Will, construction of-Executor, powers of-Prohibition to alienate -Art. 972 0, 0., P. Q.-Document not proved or produced at trial-Inadmissible on appeal.
By the 3rd clause of her will, H. the testatrix, disposed of all her property, movables, and immovables, in favor of her children as universal legatees. The legacy was subject to the extended powers of administration conferred by the 5th clause of the will (referred to in the statement of the case) and also to the power to alter the disposition in favor of the testatrix's children given by the same clause to her husband H. L., the executor, and also by the will the executor was exonerated from the obligation of making an inventory and rendering an account. H. L., in his quality of testamentary executor and administrator to the estate of the said H. M., endorsed accommodation promissory notes signed by C. L., one of his children, and "The *PRESBNT.-Sir W.
asqualitd, APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) confirming the judgment of the Superior Court, dismissing the appellants' opposition.
The respondents, the Molson's Bank, obtained judgment against the maker and the endorser of certain promissory notes drawn by E. H. Charles Lionais, and endorsed by Hardoin Lionais, in his quality of executor to the last will and testament of his deceased wife, Henriette Moreau, mother of said B. H. Charles Lionais, the amount being for $8,963.83, besides interest and costs.
On the 25th February, 1879, the bank sued out a writ of execution, and under it seized certain properties pertaining to the estate of Henriette Moreau. The appellants, J. D. E. Lionais and others, the only children of the marriage of Hardoin Lionais and Henriette Moreau, made an opposition to this seizure, claiming the properties as theirs under their mother's will, which, besides constituting them universal legatees, provided that the properties should be insaisissable, and not liable for any debts created by the said Hardoin Lionais, nor for any debts whatsoever, save those which had been created by the testatrix herself under her own signature, and concluded for the nullity of the seizure. The respondents contested the opposition, alleging: That the will of Dame Henrietle Moreau, besides investing Hardoin Lionais with the powers of an administrator, confers on him certain other powers of division of the property which are described in the will. And the respondents further alleged : That for thirty years past, Hardoin Lionais has, by unlawful and fraudulent means, put out of the reach of his creditors all what he owned, and that acting in concert with his wife he has transferred to the latter all the profits on the speculations which he has made, and which constitute - the forty-nine fiftieths of the property left by Mrs. Henriette Moreau. That the latter's intention in making her will was to practically leave to her husband the control of her property, but in such a manner as to prevent her husband's creditors from seizing it de pleno jure and without discussion. That the clause of non saisissabilitd is therefore without importance, and that the property may be seized on Hardoin Lionias himself as if he was the lawful owner and the universal legatee of said estate.
The appellants answered : That the property left by Dame Henriette Moreau belonged to herself in full ownership, and is insaisissable under the terms of her will. That the allegation of fraud and complicity of fraud between the testatrix and her husband, is false, ill-founded and expressly denied, and made .through malice, and the opposants reserve their right to have it struck out from the proceedings.
Issue being joined, the parties went to proof, and the respondents made the following admissions:- 1st. That the appellants were the only children of the late Mrs. Henriette Moreau.
2nd. That the said Mrs. H. Moreau is deceased. Mo x's 3rd. That her last will fyled has been duly registered with a declaration of her death.
4th. That the debt for which the judgment in this case has been rendered was contracted by Charles Lionais, after the death of the said dame Henriette Moreau.
5th. That the real estate or immovable property seized in this cause formed part of the estate belonging to the said Mrs. Henriette Moreau.
The appellants' opposition was dismissed by judgment of the Superior Court on the 13th September, 1880, and that judgment was affirmed by the Court of Queen's Bench for Lowoer Canada (appeal side).
The material provisions of Henriette Moreau's will are in the terms following:- " Article 3me.-Je donne et je 16gue tous mes biens, meubles et immeubles, propres et acquets, meubles meublant, argenterie, dettes actives, cr6ances, actions on parts de banques, deniers comptants, valeurs, c~dules et obligations et toutes autres choses g~n6ralement quelconques queje delaisserai A mon d6chs, sans en rien excepter ni r6server, de quelque nature qu'ils soient, et en quelque lieu et endroits qu'ils se trouvent dus et situbs, aux enfants issus de mon mariage avec le dit Hardoin Lionais, mon 6poux, et en cas de pr~dcas d'aucun d'eux, aux enfants n6s du on des pred6c6das en 16gitime mariage, par r6pr6sE itation.
" A 1'effet de quoi, je les i .stitue mes 16gataires universels en propri6t6 et jouissance, sujet, toutefois, aux Aestrictions et conditions exprim6es en Particle 5me ci-apres.
"Article 4me.-Et pour ex~cuter mon pr6sent testament je nomme et choisis le dit Hardoin Lionais, mon 6poux, mon ex6cuteur testamentaire, 6s-mains duquel je me desaissis de tous mes biens, lui en donnant la saisine durant et audelA de 1'an et jour, et pendant tout le temps quo durera 'administration de mes dits biens, sans Atre tenu de donner un cautionnement, ni de faire inventaire, ni meme de rendre compte.
" Article 5me.-Je nomme mon dit 6poux, Hardoin Lionais, administrateur de tous mes dits biens, tant en propri6t6 qu'en usufruit, avec pouvoir de les vendre, ceder, 6changer, hypothiquer, ali6ner on autrement en disposer, soit en propri6t6, soit en usufruit, fruits et revenus, 1'autorisant A faire, signer, et ex6cuter tous billets, cheques, obligations, regus, quittances et tous autres actes et documents requis et g~n~ralement A faire tous actes de la plus entiare administration, sans qu'il soit besoin, en aucun cas, d'autorisation prealable des cours de justice, ni du consentement ni de l'intervention de mes h~ritiers on aucune d'eux.
" Et pour les fins de cette administration, je veux et entends que mon dit 6poux, 6s-dites qualit6s, soit rev6tu et je le revts et l'investis des mimes droits, pouvoirs et autorisation qui I ui sont conf6r6s dans et par la procuration g6n6rale que je lui ai accord6e le sept de juillet mil huit cent cinquante-quatre, par acte requ devant Mtre L. A. Moreau et son confrdre, notaires, et ce, d'une manibre aussi parfaite que si toutes et chacune des clauses ins6r6es dans ma dite procuration formaient partie int6grale de mon pr6sent testament; mon d6sir 6tant que, sons le titre d'administrateur et ex~cuteur testamentaire, il continue A exercer et exerce A l'avenir et arrbs ma mort, les mimes droit et pouvoirs qu'il a en vertu de ma dite procuration, laquelle je ratifie et confirme dans tout son contenu, ainsi que tons les actes, transactions, proc6dures, et g6n6ralement tout ce qu'il a d6jd fait et ex6cut6 et tout ce qu'il fera A 1'avenir, avant et apras mon d6cas, en vertu de cette m~me pro* curation et en vertu des pr6sentes; voulant que toutes choses faites et accomplies par mon dit 6poux, &s-dites qualiths, aient leur plein et entier effet, et qu'elles soient oo suivies et ex6cut6es selon leur forme et teneur, sans division ni discussion.
