiff would ask to recover the absolute and free ownership of her gable wall, and not demolition of works and damages. (4).

By Art. 518, C. C., Plaintiff's ownership is affected by the equal right of her neighbor to make use of the wall. .

OF

Neither is prepayment of the indemnity mentioned in Art. 518 absolutely required.

This article is a reproduction of Art. 594 of the Coutume de Paris, but the word prepayment is left out.

The Appellant therefore claims that the only action left to Plaintiff after completion of the works, was a personal action for damages. The decisions given in Louisiana under Art. 680 of the Louisiana Code, which is almost a copy of Art. 518 of our Code, are favorable to Appellant's contention that prepayment is not necessary, and that the only action which could be maintained is one of damages.

Graihle v. Hown (1); Murrell v. Fowler ; Davis v. GraihIe

Lastly, can this action be maintained as one of damages?

The Appellant respectfully submits that it cannot. There was no wrongful act committed. By Art. 514, C. all the works complained of are allowed, and moreover by the judgment no special damages have been appropriated for the alleged trespass.

[The learned Counsel also referred to Beck v. Harris Duranton, Vol. p. 387 on Art. 667 of and Washburne on Easements, p. 472 ]

Mr. A. M. Hart, of the Montreal Bar, on the part of Respondent:- Plaintiff, before being interfered with her acquired rights, and before the new works were proceeded with, was entitled, under Art. 518 and Art. 519, to be asked her consent and, on her refusal, Defendant could have caused to be settled by experts the necessary means to prevent the new work from being injurious to the rights of the other.

The decisions under Art. 661 of French Code, of which our Art. 518 is a reproduction, prove beyond all controversy that prepayment was necessary, and that Plaintiff can have an action not only after works were completed, but also an action in rem. against any subsequent purchaser of Defendant's property.

Pocket v. Des Rocker (1); Demolombe (2); and Ferrot (3); Odiot v. Rousseau (4) is expressly in point. Although this case was not cited in any of the Courts below, your Lordships will be surprised to find how strikingly similar are the considerants of the judgment in that case with those of the judgment in this case given by the learned Chief Justice Dorion.

Now, as to the nature of this action, it is immaterial to Plaintiff whether the action of the Appellant for the removal of the works made on his gable wall is considered as of the nature of an action, petitoire or of an action possessoire and en denonciation de nouvel suvre. By Art 20 of the C. P., it is sufficient that the facts and conclusions be distinctly and fairly stated, without any particular form being necessary, and, by referring to the following authorities, it will be seen that an action en denonciation de nouvel weuvre, can be merged into a petitory or possessory action.

Vide Merlin, Question de Droit (5); Curasson, des. Actions possessoires (6) ; Troplong (7).

The case of Gugy v. Brown, cited by Appellant, is not in point. In that case the question of denonciation de nouvel auere was only casually- touched upon in a dissertation,and there was no adjudication as to whether an action asking for the removal of works illegally r., placed on a Plaintiff's property could be maintained after the works were completed.

The contention that Plaintiff cannot recover damages for the trespass is not warranted. The English, as well as the French authorities, are clear on this point. See Shadman v Smith, (1) and Fisher's CommonLaw Digest, p. 8384.

Mr. L.

The evidence proves that Appellant acted in good faith, and that Plaintiff had no objection that the works should be proceeded with. The protest was insufficient, if she really objected to the works, she should have obtained an injunction, or, rather, instituted her action before the works were completed. The judicial interpretation given to the law on this point, in France, is different from that given by the Judicial Privy Council in Gugy v. Brown.

June 28, 1877. In this case I have felt considerable difficulty as to the question of jurisdiction, but we have been referred to the Code of Lower Canada, which contains words relative to appeals either from the Circuit Court or from the Superior Court, similar to those used in the Statute establishing this Court in relation to appeals from the judgments of the Court of Appeals in the Province of Quebec.

The general rule is, that when the words of a Statute have received a judicial interpretation and the Legislature subsequently passes an Act on the same or a similar subjeut, using the same words, then you hold that the Legislature approved of the meaning affixed to the words by the Judicial decision.

I understand that the Judges and Courts in the Province of Quebec, before the passing of the Appeal and Exchequer Court Act, decided under the code that it is the amount claimed in the Declaration which gives the right to appeal and not the amount of the judgment. I think we may here hold that such is the effect of the Act of the Dominion Parliament and that the Legislature so intended by the words used. We must, I apprehend, assume to a certain extent that the Dominion Parliament is aware of the proceedings.and matters which are being transacted in the Provinces which compose the Dominion, and particularly as to the decisions of. the Courts of Justice; and being aware of the decisions as to Appeals in Quebec, when the same legislative language as to Appeals from the Court of Appeals of Quebec is used, we may apply the rule referred to and hold this Appeal will lie.

The case seems. to me to turn on two questions: 1. Whether the wall of Plaintiff's house was built wholly on het own land; and, 2nd, if so, whether the Defendant had a right to use it as a common wall, without first paying her for the same, or taking the steps necessary to make it a common wall, under sec. 578 of the Civil Code of Quebec.

The evidence called by the Plaintiff shewed the wall was erected three inches within the line of her lot; that this line was ascertained by the posts that had been planted by the surveyors, and the fence that then stood on the premises.

The witnesses called by the Plaintiff were architects.

The Defendant called a surveyor, and by his measurement, taking the house on the opposite side of Prince Arthur Street to be on the line of that street, then the wall of the Plaintiff's house was six inches off the line of Portland Street, and, giving her lot 81 feet front, it would bring the north-west gable wall of Plaintiff's house directly on the line between Plaintiff's and Defendant's lote. Supposing the Plaintiff's lot thirty feet in rear, the wall would be somewhat in on Defendant's land. He said he took no precise measurement of the rear of Plaintiff's house, and was not certain with regard to the excess in the rear of the house.

Mr. Justice Tessier, in his judgment as to this point, said Mrs. Hart had built her house wholly on her own land.

Mr. Justice Sanborn said the wall of Respondent's house was wholly on her own land, and was not mitoyen under article 518 0. C.

Chief Justice Dorion said the Plaintiff has established that she was proprietor of the wall when the works were made.

I should draw the same inference from the evidence that these learned Judges have, that the wall in question was built wholly on Plaintiff's land.

