the to APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) reversing the judgment of the Superior Court which had dismissed the plaintiffs action, and awarding $3,000 damages to the present respondents (1).
From this judgment the appellants appealed and the respondents filed a cross appeal claiming a larger amount.
The facts and pleadings sufficiently appear in the head note and judgments hereinafter given.
Roy Q C. and Doutre Q.C. for appellants, contended: 1st. That the plaintiff's action was barred by the prescription of one year.
2nd. That the expressions used in the resolution and in the petition above mentioned were not in themselves libellous and actionable.
3rd. That no malice could be attributed to the city, whilst there existed a probable and reasonable cause for their proceedings in August, 1868.
4th. That it had not been shown that the original plaintiff was entitled to damages at the hands of the city, and that, in reality, it was not proved that he suffered any.
On the question of prescription the learned counsel cited and relied on Arts. 2262, 2267 C. C.; Dunod, Prescription (2); Mangin, Action Publique (8); Grellet Dumazeau (4); Merlin, Repertoire (5); Laurent (6); Aubry & Rau (7); Troplong (8); Marcad6 (9); Demo- VOL. XIl.] SUPREME COURT OF CANADA.
lombe (1); Rolland de Villargues (2); Cass. Nan. Sirey (3); Vazelle-Prescription (.); Journal du Palais (5); Code d'Inst. Crim. (French) ; Case of Pigeon v. Le On the second point they cited:- Grellet-Dumazeau (8); Broom, Legal Maxims (9); Folkard's Law of Slander and Libel (10); Cooley, Torts (11); Odgers', Libel and Slander (12); Bigelow's leading cases on Torts (13); Gauthier v. St. Pierre and authorities quoted (14); C. C. P. Art. 426.
Sir W. J.RITCHIE C.J.-The action in this case is not an action for libel, but the complaint is that the defendants caused a resolution to be passed, whereby they instructed the attorney of the corporation to apply by summary petition to the Superior Court to stay the proceedings of the defendant and his co-commissioners appointed in the matter of expropriation for the widening of St. Joseph street in front of the property of the Honorable Charles
Wilson, and to remove and replace the said two commissioners, who, in their opinion, forfeited their obliga.
tions as such commissioners; that the resolution was calumnious, libellous and injurious to the fair name and reputation of the plaintiff, and that they did file and present to Mr. Justice Berthelot, on the 10th
August, 1868, a petition reciting the resolution, and averring certain proceedings, intentionally, maliciously ommitting to mention certain subsequent proceedings of defendant and his co-commissioners, and alleging other matters inconsistent with the proper discharge of the duty by the co-commissioners, and that they had not fulfilled the duties in a faithful, diligent and impartial manner, and prayed that the proceedings of the commis
(1) Vo. 7, 8.
sioners should be stayed, and defendant and J. Brown . should be removed from the office of commissioners, as O' having violated and forfeited their obligations. The declaration then alleged that " the said resolution and the said petition were false, malicious and libellous, and .that the allegations therein contained are false, and were made only with a view to injure the character and good name of the plaintiff, and to conceal the negligence of the defendants, throughout the said herein aboverecited proceedings before the said commissioners." And after alleging specifically the falsity of certain statements it alleges .-- That all the allegations in the said petition referring to the proceedinge of the sixth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and sixtyeight, were and are injurious, insulting, libellous and calumnious.
And after specifying on their falsities the declaration averred :
" And it is absolutely false that the plaintiff. has been at any period of time, or was under pecuniary obligations to the said Charles Wilson, as falsely alleged in the said petition, and it is false that the plaintiff did not fulfil his duties of commissioner, in a faithful and impartial manner, and without fear or favor. " That the said defendants never had any probable or reasonable cause for adopting the said resolution, or for filing the said calumnious, wicked and malicious petition against the plaintiff in this cause, and that they never had any trust-worthy or positive informations of any kind to justify them in so doing.
"That the said defendants did not prove any of the accusations in the said petition or resolution contained, and that they even did not bring a single witness to substantiate the same, and did not and could not make them good, such accusations being utterly false and calumnious as aforesaid.
80o
" That by a judgment rendered on the said petition, by the honorable Judge Berthelot, on the seventeenth day &C., of September last, past (1870), the said accusations and charges so brought by the defendants against the plaintiffs, were in fact declared false without foundation or probable cause, and were rejected in fact as such by CJ. the said judge.
" That the plaintiff is an honest and respectable citizen and has always enjoyed a high character of respectability and the confidence of his fellow citizens; that in his capacity of civil engineer and architect he has often been and is yet entrusted with the management of many important affairs; that he has often been invested with the office of trust, honor and profit, both in his capacity of engineer and that of architect aforesaid.
" That the said false and calumnious accusations and charges were of a nature to injure, and did in fact gravely injure the high character, good fame and reputation of the plaintiff, and put in danger the confidence hitherto reposed in the plaintiff by the public and his friends, and have also greatly hurt the feelings of the plaintiff, and during more than two years kept him in suspense and anguish, under the said accusations and charges, pending the said petition; that, moreover, the said plaintiff has lost a great deal of time and expended large sums of money in defending himself against the said accusations and charges, and has suffered damage to the amount of twenty thousand dollars for all the causes and reasons aforesaid, which sum he has right to claim and deserves to have from the defendants.
" Wherefore the said plaintiff prays that the said defendants may be adjudged and condemned to pay to the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand dollars currency as damages for the reasons above-mentioned with interest and costs, distraits to the undersigned."
This, then, is not an action of libel, but it is an action
SUPREfE COURP OF CANADA.
FVOL. XIl. for falsely, maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause instituting certain proceedings against plaintiff calculated to injure the plaintiff, and which accusations and charges the defendants failed to prove, or even to bring a single witness to substantiate, and which by the judgment of Mr. Justice Berthelot on 17th September, 1870, were declared false and without foundation or probable cause, and were rejected in fact as such by the said judge and subsequently by the Court of Appeal, and finally by the Privy Council. Judge Berthelot, on 17th September, 1870, held that plaintiff and Brown had committed an error ofjudgment in adopting a wrong principle as to the damages; but held that there was no proof of fraud or partiality or want of diligence and fidelity, and dismissed the commissioners for want of diligence.
The Court of Appeal, 20th February, 1873, negatived fraud and reversed the judgment as to dismissing the commissioners.
On the 11th November the Privy Council confirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, holding there was no proof of fraud, &c, and that the principle adopted by the two commissioners was not erroneous, and therefore the inference of want of diligence failed.