" Et subsidiairement, je d6sire que mon dit 6poux, as-dites qualit6s, apris mon d6chs, fasse la disposition et le partage de la totalit6 on de partie de mes biens, tant en propri6t6 qu'en usufruit, fruits et revenus comme il le jugera convenable, et dans le temps qu'il lui paraitra opportun, lui donnant toute la latitude possible dans et pour l'administration de mes dits biens et leur alienation et disposition, et laissant enti6rement A sa discr6tion la manibre de retirer ot percevoir, placer et employer les fruits et revenus et intrts provenant de mes dits biens, ainsi que les capitaux d'iceux, et le soin de pourvoir, comme il entendra, an soutien, A la subsistance, A l'6ducation et A 1'6tablissement de tous on chacun de mes enfants, et lui donnant 1'autorit6 et le pouvoir de 16guer et partager mes dits biens on portion d'iceux, selon ce qu'il jugera A propos, A et entre tous mes dits h6ritiers on aucun d'eux soit par testament, donation, entrevifs ou autre disposition testamentaire on autrement, A sa discr6tion; ma volont6 6tant que mon dit 6poux, 6s-qualit6s, ne soit aucunement li6 dans ses operations par les termes dans lesquels est coup Particle troisibme ci-dessus 6crit, lequel article ne peut et ne pourra, en aucun cas, tre interprt6 comme conf6rant un droit absolu d'hr6dit6 en faveur d'aucun de mes dits h6ritiers, mais uniquement un droit 6ventuel sujet aux dispositions libres de mon dit 6poux, As-qualit6. "En sorte que mes dits h6ritiers ne pourront, en tout etat de choses, pr6tendre qu'd ce que mon dit poux, 6s-qualit6s, d6cidera de leur accorder respectivement on ,j aucun d'eux, si, toutefois, il juge A propos de le faire, dans la proportion qu'iljugera convenable, et a I'6poque qu'il croira la meilleure, et A sa discr6tion, sans que mes dits h6ritiers on aucun d'eux ne puissent jamais ,s r~clamer et revenir contre les actes, op6rations et dispositions de mon dit 6poux, 6s-qnalit6, que je laisse entibrement libre sous tous rapports.
" Et ma volont6 est que mes dits bien, tant en propri6t6 qu'en usufruit, capitaux, fruits et revenus, tant meubles qu'immeubles, soient et restent insaisissables, et ne puissent Stre saisis, vendus et d6cr6t6s on 1'un on l'autre, que pour les dettes propres de ma succession, c'est-d-dire; celles auxquelles j'ai on aurai souscrit on serai partie, et pour nulles autres dettes.
" Cette administration et ex6cution, mon dit 6poux les conservera sa vie durante, sans tre tenu de donner caution ni de rendre aucun compte de sa gestion et de ses operations, ce dont je le dispense entibrement tant envers mes h~ritiers on aucun d'eux qu'envers toutes antres personnes que ce soit, lesquelles ne pourront aucunement le troubler on 1'iniqui~ter a cet 6gard." The questions to be determined on the appeal were: 1. Whether the property seized belonged to the defendant Hardoin Lionais himself, or to the opposants, J. D. E. Lionais et al., children of Hardoin Lionais and Henriette Moreau, deceased, and
2. Whether, if not the property of Hardoin Lionais, it could be affected by endorsement of his, in his quality of executor upon promissory notes, drawn by B.
Mr. Barnard, Q.C., on behalf of the respondents, applied for leave to produce, as forming part of the case, a copy of the power of attorney mentioned in the will for the purpose of showing that the power of endorsing notes was one of the powers specially contained in it. The court held that as it did not form part of the proceedings in the court below, it could not be made a part of the case on the present appeal.
.
Mr. Doutre, Q.C., for appellants; and Mr. Barnard, Q.C., and Mr. Creigiton, for respondents.
Lionts The argaments of counsel sufficiently appear in the judgments hereinafter given. In addition to the cases referred to in the judgments the learned counsel for the appellants cited and commented on the following cases and authorities :-Troplong on Donations (1); Sirey Furgole ; Demolombe (4); Aubry r Rau (5); Esdaile v. Lanouze And the learned counsel for the respondents cited and relied on the following cases and authorities :-The Ontario Bank v. Lionais and Lionais opposant (7); The Union Bank v. Lionais and Leman al T. S. (8); Ricard on Donations (9); Delvincourt (10).; Demolombe (11) ; Aubry 4r Rau (12) ; Demolombe (13) ; Hutchinson v. Tenant (14); Rolland de Villargues Substitutions Prohib6es (15); and in Thomson's Estate, Herring v. Barrow (16).
C. J.:- Thej udgments of the dissentient judges in the Court of Queen's Bench, particularly that of Mr. Justice Cross, commend themselves to my mind. My brother Fournier has kindly permitted me to peruse the judgment he is about to deliver and with which I entirely concur. I feel that I can add nothing with advantage to the points discussed by him.
If we look at the plaintiff's pleadings we find that the first contention is, that the property was really the property of the father colorably and fraudulently in the OF hands of the wife to keep it from the hands of the hus- IJons band's creditors-this was abandoned. Then, that by the MotoN's will the husband was the absolute proprietor, his wife having made him son legataire universel purement RitchieC.J.sirmplenent. This Mr. Justice Fournier has conclusively disposed of. Then, that this was an administration authorized by the will in accordance with the provisions of the will; this has likewise been conclusively disposed of by Mr. Justice Fournier. These then are all the objections set up in the pleadings. It is now said that the opposants should have produced the power attorney, as it may have authorized the father to endorse and bind the succession.
In addition to the fact that plaintiff does not in his pleadings take this ground, nor rely on anything in the power of attorney to justify the endorsement, nor even refer to it, the objection is to my mind conclusively met by referring to the terms of the will which provide with reference to the power of attorney that it is given only for the purposes of the administration, the words are:as-dites As Mr. Justice Fournier says, these endorsements were not authorized by the will and were clearly not made with a view or in course of administration of the estate, and the power of attorney could give no such power as to enable the executor to bind the estate for matters dehors the estate and its administration, as to do so would be directly contrary to the provisioifs of the will and misappropriation of the funds of the estate. J.:- It seems very clear that the appellants were not bound to proceed by way of " tidrce opposition " attacking the judgment. They were neither parties to the action in which the judgment was recovered nor were e.'s they represented in that action.
The judgment is therefore as regards them res inter alios acta and, as it Strong, J. has been said, no more affects their rights than a piece of blank paper would have done
They are to all intents and purposes " tiers " as regards this judgment, which has not the effect of chose jugde, as regards them, and they are therefore like every third party, whose property is seized under an execution founded on a judgment to which he is not either personally or by representation a party, entitled to maintain an opposition to the seizure in order to have it annulled. No doubt Art. 910 C. P. of Quebec would have authorized an opposition to the judgment, but the very terms of that article show that it is facultative and not restrictive. This point was not taken in the factum of the respondent and it was not insisted on by the learned judges in the court below, but as it is considered fatal by some of my learned brothers in this court, it was incumbent on me to consider it, which I have done, with the result just indicated.
Upon the merits I have come to the same conclusion as that arrived at by the dissenting judges in the Court of Queen's Bench. The question to be decided is entirely one of interpretation.
By the .3rd . clause of her will the testatrix disposes of all her property, moveables and immoveables in favor of her children as her universal legatees This legacy is, however, subject to the extended powers of administration conferred by the 5th clause of her will, and also to the power to alter the disposition in favor of the testatrix's children given by the same clause to her husband, Ilardoin Lionais, the executor. It is clear, however, that if the executor should not exercise the power of making a different Is division of the property from that made by the testatrix herself in the third clause, but should die without having either by act inter vivos or by testament altered T. that disposition, the children will take the property in equal shares by force of the direct gift thus made to them by the testatrix herself.