The decision on the demurrer in the Superior Court was in favor of the Defendant as to the right of Plaintiff to demand the demolition of the work of which she complained. Mr. Justice Johnson, in his judgment says: " that she built up to the limits of her lot, and, of course, the Defendant had the right to the mitoyennetE; but no experts were named to value it, and it is now too late to ask for the demolition. It would be obviously absurd to condemn this Defendant to demolish what he would have a right to build again the next day, upon the observance of the proper formalities."

The Plaintiff contends that the evidence shows that the wall in question was built wholly on her land, and no agreement or understanding was had with the adjoining proprietor as to the expense of building; she, therefore, was the owner of the wall in question, and the Defendant was the owner of property adjoining a wall which he had the privilege of making common under article 518 of the C. 0. of Lower Canada. That article reads as follows:

"Every owner of property adjoining a wall has the .privilege of making it common, in whole or in part, by paying to the proprietor of the wall half of the value of the part he wishes to render common, and half of the value of the ground on which such wall is built" The Defendant. contends that he had the right to make this a common wall, and to use it as such without first paying for it, and that the only way Plaintiff could prevent him from proceeding with the work or to have it demolished was to institute proceedings against him whilst the work was in progress, and before it was finished. That this must be done by an action of d6nonciation de nouvelles cauvres; that, having failed to do so, the only remedy left was to sue for the value of half the wall, and the land on which it stands. He also contended that there had been no trespass or damage done to Plaintiff, and that in resting the building against the gable wall of the Plaintiff's house he only exercised the right of making the wall common. I think the Defendant's contention in this respect cannot be sustained, but that before he can exercise any rights as to this wall as a common wall, he must make it a common wall, which he has not done. Even if it had been a common wall under Article 519 he could not make any recess in the body of the wall or rest any work thereon without -the consent of the neighbour or without, on refusal, " having caused to be settled by experts the necessary means to prevent the new work from being injurious to the rights of the other." .It was further urged by Defendant that the action could not be considered as a possessory action, because it was not shewn that the Plaintiff was in possession a year and a day before the trouble, and it is not so alleged in the declaration.

It is alleged in the declaration that she purchased the property in December, 1872; that about the first of May, 1878, she began to build her house on the lot, and it was finished and occupied on the 15th December, 1878. The action was commenced in September, 1874, certainly more than a year and a day after the Plaintiff had taken possession of her lot by beginning to build upon it. The only person who speaks of the time Defendant began to encroach on Plaintiff's wall was Plaintiff's son; he said it was in the beginning of July, 1874. The learned ChiefJustice Dorion, in his judgment, seems to think she was in possession of the wall more than a year and a day before the commencement of Defendant's works. However that may be, it is not necessary to maintain the action against the Defendant, that she should state in her declaration or shew in evidence that she was in possession for a year and a day before the trouble. It is not denied she was in possession at the time the trespass was committed, and that she was the owner of the premises. The action seems to be in substance that the Defendant, the Appellant, had taken upon himself illegally to make in the north-west wall of Plaintiff's house holes and recesses which had caused her damage, and had applied and rested his works on her property without her consent and without having first notified her or taken and observed -the formalities required in such cases. That he had trespassed on her property for about six inches, had broken and taken away ten feet of the water spout of her house; had raised the wall five feet in height, and made thereon a work in brick and out stone which altered the appearance of her house and rendered it of less value than it was before; the whole without her consent, and without having placed her en demoure to name experts to establish the means to render the works as little injurious to her as possible.

The Plaintiff Respondent contended for the demolition of the new works, that Defendant be held to fill up the holes and recesses which he had caused to be made in the wall, to place the whole in the state it was prior to the making of these works, and to pay £500 for damages for the trespass in question.

This shows a trespass on Plaintiff's property, and she claims damages for the injury.

The ground on which Defendant urges that Plaintiff could not maintain a petitory action, is that the wall was a common wall, but as that is not the case and no other objection is urged, I think the petitory action proper.

The Defendant contends also that the article 518 of Civil Code does not require the prepayment to the proprietor of half the value of the part of the wall he wishes to render common.

If it were. a case of first impression, I' should be prepared to hold that the article conferred the privilege of making the wall a common wall, the paying half of the value of the wall and land to be considered a condition precedent to the wall becoming mitoyen. This, I think, is the proper interpretation of the article. Mr. Davidson referred to No. 164 of the Custom of Paris: " If " anyone wishes to build against a wall non-mitoyes, "he can do so on paying the half as well of the said "wall as of the foundation thereof, as far as the height "of the wall non-mitoyen; this he is held to pay "'before either demolishing anything or building." I think this is, in effect, the same as article 518 of the Code.

The only ground for contending that the Defendant might use the wall; if it was wholly on Plaintiff's land, was that conferred by the 518th article of the Code, and as that neither in terms or by implication confers the right of making it mitoyes until it was paid for, I fail to see how it can justify trespassing on it. Even if it were mitoyes, he could not make holes in it nor rest his works thereon without consent, unless he settled by experts the means of preventing the new work from being injurious to the other owner under Art. 519.

Mr. Justice Tessier, in his judgment, refers to the appropriation, by the Defendant, of the half of his neighbor's wall, and of the ground on which it stands, as a kind of forced expropriation.

He says: "It is a general principle of expropriation that the individual is paid beforehand, and he cited article 407 of the Code: 'No one can be compelled to give up his property, except for public utility and in consideration of a just indemnity previously paid.'

If it were otherwise, Mrs. Hart would lose her right in rem, and nothing would be left her but a recourse ad personam against Mr. Joyce, who might be solvent or insolvent. It, therefore, follows that Mrs. Hart should pursue her right of action in rem for the demolition of the new work, or the replacement of her wall in the state it was without innovation."

The learned Chief Justice Dorion said the Plaintiff does not complain that the Defendant erected his building on his own lot, but that he has appropriated one-half of the wall of her house, by erecting his building on it and over it. It is not an action en ddnontion de nouvel asuvre, the conclusions of which are that the party, Defendant, should discontinue his works, but an action petitaire, by which Plaintiff says: "I am sole owner of the gable wall of my house; you have committed a trespass by building upon it; I ask that you be ordered to remove your building from it, and to restore the wall to its original state." There is not an author or judicial decision to be found to show that this is not a proper action, and that it ought to be dismissed, because the works were completed when the action was brought."

I think this is the proper view to take of Plaintiff's case, and that the action is. maintainable.