The complaint is simply that the defendants maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause instituted legal proceedings with a view to the dismissal of the plaintiff and his co-commissioners from the office of commissioners on false charges of partiality, corruption and improper conduct in the discharge of their duties as such commissioners, by means of which improper proceedings and false charges the plaintiff was damnified.
Until the termination of the legal proceedings how could it be established whether the complaints of the defendants were well or ill-founded, whether the allegations could be proved or not ? The defendants had F3 the right to go on and prove them if they could.
The court of first instance treated this case as an action for libel, and held it prescribed after one year from the day when the knowledge of the alleged libel came to the plaintiff under arts. 2262 and 2261 of the
Civil Code.
The Court of Appeal considered that as the matter was still in course of litigation the arts. 2262 and 22t67 did not apply, and the action was not prescribed.
The matter complained of continuing up to the rendering of the judgment, 17th March, 1870, and, the courts having found that there was no proof of the frauds and misconduct alleged, necessarily found that the proceedings were without reasonable or probable cause, and therefore properly inferred malice, but which until the termination of the suit remained an open question.
No objection has been taken that the present action has been prematurely brought, and as to prescription as regards the charges of fraud they were not disposed of and terminated till the decision of the Court of Appeal of
20th of September, 1873, their appeal to the Privy Council, decided in November, 1876, being only on the ground of the assessment having been made on a wrong principle.
I think the judgment of the court below should be affirmed and the present appeal dismissed with costs.
J.-pringle, now represented in this case by the respondent, his widow, and the tutrix of his minor children, was a statutory officer, appointed under a statute of the Province of Quebec providing for an expropriation of lands in the city of Montreal for the purpose of widening streets, and he was charged with a judicial duty as a valuator of the lands so required to be expropriated.
Whilst in the exercise of this duty he was accused of corruption and venality in office, in an application made to a judge of the Superior Court who had, by the statute, power to remove him. Upon investigation, and after hearing evidence and argument, it appeared that the only ground for this charge put forward by the present appellant, J. was, that there was a general feeling on the part of the public that the award was for too large an amount. The judge before whom the complaint was heard, the late Mr. Justice Berthelot, on the 17th of September, 1870, decided this charge of venality in favor of Springle, holding that the evidence disclosed no ground for the accusation of the city council.
This concluded the proceedings so far as it was sought to remove Springle on the ground of corruption and venality.
Mr. Justice Berthelot, however, on another ground, did pronounce judgment of amotion; his decision on this other ground was appealed against by Springle, but no appeal was taken by the present appellants from the learned judge's decision, dismissing the charge on the ground of corruption. On the hearing of the appeal it was allowed by the Court of Queen's Bench, and from that decision the city appealed to the Privy Council, without, however, including in their appeal the charge of corruption originally made, but confining it to the same grounds as those which were dealt with in the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench.
The present action was instituted by Springle on the 4th of May, 1871.
am of opinion that this was in sufficient time, and that no prescription operated to bar the action. No action could have been maintained until after the judgment of Mr. Justice Berthelot dismissing the application to remove so far as it was based on charges of corruption.
In saying this I do not consider that I am acting merely on a technical rule of English law, but on one which, for conclusive reasons, must be of universal application. These-reasons are well stated in a recent case (1) in the House of Lords by Lord Selborne L.C., as follows:
&a., it. it that it so; The gross nature of these charges, the fact that not the least evidence was advanced in support of them, and the conclusion of the proceedings in Springle's favor, are sufficient to warrant a presumption of malice, and the action being in the nature of an action for malicious prosecution I am of opinion that it was sufficiently proved; and nothing being shown on behalf of the appellants to rebut the inference of malice, and to show that there was any probable cause for the charge made, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
The Court of Appeal were, therefore, quite right in allowing the appeal, and their judgment must be affirmed with costs.
J.-Les Intim6s par reprise d'instance repr6sentent James Key Springle qui avait poursuivi la cit6 de Montr6al en dommages pour l'adoption do proc~d6s dans le conseil de la dite cit6 et dans la cour Sup6rieure du district de M-iontr~al pour le faire destituer comme commissaire en expropriation, pour cause de fraude et de partialit6 dans 1'exercice des fonctions de sa charge.
La d6claration apres avoir all6gu6 la nomination du dit Springle comme commissaire conjointement avoc Thomas Storrow Brown, pour d6terminer la compensation A accorder A l'honorable Charles Wilson pour certains terrains requis pour l'61argissement de la rue atropolitan Bank St. Joseph, expose los proc6d6s qui eurent lieu devant les dits commissaires pour en arriver A une decision. OE
C'est sur ces proc6d6s que le conseil de ville se fonda pour adopter A 1'unanimit61 a r6solution suivante: That their attention had been called to the extraordinaiy award Fournier J* recently declared by two of the Commissioners, (meaning the Plaintiff in this cause and the said Thomas S. Brown) appointed in the matter of expropriation for the widening of St. Joseph Street, in front of the property of the Honorable Charles Wilson and that the exorbitant amount, awarded by the majority of the commis. sioners in that case, was such as to require in their opinion that steps should be adopted immediately to stay the proceedings in the interest of the public, and they therefore instructed the attorney of the Corporation to apply by summary petition to the Superior Court., or to a judge thereof, to stay the proceedings and to remove and replace the two Commissioners whose award is complained of, and who, in their opinion, forfeited their obligations as such commissoners.
Conform6ment a cette r6solution, des proc6d6s furent pris le 10 ao-ht 1868 devant 1'honorable juge Berthelot au moyen d'une p6tition contenant la r6solution cidessus et d'autres graves accusations pour demander la destitution du dit Springle comme commissaire. Aprs quelques autres all6gations expliquant la conduite des dits commissaires, la d~claration continue comme suit: That the said resolution and the said petition were false, malicious, and libellous, and that the allegations therein contained are false and were made only with a view to injure the character and good names of the Plaintiff and to conceal the negligence of the Defendants, throughout the said herein above recited proceedings before the said commissioners.
Cette d6n~gation g6n6tale des accusations port6es dans la r6solution et la p6tition est suivie d'une d6n6gation sp~cialc de chacune des accusations sp6cifi~es dans la r~solution et la p6tition, avec l'addition qu'elles sont injurieuses, outrageantes et calomnieuses.