I cannot agree that the executor has anything more than powers of administration, greatly extended, no doubt, beyond those which the law would have given him, but still powers of disposition and administration merely, as distinguished from either property or usufruct in himself. It is impossible, therefore, consistently with this view to concur in the opinion of those who hold that Hardoin Lionais had the right to dispose of the property of the testatrix beyond the express power of disposition in favor of his children given him by the will. It is true that the will exonerates him from the obligation of making an inventory and rendering an account. But these dispensations are insufficient to constitute a gift of the property in his favour, they do not make him a legatee. Although relieved from the obligation of furnishing an account, he would still be liable to the heirs or universal legatees, if he made any fraudulent disposition of the property, and would be bound at the close of his administration to hand over the residue of the estate to those beneficially entitled (1).
Then the question arises, whence is the power derived to bind the estate to the prejudice of the heirs by the endorsements which Hardoin Lionais made for the accommodation of his son Charles? Not from the law, for it is clear that no such authority is incidental to the powers conferred by the articles of the code, which define the authority of testamentary executors.
If any such power exists, it must, therefore, be found in the express provisions of the will. L IoAs Then to which of these provisions is it to be referred? ' It is out of the question to say that it is comprised in the duty which the testatrix has devolved upon the g0, j. executor of providing for the subsistence, education and establishment of the children.
Endorsing accommodation bills is surely not within any of these provisions.
The establishment of a child means setting him forth in the world, and Charles Lionais was a man already extensively engaged in business on his own account, when his father endorsed the notes in question. Further, the pledging the credit of the estate contingently and conditionally, by a cautionary obligation, such as that undertaken by an accommodation endorser, cannot possibly be considered as a proper mode of establishing or advancing a child, and cannot therefore be presumed to have been contemplated by the will. There only remains the power to make a division of the property which is contained in these words: Et subsidiairement, je d6sire que mon dit 6poux s-qualit6s, aprbs mon d6chs, fasse la disposition et le partage de la totalit6 ou de partie de mes biens, tant en propri6t6 qu'en usufruit, fruits et revenus, comme il le jugera convenable et dans le temps qui lui paraitra opportun, lui donnant toute la latitude possible dans et pour l'administration do mes dits biens, et leurali~nation et disposition, et laissant entibrement & sa discretion la rnanibre de retirer et percevoir, placer et employer les fruits et revenus et int~rats provenant de mes dits biens ainsi que les capitaux d'iceux, et le soin de pourvoir comme il l'entendra au soutien, A la subsistance, 1 l'6ducation et & l'tablissement do tous ou aucun de mes enfants, et lui donnant l'autorit6 et le pouvoir del6guer et partager mes dits biens ou portion d'iceux, selon ce qu'il jugera a propos, A et entre tous mes dits h6ritiers eu aucun d'eux soit par testament, donation entre-vifs on autre disposition testamentaire ou autrement A sa discr6tion; ma volont6 6tant que mon dit 6poux 6s-qualit, ne soit aucunement li6 dans ses op6rations et dispositions par les termes dans lesquels est conqu Particle troisibme ci-dessus 6crit, lequel article ne peut et ne pourra en aucun cas, 8tre interprt6 comme conf6rant un droit absola d'hridit on favour d'aucun de mes dits h6ritiers, mais uni- quement un droit 6ventuel, sujet aux dispositions libres de mon dit e.
6poux, As-qualit6.
En sorte que mes dits h6ritiers ne pourront, en tout 6tat do choses, pr6tendre qu'A ce quo mon dit 6poux, 6s-qualit6, d~cidera de leur Strong, J. accorder respectivement on A aucun d'eux si toutefois il juge 6 propos de le faire, dans la proportion qu'il jugera convenable, et A 1'6poque qu'iI croira la meilleure, A sa discr6tion, sans que mes dits h6ritiers ou aucun d'eux ne puissent jamais r~clamer et revenir contre les actes, op6rations et dispositions de mon dit 6poux s-qualit6, que je laisse entibrement libre sous tous rapports.
Et ma volont6 est que mes dits biens, tant en propri6te qu'en usufruit, capitaux, fruits et revenus tant meubles qu'immeubles soient et restent insaisissables et ne puissent 6tre saisis, vendus et der6t6s, ou Pun ou l'autre, que pour les dettes propres de ma succession, o'est-Adire, celles auxquellesj'ai ou aurai souscrit ou suis o i serai partie, et pour nulles autres dettes.
The fair meaning and interpretation of the provision of the will appears to me to authorize only a direct disposition in favour of the children of the testatrix, either by testament, donation inter vivos, or in some analogous manner, and if it stood alone, and the construction which I put upon it was not, as I think it is, greatly strengthened by other parts of the will, I should be prepared to hold that the executor was not empowered to carry out the dispositions which the testatrix left him free to make by undertaking cautionary obligations for the benefit of one of the children.
When I find, however, that the testatrix has explicitly declared that her property, moveable as well as immoveable, shall not be liable to execution for any debts except the proper debts of her succession, which she further explains to be those which she shall have herself subscribed, or to which she was or should become a party, it seems to me that she has by express words prohibited her executor from conferring benefits on the children or any of them in the indirect manner insisted on by the respondent here, viz.: by the endorsement of accommodation bills to be paid out of the funds of the X.]
estate, in case the party principally liable should make default in paying them; for it is impossible to give effect to this provision of the will without accepting it ' as equivalent to a declaration that such endorsements as those in respect of which this judgment was recov- J,. ered should not bind the estate. But even granting that the pretentions of the respondents were so far well founded as to require us to hold that an indirect benefit of this kind was intra vires of the executor, I should still be unable to acquiesce in the result at which the courts below have arrived.
It would even in that case still be necessary to show that the executor intended to exercise the power to give conferred upon him. But how could it be said that any such intention is apparent in the present case ? There is no pretence for saying that the executor ever made any express declaration of an intention to execute the bounty of the testatrix in this irregular manner. Nor is anything shown to warrant the presumption of fact that the executor in endorsing the notes in question intended conditionally or contingently, in case he was called upon to pay them, to appropriate a portion of the estate corresponding in amount to Charles Lionais. In point of fact no such intention could be presumed, for the plain reason that the notes were endorsed in reliance on the credit and solvency of Charles Lionais, and in the expectation that he would pay them; and it was not contemplated that the estate would be called upon to make good the undertaking of the executor.
As to any legal presumption of such an intention, none can be suggested sufficiently supported by either principle or authority to call for any argument in refutation. Then a fair test by which to ascertain whether the endorsements were, in fact, made with the intention of exercising in favour of Charles Lionais the liberality with which the testatrix had entrusted her executor, is to ask this question; could Charles Lionais, if his father LOIS had thought fit to pay and to retire the notes, and had v* so done, and had then sued him upon them, have opposed any defence founded on the will to such an action S "-,g, j. by the executor?
It is manifest from the facts in evidence that he could not, but on the contrary that Charles Lionais would, if the notes were to be now taken up by the executor, be liable to have judgment recovered against him by the executor for their amount-at least so far as such an action has not been prescribed. This consideration, seems to me, to show conclusively that the endorsement can not be considered as a donation to Charles Lionais out of the testatrix's estate to the amount of the notes, and if it cannot be said to be a donation or exercise of liberality authorized by the will, the executor had no more power to bind the estate for debts of Charles Lionais than for those of any stranger. Therefore the direct proof being all against the existence of any such intention, there is nothing to show that the executor, even if he had had power to give in such an indirect manner, ever intended so to exercise the powers conferred on him by the will.
