Tremblay v. Les Commissaires d’écoles de la Paroisse de St. Valentin

March ON APPEAL FROM THE C 1URI OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).

Sir W. J. RITCHIE C. J.-I think the school commissioners did not carry out the decision of the Superintendent of Education as they should have done, but on RiteCj.the contrary have attempted to evade doing so in an unjustifiable manner.

I think the appeal should be allowed.

FOURNIER J.-La contestation entre les parties en cette cause origine d'une diff6rence d'opinion entre les contribuables de l'arrondissement No. 2, de la municipalit6 scolaire de la paroisse de St. Valentin, sur l'opportunit6 de faire une nouvelle division de cet arrondissement demand6e par certains d'entr'eux aux commissaires d'6cole, intimbs, qui, par leur r6solution en date du 2 mai 1882, refus~rent cette demande. Par une autre r6solution adopt6e A la mme s6ance, ils retranchirent cependant une partie de cet arrondissement connue sous le nom de " Le Petit rang."

La section 11 du ch. 22, de 40 Vic. accordant un appel de cette d6cision des commissaires au Surintendant de 1'instruction publique, les requ&rants dont la demande avait t6 refus6e adopt6rent les proc6d6s indiqu6s par la loi pour appeler de la d6cision rendue contre eux. Sur cet appel le surintendant rendit le 17 mai une d6cision dont le dispositif est en ces termes:

j'andit j'ordonne et Boivin et at sous fixe et 54E centre de chacun des dits arrondissements, eu 6gard aux distances et an chiffre de la population.

Pour se conformer A cette d6cision les intim6s adopthrent le 5 f~vrier 1883, une r6solution divisant 1'arrondissement No. 2 en deux autres, d6sign6s par les Nos.Fournier J. 2 et 21. Tout en reconnaissant qu'il 6tait de leur devoir de se soumettre A cette sentence, ils exprimaient leur opinion que cette division 6tait de nature A nuire A l'instruction en d6truisant une de leur meilleures 6coles. Aprbs avoir d6fini les limites des nouveaux arrondissements, les commissaires, ordonnent comme suit la construction de deux maisons d'6coles:

Que le site de l'6eole du dit arrondissement No. 2, soit fix6 sur le coin ouest de la propri6td de J~r6mie Boivin, sur le chemin de la dite deuxime ligne, laquelle propri6t6 est d6sign~e an livre do renvoi officiel sous le num6ro 236 pourvu toutefois qu'il n'y ait pas de batisses de construites sur le dit site. Dans ce cas, un autre endroit prbs de devra 6tre choisi;

Qu'une maison d'4cole soit construite d'aprs les plans et devis do la maison d'6cole No. 1, si tels plans et devis sont approuv6s par le surintendant; sinon qu'il soit pri6 lui-mime d'avoir A en fournir d'autres, que le Secr6taire-Tr~sorier soit autoris6 A lui 6crire A cet effet afin que les travaux de la dite maison puissent se commencer le plus t6t possible. Agr66 unanimement.

Le 27 du m~me mois une autre requAte pr~sent6e aux commissaires, leur demandant de rescinder leur r6solution du 5, fut rejet6e pour les motifs suivants:

Quo les commissaires ne doivent ni ne peuvent prendre sur eux de changer leur resolution du cinq f6vrier courant par laquelle ils ont divis6 l'arrondissement No. deux, tel qu'ordonn6 par la sentence de l'honorable Surintendant, en date du dix-sept mai huit cent quatre-vingt-deux.

Que cope idant, les dits commissaires seraient heureux que le dit honorable Hurincendant voulit bien faire droit A la dite requ6te et r6voquer la dito sentence, vu quo c'est la conviction des dits commissaires qu'un tel arrangement serait pour le plus grand avantage des contribuables et mirme des opposants.

Qu'en cons6quence, la dite requate soit adress~e par le secr6taire.

tr6sorier au dit honorable Surintendant, avec pridre do vouloir bien la prendre an consid6ration;

Fournier J.