Mr. Davidson referred to Demolombe, (1) to show the only action Plaintiff could take was a personal action for the value of the wall. The first part of the citation reads thus (translated): " But if the "proprietor of a wall, for any reason whatever, has "not received the price of the mitoyennetM acquired, "could he claim the privilege of his debt in a case "where the circumstance would render the exercise of "this privilege possible ?

The Court of Paris has "adjudged in the negative, holding that article 661 "gives him only a personal action."

But the author further continues: " It is a fact, however, that the pro- " prietor has sold an immoveable, and we cannot see "why he could not, as well as any vendor of an "immoveable, claim the privilege of his debt. Article "661 does not give him a personal action, for it has "been decided, and correctly, in our opinion, in 1848, "in the case of Pochet, Desrocher's Journal du Palais "Vol. 40, p. 868, that an action would lie against a "subsequent purchaser."

The case of Rosseau v. Odiot, referred to by Mr. Hart, well sustains the view that an action will lie similar to this, though the work complained of has been completed; having reference to Article 661 of Code Napoleon, which is to the same effect as Article 518 of Civil Code of Lower Canada.

The report is to the following effect (translated) DeCourt had built a house adjoining the wall of a house belonging to Odiot, and Rousseau bought it at a public sale. Odiot sued DeCourt and Rousseau to have the building demolished or to pay the value of the wall and charges. The judgment was " considering that "when a party has taken his neighbour's wall the abso- "lute owner has a right to get back possession if he "has not been paid the value of the mitoyennetd, and that "it gives him a right to an action in rem against any "subsequent holder of the property; the claim of M. "Odiot is, therefore, well founded against DeCourt and "Rousseau, saving to the latter his rights against "DeCourt."

The concluding part of the judgment was: "The Court doth condemn DeCourt and Rousseau to "demolish within a fortnight after the notification of "the judgment, the works erected alongside of the wall "of Odiot's house, and on their failing to comply with "this order Odiot is authorized to do so at the expense "and cost of Rousseau, provided always Rousseau "refuses to pay, after the amount has been settled by "experts, the value of the mitoyennett and interest and "costs."

This was appealed and judgment affirmed.

I see no reason why the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench should be interfered.-with.

As to the jurisdiction of this Court in this case, I will say that I would be very much impressed with the line of argument taken by Mr. Justice Strong, but for the fact that a judicial construction was given to these terms by the Lower Canada Bench before the Supreme Court Act was passed. I am, therefore, of opinion that the appeal is properly before us. I entirely agree with the judgments delivered in the Court of Appeal. Respondent in Court below (Appellant in this Court) had no right to use Plaintiff's wall without having taken the necessary legal steps to secure the right, and having first indemnified Plaintiff, by paying for one half the value of the wall and ground on which erected; pre-payment being, in my opinion, expressly required before the owner of a property adjoining a wall obtains the privilege of making it common.

J.:--- I am of opinion that the motion to quash this appeal which was made by the Respondent ought to be granted unless the Appellant, - within a reasonable time, files an affidavit shewing that the Defendant's works, which the judgment orders the demolition of in the event of the Defendant not making the wall common are of the value at least of $1,900, which, with the damages ($100), would make up the sum of $2,000. I feel bound by Lord Chelmsford's judgment in McFarlane v Leclaire, (1)'to hold that to ascertain if this Court has jurisdiction in appeals from the Province of Quebec, under Sect. 17 of Supreme Court Act, we are, in cases of appeals by a Defendant. to take the amount awarded by the judgment as the amount in dispute. If the judgment deals in any way with property of which the value is not ascertained by the judgment itself, I am of opinion that an affidavit should be filed shewing the value of the property. This was the practice followed in the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of appeals from the Circuit or District Courts, which were limited to cases in which " the matter in dispute exclusive of costs " exceeded the sum or value of $2,000. The Supreme Court adopted precisely the same rule as that laid down in the Privy Council, and held that, if a judgment was recovered against a Defendant for a less sum than $2,000, there was, on the part of the Defendant. nothing in controversy beyond the sum for which the judgment was given, and. that consequently he was not entitled to appeal or bring a writ of error. In an old case in the Supreme Court, the question arose where the judgment appears not to have been for the recovery of damages but in rem, and the Court there made an order that the Plaintiff in error should be at liberty to shew by affidavit that the matter in dispute exceeded in value $2,000

I refer to several authorities on this question (2).

The majority of the Court being, however, of opinion that the value of the matter in dispute is to be ascertained by reference to the amount of the damages for which the declaration concludes, my opinion is overruled.

I therefore proceed to state briefly my judgment on the merits:

I consider this case does not call for any adjudication upon the question whether the action of " ddnonciation de nouvel " is or is not a possessory action distinct from the ordinary possessory action of " complainte or whether it lies for _works erected on the Plaintiff's land or only on the Defendit's own land to the prejudice of the Plaintiff; or whether demolition may be ordered -after the works are- completed or only when they are in an unfinished state; all subjects of much controversy, though they seeni-now to be settled by the general consent of commentators and authors who have written on the subject.

The declaration contains no allegation of possession for a year and a day before the_" trouble", which would be fatal to it as a possessory action.

It is, as far as I am able to give an opinion, 6 petitory action brought to recover property of the Plaintiff of which the Defendant has illegally possessed himself; it libels all the facts necessary to such an action and. the conclusions are adapted to it. That demolition of works completed, as well as works unfinished, may properly be Cbri made an incidental demand in a petitory action for the recovery of property is very clear on many authorities (1). When the Plaintiff, by his conduct, has induced the Defendant to proceed with his works in error, or in the belief that the Plaintiff acquiesced in the prejudice caused to his rights, I take it for granted that an exception, analogous to an exception of fraud, might be opposed to the action. Take, for instance, the case of the Defendant making a large expenditure in building on his own lands to the prejudice of an insignificant servitude of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could not, after passively awaiting the termination of the work, in either a possessory or petitory action, insist on the demolition of the buildings. Again, if the Defendant believed himself to be building on his own land, whilst the Plaintiff knew he was on the Plaintiff's land, it would be conduct amounting to fraud on the part of the Plaintiff silently to permit the Defendant to complete his erections and then turn round, assert his title, and ask to have the buildings destroyed. In the present case nothing of this kind occurred, for the protest made by the ministry of a notary, in due form of law, gave'early notice to the Defendant that he was infringing on the Plaintiffs rights, and put him in such a position that all he did subsequently was done with full knowledge, and at his own risk and peril. Then the Court of Appeals, having it in their power to award immediate unconditional demolition, thought fit to interpose a delay and conditions in favor of the efendant, by giving the Defendant an opportunity of making the wall common. The Defendant's Counsel seg.: however, insists that this had already been done, for that under Art. 518, Civil Code of Lower Canada,which corresponds with Article 6i1 of Code Napoleon, the payment of half the value of the.wall and of the soil on which it was built, Was not a condition precedent to making it common, as it was expressly under Art. 194 of the Custom of Paris. This, however, cannot possibly be so; this right of a proprietor to make his neighbour's wall "mitoyen," is a species of expropriation for purposes of public utility, and prior indemnity is always a condition of such a mode of forced acquisition, which, indeed, the words of Article 518, though not so explicit as the article of the Custom, seem to contemplate.