Lastly, I am of opinion with Mr. Justice Cross that Art. 972, by itself and independently of the preceding considerations as to the powers of the executor, is a sufficient ground for maintaining this opposition, and that, by force of the express terms of the article referred to, the clause in the will exempting the property of the testatrix from execution is valid and must be given effect to.
As regards the power of attorney. That is not proved nor produced, and it is out of the question to say that it can make any part of the case against the present appellants upon the opposition which they have formed to the seizure.
The judgment itself is res inter alios acta as regards them, and if they are not bound by the judgment, they certainly cannot be bound upon the mere presumption as to the terms of a document not to be found in the record of which the judgment forms part. Had the opposants been put in cause in the original action, and had this power of attorney been traced to strong, J. their possession, then on their refusal to produce it, a presumption as to its contents might perhaps have been made against them, but it does not appear ever to have been in their possession, and if it was they have never declined to produce it. Had it been proved on the contestation of the opposition, it might, if its terms had been sufficiently extensive, have warranted the Court in maintaining the seizure, but no reference appears to have been made to it, so I regard it as entirely out of the case.
I am for reversing the judgments appealed against with costs in both the Courts below, and for maintaining the opposition with costs.
J.
Bien que dans cette cause il ne s'agisse que d'une question d'interpr6tation de quelques clauses d'un testament, il est cependant n6cessaire A cause d'une objection faite A la proc6dure adopt~e par les appelants, de donner un expos6 des plaidoiries au moyen desquelles les parties ont li& contestation, afin de s'assurer si les questions a decider ont 6t6 rgulibrement sonmises.
La Banque lifolson, intim6e, a obtenu contre le d6fendeur en cette cause, Ilardoin Lionais, un jugement pour la somme de $8,963.83, montant de certains billets promissoires qu'il avait endoss6s en qualit6 d'ex6cuteur testamentaire et administrateur de la succession de dame Henriette Moreau, son 6pouse d6c6d6e,-ainsi que contre E. M. Charles Lionais, le faiseur de cesbillets.
En execution de ce jugement, I'intim6 a fait saisir sur le d6fendeur Hardoin Lionais des immeubles .oon' dont il est en possession en sa qualit6 susdite.
Les appelants, souls enfants du d6fendeur Hardoin Fournier, j. Lionais et de son 6pouse, dame Henriette Moreau, ont par opposition demand6 la nullit6 de cette saisie en se fondant sur le testament de leur mare contenant les clauses suivantes qui ont donn6 lieu A la contestation en cette cause (1).
Les appelants allkguent que dame Henriette Moreau est d6c6d6e a Montr6al, le 21 d6cembre 1874, sans avoir r6voqu& son testament, lequel a 6t6 enregistr6 avec un certificat de son doss, le 30 d6cembre, meme ann6e. Qu'en sa qualit6 d'exkcuteur testamentaire et d'admimistrateur, le dit Hardoin Lionais a pris possession de toutes les propri6t6s d6laiss6es par sa dite 6pouse et les a administres,-que dans le cours de son administration, il a outre pass6 ses pouvoirs, et qu'il a sans autorit6 endoss& les billets promissoires sur lesquels a t6 rendu jugement en cette cause contre lui;
Que la dite Henriette Moreau n'a jamais endoss6 les dits billets,-ni contract6 les dettes pour laquelles les dits billets ont 6t6 donn6s,-que les dites dettes, non plus que les dits billlets, n'ont 6t0 faits pour l'avantage de sa succession, mais bien au contraire A son d6triment.
Qu'ils sont les seuls enfants issus du mariage de dame Henriette Moreau avec Hardoin Lionais, et, par cons6quent, les souls 16gataires universels en pleine proprit6 et en usufruit de sa succession, int6ress6s A ]a conservation des dits biens et A faire d6clarer que la saisie d'iceux est nulle et ill6gale, attendu que les biens de la dite succession sont, par les termes de son testament d6clar6s insaisissables, et qu'ils ne peuvent Atre saisis et vendus que pour les dettes contract6es par la $43 dite Henriette Moreau elle-m~me, ou pcur l'avantage de sa succession, tandis que la dette pour laquelle a 6t6 rendu le jugement sur lequel est fond6e la saisie n'est o.on's pas une de ces dettes.
L'intim6e a plaid6 i cette opposition que le FournierJ. testament de dame
Henrietle Moreau, en outre des pouvoirs d'.excuteur testamentaire et administrateur, conf6re i Hardoin Lionais le pouvoir de disposer de sa succession en la manibre indiqu6e dans les clauses ci-dessus cit6es.
Elle allkgue de plus que pendant au moins trente ans Hardoin Lionais a, par des moyens frauduleux, mis ses biens A 1'abri des recherches de ses cr~diteurs, en plagant au nom de sa femme tous les profits des speculations qu'il faisait et qui composent aujourd'hui en grande partie la succession de sa femme. Que cette dernibre en faisant son testament avait 'intention de laisser h son mari le contr6le de ses biens de manibre A emp~cher les cr~anciers de son mari de les saisir. Qu'en cons6quence, la clause d'insaisissabilit6 est sans effet, et quo les propri6t6s peuvent tre saisies comme appartenant A Lionais lui-m~me, et comme s'il 6tait le 16gataire universel de la succession.
Les appelants ont r6pondu sp6cialement que les propri6t6s saisies appartenaient en pleine propri6t6 A leur mare qui les avait, en vertu de son testament, d6clarbes insaisissables. Ils niaient aussi sp6cialement I'all6gation de fraude en se r6servant le droit do la faire disparaitre du dossier.
La preuve sur la contestation ainsi li6e consiste dans les productions faites par les parties et dans 1'admission de faits qui suit:
Que les dits opposants sout les souls enfants tous majeurs, issus du l6gitime mariage du d6fendeur et de son 6pouse, feue dame Henriette Moreau.
Que la dite dame Henriette Moreau est d~c~d6e A Montrial le 21 d6cembre 1874.
Que le testament de la dite dame Henriette Moreau, a 6ti requ par C. A. Yerrous et collkgue, notaires, le 18 juillet 1868, qu'il a 6t6 diment enregistr6 avec une dclaration du d~chs de la dite testatrice.
J. Que la dette pour laquelle le jugement en cette cause a 6th rendu, a 6t6 contract6e par Charles Lionais, aprbs le d6cas de la dite dame Henriette Moreau.
Que les immeubles saisis en cette cause, font partic et d6pendent de la succession de la dite dame Ilenriette Moreau.
L'admission de fait consentie par l'intim6e que les proprit6s saisies en cette cause formaient partie des biens de la succession de dame Henriette Moreau, met A n6ant cette partie de son ploidoyer all6guant fraude de la part de Hardoin Lionais pour mettre ses proprt6s A l'abri des poursuites de ses cr6anciers. Cette question 6cart6e, il ne reste 6videmment quo la question d'interpr6tation du testament.
C'est maintenant la soul contestation entre les parties. Elle a t6 d6cid6e contre eux par la Cour Sup6rieure dont le jugement a t confirm6 par une majorit6 de la Cour du Bane de la Reine.
C'est de ce dernier jugement dont ils appellent. Avant d'entrer dans la consid6ration du m6rite de cet appel, je dirai quelques mots de 1'objection soulev6c contre la proc&dure.
L'intimbe pr6tend que les appelants auraient did attaquer par le moyen do la tierce opposition le jugement rendu contre Hardoin Lionais, au lieu de s'opposer A son ex6cution en le consid6rant quant A eux comme res inter alias judicata. Il n'est pas douteux qu'ils auraient pu adopter cette voie; et 1'intim6e pour 6viter de voir plus tard son jugement attaqu6, aurait sans doute mieux fait de faire juger la question de 1'tendue des pouvoirs de Hardoin Lionais contradictoirement avec se enfants en les mettant en cause avec lui.