Mais le 27 avril 1883, une requate ayant th pr6sent6e aux appelants leur demandant de r6unir l'arrondissement No. 2 et No. 2), ils firent droit A cette requate, rdvoquant virtuellement leur rbsolution du 5 f6vrier 188-.

La r6solution du 27 avril ayant 6t6 communiqu6e an Surintendant, il r6pondit qu'il ne pouvait approuver le devis de la maison d'6cole qu'ils avaient l'intention de construire dans l'arrondissement No. 2, vu que par il approuverait leur r6solution du 27 avril dernier, ce qu'il n'avait pas le droit de faire. II les pr6venait en mime temps que sur eux retomberait toute la responsabilit6 de cette proc6dure.

Les appelants d6sirant se pr&valoir de la sentence du Surintendant et consid6rant comme absolument nuls tous les proc6d6s des commissaires tendant A l'anbantir, demandbrent un bref de mandamus pour faire ordonner 1'ex6cution de la dite sentence, en date du 17 mai 1882, et faire ordonner conform6ment A icelle la construction d'une maison d'&cole convenable dans 1'arrondissement No. 2, tel que fourni par la r6cente sub-division, et A ce que les r~solutions contraires A la dite sentence soient d6clar6es nulles. Les intim6s ont plaid6 par d6fense en droit que la requte ne fait pas voir que le Surintendant avait le pouvoir de rendre la dite sentence (11 mai 1882), et que les r6solutions des 27 avril et 17 mai 1883, modifiant sa dite sentence n'ayant pas t6 port6es en appel, sont en force, et qu'il n'est pas all6gu6 que les requ.rants n'ont pas d'autre remAde que le mandamus. La d6fense an fonds r6p6te les m~mes moyens dans une forme pen differente.

Aprbs enqu6te et audition au m6rite, la Cour Sup6rieure a ordonn6e 1'6mission d'an bref de mandamus. Ce jugement, port6 en appel A ]a Cour du Banc de la Reine, a 6t6 infirm6. G'est de ce dernier jugement qu'il y a maintenant appel A cette Cour.

La principale question soulev6e par cette contestation est de savoir si la r6solution du 2 mai 1882, pouvait former la base d'un appel au surintendant, et si celui-ci avait juridiction pour r6viser un proc6d6 de cette nature. Autant qu'on pent le voir par les all6gations de la requste libell6e, la demande faite aux commissaires et servant de base A la r6solution du 2 mai 1882, est une demande n6gative.

O'est plut6t une protestation contre le projet de diviser 1'arrondissement No. 2, dont il devait sans doute 6tre question.

La requate A ce sujet n'tant pas all6gu6e on ne peut s'en faire une ide que par le procks-verbal de la s6ance dans laquelle a 6t6 adopt6e la r6solution du 2 mai 1882 qui constate que les commissaires prennent en consid6ration une requ~te sign6e par 29 contribuables de l'arroudissement

No. 2 demandant que leur 6cole soit r6par6e, tel que d6cid6 par les commissaires " et qu'aucun changement et division ne soient faites dans cet arrondissement."

La requte parait aussi avoir demand6 le renvoi A leurs arrondissements respectifs des personnes qui avaient t6 annex6es A cet arrondissement.

Ensuite la r6solution suivante eat adopt6e:

dit

Les commissaires prennent aussi en consideration A la m~me seance, la requ6te de Jean-Baptiste Bornais, 'un des appelants, demandant A 6tre annex6 A l'arrondissement No. 2, et la renvoie.

Cet expos6 des proc6d6s 6tait certainement insuffisant pour faire voir qu'il avait 6t adopt6 A cette s6ance une d6cision susceptible d'stre reform6e par appel.

Mais la preuve a suppl66 .1 ce dfaut par la production du prochs-verbal entier de cette s~ance, lequel fait voir que ce jour-lA une lettre du Surintendant de l'instruction Fourner J. publique avaient t lue devant les commissaires, les autorisant i changer les limites de 1'arrondissement No 2, en en d6tachant le Petit rang, et engageant en mme temps les commissaires A diviser le reste de l'arrondissement No. 2, et A y fixer deux maisons d'&coles.