La d6claration contient en outre la d~n6gation de l'existence de cause raisonnable on probable pour l'adoption de la dite resolution et la presentation de la dite p6tition :
Il est ensuite all6gu6 que, par le jugement rendu le Fournier J. 17 septembre 1870 par l'honorable juge Berthelot, toutes les accusations port6es contre les dits commissaires furent d6clarbes fausses et sans aucune cause raisonnable on probable.
J'ai cru devoir citer quelques parties de la d6claration, afin de faire voir, d'aprbs la nature de ces all6gations, quel doit 6tre le v6ritable caractbre de l'action de 1'Intim6.
Est-elle, comme le dit 1'honorable juge Caron dans ses notes dans la cour du Banc de la Reine: " une demande par Springle pour $20,000 de dommages " soufferts, en cons6quence de son in.juste destitution " comme commissaire en expropriation "? On bien n'estce pas, comme le pr6tend 1'Appelante, une action fond6e sur le libelle contenu dans la r6solution et la p6tition du conseil de ville, pour r6paration du dommage caus6 par les expressions injurieuses de ce libelle.
Il est 6vident que si les accusations contenues dans la r6solution 6taient fausses, elles constituaient un libelle; et que si le conseil de*ville n'eut donn6 aucune suite au projet de demander la destitution des commissaires, I'offense commise par l'adoption de cette resolution aurait 6t6 prescrite par le laps d'une ann~e, suivant l'art. 2262.
Mais cette resolution kant n~cessaire poar autoriser la poursuite, doit, en ralit6, 6tre consid6r~e comme la premibre proc6dure dans cette action; les deux doivent 6tre consid6rees comme un seul et mime acte.
Bien que la r6solution et la p6tition contiennent un libelle-ce n'est pas la punition de ce libelle que Springle a demand6e par son action-c'est la r6paration des dommages pour une poursuite malicieuse demandant sa destitution en invoquant le libelle comme base de cette demande.
Ceci me parait clairement r6sulter des parties ci-dessus cit6es de la d6claration et surtout de la suivante:
En cons6quence, je considbre 1'action en cette cause comme ayant pour but d'obtenir le montant des dommages causes & Springle par la poursuite malicieuse en destitution intent~e par l'Appelante au moyen de sa p6tition A cet effet.
Si cette manibre d'appr6cier la nature de 1'action est correcte, il s'en suit que la prescription A opposer A la pr6sente action n'est pas celle de 'art. 2262, C. C., contre les injures verbales ou 6crites, mais bien celle de 1'art. 2261 0. C., limitant A deux ans la prescription " pour " dommages r~sultant de d6lits et quasi d61its, A d6faut " d'autres dispositions applicables."
Pour d6cider la question de prescription il faut d'abord 6tablir A quelle 6poque remonte le droit d'action, car la prescription a dfi commencer avec la naissance de ce droit, A moins que la loi n'ait fait une exception au cas actuel.
C'est pr6cis6ment ce que pretend l'Intim6 en all6guant que la litispendence sur la p6tition demandant la destitution des commissaires a en 1'effet d'interrompre la prescription. Dans ses notes sur cette'cause, 1'honorable juge Caron pose ainsi la question:
et je
Car ce jugement rendu le 17 septembre 1870, a r6ellement constat6 d'une manidre irr~futable que les accusations contenues dans la la requ~te des Intim6s 6taient calomnieuses puisque les requ6rants oF n'avaient pas rbussi & les prouver.
Le droit des demandeurs d'obtenir des dommages a done etk en r~alit6 suspendu, jusqu'd ce jugement qui a 6tabli d'une manidre d6- . finitive que M. Springle n'avait pas forfait (forfeited) A ses obliga. Fournier J. tions comme conunissaire 6valuateur et qu'il avait Wt un employ6 fiddle des Intim6s.
La prescription annale de Part. 2262 de notre Code Civil ne pouvait done courir que de ce jour-1A contre Springle.
Cette proposition de 1'honorable juge que le droit d'action en dommage, pour r6paration d'un d6lit, comme dans le cas actuel, est suspendu jusqu'au jugement d6finitif et sur la poursuite malicieuse qui donne lieu A 1'action en dommage est-elle conforme au droit de la province de Qu6bec ? Je ne le pense pas. Les autorit~s que l'honorable juge a cit6es A 1'appui de cette proposition sont tir6es d'auteurs qui traitent de cette action telle qu'elle est r6gl6e par le code d'instruction criminelle frangais qui n'a ici aucune application. En France l'action civile en reparation du dommage caus6 par un d6lit est unie A 1'action publique et se poursuit devant le tribunal lui-m~me saisi de l'action publique. On ne trouve dans le code Napol6on aucune disposition concernant la prescription de cette action. Cette matibre est r6gl6e par le code d'instruction criminelle qui tablit la prescription contre les crimes et d6lits et les actions civiles qui en r6sultent.
Les autorit6s cit6es par 1'honorable juge Caron sont fond~es sur les articles suivants du Code Criminel, art 637:
L'action publique et Paction civile, r~sultant d'un crime de nature & entrainer la peine de mort, ou des peines afflictives perp6tuelles on de tout autre crime emportant une peine afflictive on infAmante, se prescriront apr~s dix ann6es r~volues, & compter du jour oi le crime aura 6tk commis, si, dans cet intervalle, it n'a t fait aucun acte d'instruction ni de poursuite. S'il a t6 fait dans cet intervalle des aetes d'instruction on de poursuite non suivis du jugement, Paction publique et, Paction civile ne se prescriront qu'aprs dix anri6es r~volues, A compter du dernier acte, A 1'6gard m~me des personnes qui ne seraient pas impliqu6es dans cet acte d'instruction on de poursuite.
Art. 638:
Dans les deux cas exprim6s en Particle pr6c6 lent et suivant los distinctions d'6poque qui y sont 6tablies, la durbe de la prescription sera r6duite A trois ann~es x6volues, sil s'agit d'un d6lit de nature A Fournier J 8tre puni correctionnellement.
L'article 640 reduit A un an ces prescription en matibre de contravention
Ainsi, d'aprbs le code d'instruction criminelle, le d61ai de la prescription est fix6 par les articles 637, 638 et 640, A dix ans, trois ans ou un an, suivant la nature du fait incrimin6.
Mais lorsqu'il sagit d'un d6lit civil on d'un quasi d6lit, (dit Lau. rent) (1) Ia prescription est de trente ans, d'aprs le droit commun, auquel il n'est pas d6rog6 pour les faits dommageables (2). Si le fait constitue un dblit criminel, on suit les rbgles sp6ciales qui r6gissent 'action civile.
