Corporation of the County of Ottawa v. Montreal, Ottawa & Western Ry, Co.

Sir W. J. C.J.-I have been unable to bring my mind to the conclusion at which my brothers have arrived. I think it right to express, but with great hesitancy, the doubts I entertain. If this case had been brought for the delivery of the debentures, the correct measure of damages in the case, it appears to me, would be to recover the debentures, or the amount of the debentures and interest.

But, as I understand the judgment, this is not the nature of the action, no such claim being put forward.

On the contrary, the claim is to recover damages, apart from the amount of the debentures and interest, for which, it is stated, an action has been brought and is pending.

I am unable to discover anything in this case other than simple delay in not paying in the manner agreed on, for which the only claim I can conceive the plaintiffs would have against the defendants would be for the delivery of the debentures, or their value in money, and interest.

This delay, the plaintiffs allege, caused the damage complained of, but such damages I think the article of the Civil Code of Lower Canada 1077 clearly declares shall consist only of interest. The agreement to take stock and pay for it by debentures, was no more than an agreement to take stock securing the payment of the money therefor by debentures, and therefore an obligation to pay money, which, in the words of the respondents factum, " the corporation putely and simply refuse to pay," and to which, it seems to me, article 1077 applies. That article reads thus:- There does not appear to have been any interest due on the subscription of appellants, or on the debentures had they been issued at the time the action was instituted, in which, however, neither debentures nor interest were claimed.

My mind inclines strongly with that of the learned Chief Justice of the court below, that the plaintiffs' action should be dismissed on the twofold ground, that the declaration discloses no right action, and that the respondents have not proved that they had suffered any loss or damage for which the appellants could be held liable. Therefore I am inclined to think this appeal should be allowed, and the judgments of the courts below should be reversed.

J.-L'action de l'Intimee r6clame de l'Appelante des dommages r6sultant de l'inex~cution d'un contrat par lequel cette derniere, dfinent autoris6e . cet effet par un r6glement special, cofifirm6 par les 6lecteurs du comt6 d'Ottawa, avait souscrit 20000, parts dans le capital de la compagnie de l'Intimbe. La souscription contenait les reserves suivantes, entre autres :

Cette souscription fut ensuite r~gulibrement accept6e par le bureau. des directeurs de la compagnie avec les conditions et stipulations contenues dans le r~glement qui 1'autorisait.

D'aprbs ce r6glement 1'Appelante devait remettre en acquit des 20,000 actions souscrites des bons ou d6bentures du comt6 an montant de $200,000 remboursables dans 25 ans. Cent cinquante mille piastres devaient tre 6mis & mesure que 1'ouvrage avancerait, mais sans d6passer cependant la moiti6 du co-ht des ouvrages faits dans le comt6 d'Ottawa, et la balance de ces d6bentures devait 6tre livr6e lorsque les travaux seraient termin6s.

L'Intim6e pr6tendant avoir ex~cut6 les conditions de la souscription et du riglement, r6clama, le 19 janvier 1877, la somme de $112,096, de d6bentures pour moiti6 des ouvrages qu'elle avait faite dans le comt6 d'Ottawa. Le 19 juin suivant, 1'Intim6e apr~s avoir pr6alablement mis l'Appelante en demeure de lui livrer les d6bentures tel que convenu, porta sa pr6sente action pour dommages-int6rts, lui r6sultant du refus de 1'Appelante de livrer les dites d6bentures.

Ce refus, ainsi que I'allgue l'Intim6e, 1'aurait mis dans l'impossibilit6 [VOL. IIV. de compl6ter le chemin de fer, et expos6 par A la perte des $80,000 de debentures payables A la terminaison des ouvrages du chemin de fer, et lui aurait aussi fait perdre les subsides consid~rables qu'elle avait droit d'avoir de la cit6 de Montr6al et du gouvernement de la province de Qu6bec. Elle alligue aussi & qu'elle avait droit A l'int6r~t depuis le janvier 1875 sur le montant pour lequel les d6bentures auraient du J. 6tre 6mises. Mais la conclusion qui demande $500,000 de dommages-int&rts, caus6s par le refus en question, omet de demander l'intbr~t sur les d6bentures depuis le 19 janvier, bien que laction contienne une all~gation A cet effet.