La suggestion du Surintendant quant au retranchement du Petit rang fut adopt6e, mais la division du reste de l'arrondissement fut refus6e. De cette manibre on voit que la r6solution ne se borne pas an maintien des limites de 1'arrondissement No. 2, mais qu'il est aussi fait un changement important dans ses limites par le retranchement du Petit rang, en m~me temps qu'elle constate le refus, de diviser ce qui reste de cet arrondissement conform6meut A 1'ordre du Surintendant. Cette d6cision est-elle applicable ?

La section 11 de 1'acte 40 Vic., chap. 22, dit:

fait 6tabli ngligent qu'il defaire D'aprbs cette section, il est clair qu'un changement fait dans les limites d'un arrondissement donne le droit d'en appeler an Surintendant.

Dans ce cas, un tel changement ayant en lieu par le retranchement du VOL. XIl.] SUPREME COURT OF.CANADA.

Petit rang l'intervention du Surintendant 6tait justifiable.

Le refus de diviser le reste de l'arrondissement, ainsi que l'ordcnnait le Surintendant, donnait 6galement Arm. droit d'appeler de la d6cision des commissaires; car si les circonstances, exigeaiomt cette division dans l'int6rt de 1'6ducation comme le d6clare le Surintendant, le refus de le faire 6tait une n6gligence et un refus de la part des commissaires de remplir une de leurs attributions, d'aprbs les termes de la susdite section, et donnait lieu d'appeler d'une decision refusant cette division. Pour ce refus de diviser, comme pour le changement fait par le retranchement du Petil rang, il y avait lieu A appel et la sentence rendue A ce sujet par le Surintendant est dans les limites de ses attributions.

Cette sentence ayant donn6 gain de cause aux appelants, ceux-ci se trouvaient avoir par cela m~me acquis le droit de la faire ex6cuter.

Mais les commissaires, aprbs s'8tre soumis A cette sentence et avoir rejet6 une requte qui en demandait la modification comme on l'a vu par la r6solution ci-dessus cit6e, ne tardbrent pas a adopter des proc6d6s qui en d6truisaient 1'effet.

le 27 avril 1883, ils adressent une requate demandant, contrairement A la dite sentence, la r6union des deux arrondissements No. 2 et 2J, et d6clardrent qu'une seule 6cole, an lieu de deux, serait construite. Le 17 mai, une r6solution fut adopt6e pour donner suite A celle du 27 avril, dbcrftant la r6union des arrondissements.

Etait-il alors an pouvoir des commissaires d'exercer une juridiction quelconque au sujet des limites de ces arroudissements et d'en ordonner la r6union, aprbs la sentence rendue par le Surintendant et aprbs avoir d6clar6 qu'ils s'y conformeraient.

L'affirmative a t soutenue par eux en se fondant sur les secs. 31 et 33 du ch. 15, Statuts Refondus, B. C. Ces deux sections sont en force et donnent certainement aux commissaires le droit d'6tablir des arrondissements d'6cole, d'en d6terminer les limites, de les changer A leur discr6tion, de cr6er de nouveaux arrondissements de temps en temps suivant les besoins de la population; ainsi que le droit, quand its le jugeront A propos, d'unir deux ou plusieurs arrondissements, et de les s~parer de nouve.u, en donnant avis de leur decision au Surintendant. Les commissaires ont incontestablement ce pouvoir et ils en ont fait un 16gitime exercice quand, pour se conformer A la sentence du Surintendant ils ont fait la division qu'il avait ordonn6e.