Ces derniers n'ayant pas t& mis en cause 6taient-ils oblig6s, pour attaquer le jugement d'employer la voie de la tierce opposition ? Non. Ce mode d'attaque 6tant rONAIS facultatif, ils out pu 16galement renouveler la contestation sur une question qui n'avait pas 6 jug6e avec eux. Les autorit6s suivantes font voir que la voie adopt6e par les opposants leur 6tait ouverte.
L'article de notre Code de procedure au sujet de la tierce opposition est au m~me effet que celui du Code Napoldon (1).
peut bode Napoldon (2):
peut n'ont
" L'art. 474 (3) dit bien qu'une partie peut former tierce-opposition, etc., mais il ne dit pas qu'elle est tenue de prendre cette voie; il ne lui 6te pas la facult6 de se borner A dire que le jugement qu'on lui oppose, n'a pas 6t6 rendu avec elle; qu'il lui est 6tranger; que ce jugement est A son 6gard comme s'il n'existait point; que c'est, en un mot, res inter alios acta.
" Ainsi la tierce-opposition est purement facultative, et si nous avons dit sur la quest. 1682, que 1'on peut forcer d'intervenir celui qui aurait droit de se rendre tiers opposant A un jugement d rendre, on ne peut en conclure qu'il ait besoin d'user de ce droit pour empicher que le jugement ne produise ses effets contre lui; le droit de le contraindre A cette intervention n'est 6tabli qu'en faveur de la partie int6ress6e A ce que le jugement qu'elle poursuit soit rendu contradictoirement avec lui (4)."
P. art.
On peut done l'attaquer pour cause de fraude, de collusion, etc., on faire juger qu'il est res inter alios acta. "Ainsi celui qui n'a pas 6t6 partie A unjugement qui pr~judicie A ses droits, peat en pr6venir 1'ex6cution & son 6gard, en 1'attaquant par tierce-opposition, soit principale, soit incidente.
"Mais il n'est pas tenu de prendre cette voie; 'art. 414, C. Pr., ne lui 6te pas la facult6 de se borner 4 invoquer la maxime res inter alios judicata aliis non nocet. "Ainsi jug6 que la tierce-opposition n'est point n~cessaire contre un jugement dans lequel on n'a point fth partie; cons6quemment, une demande en partage contre laquelle on oppose an .jugement rendu avec une autre partie, doit tre appr~ci6e, nonobstant le rejet de la tierce-opposition." Bioch, (1).
Ind6pendamment de la facult6 qu'avaient les appelants d'adopter l'un on l'autre des moyens, qui leur 6taient ouverts, il faut remarquer que 1'intim6e ni dans ses plaidoyers ni dans son factum devant la Cour du Banc de la Reine, ni devant cette cour, n'a fait objection A la procedure adopt6e par les appelants.
Elle les a suivis sur le terrain qu'ils avaient choisi et elle a li6 contestation avec eux.
Cette contestation est I6galement li~e comme on le voit par les autorit6s ci-dessus cit6es.
Il ne doit en cons6quence rester pour 1'examen de cette cour que les questions d6cid~es par les deux autres cours, savoir :-1o Si Hardoin Lionais, en vertu des pouvoirs qui lui sont conf6rbs par le testament, peut 6tre (Le9sidre comme ayant autorit6 pour lier la succession Dame Henriette Moreau par des endossements con- .sentis .en sa qualit6 d'ex6cuteur testamentaire et d'ad- ;ministrater de cette succession en faveur de Charles lionais, un de ses fils, sans avoir requ aucune valeur on consid6ration pour les endossements.
20 Si les biens que Lionais est charg6 d'administrer comme ex6cuteur testamentaire out R t16galement d~clarbs insaisissables. La solution de ces questions &pend uniquement de l'interpr6tation A donner aux clauses ci-dessus cit6es J. de ce testament.
L'hon. juge Sicotte qui a rendu en premibre instance le jugement en cette cause, a interpr6t6, ce testament comme donnant A Hardoin Lionais un droit absolu de propri6t6.
Dans une autre cause oiu la mame question a t soulev6e, 1'hon. juge Jettd a dboid6 que Lionais ayant le droit de disposer des propri6t6s pour l'6ducation, le soutien et l'6tablissement des enfants, cela devait comprendre le droit d'endosser des billets pour aider Charles Lionais dans son commerce; de plus, qu'ayant par le testament le pouvoir de disposer des biens en faveur des enfants on de 1'un d'eux, A son gr6 soit par testament, donation entrevifs ou autrement, ces pouvoirs devaient aussi comprendre celui de douner les endossements qu'il avait consentis en faveur de Charles Lionais.
Dans une autre cause, l'hon. juge Papineau a d6cid6 la m~me chose.
Il y a encore une cause cit6e dans le factum de l'intim6e oil la question d'insaisissabilit6 des memes biens a t6 soulev6e; l'hon. juge Johnson a d6cid6 dans cette memc cause que comme il s'agissait d'nne dette de la succession m~me, la question ne pouvait pas alors tre soulev6e.
Cette d6cision n'affecte pas les questions soumises sur le present appel. Dans la Cour du Banc de la Reine les opinions ont aussi 6t6 partag6es.
Les autres d6cisions, portent sur le m6rite de cette cause.
Est-il vrai, comme 'a d6cid6 l'hon. juge Sicotte, que Hardoin Lionais est propri6taire absolu, malgr6 le legs universel de la propri6t6 fait en faveur de celui on de ceux des enfants de la testatrice qu'il lui plaira d'indiquer.
,s
Le testament donne, A la v6rit6, des pouvoirs tras 6tendus h
1'ex6cteur testametaire. Isant de la faclt6 que donne au testateur 1'art. 921 du Code Civil, la testatrice a, par 1'art. 4 de son testament, autoris6 son ex~cuteur testamentaire et administrateur A vendre et hypoth6quer les biens de la succession, les c~der, 6changer, hypoth6quer, ali~ner on autrement en disposer, soit en proprit6 soit en usufruit, etc., 1'autorisant A faire, signer et ex6cuter tons billets, chques, etc., et tous autres documents requis; et g~n6ralement A faire tous actes de la plus entidre administration. Tous ces pouvoirs ne sont donn~s que pour des fins d'administration.
La declaration en est plusieurs fois r6p~tke par la testatrice.
Dans la 5me clause, elle d6clare lui donner toute la latitude possible dans et pour l'administration des dits biens.
Encore dans cette mame clause en parlant de la dur6e des pouvoirs conf~rbs, la testatrice dit " cette administration et ex~cution, mon dit 6poux les conservera sa vie durant." Si 6tendus qu'ils soient ces pouvoirs ne sont 6videmment que des pouvoirs d'ex6cuteur testamentaire et d'administrateur; ils sont nullement ceux d'un propri6taire. n'y a pas une seule expression dans ce testament qui confdre A .Hardoin Lionais, la proprit6 ou mime l'usufruit des biens en question.
C'est en s'appuyant sur 1'etendue des pouvoirs mime que l'on essaie d'en tirer 1'induction qu'en r~alit6 il en est non seulement 1'administrateur, mais le proprietaire
Cette induction serait juste si 1'on pouvait consid~rer les poavoirs donn6s en faisant abstraction de la qualit6 d'ex~cuteur. Lionais a droit de vendre, c'est vrai, mais comme administrateur et ex6cuteur son pouvoir de vendre est limit6 par sa qualit6 d'ex6cuteur testamentaire.