If any authority were wanting to negative such a proposition, it is to be found in the case cited in the Journal du Palais an arrAt of the Paris Court of Appeals, corresponding exactly with the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in the present case. This arrAt also shows that the demolition may be awarded in such an action as this, for'the case of Odiot v. Rousseau could not have been a possessory action, since it appears to have been originally instituted in the civil tribunal. I am, therefore, of opinion the appeal Aould be dismissed with costs.

La premibre question que nous devons d6cider en cette cause, est celle de savoir si l'appelant avait droit d'appel. Les intim6s pr6tendent que le montant que l'appelant a 6t6 condamn6 A leur payer n'6tant que de $100, en d'une condamnation & d6faire certains ouvrages par lui brig6s sur la propri6t6 des intim6s et dont la valeur n'est ni all6gu6e ni prouv6e Atre d'un montant suffisant pour couvrir lea $2,000, montant requis par la section 17 du statut 6rigeant la Cour Supreme pour donner droit d'appel, ce droit d'appel n'appartient pas a l'appelant et que son appel devrait 6tre renvoy6. En un mot lea intim6s pr6tendent que ce n'est pas le montant demand6 par 1'action originaire qui doit r6gler le droit d'appel, mais bien le montant accord6 par le jugement. Nous n'adoptons pas dans le mAme sens que lea intim6s, la section 17 de l'acte de la Cour Supreme qui r~gle le droit d'appel quant A ce qui concerne la province de Quebec qui est en ces termes : " Pouryu que nul "appel d'un jugement rendu dans la province de "Qu6bec, ne sera permis dans lea causes oi la somme "on la valeur de la chose en litige ne s'616ve pas A deux "mille piastres."

De son c6t6 l'appelant pr6tend que le droit d'appel n'est pas r6gl6 par le montant on la valeur de la matibre en litige.

Cette question n'est pas nouvelle et elle a d6jd 6t6 soulev6e devant nos tribunaux civils en la province de Quebec, A propos du droit d'appel de la Cour du Banc de la Reine an Conseil Priv6 de Sa Majest6. L'article 1178 du Code de Proc6dure Civile qui permet ces appels eat, A pen de chose prAs, dans lai momes termes que ceux de la section 17 de l'acte de la Cour Supreme savoir: " II y a appel & Sa Majest6 en son Conseil Priv4 de tout " jugement dans une cause la matibre en litige " exchde la somme on valeur de £500 sterling." On voit qu'il n'y a de diffirence que dans le montant. Pendant quelque temps en la province de Qu6bec, lea tribunaux -par quelques majorit6s ont adopt6 la manibre d'interpr6ter ces section et article dans le sens que leur donnent les intim6s; mais ces d6cisions n'ont pas confirm6es ni approuv6es, je crois au contraire qu'elles ont 6t6 a&vrement bl~m6es, et en effet depuis plusieurs ann6es les tribunaux civils de la province de Qubbec les ont renvers6es; ils ont interpr6t ces articles du Code de Piocdure Civile comme r6glant que le droit d'appel serait d6termin6 par le montant r6clam6 ou la valeur de la matibre en litige, donnant ainsi le droit d'appel & l'une ou l'autre des parties qui se croirait 16s6e par le jugement. La mome question soulev~e quant aux appels de jugements de la Cour de Circuit A la Cour Sup6rieure, et quant A ceux de la Cour Sup6rieure A la Cour du Banc de la Reine a 6t6 jug6e dans le meme sens.

En la pr6sente cause, il est indubitable qu'il est demand6 deux mille piastres de dommages, et de plus, . que le d6fendeur soit condamn6 A d6molir certains travaux de grande valeur. La somme ou la valeur de la chose en dispute est 6videmment d'au moins deux mille piastres; les demandeurs, pr6sents intim6s, ont fait leur position et ont admis que la chose en litige 6tait d'au moins $2,000, mais le jugement de la Cour d'Appel ne leur accorde que $100 de dommages et lea oblige A remettre la maison des intimbs dans le meme 6t qu'elle 6tait avant les voies de fait dont ils se sont plaints. Et les intimbs qui trbs probablement auraient eu droit d'appel de ce jugement qui ne leur accorde que $100 lorsqu'ils en ont demand6 $2,000 pourraient refuser A l'appelant le m6me droit d'appel sur le principe que pour twi seul, la valeur de la matibre en litige n'est que de $100.00 Comme je l'ai d6ji dit les dcisions du plus haut tribunal de la province de Qu6bec, ont fait justice de ces pr6tentions, et aujourd'hui il n'y a plus de doute que le droit d'appel eat regl6 tant en faveur d'un demandeur qu'en faveur d'un d6fendeur par le montant originairement r6clam6 par l'action et non par le montant adjug6. II serait singulier qu'un demandeur qui pr6tendrait avoir un bon droit d'action pour un montant de $2,000 prit Atre forc6 de renoncer & son droit d'appel sous pr6texte que n'ayant obtenu que $100, la matibre en litige ne repr6sente pas un montant suffisant pour lui donner droit d'appel et qu'il lui faut accepter ce verdict comme final. Un d6fendeur poursuivi pour $2,000.00 mais condamn6 seulement A payer $1,999.99 se-verrait 6galement priv6 de son droit d'appel parce qu'il aurait plu & une autorit6 quelconque de ne le condamner que juste pour un montant qui lui enl6verait son droit d'appel, droit qu'un centin de plus dans le chiffre de sa condamnation lui assurerait. Je crois que le montant r6clam6 doit r~gler le droit d'appel et non pas le montant de I condamnation.