Mais ce pouvoir une fois exerc6 devient sujet A 1'appel 6tabli par la see 11, et ne peut plus aprbs cet appel tre exerc6 par les commissaires; il tombe ensuite sous le contr6le exclusif du Surintendant. Sa d6cision 6tant finale, les commissaires doivent s'y soumettre et n'ont plus le pouroir d'adopter aucune r6solution qui serait en contradiction avec sa sentence. C'est pour toutes les parties int6ressbes chose jug6e. Admettre la pr6tention des intim6s ce serait virtuellement abolir le droit d'appel qui ne serait plus qu'une proc6dure illusoire, si les commissaires pouvaient mettre de c6t6 la sentence du Surintendant en adoptant une autre r6solution au meme effet que celle que le Surintendant aurait rejetbe ou modifibe. Los commissaires sont, dans ce cas, dans la m~me position qu'un tribunal infbrieur vis-A-vis d'une cour d'appel, lorsque celle-ci est saisie du litige, le tribunal de premibre instance n'a plus de juridiction, et la d6cision du tribunal sup6rieur doit Atre ex6cut6e. Je considbre comme absolument nulles les resolutions des 27 avril et 17 mai 1883, ordonnant la r6union des deux arrondissements, et il n'y avait aucune n6cessit6 d'en faire le sujet d'un second appel, comme le pr6tendent les intim6s Mais comme il peut Atre utile, suivant les circonstances, de faire modifier la sentence du Surintendant, la loi y a sagement pourvu par la sec. 7 du ch. 28, 33 Vic., en statuant que:

l'ducation Cette section qui donnait aussi un appel au Surintendant a t6 retranch6e et remplac~e par la section 11, du ch. 2 2 de 45 Vic, cit6e plus haut.

est 6vident d'aprbs cette section que s'il devient avantageux de faire des modifications aux changements des limites d'arrondissements r6gl6es sur appel par une sentence du Surintendant, que ce n'est plus aux commissaires que 1'on peut s'adresser, nonobstant les secs. 31 et du ch. 16, mais au Surintendant qui par la dite sec. 7, est seul investi de ce pouvoir. Ceci d6montre l'6vidence qu'il ne pouvait pas y avoir appel sur les r~solutions des 27 avril et 17 mai 1883, modifiant la sentence, mais que le seul rem~de qui restait aux int6ress6s 6tait de s'adresser an Surintendant pour lui demander de la modifier lui meme en lui donnant des raisons suffisantes pour l'engager A le faire.

est facile de voir que la loi n'a pas cr6 deux juridictions concurrentes sur les changements d'arroudistements, mais une jurisdiction de premibre instance chez les commissaires et une d'appel chez le Surintendant

Un conflit de juridiction 6 ce sujet aurait ts une source f6conde de contestation que la loi a roulu &viter en rendant la d&cision du Surintendant finale, et ne laissant qu'd lui seul le droit de modifier sa sentence. En cons6quence je suis d'avis que la sentence du Surintendant a 6t valablement rendue, et qu'elle ne pouvait 6tre affect6e par les r6solutions contaire des commissaires, et que les appelants ont droit d'en demander l'ex6cution.

Quant aux objections faites A 1'6mission du bref de mandamus, je suis d'avis pour les raisons donn6es par $6

SUPREME COUTRT OF CANADA.

[VOL.

VA, wrm.

Pour ces motifs, je suis d'opinion que l'appel doit Fournier Jtre allou6 avec d6pens.

HENRY J.-The differences existing between the parties to this suit have arisen under section 11 of ch. 22, 40 Vic., of the Statutes of Quebec, which provides as follows:

When a site for a school house is chosen by the school commissioners or trustees, or a change is made in the limits of a school district, or a new school district is established in a school municipality, or when one or more established school districts are changed or subdivided, or when the school commissioners or trustees refuse or neglect to exercise or fulfil any of the functions or duties conferred upon them by this section, the ratepayers interested may at all times appeal to the Superintendent, by summary petition; but such appeal shall not be allowed, unless with the approval of three visitors other than the school commissioners or trustees of the said municipality; the decision given by the Superintendent shall final and he may, by such decision, order the school commissioners or trustees to do that which they have been required or which he orders them to do, or abstain from doing, or to do only in whole or in part and upon the conditions required by such decision. It is shown that within the jurisdiction of the respondents there was in 1882 a school district considered by some to be too large, and a petition for a division of it into two districts having been considered and rejected by the respondent commissioners, the matter was taken by appeal under that section from that decision to the Superintendent, who ordered that the district should be divided into two districts with a school house in each. That order was duly made and a resolution of the commissioners was passed in February, 1883, as follows - That though they regret to be obliged to make the said division, yet they are bound to obey the decision of the superintendent and comply with his order in the matter, and consequently the said division is decreed.