II ne pent pas vendre personnellement, pour son profit et avantage. ne pourrait donner un titre valable.
Chaque fois qu'il exerce un des nombreux pouvoirs M o conf6r6s, ce doit 6tre en sa qualit6 d'ex&cuteur.
La testatrice se sert plusieurs fois de cette expression pour Fournier, J. d6signer 1'exercice par son mari de ses fonctions d'ex- 6cuteur testamemtaire.
ne peut pas agir en autre qualit6, et dans l'appr~ciation des actes qu'il fait on ne doit jamais perdro de vue qu'il n'a le pouvoir de les faire que 6s-qualit6.
Alors il ne peut plus are consid6r6 comme propri6taire absolu; les termes du testament s'y opposent.
Par l'art. 4me, Lionais est aussi dispens6 de faire inventaire, et mme de rendre compte.
Le 5me, le dispense aussi de rendre aucun compte de sa gestion ou de ses op6rations, tant envers les h6ritiers de la testatrice qu'envers toutes autres personnees que ce soit. On s'est encore appuy6 sur ces exemptions pour en conclure que Hardoin Lionais doit Atre consid6r6 comme propri6taire des biens.
Ces exemptions sont autoris6es par l'art. C.
Le testateur pent limiter 1'obligation qu'a l'ex6cuteur testamentaire de faire inventaire et de rendre compte de 1'ex6oution de sa charge, ou m~me 1'en dispenser entibrement.
Quant A l'effet de cette dispense, j'adopte . ce sujet 1'opinion que l'honorable juge Cross a exprim6 dans ses notes sur cette cause on 1'appuyant des autorit6s qu'il a cit~es. I peut sans doute r6sulter de cette dispense un avantage pour l'ex6cuteur, mais cela ne peut le constituer 16gataire de ce qui reste.
La suite de cet article (911) en contient une d6claration expresse en ces termes : " Cette d6charge n'emporte pas celle de payer ce qui lui reste entre les mains, i moins que le testateur n'ait voulu lui remettre la disposition des biens sans responsabilit6, le constituant Idgataire, on que les termes du testament ne comportent autrement la d6charge de payer."
Dans le cas actuel on ne peut pas dire que la testatrice ait voulu remettre ses biens A son ex~cuteur, ni en faire son 16gataire, puisqu'elle 1'a charg6 d'en faire luim~me la distribution, et qu'elle a institu6 des 16gataires Fournier, J. universels par la disposition suivante:
3me.-Je et et & et et Hardoin Lionsis, 6poux, et et et La testatrice a apport6 il est vrai des restrictions .1 cotte institution, en chargeant son ex6cuteur par 1'art. 5 de faire lui-meme le partage et la disposition de la totalit6 ou de partie de ses biens, comme il le jugerait convenable, s'en rapportant seulement A lui pour la subsistance, I'ducation et 1'tablissement de leurs enfants; lhi donnant le pouvoir de partager et 16gueT ses biens on portion d'iceux, etc., lorsqu'il le jugerait A propos, on entre tous ses h6ritiers on A aucun d'eux, ajoutant que sa volont6 6tait que son dit 6poux esqualit6, ne ffit aucunement li& dans ses op6rations et dispositions par les termes de 'article troisibme, lequel ne pouvalt en aucun cas 4tre interpr6t6 comme conf6rant un droit absolu d'hr6dit6 en faveur d'aucun de ses enfants, mais uniquement un droit 6ventuel, sujet aux dispositions libres de son dit 6poux 6s-qualit6. Si la disposition donnant & 1'ex~cuteur le droit de faire le partage des biens est 16gale, elle doit avoir son effet, rien dans le testament ne s'y oppose; il n'y a pas d'autre disposition de la pleine propri6t6 des biens que celle faite par l'art. 3, sous les restrictions ci-dessus mentionnes-les autres ne concernant que 1'administration. II n'y a aucune contradiction entre ces clauses, elles ne sont pas incompatibles et doivent par cons6quent recevoir leur ex6cution.
Fonmer, J. Quant au pouvoir de la testatrice de charger son ex6cuteur testamentaire de faire la distribution de ses biens, il n'est aucunement contraire A la facult6 illimitae de tester, et sa 16galit6 en est parfaitement d6montr6e par 1'honorable juge Cross, aux notes dnquel je r6fare, ainsi qu'aux autorit6s qu'il a cit6es, ainsi qu'd celles cit~es dans le factum des appelants. Cette question ne peut faire difficult6.
De ce qui pr6c~de, je conclus que Hardoin Lionais n'est ni 16gataire ni propri6taire absolu, qu'il n'est qu'ex~cuteur testamentaire et administrateur avec des pouvoirs trbs 6tendus, c'est vrai, mais pour g~rer et administrer seulement.
D'apris le code, les pouvoirs de 1'ex6cuteur testamentaire sont assimil6s h ceux du mandataire-ce sont par consequent les principes du mandat qui doivent r6gir la conduite de 1'ex6cuteur.-Sur ce point la cause n'offre pas de difficult6.
La divergence d'opinion s'616ve sur 1'6tendue des pouvoirs conf6r6s.
Si consid6rables qu'ils soient, comportent-ils 1'autorit6 en faveur de Hardoin Lionais de consentir des endossements de billets comme il 1'a fait, sans consid6ration, pour Charles Lionais ? Le testament lui donne bien le pouvoir de faire, signer et ex6cuter des billets, mais il est tout-a-fait silencieux A 1'6gard des endossements.
La diff6rence entre ces deux sortes d'actes est essentielle
Dans le premier, le faiseur du billet agit pour son int6r~t personnel, et il est cens6 avoir requ valeur on consid6ration pour 1'engagement qu'il signe. Dans le second, il donne simplement un cautionnement pour la dette d'un autre sans en retirer aucun avantage.
L'autorisation de signer un billet comme faiseur ne pent pour cette raison comporter celle N, d'endosser.
La responsabilit6 6tant beaucoup plus consid&rable dans le second cas, que dans le premier; un ex6cuteur testamentaire on autre mandataire ne pourrait lier la succession ou son mandant sans une autorisation sp6ciale, car le mandataire doit se renfermer exactement dans les bornes de son mandat. Pothier I en sortirait &videmment en donnant un cautionnement on endossement sans consid6ration, quand il n'est autoris6 qu'd signer un billet pour valeur reque et pour des fins d'administration seulement.
On trouve an 5me vol. L. C. Rep. (2), une cause qui a beaucoup d'analogie avec celle-ci, c'est celle de Castle v. Baby. Dans cette cause il a t6 d6cid6 qu'un agent revtn du pouvoir de vendre, 6changer, conc6der les propri6t6s mobilibres et immobilibres, de composer, ref6rer A arbitres, etc., enfin d'agir aussi amplement et effectivement que la mandante elle-meme aurait pu le faire en personne, n'avait cependant pas le pouvoir de faire et escompter des billets promissoires comme agents. La Cour du Bane de la Reine a maintenu cette mime doctrine dans deux causes rapport6es dans lp 21 vol. L. C. J. (3), Serre dit St. Jean v. La Banque .Metropolitaine, et dans celle de Synes contre la m~me banque (4).
Dans Parsons (5), on frouve cit6es plusieurs causes dans lesquelles il a t d6cid6 que l'autorit6 de faire des billets ne comporte pas celle d'en endosser.