Par sa d6fense en droit A pette action l'Appelante a plaid6 que l'Intimbe n'avait pas droit A des dommages pour la perte de son cr6dit et le tort caus6 par la nonlivraison des d6bentures; que le seul droit qu'il y avait

6tait de demander l'6mission des d6bentures ou leur valeur en argent,-que 1'obligation de 1'Appelante 6tant pour une somme d'argent, la r&clamation de l'Intimbe devait se borner aux int6r~ts sur cette somme, mais qu'ils n'6taient pas demand6s par l'action, enfin que si l'Intimbe avait droit A sa pr6sente action, 1'Appelante n'en demeurerait pas moins oblig6e au paiement des d6bentures et de 1'int6rt. Cette d6fense 6tait accompagn6e d'une exception au sujet de laquelle il ne s'616ve maintenant aucune question.

La d~fense en droit fut renvoy~e par la Cour Sup6rieure et l'Appelante condamn6e A $100, de dommages-int6rgts.

Ce jugement a t6 confirm6 en appel.

La question soulev6e sur cette contestation est de savoir si l'Intimbe ayant ex6cut6 les conditions auxquelles elle avait accept6 1'Appelinte comme actionnaire, cette dernibre n'est point passible des dommages et int6r6ts autres que l'int&r&t 16gal en cons6quence de son refus de livrer au temps convenu les d~bentures promises. L'obligation contract~e par 1'Appelante n'est pas 1'obligation ordinaire de l'actionnaire qui a souscrit des parts au statut organisant une compagnie do chemins de fer, et aux lois concernant les chemins de fer.

L'tendue et les cons6quences orTAwA d'une telle obligation sont rgl~es d'uno maniore sp6ciale par ces lois qui devraient tre appliqu6es Fournier l'Appelante, si ello n'6tait qu'un souscripteur ordinaire.

Dans cc cas, i n'est pas douteux que 1'obligation de 1'Appelante sorait limit6o au paicment d'une somme d'argent, par versements, tel qu'exig6 par la compagnie, et que le d~faut de paiement a l'6poque fix~e entraluerait 1'obligation de payer l'int6rt et emporterait mame la poino de confiscation, si le paiement n'6tait pas fait dans les deux mois apres que 1'actionnaire a te mis en d6faut-ces dispositions des lois de chemins de fer n'ont pas d'application cas actuel.

L'Appelante, par suite du contrat sp&ial qu'elle a fait n'aura'it pu 6tro poursuivie pour paiement de ses parts ; aucune confiscation n'aurait pu 6tre prononce contre elle-parce que, par leurs conventions les parties avaient d6rog6 h ces dispositions de la loi pour 6tablir un autre moyen d'acquitter les parts sonscrites. Le mode convenu consistait dans la livraison h l'Intim6e, par l'Appelante, l'6poque fix6e, des bons on d~bentures do cette dernidre pour la somme de $200,000, montant des parts souscrites. L'Appelante ne s'obligeait par qu'& livrer ses bons payables dans vingt-cinq ans et n6n pas h payer de 1'argent dans le pr6sent.

Son obligation no consistait qu'h remettre livrer ses d6bentures tel que convenn. C'est donc lPobligation de faire tne certaine chose-la livraison en question que la 'compagnie avait 1i, droit d'exiger de l'Appelante et non le paiement d'une soimme d'argent qui n'6tait exigible que dans vingt-cinq ans. L'intention 6vidente des deux parties en adoptant mode d'acquitter les parts, 6tait, sans doute, de mettre de suite la compagnie en 6tat, par la r~alisation des d6bentures, d'e'x&cuter ses travaux. Le refus de les livrer, ' privait la compagnie du moyen convenu pour se procurer des capitaux n6cessaires et compromettait in6vitablement le succhs de 1'entreprise commune. Dans ce cas, la compagnie avait une action pour contraindre l'Appelante A faire la livraison des debentures, mais elle J. n'en avait pas pour exiger le paiement d'une somme d'argent avant 1'expiration des 25 ans. Quelle doit tre la cons6quence de l'inex6cution d'une telle obligation?