Nothing, however, was done by the commissioners to carry out or give effect to the order of the superintendent, but a resolution was subsequently passed refusing to do upon which the appellants obtained VN. a peremptory writ of mandamus to be issued out of the Superior Court, ordering and requiring the commis- Henry J. sioners to perform the order of the superintendent.

The respondents seek to justify their refusal to perform the order of the superintendent, because, as they allege, a petition was subsequently, during the said month of February, presented to them against the said division and that they unanimously resolved:- 'that The commissioners failed to cause the division to be made, and in the month of May following passed a resolution, that the district should not be divided as ordered by the superintendent, but re-united into one, and it alleged that such was done in answer to the prayer of a petition of a majority of the inhabitants the district.

That is substantially the justification offered by the commissioners for their failure to do what appears to me to have been their plain and obvious duty.

After the decision of the superintendent was regularly made in regard to any matter as provided for by the section in question the duties of the commissioners became wholly and solely ministerial.

After a case before them goes to the superintendent by appeal the functions of the commissioners as judges in the matter are at end and they, by the plain and express words of the section, become the mere instruments provided to put in execution the orders of the superintendent. The commissioners are virtually a court of original jurisdiction over certain matters in relation to schools with an appeal from their decisions to the superintendent. When he becomes legally seized by an appeal of a matter previously decided by the commissioners, they become denuded of all power over the subject matter except, ministerially, to carry out his orders and cause the proper effect to be given to them.

In this case he, as the appellate and higher tribunal, decided that the district in question should be divided. The law as found in the section of the statute I have quoted makes his decision final and conclusive and it throws upon the commissioners the duty of carrying out his orders. That is their only duty and it is one they are bound to perform.

They have no discretion in the matter nor can they either question or consider, as far as their functions go, the propriety of the legitimate decision of the superintendent.

As well, in my opinion, might a legal tribunal of first instance undertake to reverse a decision of a higher court to which a case had been removed by appeal, or decline to adopt and carry out the decision of the higher tribunal. I think the writ was properly issued and that the appeal should be allowed and that our judgment should be for the appellants with costs in all the courts. If the commissioners had, as required, caused the decision of the superintendent to be carried out by an actual division of the district into two in the manner directed by the order of the superintendent, and that the two districts actually existed, the commissioners might then have received and decided upon a petitioL to unite them and their decision would be binding unless by an appeal to the superintendent their decision was reversed. That, however, is not the case before us. The commissioners in this case had, as I think, no jurisdiction.

Their last order was to re-unite two districts that had never existed-that had never been created or established as required by the order of the superintend- ent. The commissioners had passed a resolution agree- Henry ing to do so, but failed to give effect to their own resolution.

Their last order was, in my opinion, against the provision of the statute, and they having no authority to make it, no appeal from it was necessary.

1 think the writ was properly issued, that the appeal should be allowed and that the appellants are entitled to our judgment with costs.

TASCHEREAU J.-This is a case under the Lower

Canada School Law about the division of certain school districts in the municipality of St. Valentin.

The appellants obtained a preremptory writ of mandamus in the Superior Court against the school commissioners of the said municipality ordering them to put into execution a certain decision of the superintendent of education, rendered on the 17th May, 1882, under sect. 1140 V. ch. 22, which reads as follows:- When a site for a school house is chosen by the school commissioners or trustees, or a change is made in the limits of a school district, or a new school district is established in a school municipality, or when one or more established school districts are changed or subdivided, or when the school commissioners or trustees refuse or neglect to exercise or fulfil any of the functions or duties conferred upon them by this section, the ratepayers interested may at all times appeal to the superintendent, by summary petition but such appeal shall not be allowed, unless with the approval of three visitors other than the school commissioners or trustees of the said municipality; the decision given by the superintendent shall be final and he may, by such decision, order the school commissioners or trustees to do that which they have been required or which he orders them to do, or abstain trom doing, or to do only in whole or in part and upon the conditions required by such decision.