Quant au m6rite de la demande 'et de la d6fense, je dirai que les faits qui y ont donn6 lieu sont peu compliqu6s et se r6duisent i la plainte que forment les intim6s contre 1'appelant d'avoir commis certaines voies de fait contre la propri6t6 des intim6s, savoir, de s'4tre empar6 du mur du pignon de leur maison, d'y avoir fait des surcharges,. d'y avoir fait des trou6es et des ouvertures en batissant lui-meme & c6t6 et d'avoir trait6 ce mur comme mitoyen tandis qu'il ne l'6tait pas, et surtout d'avoir fait tous ces empidtements sans avoir pris lea moyens d'acqu~rir la mitoyennet6 et d'en avoir pay6 I valeur.

faits sont incontrovertibles et ne font audane difficult6, et l'Appelant a 6t6 condamn 6par la Cour du Bane de la Reine i d6faire sea travaux et i payer $100 de dommages aux Intim6s. Je crois le jugement bon, tout en d6clarant que lore de Ia plaidoirie devant nous, mon impression 6tait en faveur de 'Appelant, et ce qui contribuait alors A me faire consid6rer la position des intim6s sous un jour tr6s d6favorable 6tait le fait (lequel ne semblait pas ni6 par eux) que lea travaux dont lea intim6s se plaignaient avaient 6t6 commenc6s et completement termin6s par l'Appelant au vu' et su des Iintim6s et sans protestation de leur part. Je me disais et je crois avec raison qu'aprbs avoir vu l'Appelant faire les ouvrages en question, sans objection de leur part, il y avait consentement tacite, -sinon formel de leur part i ce que 1'Appelant acquit ainsi la mitoyennet6 et que la question de l'indemnit6 n'6tait que secondaire entre des voisins et devait se r~gler A 1'amiable;-et dans ce as il me semblait remarquer une grande rigueur dans le jugement dont est appel, lequel condamnait l'Appelant A payer des dommages pour avoir fait ce qu'il pouvait faire sons certaines conditions pr6alables, il est vrai, mais dont les Intim6s me semblerent le dispenser en ne e'y opposant pas, on en ne protestant pas. Mais la lecture du dossier m'a convaincu que l'Appelant a 6t6 proteet6 dhs le commencement des travaux faits par lui, et que sous le pretexte que le prot4t notari6 qu'il avait requ 6tait r6dig6 en langue frangaise, il avait renvoy6 ce prot~t aux Intimbs. L'Appelant a eu grand tort en agissant ainsi: si vraiment il ne pouvait comprendre le frangais il devait se faire expliquer ce protst et discontinuer sea operations. Dbe ce moment il 6tait -constitu6 en mauvaise foi et ne pouvait plus se m6prendre sur le silence des Intim6s: il violait la propri6t6 de son voisin et agissait en contravention de Particle 518 du Code Civil de la province de Qu6bec qui l'obligeait de payer, avant que de rien entreprendre contte le mur dee intim6s, la valeur du droit de mitoyennet6 qu'il pr6tendait acqu6rir et la valeur du sol dont il s'emparait. II a t6 condamn6 et je crois avec raison, et quoique les dommages me paraissent un peu au-dessus de la r6alit6, je consid~re que sa conduite a 6t6 pr6cipit6e et blAmable. Je suis d'opinion de renvoyer l'appel au m6rite et de confirmer le jugement de la Cour du Bane de la Reine.

J:

La preuve en cette cause d6montre de la manidre la plus convaincante le fait que l'Intim6e, Mde. Hart, a bAti le mur de sa maison enti~rement sur son terrain, dans la ligne de division.

Son voisin 1'Appelant, Joyce, sans avoir pay6 ou fait aucune offre r6elle de payer la valeur de la moiti6 de ce mur et le prix de la moiti6 du terrain sur lequel il eat biti, a exerc6, comme s'il les avait 16galement acquis, les droits de mitoyennet6 dana le mur en question, en y faisant pratiquer les ouvrages dont l'Intim6e se plaint dans ea d6claration. Le pouvait-il ? II le pr6tend dans sa d6fense, all6guant qu'il n'a fait qu'user de la facult6 donn6e par Ia loi, d'acqu6rir la mitoyennet6 et qu'il a toujours 6t6 pret i payer la moiti6 du mur. Suivant lui, la loi n'exige pas le paiement prbalable de l'indemnit6 pour devenir mitoyen. Cette pr6tention est 6videmment erron6e.

L'article 518 C. quoique moins explicite que l'article.194 de la Coutume de Paris, n'en contient pas moins la m~me condition de paiement pr6alable. Cet article donnant "au propriftaire joignant un mur la facult6 de le rendre mitoyen en remboursant an propri6taire la moit6 de la valeur de la portion qu'il veut rendre mitoyenne et moiti6 de la valeur du sol sur lequel le mur eat biti," est identique avec l'article 661 du Code Civil frangais. Bien que dans ce dernier article, comme dans le n6tre, il y sit omission des expressions del'article 194de la Coutume de Paris au sujet du paiement du droit de mitoyennet6 " qu'il tenu payer paravant que de rien ddmolir, ni bdtir," on n'a cependant pas cess6 en France, depuis le Code, d'exiger le paiement prbalable;-le privil6ge n'6tant donn6 qu'en remboursant la moiti6 de la valeur, etc., d6pend par cons6quent de l'accomplissement de cette condition. Ce droit n'est pas acquis avant ce paiement. Cela r6sulte bien clairement des termes des deux articles. C'est ainsi que lee commentateurs du Code francais ont interpr6t6 l'article 661, et c'est aussi, sans doute, l'interpr6tation que nous devons adopter pour P'article 518 puisque la r6dac tion est la meme. Si elle laissait un doute sur sa signification, ce que je ne pense pas, on pourrait alors recourir A 'article 407 exigeant l'indemnit6 pr6alable dans le cas d'expropriation forc6e pour cause d'utilit6 publique. Puisque c'est pour cette raison que la 16gislation frangaise a adopt6 cette modification du droit de propri6t6, on pourrait done sans incons6quence appliquer. i 1'acquisition du droit de mitoyennet6 la disposition de l'article 407. Mais l'accord des commentateurs sur 1interpr6tation de l'article 661 0. N. (Article 518 de notre code) nous dispense d'aller au-deld de l'article lui-meme pour trouver la solution de cette question.-Toullier, Droit Civilvol. 3.,No 195. " Le prix (de la mitoyennet6) est fix6 par des experts, si les deux voisins ne peuvent s'accorder, et le prix doit 6tre pay6 prdalablement a toute entreprise " Demolombe, vol.11, No. 367. " L'indemnit6 doit 4tre pay6e au propritaire du mur pr6alablement i toute entreprise."