Sourdat dit la m6me chose (3):
Or nous avons vu que Faction civile, qui nait des d6lits incrimins par la loi p6nale, est soumise quant L la prescription, A des rAgles sp6ciales.
Mais quand Faction nait d'un ddlit purement civil, elle n'est r6gie par aucune loi particulibre, elle tombe sons Papplication de Particle 2262-et ne se prescrit, par cons~quent, que par trente ans, A. dater du jour oi le fait dommageable West accompli. Taut que le dorumage caus6 peut Stre constat, et quil n'a pas t mis A couvert de Paction en r6paration par ce laps de temps, celui qui l'a souffert peut en poursuivre 1indemnit6, quelque long qu'ait 6t son silence. Toutefois je dois dire que cette doctrine est contest6e et qu'il y a des decisions qui la r~pudie.
Mais, pour les fins de cette cause, il n'est pas n6cessaire de faire plus que de mentionner la contrari6t6 d'opinions, et la diff6rence entre le droit frangais et le n6tre sur cette question. Cette question de prescription en matibre de dM1its et quasi d6lits se trouve ainsi regl6e en France, bien diff6remment de notre code.
Lorsqu'il s'agit d'un fait incrimin6, c'est aux articles 637, 633 et 640 du (1) Vol. 20, 544.
(3) Au 636, ler vol. (2) Cour de Cassation de Belgique, 12 juin 1845, (Pasicrlsie,
1845, 1).
VOL. Xll.]
SUPRETE COURT OF CANADA.
code d'instruction criminelle qu'il faut avoir recours, si au contraire c'est un fait dommageable mais non incrimiu6, c'est alors le cas d'appliquer 1'art. 2262.
Pent-on sous le Code ivil de la province de Quebec faire application au cas actuel do l'une on de l'autre de ces prescriptions du code frangais ? est clair que non. Fournier J. Aucune disposition du code d'instruction criminelle de France ne peut avoir force de loi chez nous
Quant
A la prescription de 30 ans on ne peut l'invoquer non plus parce que notre code a, sur ce sujet, une disposition formelle, qui n'existe pas en France.
y a a ce sujet dans le Code Napol6on une lacune qui n'existe pas dans le n6tre. Elle a 6t6 comblke par l'art. 2261 d6crktant quo " 1'action se prescrit par deux ans dans les cas sui- " vants : parag. 2. Pour dommages r6sultant de dW1its et
"quasi d6lits, A d6faut d'autres dispositions applicables."
11n'y a pas dans le Code Napol6on d'article correspondaut
A celui-ci qui a introduit un droit nouveau. Cet article no faisant aucune distinction entre les d61its incrimin~s et ceux qui no le sont pas doit recevoir son application dans tous les cas o-t il s'agit de dommages resultant do d6lits on quasi d61its quelle que soit leur nature.
L'action en dommage naissant du fait de poursuite malicieuse dont se plaint l'Intim6 est 6videmment comprise dans cot article et soumise A la prescription qu'il introduit, parce que les termes en sont g6n6raux et absolus et qu'il n'existe aucune prescription contre cette action.
Mais on a pr6tenda en cour inf6rieure que la prescription dans le cas actuel 6tait suspendue pour deux raisons, la premibre, parce que la poursuite qualifie de malicieuse n'6tant pas termine, ]a prescription so trouvait suspendue; la deuxibme, parce que le fait dommageable constituait un dlit successif.
Quant an premier de ces motifs, il est 6videmment contraire au principe que la prescription commence A
!)1 courir du moment que 1'action est n6e. Laurent dit A ce sujet
V.L 6teinte; oue
A justice; et 2 FRAubry et Rau, Troplong, Marcad6 et tons les autres auteurs cit6s par I'appelante dans la liste suppl6mentaire d'autorit6s qu'elle a fournie soutiennent la m6me doctrine, sur laquelle on peut dire qu'il n'y a pas de diff6rence d'opinion.
De droit commun le point de d6part de la prescription 6tant la naissance du droit d'action, il faut, pour en adopter un autre s'appuyer sur un texte de loi. C'est la disposition de Part. 2232 C. C., qui d6crbte comme droit nouveau
L'Appelante n'a ni all6gu6 ni d6montr6 qu'elle 6tait dans le cas d'une exception.
L'Intim6 pr6tend que pour prouver la malice qui animait 1'Appelante dans ses proc6ds, il 6tait n~cessaire d'attendre le r6sultat du prochs engag6 sur la requte en destitution. Cet argument peut-il cr6er une exception au principe g6n6ral, et est-il vrai que ]a malice ne pouvait 6tre prouv6e qu'aprbs ce jugement?
S'il y a en malice, elle a exist6 an moment de l'adoption de la r6solution du 27 juillet 1868 et de la prbsentation de la p6tition, et n6cessairement avant le jugement du 7 septembre 1870 par lequel Springle, quoique exon6r6 des imputations calomnieuses, 6tait cependant destitu6 de ses fonctions comme commissaire.
Ce jugement ne retranchait ni n'ajoutait A la nature des faits imput6s; il ne faisait que les constater. Cette constatation pouvait 6tre tout aussi bien faite dans l'action en dommage si elle avait 6t6 prise aussit6t aprbs la signification de &C., la requ6te qui constituait le d6lit de poursuite malicieuse.
Aucune circonstance ne pouvait modifier ces deux faits, et ce sont les deux seuls qui forment la base de sa demande
I n'y avait done aucune impossibilit6 Fournier J. d'agir, ni en fait, ni en droit
La preuve eut 6t6 aussi facile A faire dans un cas que dans l'autre.
En cons6quence, la n~cessit6 d'attendre le r6sultat du premier procks me parait, avec raison, insuffisante pour faire admettre une exception que la loi n'a pas 6tablie.
Springle devait done prendre son action en dommage du moment que le d61it dont il se plaignait avait 6t commis, car la prescription courait A dater de ce moment.
Avant le Code Civil, dans la province de Quebec, il a tonjours 6t6 consid6r6 que cette espace d'action n'6tait pas suspendue par la litispendence de celle qui y avait donn6 origine, m~me en matibre criminelle. Il en 6tait de meme aussi des poursuites en dommage pour arrestation et saisie-arr~ts malicieuses.
Les deux poursuites
6taient et sont encore ind6pendantes l'une de 1'autre;
elles peuvent se faire en mime temps, on l'une aprbs
1'autre, indiff~remment.