The superintendent had ordered, on an appeal to him duly instituted under the said section, that a large school district in the said municipality should be divided into two districts with a school house in each. we The legality of this order has not been questioned before this Court.

J.

The school commissioners appeared disposed at first to submit, and unanimously passed in February, 1883, a resolution couched in the following terms:

matter, On the 27th February, again on a petition presented against this division, the commissioners unanimously resolved:

the the the Nothing better than these resolutions, had they acted in accordance with them, could be expected from the commissioners, and they certainly seemed fully then to know their duty and to be so far ready to perform it. It seems, however, that in their opinion the simple passing of these resolutions and the mere consignment in their registers that they were ready to submit to the superintendent's orders were by themselves a sufficient compliance with these orders, and to this, alone, their submission was to be confined. For not only did they never take any steps to put these orders into execution, but few weeks later, on the 27th of April and 17th of May, they openly set them at defiance, and not only refused to execute them, but actually ordered the very reverse, of what had been ordered by the superintendent, by a resolution to that effect at a regular meeting that the said districts should not be divided as ordered by the superintendent but re-united into one. These last words appear by their own registers to have been asceau in the prayer of the petition presented to them. They J. now plead in answer to the demand for a mandamus ordering to put the superintendent's decision into execution:

1st. That they were justified to refuse to execute the said decision because a majority of the parties interested had petitioned them to do so; and 2nd. That their resolution refusing to obey the said decision of the superintendent has not been appealed from to the superintendent.

Their contention, it seems to me, is an extraordinary one. Their whole argument consists in opposing their rebellious act as a justification for their rebellion to the constituted authority in the matter. We have not here got to enquire whether this division should take place or not.

The superintendent has pronounced on that, and his decision is final, says the statute.

And the contention, that because a majority, or the totality of the inhabitants of these divisions, or of the whole parish, or, even if it were of the whole of the Province itself, have asked the commissioners not to obey the superintendent's orders, they were, ipso jacto, authorized to do so, seems to me utterly untenable. The statute tells them " you shall obey "; these petitioners said to them " don't obey," and to the petitioners' wishes, (say the respondents,) we submitted in preference to the law's precepts; and that is our defence to the mandamus. I have no hesitation to say that such a defence cannot prevail.

That is not, in my opinion, how should be received the orders of a high officer of the state, whom, very properly indeed, the law has declared should be the sole arbiter of these dissensions amongst the school ratepayers.

His decrees must be respected and obeyed as those of a court of justice should be, and the refusal or negligence to do so is nothing else but an act of Iaschireau rebellion to law and authority.

As to the commissioners contention that their resolutions of April and by which they refused to submit to the superintendent's decision, have not been appealed from the to superintendent himself, and so that they stand in full force, it evidently is as unfounded as their first one, and must fall with it. They had no right or authority whatsoever to pass these resolutions; they were consequently null, absolutely null, and no appeal against them was necessary to put them aside. In fact it all comes to the same question; they here again oppose their rebellious acts in support of their rebellion.

They say " it is true that we refused to obey the decree, that we acted in direct opposition to it, but our refusal, our acts of insubordination, stand till they are appealed from."

Well, as I have said before, the refusal, their acts of insubordination, are illegal and void, and it"was not necessary, nay, it would have been ludicrous to say the least, to appeal from them to the superintendent.

I am of opinion that the judgment of the Superior Court by which the commissioners were ordered to submit to the superintendent's decree was right, and that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench which reversed the judgment of the Superior Court was wrong. The appeal should, therefore, in my. opinion, be allowed, and the judgment of the Superior Court restored with costs in all courts against the respondents. The conduct of the commissioners in the matter has been so outrageous, the illegality of their acts so flagrant, and their bad faith so glaring, that, had it been asked, I would have put all the costs against them personally.