Plus loin il ajoute: " L'article 661 d'ailleurs a si pen voulu lui accorder une action purement personnelle que l'on a d6cid6 fort justement, A notre avis, que son action pouvait 4tre form6e contre tout tiers d6tenteur de 1'h6ritage voisin." Il cite plusieurs arrats &L

Pappui de cette proposition.

Solon, Servitudes. rdelles, No. 145. " La vente de la mitoyennet6 d'un mur ne pent Atre forc6e que moyennant une juste et prbalable indemnit6."

No. 146. " Les parties peuvent fixer d'un commun accord, le montant de 1'indemnit6, si elles'ne peuvent s'accorder sur ce point, il faut qu'elles conviennent au moins, de la nomination d'un on de trois experts, et si enfin leur caprice va jusqu'au point de ne pouvoir s'entendre sur cette nomination, il faut que l'acheteur fasse d6signer les experts par la justice et A ses frais." No. 147. " Dans tous les cas, celui qui vent acheter la mitoyennet6 ne peut prendre possession du mur, c'est-&dire qu'il ne peut y adosser aucune construction, y adosser aucun appui, sans avoir prbalablement pay6 le prix d'achat.

C'est bien assez de forcer un individu de vendre, contre son gr6, la chose qui lui appartient, sans 1'exposer A-perdre le prix on dplaider pour l'obtenir." Voir aussi: Pardessus, Traite des servitudes, No. 158,.p. 865. Duranton, vol. 5, No. 828. " Loraque la mitoyennet6 nest pas cde & 1'amiable, celui qui la r6olame doit aire signifier une sommation de cession avec offre d'un prix suffisant."

* *

Un pen plus loin l'auteur ajoute que 1'expertise judiciaire n'est pas de rigueur.

" Nous pensons, dit-il, sans difficult6 que l'acqu~reur i polirrait faire offre r6elle de l'indemnit6, et forcer ainsi le vendeur A 1'accepter telle qu'elle serait faite on & soutenir son insuffinance. Le procks qui aurait lieu sur ce point serait & la charge de l'acqufrear, s'il n'avait point fait une offre suffiante, tandis qu'au contraire, les frais en seraient support6s par le propri6taire du mur, si son refus n'6tait pas fond6."

Par ce qui pr6c6de on voit qu'avant de toucher au mur de l'Intim6e, la loi tra9ait A 1'Appelant une conduite toute diffbrence de colle qu'il a suivie. Ayant n6glig6 d'avoir recours aux proc6d6s indiqu6s pour I'acquisition de la mitoyennet6, il n'a pu sans violation du droit de propri6t6 de l'Intim6e, faire les travaux dont elle se plaint A bon droit. Mais ilr6pond A celle-ci que l'action qu'elle a port6e contre lui et qu'elle d6signe sous le nom d'action en dmolition de nouvelles muvres, ne lui compbte point, parce qu'elle aurait dfi Atre 6man6e avant la fin des travaux dont elle demande la d6molition. Sous le droit ant6rieur au code cette objection efit 6t6 fatale, mais il n'en peut 6tre de m6me aujourd'hui. Sous le Code Civil de la province de Qu6bec, comme sons le Code Napol6on, cette action a perdu le caractbre particulier qu'elle avait autrefois.

Oe n'est plus aujourd'hui, en France comme ici, qu'une action possessoire ordinaire qui pout 6tre exerc6e avant ou apr~s la fin des travaux consid6r6s comme trouble. Ce changement r6sulte du silence du code comme le dit Daviel, " Cours d'Eau": " Sous notre nouveau droit la d6nonciation de nouvel couvre est assimil6e aux autres actions possessoires, parce que les lois n'ont pas reproduit les conditions particulibres qui la caract6risait autrefois." Cette omission a 6galement lieu dans notre code. Concourant pleinement dans les vues exprim6es sur la nature d'une telle action dans les savantes dissertations des honoiables juges de Ia Cour du IBanc de la Reine, je regrette copendant d'avoir A ajouter que je ne les crois pas toutes applicables A l'action de l'Intim6e que je considere comme 6tant seulement de la nature d'une action p6titoire. Pour en faire une action possessoire la d6claration manque d'un 616ment essentiel: I'all6gation d'une possession 16gale pendant I'an et jour avant le trouble qui donne lieu A la plainte. D'accord avec 1'honorable juge qui a renvoy6 la d6fense en droit par laquelle l'Appelant prenait avantage de cette objection, je trouve, comme d'ailleurs la Cour du Bane de la Reine l'a fait aussi, des all6gations suffisantes. pour accorder la plupart des conclusions prises par cette declaration.

Jo considbre cette action comme bien port6e parce qu'elle contient les 616ments de i'action p6titoire. La d6nomination erron6e donn6e par I'Intim6e & son action ne pent avoir aucun effet. J'adopte entisrement sons ce rapport l'opinion ainsi exprimbe par l'honorable juge en chef Dorion, sur le caractbre de laction: "The action " of the appellant is not an action en dnwonciation de " nouvel auvre, the conclusion, of which are that the " party defendant should discontinue his works, but an "action pititoire by which appellant says: I am the "the sole owner of the gable wall of my house, you "have committed a trespass by building upon it, I ask "that you be ordered to remove your building from it, "and to restore the wall in its original state. There is "not an author or a judicial decision to be found to "show that this is not a proper action and that it ought "to be dismissed, because the works were completed "when the action was brought."

Cette manisre d'envisager l'action de l'appelant est conforme aux principes pos6s dans le jugement de la Cour Royale a Paris le 22 juin 1884, dans la cause de Odiot v. Rousseau. (1) Les faits ont tant de similitude avec ceux de la cause actuelle que je crois devoir la citer en entier pour en faire voir la parfaite application A la cause maintenant sous consid6ration.