Cette doctrine de la suspension du droit d'action en pareil cas, me parait toute nouvelle et n'a pas, que je sache, t sanctionn6e par aucune d~ision-tandis qu'au contraire, depuis un temps consid~rable, la jurisprudence des tribunaux a reconnu A une partie 16see soit par une arrestation, soit par une saisie malicieuse ou mime par les cons6quences d'un dW1it ou quasi d61it, le droit de porter son action en r6paration civile, sans attendre le r6sultat des proc6d6s qui ont occasionn l'action en dommage
Cette question a 6t0 d6cid6e dans la cause de Lamothe et Chevalier et al., en appel, le 17 janvier
1854, par les honorables juges Rolland, Panet et Aylwin, qui ont maintenu: " 1
Que dans 1'espbce, les termes 6nonciatifs d'un assaut grave sur le Demandeur ne comportait pas une accusation de fblonie.
20 Que dans le cas m~me oi- cet assaut aurait le caractbre de 'ILi f6lonie, le Demandeur peut r6clamer des dommages sans Fournier J.avoir pr~alablement poursuivi au criminel, pour l'assaut dont il se plaint."
En cour d'Appel l'honorable juge Rollanl motiva son jugement dans les termes suivants:
dns Dans ses observations sur cette cause, I'honorablejuge Aylwin fait au sujet de la suspension de la poursuite civile, la remarque suivante:
A 1' poque de cette d6cision comme aujourd'hui, la rbgle 6tait diff6rente en Angleterre; la poursuite criminelle doit pric6der le recours civil.
De mime dans les actions pour poursuite, saisies ou arrestations malicieuses, il est n6cessaire dans l'action en r6paration ci. vile d'all6guer le resultat final de la proc6dure dont on se plaint. Il n'en a jamais th de mime ici, que je sache. Je ne trouve point de d6cision qui ait fait de cette all&gation une condition n~cessaire pour porter l'action en dommage. Je trouve des decisions remontant A une 6poque 6loignhe qui ont maintenu le contraire. Dans les Stuarts Reports, (1) on voit que la question a d6cid6e dans le cas de saisie-arr6t simple maliciouse, comme suit: SUPRLBfE COURT OF CANADA.
the that Dans le Robertson's Digest on trouve qu'il a t6 d6cid6 dans la cause de Dagenay vs Hunter
Dans le mime, aux mots malicious arrest, dans la cause de Boyle vs Arnold, (2) il a 6t6 dcid6 :
that the it that the La cause de Pacaud vs Price, d6cid6e le 18 juin 1870, en appel est parfaitement analogue A la pr6sente. Le Demandeur Pacaud r6clamait d-s dommages r6sultant des 6critures calomuieuses et diffamatoires que l'Intim6 Price et son frbre avaient faites sur le caractbre, la r6putation et 'honneur de l'Appelant, dans une cause devant la cour Sup6rieure, pour le district d'Arthabaska, dans laquelle is 6taient Demandeurs contre Theophile Cot6, secr6taire tr6sorier de la municipalit6 du comt6 d'Arthabaska, la corporation du township de Chester-Onest et l'Appelant,-D6fendeurs.
Par cette action, les Price demandaient la nullit6 de 1'acte de vente que le dit Th'ophile Ct avait consenti A I'Appelant, le 3 avril 1860, du lot de terre no 12, rang Craig-Sud, dans le township de Chester-Onest.
Pacaud, 1'Appelant, intente de suite contre 'Intim6 Price une action on dommage dans laquelle il d6clarait que toutes les accusations de fraude proffrtes contre lui 6taient mensongres et obtint, le 26 novembre 1867, devant la cour Sup6rieure une condamnation de $800 de dommages contre Price
Le jugement fut renvers6 en cour de Revision, rnaii r6int6gr6 par la cour d'Appel a l'unanimit6.
Dans cette cause l'Intim6 Price avait soulev6 par exception temporaire la question de la suspension de cette action pour attendre le r6sultat de l'ac- . tion dans laquelle il s'6tait rendu coupable des calomnies reproches.
La cour Sup6rieure avait rejet6 cette pr&tention par le consid6rant suivant:
t et dit et factum-le d'attendre eut et dit dit et et Ce motif fut adopt6 par la cour du Bano de la Reine. L'analogie entre les deux causes est parfaite Les faits reproch6s et servant de bAse A ces actions ont t6 dans les deux cas, commis dans des proc6d6s judiciaires, et sont absolument de meme nature.
La seule diff6rence qu'il y a et elle n'est gubre enfaveur de l'Intim6e, c'est que dans cette cause, an lieu de prendre une action pour diffamation conforme A la nature des accusations dont on se plaint, on a sans doute, pour. 6viter la difficult6 de la prescription annale, qualifi6 l'action en cette cause d'action en dommage r6sultant de poursuite malicieuse.
La qualification donn6e n'y fait rien, c'est par la nature des faits all6gu6s que l'on doit juger du caractbre de 1'action.
Au fond ce n'est qu'une action pour libelle, et Springle n'avait pas d'autre sujet de reproche contre l'Appelante. On ne pouvait lui contester son droit de demander la destitution pour cause d'incomp6tence, par exemple, si la requte n'eat contenue que ce motif, est-ce que Springle aurait eu droit de se plaindre? Il est 6vident que non; le seul grief qu'il ait, ce sont les imputations faites contre son caractbre.
Elles constituent un libelle pour lequel il aurait di poursuivre. Mais ayant laiss6 passer les d6lais de la prescription, il espbre en 6viter la cous6quence en pr6sentant son action sous un autre aspect. Si on la consid6re comme une action pour libelle, &C., elle est prescrite par un an en vertu de l'art. 2262; si, au contraire, on la consid~re comme demandant la r6paration du dommage caus6 par une poursuite malicieuse, elle est alors prescrite par 'art 2261 Cette prescription, Fournier J. quoique n'ayant pas 6t6 plaid6e, est une de celle que le juge doit suppl6er en vertu de l'art. 2267.
O'est ce qui a t6 fait par le jugement de la Cour Sup6rieure qui a renvoy6 cette action.
I reste maintenant A consid6rer le deuxibme moyen invoqu6 pour empicher la prescription de courir, savoir, que les faits reproch6s constituent un d61it successif. Il est reconnu qu'en cas de d~lit de cette nature, la prescription ne commence A courir que du moment que le d6lit a cess6.