L'intention de la testatrice de ne conf6rer que des pouvoirs d'administration, et non des droits de paiements a Hardoin Lionais, est encore d6montr6e par la precaution qu'elle a prise de declarer tons ses biens insaisissables, par la clause suivante: " Et ma volont6 est que mes dits biens, tant en propri6t6 qu'en usufruit, capitaux, fruits et revenus, tant meubles qu'immeubles, soient et restent insaisissables, et ne puissent tre M o saisis, vendus et dcrts ou l'un on l'autre, que pour les dettes propres de ma succession, c'est-A-dire : Fournier, J. celles auxquelles j'ai on aurai souscrit, on suis on serai partie, et pour nulles autres dettes."
La testatrice pouvait 16galement attacher cette condition d'iusaisissabilit6 k sa lib6ralit6
En d~clarant que ses biens ne pouvaient tre saisis que pour ses propres dettes et pour nulles autes dettes, n'6tait-ce pas clairement limiter les pouvoirs de 1'ex6cuteur testamentaire A ceux d'administrateur seulement?
Si elle avait en 1'intention de lui donner le pouvoir de lier sa succession d'une manibre g6n6tale, elle n'aurait certainement pas pu imposer cette condition d'insaisissabilit6; car on ne pent s'affranchir du paiement des dettes que l'on a contract6es ou que 1'on autorise 6 contracter. L'imposition de cette condition fait voir la limite impos6e A 1'6tendue des ponvoirs.
Elle ne pent tre dans le cas actuel consid6r6e comme un simple conseil donn6 A l'ex6cteur, puisqu'il n'est pas 16gataire. En vue du legs universel, elle doit tre consid6ree comme impos6e en faveur des 16gataires universels auxquels elle vondrait faire parvenir ses biens.
Mais on r6pond A cette observation en disant que ceux:-ci n'ont qu'un droit 6ventuel. L'honorable juge Tessier a fait justice de cet argument par un raisonnement si fort et si juste que je crois devoir le citer en entier:dit n'est a'applique et A dant &v6nement, Fournier, J. Pour justifier les endossements en faveur de Charles Lionais, l'intimbe invoque aussi la disposition du testament donnant pouvoir a 1'ex6cuteur testamentaire de pourvoir A la subsistance, A 1'6ducation et A l'6tablissement de tons on chacun des enfants de la testatrice. Si la preuve 6tablissait que l'ex6cnteur testamentaire a exerc6 ces pouvoirs en endossant pour son fils Charles, toute difficult6 cesserait; mais c'est tout le contraire qui est prouv6.
Charles Lionais 6tait d6ji 6tabli lorsque son pere a commence A endosser pour lui. Il ne l'a fait, comme il le dit dans son t6moignage, que dans le but d'aider son fils A passer quelques 6poques difficiles dans ses affaires;
mais toujours avec la certitude que celui-ci paierait ses billets. II ajoute que s'il avait cru que Charles Lionais n'aurait pas 6t0 capable de payer ses billets, il ne les aurait pas endoss6s.
II d6clare aussi qu'il n'a jamais en en cela l'intention de lui faire aucune lib6ralit6 en vertu du testament, les endossements ne peuvent tre consid6r6s comme une donation.
L'ex6cuteur ne pouvait donner qu'une chose qui existait dans la succession et en observant les formalit6s voulues en pareils cas C.C. art. 776, et en se d&partissant de son droit de propri6t6 dans la chose donn6e, art. 777 0.0. Quel droit de proprift6 pouvait-il avoir dans les fonds emprunt6s par son fils de la Banque Molson ? Aucun.
n'avait fait qu'encourir avec lui l'obligation de rendre ces fonds A la Banque.
Il est en cons6quence impossible de consid~rer ces endossements comme lib6ralit.s faites en avancement d'hoirie. La nature de la transaction et la preuve s'y opposent.
En r6sum6 je suis d'opinion que la contestation a 6t0 bien soulev6e par les plaidoiries et qu'il y a lieu de decider les questions jug6es en premiere instance. Que Hardoin Lionais n'est pas propri6taire absolu des biens mentionn6s dans le testament de dame Hen- Fourier, J. riette Moreau, son 6pouse, qu'il n'avait pas le pouvoir de consentir les endossements des billets sur lesquels a 6 rendu le jugement en cette cause, le condamnant A payer $8,963.88.
Que la clause d'insaisissabilit6 est 16gale et que les propri6t6s appartenant 6 la succession de Henriette Moreau, saisies en cette cause, sont exemptes de saisie et ne peuvent 6tre vendues pour le paiement des endossements en question.
L'appel doit tre allou6.
HENRY, J.:- I am of opinion that, under the will, Lionais had no power to bind the estate by becoming endorser for one of his sons. It was not carrying out the objects of the will.
Although power is given to him to manage the estate in any way he likes, still he has to do it with a view to dividing it amongst the children of the party who made the will. He was not required to account to them, but it was clearly the intention of the testatrix that the children should have the benefit of the property. He was restricted by the terms of the will in such a way that he could pay nothing and become answerable for nothing, except what was really a debt due by the succession.
He then undertakes to bind the estate as surety for his son, and it is stated that that is giving to the son an advance in pursuance of the will. But he swears that he never expected to pay the notes, and the evidence shows that he only pledged the security of the succession as security, and he expected that the son would pay the debt at maturity. Surely then, that cannot be taken as an act of an executor in pursuance of the terms of the will, or looked upon as an MoN osadvance in favor of one of the legatees.
Then, as to the question whether the parties could He..y, j. make opposition in the way in which they have done ? I can see no difficulty at all in their doing so. They had no notice of the suit in which the judgment was taken, and I can find nothing in the code of procedure to prevent them from doing so. They are coming in and showing that the judgment is wrong and should never have been given against the estate so as to bind the property of the succession. I think they can do so at any time, when that property is subject to seizure or about to be seized.
I fully concur in the views that I have heard expressed by my learned brother Fournier on all the points of the case. It is unnecessary for me to repeat them. After a full consideration of the case, I think the appeal should be allowed, and the judgment of the court below reversed with costs.
J.
The respondents (The Molson's Bank) have obtained a judgment for the sum of $8,963.83 against the defendant, Hardoin Lionais, in his quality of testamentary executor and administrator to the estate of his wife, the late Mrs. Henriette Moreau, for the amount of certain promissory notes made and signed by Charles Lionais, one of his children, and endorsed by the said defendant, Hardoin Lionais, in his said quality.
An execution was issued against the said defendant es-qualit, and certain real estate of the late Mrs. Henriette Moreau, which he detained in his said capacity, was seized and advertised for sale by the sheriff of the district of Montreal.
The appellants, who are the only children of the defendant Hardoin Lionais and his said wife Dame X.]
Henriette Moreau, opposed the sale of the property seized by an opposition in which they allege:
"That by her testament and last will dated 18th July, 1878, received before Mtre C. A. Terroux and colleagues, notaries, in the city of Montreal, Dame Henriette Moreau, the wife of the defendant Hardoin Lionsis, bequeathed all her property, moveable and immoveable, in ownership and in usufruct to the children born of her marriage with the said Hardoin Lionais, appointing them her universal legatees, and in the event of the decease of any one of them, his share to revert to the survivors. - " That by the said will, the said Hardoin Lionais was appointed testamentary executor and administrator the said estate.
" That by a clause of her will, the said Dame Henriette Moreau decreed and ordered that all her property, whether moveable or immoveable, the principal, the usufruct and the rents and revenues thereof shall be and remain ansaisissable and could not be seized nor sold, save and except only for the personal debts of the said testatrix, viz.: for those debts only which she should have herself subscribed during her lifetime, and for no other debts.