"Lorsque voisin a pris le mur de son voisin pour le Hart.

rendre mitogen, celi a qui le mur appartient exclusive- " ment a le droit de le reprendre, sil n'est pas payd de la "v aleur de la mitoyennetd.

"Ce droit donne lieu A une action rdelle qui pent etre exercde contre tout ddlenteur de l'immeuble en quelques "mains qu'il passe C. art. 661.

ODIOT

"Decourt avait construit une maison contre le mur de "la maison voisine appartenant A Odiqt.

" Rousseau ach~te la maison de Decourt par adjudica- "tion publique.

" Le contrat 6tait transcrit et les notifications faites aux "crbinciers inscrits, lorsqu'Odiot assigna Rousseau et "Decourt A 1'effet de d6molir les constructions adoss~es a "son mur, sinon & payer les droits de mitoyennet6 et de surcharge.

" Le 28 Mars 1838, jugement du tribunal civil de la Seine qui admet cette demande. * Attendu qu'aux ter- "'mes de l'art. 658 et 661, C. Civ., tout propriftaire joi. "' gnant un mur a la facult6 de le rendre mitoyen en tout "' ou en partie, en remboursant au maitre du dit mur les "' droits de mitoyennet6 et de surcharge. Attendu que "' lorsque le voisin a pris le mur de son voisin pour -le "' rendre mitoyen, celui A qui il appartient ale droit de le "' reprendre s'il n'est pas pay6 de la valeur de la mitoy- 'ennet6; que ce droit donne lieu A une action r6elle, qui peut Atre exerc6e contre tout d6tenteur de l'immeuble, "'en quelques mains qu'il passe, qu'il en r6sulte que la "'r6clamation du sieur Odiot est fond6e tant contre De- "'court que contre Rousseau. sauf le recours de ce dernier "'contre Decourt : Par ces motifs condamne Decourt et "'Rousseau A faire d6molir dans la quinzaine de la signi- "'fication du pr~sentjugement les constructions 6lev6es "6' contre le mur de la maison d'Odiot; sinon et faute de ce faire dans le dit d61ai, et icelui pass6, autorise d6s "'A pr6sent le sieur Odiot A faire faire lea d6molitions aux "'frais, risques et p6rils des d6fendeurs, si mieux n'aiment "'ces derniers payer .au dit sieur Odiot d~s aprbs le riglement contradictoire, la somme A laquelle montent lea "'droits de mitoyennqt6 et de surcharge, plus les int6rAts a compter du jour de la demande.' "

Par le dispositif dujugement qui n'est sans doute que la r6p6tition des conclusions prises par le demandeur, il est 6vident quo 1'action d'Odiot devait dtre semblable A celle de 1'Intim6e. Les arr6ts et jugements consacrant ce principe sont nombreux.

Le jugement de la Cour du Banc de la Reine adjugeant lea conclusions de d6molition, sous l'alternative de payer, 6tant conforme a la jurisprudence et aux opinions des commentateurs, doit 6tre confirm6 avec d6pens. A motion was made in this case to set aside the appeal, on the ground that the judgment being under $2,000 an appeal does not lie and we have, therefore, no jurisdiction.

We have heard the arguments on the merits in this case, but we must first dispose of the preliminary question, as upon it depends' our power to deal with the subject-matter.

The case is not without some difficulties.

The Statute says the appeal shall not be had in the Province of Quebec in any case wherein the sum or value in dispute does not amount to two thousand dollars. When the writ and declaration are served, the amount claimed in- the latter as debt or damage is clearly the amount then in dispute, and so remains, at least till verdict. It has been held by high authorities that the sum or value of the matter in dispute is then affected by the verdict, and if the amount the Defendant would then have to pay to settle the Plaintiffs demand be under $2,000, he would not be entitled to an appeal, although the Plaintiff, if dissatisfied with the judgment, would be entitled to one. A manifest inequality between the position of the parties would be thus established that ought not, I think, to exist if it can be properly avoided.

The Plaintiff, by the operations of that system, qualifies himself, by the insertion of a large sum as a claim in his declaration, to ask for an appeal, in case the judgment *should be against him, or he should be dissatisfied as to the damages awarded him. On the trial, however, he might feel it his interest to deprive his opponent of the appeal by taking means to have a verdict for less than an appeal would lie for, if that would avail to prevent the Defendant's appealing. He could do this by asking damages only to a certain amount, and no Judge or Jury would in that case be likely to give him more. Construing the Statute in a manner to permit of this being done, would, I think, be unjust to a Defendant, and I am of opinion that where a Plaintiff, by claiming over two thousand dollars, secures to himself the right to appeal, in such a case an appeal should lie also at the instance of the Defendant. If the Plaintiff thus secures to himself the right of appeal, and the right to go before the highest legal tribunal, he should not complain that his adversary should, if necessary, do the same. In regard to the legal rights of the parties, they are thus placed on an equal footing, and if the Plaintiff, when bringing his suit, is to take his chance of being. satisfied with the judgment the Court of last resort in the Province of Quebec may give, he has the power, by limiting the claim in his declaration, of confining the final decision <f his case to that tribunal.

It has not been done so in this case, and I am of opinion the appeal is therefore regular. With all due deference to those entertaining an opposite opinion, I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to apply the restriction to cases where but one party could avail himself of the privilege of appealing.

I feel bound, therefore, to construe the provision of the Statute in question as intended by the Legislature not to give an absolute right to one party and leave that of the" other dependent, it may be,on the finding, upon doubtful evidence, of a Judge or Jury, or, what would be worse still, the contrivance or cunning management, on the trial, of the Plaintiff himself. Being clearly of the opinion that justice and equity favour this view, I am, I think, bound to declare that the Legislature so intended it. The views I have expressed have been, as far as I can learn, those unanimously for some time held and acted upon by all the Courts in Quebec.

Several judgments founded on those views have been recently given in accordance with them when the Act establishing this Court was passed, and I think myself fully justified in holding, in view of that fact, independently of other considerations, the provision in question was intended as, and should be adjudged, a Legislative sanction of those judgments. We should not, I think, restrict the right of appeal in Quebec more than we are compelled by the Act to do, when in the other Provinces no restriction whatever of that right exists.

The Respondent (Mrs. Hart) was, in 1874, the owner of a stone house in Durocher Street, in the City of Montreal. The Appellant became owner of the lot next adjoining the north-west gable wall of her house, which, at that time, seems admitted on all sides not to have been mitoyen under Article 518 of the Civil Code, or indeed in any other way. It is even contended that her lot extended six inches beyond the line of the wall in question. In view, however, of the law bearing on the case as I look at it, the fact last referred to is of no consequence.