Mais qu'est, ce qu'un d6lit successif ? Masson (1) le d6finit ainsi :
et tuent d'instants.
et un
II ajoute qu'il n'est pas tonjours facile dans la pratique de savoir ce qu'il faut consid6rer comme d6lit successif. Il en donne pour exemple le fait de ne pas faire la d6claration exig6e par la loi pour la publication d'un journal.
On a jug6 que l'infraction A cette obligation constitue un d6lit successif, parce que l'infraction existe et se r6p6te tant que la d6claration exig6e n'a pas t6 produite.
Sourdat (2) en donne comme exemple la d6tention arbitraire, le d6lit dure aussi longtemps quo subsiste la d6tention
La Cour du Bane de la Reine a d~clar6, dans la cause de Grenier vs. La citM de .Montrial
(3), que des travaux qui font affluer l'eau sur le terrain d'un voisin constitue un d6lit successif.
II est 6vident qu'il n'y a aucune analogie entre ces ler,
(3) 0. Jur.
'I faits reconnus comme constituant des d6lits successifs et celui de prendre une action qui s'accomplit A l'instant de V'nanation de l'action. S'il y a d6lit, il est alors complet et aucune proc6dure ni aucun fait post6rieur n'ajoute A sa gravit6 ou ne la diminue. On ne pent pas dire que 1'Appelante prenait une nouvelle action, on commettait un nouveau dblit chaque fois qu'il 6tait fait un proc6d6 dans son action.
Si cet argument avait quelque force, la cour du Banc de la Reine l'aurait admis dans la cause de Pacaud vs Price en d6clarant que le d6lit dont se plaignait 1'Appelant ne pouvait 6tre consisid6r6 comme accompli qu'A la fin du prochs, et que le Demandeur n'avait aucun droit d'action lorsqu'il a intent6 la demande,-mais elle a au contraire d6clar6 que le dlit 6tait complet et que l'exercice du droit d'action ne pouvait 6tre suspendu.
La cons6quence de cette doctrine est que la prescription avait commenc6 A courir du moment de la production du document incrimin6. Il est assez extraordinaire que l'on ne trouve pas une seule decision dans nos rapports qui soutienne la doctrine de la suspension du droit d'action.
Mais on en trouve au contraire un nombre assez consid6rable, celles entre autres cit6es plus haut, qui la r6pudie.
Ces d6cisions admettant que le droit d'action pent tre exerc6 ind6pendamment du sort de la premibre action, reconnaissent par la mime que le droit d'action est complet, et que partant il est sujet A la prescription.
Pour ces raisons je suis d'opinion que l'appel devrait tre accord6- et le jugement de la cour Sup6rieur r6int6gr6. HtNaY J.-This suit was commenced in May, 1871, by James Key Springle, the original plaintiff herein, who died in January, 1877, and the suit has been continued by the present respondents, Mary E. Hall, his widow, and Anna Augusta Springle, one of his daughters.
It is substantially an action for a false and malicious complaint made by the appellants through which the original plaintiff alleged he had suffered and sustained serious and heavy damages and losses as complained of in his declaration. It was contended on the part of the appellants that it was but an action for libel and that Henry J. the time limited by the Civil Code for bringing such an action had expired before the commencement of the action. The declaration, no doubt, charges the appellants with having published a libel against the plaintiff, but it also charges them for a malicious prosecution in the shape of a petition addressed to one of the judges of the Superior Court in the Province of Quebec, in 1868, alleging, amongst other things, dereliction of duty and dishonest and improper conduct on the part of the said plaintiff and one Thomas S. Brown, whilst acting as two out of three of a permanent board of commissioners, duly appointed for the appraisement of damages to parties whose lands and premises might be from time to time appropriated for city purposes, and for which services the said commissioners were provided to be paid; and praying that certain proceedings referred to in the petition might be stayed and the said commissioners removed from office and replaced.
After a general and specific denial of the charges contained in the petition, the plaintiff, in his declaration, alleges:
I think the foregoing charges the defendants as for a malicious prosecution, and alleges the want of reasonable or probable cause. The matter of the petition came to a hearing before Mr. Justice Berthelot, and in
Ti
September, 1870, he gave his judgment thereon, acquitting the two commissioners complained against of all MOFA the charges contained in the petition, but removed them from office for, as he says, error of judgment only resulting from an erroneous impression of the law as J* to expropriation.
From that decision the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench, and the latter court by its judgment in September, 1873, reversed the judgment of the Superior Court given by Mr. Justice Berthelot as before mentioned.
From the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench the appellants took the case by appeal to the Privy Council, and by a judgment of the latter in November, 1876, the appeal was dismissed and the judgment appealed from affirmed.
There is abundant evidence, therefore, to establish the allegations in the declaration, and to show that the original plaintiff sustained serious damage by the false charges made against him, which the respondents were unable and did not attempt in the slightest degree to prove.
The suit was brought within the prescribed time after the proceedings under the petition were terminated, and I have no doubt that the plaintiff had a good and available cause of action.
Having considered the amount of damages awarded, I am of opinion that the award of them is not only not excessive, but much less than, under the circumstances, I should have awarded.
I am of opinion the appeal should be dismissed and the judgment of the court below affirmed with costs. GWYNNE J.-Two points were urged by the learned counsel for the appellants in support of this appeal. 1. That, assuming the action to lie, it was absolutely barred under the provisions of articles 2262 and 2267 of the civil code of the Province of Quebec, the former &o., of which enacts that actions for slander and libel are prescribed by one year from the day that it came to the knowledge of the party aggrieved, and the latter, that no action can be maintained after the delay for prescrip- J. tion has expired; and
2. That no action at all lies against the defendants, the now appellants, under the circumstances appearing in the case.
If the present action was one for libel merely, and was founded solely upon the matter which is contained in the resolution of the council of the corporation of the 27th July, 1868, assuming an action founded upon that resolution alone to have lain, it must be admitted that it would have been barred by the above articles of the civil code; but this action is not one for libel merely, nor is the resolution of the
27th July the sole foundation upon which it is framed.
The action is for following up that resolution by a proceeding instituted in the courts, maliciously, as is alleged, and without any probable cause, wherein the defendants, by certain false and scandalous charges of venality and corruption made by them against the original plaintiff, maliciously and without any probable cause, endeavored to have the said plaintiff removed from a certain office of profit, and employment of a quasi judicial nature in the pursuit of his profession, the effect of so falsely and maliciously prosecuting which proceeding, naturally and in fact, was, to deprive the said original plaintiff almost wholly of the benefit of his profession, by branding him as venal and corrupt and unworthy of all trust and confidence, and of being employed in the business of a valuator of real estate which he followed as a profession.