"That the said Dame Benriette Moreau departed this life at Montreal, on the 21st December, 1874, without having revoked her said will, which has been duly enregistered according to law, with a certificate of her death, on the 30th December, 1874.
"That in his capacity of testamentary executor of the said Dame Henriette Moreau, and as administrator to her estate, the said Hardoin Lionais has taken possession of all the property and has administered it, but that he, the said Hardoin Lionais, although acting in good faith, has nevertheless outgone the powers conferred upon him, and without any authority has endorsed without receiving any value or consideration therefor, certain promissory notes, to wit: those for which the judgment in this cause has been rendered.
"That the said Dame enriee Moreau has never Tasonereau,subscribed to, nor been a party to the debt for which .
the said promissory notes have been given; that the said debt was not contracted nor said notes given for the advantage or benefit of her estate, but on the very contrary, said debt is onerous and detrimental to its interests.
" That the said opposants are the only children, issue of the lawful marriage of the said late Dame Henriette Moreau with the said Hardoin Lionais, and they are consequently the only universal legatees as well in ownership as in usufruct of the property of the said estate, and that they are all interested in the safe-keeping and conservation of said property, and in having it declared that the seizure made in this cause of part of the real estate left by the said Dame Henriette Moreau, is null and illegal and must be set aside, in as much as said real estate is exempt from seizure by the terms of the will, insaisisable, and can only be seized and sold for debts subscribed to by the said Dame Henrielte Moreau herself, or for the benefit of her estate, whereas the debt for which judgment has been rendered and said seizure made, is not one of those.
" Wherefore the said opposants pray that the said seizure of the said immovable property be set aside and annulled, and that it be declared that the said immovable property cannot be seized in execution of the judgment rendered in the present cause against Hardoin Lionais in his said quality of executor and administrator to the estate of the late Dame Henriette Moreau." Issue having been joined by the bank with the opposants on the said opposition, the Superior Court dismissed the opposition and held that the said immovables could be seized in execution of the judgment rendered against Hardoin Lionais in his said quality, that is to say, against the estate. On appeal, the Court a S'S of Queen's Bench confirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.
The opposants now appeal to this court.
J. I am decidedly of opinion to dismiss their appeal. The features of this case are such that I do not hesitate to say I would have been very sorry indeed to find myself obliged to come to a different conclusion.
One of the opposants is the same Charles Lionais for whom these notes were endorsed and who, upon the security of these endorsements, got the bank to advance him the amount it endeavors to recover in the present case. Here is a man who went to the bank with certain endorsements, obtained money on the security of these endorsements, and who, now, that the bank exercises its action against the endorser, claims the right to intervene, and, on the ground that his endorser had not the right so to endorse for him, tries, with the assistance of his brothers, the other opposants, and with the connivance of his father the defendant and the said endorser, to hinder and stop the execution of the judgment obtained by the bank on such endorsements. Can such a contention, on his part, be entertained? Is he not estopped from taking such a position?
As I have already remarked, the judgment is not against Hardoin Lionais, personally, but against him as administrator and executor of the said estate. It fol. lows, of course, that it is not executory against any property of Lionais himself other* than the property coming from his wife. If executory at all, it must be so against the estate only. This seems to be undeniable. Then so long as the judgment stands against the estate, it must be executory againt the estate. It follows that it is the judgment that the opposants should have impugned, either by requdle civile or tidrce opposition-if, LIOls as they contend, their father had no authority to bind the estate by endorsing notes in the name of the estate. Their allegation, in the opposition, that their father had authority to endorse notes in the name of the estate * would be perhaps a sufficient ground of opposition to the judgment, but it is not a valid ground of opposition to the seizure. As long as the judgment stands and is allowed to stand against the estate, it is chose jugee that their father had a right to endorse notes in the name of the estate as he did.
I cannot, however, leave the appellants under the impression that they might with any chance of success attack the judgment. I am of opinion with the two courts below that Hardoin Lionais had full power and authority to endorse notes for one of his sons as he has done, and to bind the estate thereby. The appellants, it seems to me, fall into the error of treating this case, as if Hardoin Lionais had so endorsed not for one of his sons, but for a third party, a stranger. That would be a different case, and would raise different questions which we have not to determine here. The endorsements made by Hardoin Lionais in his quality of executor and administrator of his wife's estate have been made to assist one of his and the testatrix's sons in his trade and business. He certainly had the power to do so under the will. He had the power to give even all the estate to this son, Charles, and this, either by " dona- " tion entre-vifs on autrement d sa discrtion: " he had the power to borrow from the Bank any amount, one, two, three hundred thousand dollars to mortgage'all the estate for it, and place the sum, in Charles's busines, either as a loan or a gift to him. Could the appellants then have contended, that though their father had clearly the right to give su6h a mortgage, yet the Bank StIPREMI dOUT OF CANADA.
could not have recovered upon the inortgage because the will says that all the estate is to be insaisissable. That is what he did virtually here: he did not grant a o special mortgage to the Bank-a mortgage is only a cause of preference between creditors-but he borrowed from the Bank in the name of the estate to assist his son: all . the estate then has become le gage de la cr6ance, because the debt itself is the debt of the succession.
Hardoin Lionais could even have sold any part of the estate, or even the whole of it, and have put the proceeds into Cia, les's business.
The clause of insaisissabilit6 clearly cannot apply to a debt contracted for the estate or in the name of estate, and authorized by the will. Mr. Justice Tessier admits this, though the learned judge differed as to the right of Hardoin Lionais to endorse for his son.
I am of opinion with the two Courts below, and the six judges out of eight who have had this will under consideration, that Hardoin Lionais had full power to so endorse for one of his sons, and that by doing so he bound the estate. The judgment dismissing the appeal should therefore be confirmed.
In the judgment of my brother Taschereau I fully concur, but I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed, and the contestation of the opposants fail upon this single ground, that upon them is cast the burthen of establishing beyond all doubt, and by the most conclusive evidence, that the estate of a testator is not liable to be seized and sold upon an execution issued to enforce a judgment obtained against his execu. tor in the character of executor. In this case the estate of the testatrix is primd facie liable to satisfy the judg. ment recovered against the administrator of her will in b61 his character of administrator ; the opposants can only LiIs displace this primd facie liability by clear proof of the contrary, and such proof must be complete in omnibus. They profess to do so by producing the will of the testatrix, by which, however, it appears that she declared her will and desire to be, that her husband, whom she made administrator of her will, besides the special powers conferred upon him as named in the will, should be clothed for the purpose of administration of the testatrix's estate, and she, by her will, clothed and invested him, with all the powers, rights and authority which she had conferred upon him by a power of attorney, which she had granted to him the 7th July, 1854, executed before Mr. Moreau et son confrdre, notaries, and that in as perfect a manner as if all and each one of the clauses inserted in the said power of attorney formed an integral part of her last will and testament, her desire being that under the title of testamentary administrator and executor he should continue to exercise after her death the same rights and powers which he had in virtue of her said power of attorney, which she, by her will, ratified and confirmed in every particular, as well all the acts, transactions and matters, and generally everything which he had already done, and everything which he shall do in the future, both before and after her decease, in virtue of that same power of attorney and of her said will.
Now, until the opposants produce, and they have not produced, this power of attorney so confirmed with the powers therein contained made part of her will, it can. not be said that the testatrix's administrator had not full power and authority to do the very act for the doing which the judgment recovered against him in his character of administrator was recovered. The opposants therefore have failed to prove the issue, the whole