The Appellant, in the spring of 1874, while Mrs. Hart so owned and possessed the premises in question, committed the injuries complained of. Was he in any way justified?

If not, what redress is Mrs. Hart entitled to, and by what means can she obtain it? I think I am safe in starting with the proposition that the wall in question, when the injury to it was done was not mitoyen. How, then, could the Appellant make it so ? By Article No. 518, Civil Code, by paying to the proprietor of the wall half the value of the part he wished to make common and the value of the ground on which said wall is built. The Code requires " payment " to be made and a "tender," but if not sufficient it fails to provide the means of ascertaining the amount to be paid. He might possibly have an expertise, although the code does not provide for it; at all events, unless he made previous payment, he, I think, was not justified in doing what is complained of. Article 519 provides for calling in the aid of experts, but that provision only applies to cases where one neighbor wishes to make " any recess in the body of a common wall " (nitoyes) or to " apply or rest any work there," but the provision does not in any way apply to Article 518.

The latter article is, to my mind, of better help to the applicant, or to any other situated as he was previous to the commencement of his works. If that course was not open to him, then he should not have committed the trespass complained of. This it appears was not done. The Appellant comluitted a trespass on the Plaintiff's prQperty, for which, as far as I can see, there is no justification. He is consequently answerable for such damages as may be shewn to have been done.

The Respondents, however, not only seek to recover damages for the injury but dimolition des nouvelles envres. The question is therefore raised as to their right to that remedy, as awarded by the Court of Queen's Bench (Appeal side), over-ruling the judgment of the Superior Court, Montreal, which declares,that although no expertise was had respecting the value of the right of miloyen isetd existing between parties, Plaintiff and Defendant, yet, as the building of the Defendant was done and completed before the institution of the present action, " the Plaintiffs have therefore no right to obtain the demolitionrof the same."

The fact that the Defendant's wall was finished before the proceedings herein were commenced, is found by the Court of first instance, and such conclusion I feel bound by. The fact is hardly disputed and the evidence satisfies me of the soundness of that conclusion. I am of opinion that in the old action en dinonciation de nouvel auvre, the Respondents cannot recover for the appropriation of their wall by building on it, although a doubt may exist that such is the law, for certainly by many, if not'all the authorities, it is alleged to apply to cases only where the erection is on the land of the party himself and not on his neighbor's.

The learned Chief Justice of the Queen's Bench, says: "The action of the Appellant (now Respondent) is not one en dinonciation de nouvel aiuvre, the conclusions of which are that the party Defendant should discontinue his works; but an action petitoire, by which Appellant says, ' I am the sole owner of the gable wall of my house' you have committed a trespass by -building a wall on it, I ask that you be ordered to remove your building from it and to restore the wall to its original state.' There is not an author or judicial decision to be found to show that this is not a proper action, and it ought to be dismissed because the works were completed when the action was brought."

If, therefore, the action is not one en d6sonciation de wouvelauore but petitoire, and not ajumbling up of both, we must see, before concluding, whether, in the action petitoire the Respondent can ask for a judgment for demolition. The learned Chief Justice again says: "It is true that in the action en denoncation de nouvel suzre proper, under the Roman law, no order could be obtained to remove the works when once completed," but he denies that the French jurisprudence adopted that principle. With all due deference, I am warranted in the statement that the French jurisprudence, until an alteration of the Code, fully adopted the principle of the Roman law, and that, under that jurisprudence, the action en dinonciation de nouvel was available up to any time before the completion of the work, and, but for the alteration by the Code or otherwise, it would still be the law in Lower Canada. Let me quote, in proof of this position, portions of the judgment of the Privy Council in Brown v. Gugy (1864),

" In Daviel ' Cours d'eau,' (2) it is distinctly laid down that by the old French law, that is by the law now prevailing in Lower Canada, the dinonciation de nouvel could only be maintained if instituted before the work was completed, though by an. alteration introduced by the French Code the law is in this respect altered, and the action may be maintained in respect of a work either fait on commence.'"

"In this case," the judgment proceeds, " there is no doubt that the work was completed before the action was commenced and the relief sought is different from that which, according to Daviel, could be granted in an action enddnonciation de nouvel auvre." I have thus the highest and most controling authority for the position, that in 1864 the action en dinonciation de nouvel would not lie where the works had been completed, and I have sought for a legislative change in that law in Lower Canada by the Code of 1866, or otherwise. Article 20, Code Civ. Proc., L. provides, that "in judicial proceeding it is sufficient that the facts and any conclusions be distinctly and fairly stated, without any particular form being necessary, and such statements are interpreted according to the meaning of words in ordinary language."

Article 17 of the same Code provides that "the Court cannot adjudicate beyond the conclusions of a suit, but it may reduce them and grant them only in part."

Article 20 may be said to have done away with the forms of actions, and therefore the peculiar form of the action en ddnonciation de nouvel ouvre is no longer necessary.

Does it in anyway affect the subject-matter ofthat peculiar remedy so as to entitle a party in an action petitoire or possessoire, according to his title or possession, to the remedy or judgment now, under circumstances in which previously to the Code, he was not entitled? Or, indeed, could a party, before the Code, either by an action, en ddnonciation de nouvel muvre, or otherwise, have a judgment en ddmolition for a work done and completed on his land before action brought?

From a careful study of the matter I cannot see that Article 20 of this Code establishes any new or different rights or relations between the parties, and gives any new remedy in the shape of dimolition, and as the Respondent's claim cannot be sustained by a remedy en dimolition, as the work was finished before the action was brought, and the only remedy, previous to the Code, being by action en ddnonciation de nouvel euvre where the work was unfinished, I do not see my way clear to adjudge that remedy to the Respondent in that peculiar action; but, according to reliable authorities, a party in an action petitoire would be entitled, in case of a trespass to his property, to recover damages for the injury; and, in case of a building erected upon his land, to a judgment or d~molition, irrespectively of the principles which governed in actions en dinonciation de nouvel suvre, and that as well before as since the Code. I am of opinion that the judgment appealed from should be confirmed, and the appeal dismissed with costs, the time given by the Court appealed from to run from the date of the judgment herein.