The declaration alleges the appointment, under the provisions of the statute 27 and 28 Vic. ch. 60, of the original plaintiff and one Thomas Storrow Brown and one Damase Masson, as commissioners to determine under the statute the price or compensation to be allowed to one Wilson for expropriation of certain property J.situate in the city of Montreal and required by the corporation for the widening of St. Joseph street, and that after having been duly sworn they proceeded to take the proceedings indicated by the statute for the purpose of valuing the piece of land in question; that the corporation, although applied to by the commissioners, declined to produce any witnesses or evidence to contradict that adduced by Mr. Wilson, until at length, after an adjournment for the express purpose of enabling the corporation to produce evidence, they produced two witnesses who, in so far as they gave any relevant evidence, corroborated the evidence adduced on behalf of Mr. Wilson. The declaration then states the whole of the proceedings of the commissioners, and that the original plaintiff and Mr. Brown arrived at a preliminary appraisement, in which, however, the other commissioner did not concur, and a meeting was called, conformably with the provisions of the statute, of the parties interested, and, a notification given to such parties, that the commissioners would hear them, to the end that, after the said parties should be heard, the commissioners should decide whether they should maintain or modify such preliminary appraisement. It then alleges the reception of such evidence as was offered by the parties interested, and the modification of the preliminary appraisement, and a final report of the valuation of the piece of land to be expropriated at the sum of $13,666. It then alleges that, notwithstanding what is before stated, the council of the city passed the resolution of the 27th July, 1868, authorizing and directing proceedings to be instituted for the purpose of staying all proceedings of the said commissioners, and of having the said original plaintiff and Mr. Brown removed from being commissioners for valuation of the said piece of land as persons who had forfeited their obligations as such commissioners.
It then sets out a petition presented to one of the judges of the Superior J. Court of the Province of Quebec by the corporation of the city of Montreal, wherein after divers charges of venality and corruption culminating in their having, in violation of their duty as commissioners, made what was charged to be an unjust, excessive and exorbitant valuation in favor of Mr. Wilson under the influence of bribery and corruption, the defendants prayed for an order of the said judge adjudging that the proceedings of the said commissioners should be stayed, and that the said original plaintiff in this action and
Thomas S. Brown should be removed from the office of commissioners as having violated and forfeited their obligations.
The declaration then proceeds to allege that the said petition and the allegations therein contained are false, malicious and libellous, and were made solely with the view to injure the character and good name of the original plaintiff; and the declaration charges that the several allegations in the petition, charging the said original plaintiff and Thomas S.
Brown with partiality, venality and corruption, are false, repeating such charges seriatim, and alleges that the defendants never had any reasonable or probable cause for adopting the said resolution or for filing the said calumnious, wicked and malicious petition against the plaintiff in this cause, and that they never had any trustworthy or positive information of any kind to jus.
tify them in so doing; that the said defendants did not prove any of the accusations in the said petition or resolution contained, and that they did not even bring a single witness to substantiate the same, and did not and could not make them good, such accusations being utterly false and calumnious as aforesaid. That by a judgment rendered on the said petition by the honorable Judge Berthelot, on the 17th day of September, HL
1870, the said accusations and charges so brought by J. the defendants against the plaintiffs were in fact declared false, without foundation or probable cause, and were rejected in fact as such by the said judge. That the said filse and calumnious accusations and charges were of a nature to injure, and did in fact gravely injure, the high character, good fame and reputation of the plaintiff, and put in danger the confidence hitherto reposed in the plaintiff by the public and his friends, and have also greatly hurt the feelings of the plaintiff and during more than two years kept him in suspense and anguish under the said accusations and charges pending the said petition; that, moreover, the said plaintiff has lost a great deal of time and expended large sums of money in defending himself against the said accusations and charges, and has suffered damage to the amount of twenty thousand dollars for all the causes and reasons aforesaid.
It is apparent that this declaration discloses what in English jurisprudence is known as an action for malicious prosecution, which consists in the prosecution by the defendant of legal proceedings of a civil or criminal nature against the plaintiff, maliciously and without probable cause, the essential ground of the action being that a prosecution authorized by law, if the grounds which justify its being instituted exist, was carried on without any probable cause, from the absence of which malice may be, and, as said in Johnstone v. Sutton in error (1), most commonly is, implied. The meaning of a malicious prosecution is that a party, from a malicious motive, and without reasonable or probable cause, sets the law in motion against another; and as the want of probable cause for instituting the legal proceeding com- &o., plained of is the essential foundation for the action, the termination of such proceeding in favor of the plaintiff must be alleged in the declaration.
Barber v. Lesiter (1) ; Stewart v. Gromett (2); Basib6 J. v. Matthews (3).
It is obvious, therefore, that the period when prescription of such an action will begin to run cannot be until such termination. In this case that period did not certainly arrive before, and it is alleged in the declaration to have arrived, upon the delivery of the judgment of Judge Berthelot in the Superior Court upon the 17th September, 1870, whereby the original plaintiff and Thomas S. Brown were acquitted of the calumnious charges which were made the foundation of the petition, and which in effect were pronounced to be false and without foundation or probable cause; and these gentlemen were adjudged by the court to have acted in the discharge of their duty as commissioners with diligence, integrity and impartiality, although they were removed from their office of commissioners for another cause which, upon appeal, was pronounced by the Court of Appeal to have been unfounded and insufficient and illegal, and this judgment of the Court of Appeal, upon an appeal therefrom by the present defendants to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, has been maintained.
As the objection here urged to the maintenance of the present action is that it has been commenced too late, after being, as is contended, prescribed, not that it has been commenced prematurely, it is unnecessary to enquire whether the cause of action as stated in the declaration, was or not made complete by the judgment of the Superior Court, which, while acquitting the parties accused of the accusations preferred against them as unjust and unfounded, nevertheless removed them from their office of commissioners to e.
adjudicate upon the special matter submitted to them, but for a different cause which was, upon appeal, finally J. pronounced to have been insufficient, illegal and equally unfounded.
It is not pretended that an action will not lie under the French law, which prevails in the Province of Quebec, under the like circumstances as an action for malicious prosecution will lie by the law of England; indeed it is contended that the French law is more liberal that the English in giving redress to a party injured by calumnious accusations, inasmuch as it is contended that in virtue of an ordinance of Francis the First, made in 1539, for either a plaintiff or defendant to allege anything in any pleading, false and calumnious of the opposite party, is actionable as a libel, and this wholly irrespective of the termination of the action or proceeding in which such calumnious matter is alleged, and even though it be alleged in assertion of a legal right which the party alleging it succeeds in establishing; the sole test of the calumnious matter being or not being actionable, consisting in its being, or not being, proved to be true; and in support of this contention divers passages from the works of Domat, Dumazeau, Dareau, Merlin and others, and a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Province of Quebec in Pacaud v. Price (1) are cited.
The authority of this latter case is disputed by the learned counsel for the appellants, who contended that it was not well decided and that it should not be followed, but I do not think we are called upon in this case to determine whether it was well or ill decided, for even if the judgment of the Court of Revision in that case had prevailed, which held that the action in that case did not lie because, in the opinion of that court, although the defendant therein did not, in the action which had been brought by him, prove the calumnious matter alleged by him, he had probable cause for making the allegations complained of, still the pre-r J. sent action would be maintainable, as it cannot be, and indeed, in this action, has not been, contended that the defendants had any probable cause for making the calumnious accusations, which they did make, for the purpose of having the original plaintiff and Mr. Brown removed from their office. Although they repeat in their plea to the present action the substance of the charges, they appear to have offered no evidence in support of them. Despairing it may be of being able to establish the truth of the charges in the face of the judgments of the Superior Court and of the Court of Appeals for the
Province and of the Privy Council upon the matter of their petition, they rather rest their defence to the present action upon an allegation that they filed the petition, which contained the charges, in the exercise of what they call their legislative and judicial functions, and in the interest of public justice, having no interest whatever in the matter themselves, and upon the advice of their counsel, and without malice, and the evidence which they have adduced seems to have been confined wholly to the question of damages.
What is meant by the contention that a legal prosecution founded upon calumnious charges made without any probable cause for making them, is a thing done in the exercise of legislative and judicial functions, I find it difficult to understand
Neither can I appreciate the force of the contention that parties having no interest whatever in a matter brought by them before the courts for adjudication, but who intervene as prosecutors in the interest, as they say, of public justice, can have, a right to demand that the courts wherein justice, whether AtR, &,., public or private, should be dispensed with an equal MOAL measure, should, in the interest of public justice, pronounce to be justifiable a prosecution against individuals based upon scandalous, false and calumnious charges Gwynne J. made without any foundation in fact or any probable cause for believing them to be true. The defendants, if they could shelter themselves under the plea that what they did was done by them under the advice of their counsel, have failed to offer any evidence of such advice. It may be assumed that counsel may have advised, and very probably did advise them, that the charges stated in the petition, if proved, would require the court to grant the prayer of the petition for the stay of all proceedings and the removal of tie commissioners who were accused of partiality and corruption, but further than this we cannot go; nor can we read the plea of the defendants as alleging that counsel advised them that they would be justified in making the charges if they knew them to be false or had no reasonable or probable cause for believing them to be true. For the truth or falsity of such very grave accusations, and for their probable and reasonable cause for making them, the defendants must have known, or, at least, must be regarded as having known, that they themselves must be alone responsible.
There remains only to be considered the question of malice, and upon this point it is unnecessary to enquire whether the falsity of the charges in itself alone, or coupled with the absence of probable cause, is sufficient conclusively to establish malice. Malice may be, and frequently is, implied from the absence of probable cause, but there is not wanting in this case, I think, other evidence from which it may be inferred.
A plea of justification of the imputation of calumnious matter upon the ground of the truth of the calumnious matter, may be taken into consideration on the question of malice. Wilson v. Robinson (1.)
Now, &o., the defendants in their plea allege:
MOFAL That the said plaintiff and the said Thomas Storrow Brown refused to concur in the opinion of the said Damase Masson, or in his valuation, and that in consequence thereof the defendants, well know- Gwynne J. ing that the proposed award of the said plaintiffs and the said Thomas S. Brown was excessive, exorbitant and unjust, and would entail grievous loss upon the property owners to be assessed for its payment in the event of the said proposed award being homologated, protested against the said proposed award of nineteen thousand five hundred dollars; and although no part of said amount, if made payable, could be exacted from the said defendants (the whole being assessable upon the properties of the persons interested in the said improvements), nevertheless the defendants being by law constituted the civic guardians of the rights of the citizens of Montreal in all such matters, felt constrained to, and did, institute and cause to be instituted, legal proceedings as by their attorney and counsel they were advised would be necessary and proper to prevent the said proposed award from taking effect and from being ratified or homoL ogated by any legal tribunal.
Now, here it is to be observed that the defendants profess to justify their filing the petition for the removal of the commissioners upon the ground of charges of partiality and venality preferred against them as their motive for awarding to Mr. Wilson an amount which the defendants pronounce upon their own knowledge to be unjust, excessive and exorbitant. Yet, despairing, as it would seem, of establishing the truth of the allegation, they offer no evidence in support of it; moreover, it is not unworthy of observation, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, that the defendants here persist in stating the proposed award to be nineteen thousand five hundred dollars, although it appears that this sum was a preliminary appraisement subject to review upon evidence being adduced by the parties interested, and which was in fact reduced to thirteen thousand six hundred and sixty-six dollars before ever (1) 7 Q.
the petition was served and presented to the court, and notwithstanding the finding of the court to which the petition was presented, that the accused commissioners were not guilty of the accusations upon which the peti= tion was founded; nor upon the question of malice, do J. I think that we can overlook the fact that after the Superior Court had acquitted the accused commissioners of the charges of partiality and venality made against them, but had pronounced a judgment removing them from their office for another cause; and after the Court of Appeal had reversed that judgment of removal and had reinstated the commissioners, the defendants persisted in their prosecution by appealing from that judgment to the Privy Council for the express purpose endeavoring to have the judgment of removal reinstated, although the sole grounds upon which the statute authorized them to interfere had been adjudged against them, from which adjudication no appeal was ever taken.
Under all these circumstances, I think that the Court of Appeal of the Province of Quebec, which is the only court that has adjudicated upon the merits of the case, was justified in concluding that the proceeding against the accused commissioners was instituted maliciously. Upon the question of damages I do not think that a court of appeal should interfere with damages as awarded by a judgment under consideration in appeal, unless they appear to have been calculated upon a wrong principle or arrived at without regard to the considerations which ought to govern a tribunal in awarding damages-neither of which imputations have been or can be suggested here. It is not sufficient that we, if sitting as judges of first instance, might have given, as some of the judges of the court below were disposed to give, much larger damages.
Our judgment, in my opinion, should be to dismiss