La r6ponse d6pend du caractbre que 1'on attribue 4 cette obligation; si c'est simplement une obligation de payer une certaine somme d'argent, nul doute que 1'on doit alors faire application de Particle C. C., et que dans ce cas, les dommages ne peuvent pas d6passer 1'int6rt 16gal. Mais si 1'on considbre que le v6ritable caractbre de l'obligation contract~e consistait uniquement A faire, an temps convenu, la tradition des d6bentures promises, n'est-ce pas alors une de ces obligations dont 1'inex~cution soumet la partie qui l'a contract~e aux cons6quences des articles 1065 et 1073

. ? Il me semble qu'il est clair que ce sont li les articles du Code Civil qui devraient, plut6t que l'art.

1077, 6tre appliques au cas actuel.

Bien que les opinions aient 6t6 partag-es dans la cour du Bano de la Reine, que la majorit6 de la cour ait adopt6 le principe que l'art. 1071 ne s'appliquait qu'aux int6rsts moratoires et qu'il pouvait y avoir d'autres dommages pour le .d6faut de paiement d'une somme d'argent, tandis que cette doctrine a 6t6 combattue par la minorit6, tous les honorables juges out cependant 6t6 d'avis que o'est le Code civil, et non les lois de chemins de fer qui doivent. d6terminer les cons6quences de l'obligation en question. Sans entrer dans le m~rite des savantes dissertations qui out 6t& faites de

IR.

part et d'autres, je crois que du moment qu'il est admis que 1'on doit chercher la solution dans le Code civil, la question, cesse de faire difficult, car le Code contient des exceptions A Particle 1077 qui sont d'une 6vidente application A cette cause.

Quelle est en r6alit6 la position de l'Appelante vis-Avis de l'Intimbe,-n'est-ce pas celled'un associ6, plu- Fournier j. t6t que d'un actionnaire ordinaire ?-Au lieu de prendre cette dernibre position qui ne 1'aurait soumise qu'aux cons~quences d~terminues par les Statuts, elle a jug6 A propos de faire un contrat sp6cial qui n'est nullement affect6 par le Statut et qui doit n~cessairement tomber sous l'effet du Code civil. Par ce contrat elle s'est assur~e d'un mode plus avantageux pour elle que 6elui fix6 par le Statut, pour faire le paiement de sa mise dans le fonds social. Les v6ritables relations qui existent entre les parties 6tant celles d'associ6s,c'est alors dans les articles du Code civil, concernant les obligations des associ6s entre eux que l'on doit chercher la solution de la question qui nous occupe. Si, comme je le crois,-ils doivent s'appliquer Ala position particulibre que se sont faite les parties en cette cause, it n'est plus douteux que 1'Intim6e a droit en cons6quence du refus de livrer les d~bentures A des dommages en outre do l'intkrat, ainsi que le disent les articles 1840 et 1841.

L'associ6 qui manque de verser dans la socit6 une somme qu'il a promis d'y apporter devient d6biteur des int6rsts sur cette somme A compter du jour qu'elle devait Atre pay6e.

Il est 6galement d6biteur des int~rats sur toutes les sommes prises dans la caisse de la soci6t6 pour son profit particulier, A compter du jour il les en a tir6es. L'article 1846 du Code Napol6on correspondant aux articles 1840 et 1841 de notre Code contient les m6mes dispositions, et tons les commentateurs qui out 60rit sur cet article se sont accord6s sur son 6vidente signifi.

cation. Je me bornerai & n'en citer que quelques-uns : Laurent (1).

& L'article 1846, (0. C. P. Q, articles 1810, 1841)

contient une

Ry. Co. seconde derogation au droit commun.

D'apr~s Particle 1153, les dommages-int6rats r6sultant du retard dans l'ex~cution d'une obli- Fournier J. gation ayant pour objet une somme d'argent ne consistent jamais que dans la condamnationauxint~rits fix6s par la lo. L'a-ticle 1846, apr6s avair dit que 1'associ6 doit les int&rts de plein droit, ajoute :

" Le tout sans pr~judice a de plus amples dommages-int6rts, s'il y a lieu." Cette exception r~sulte aussi de la nature du contrat de soci6t6.

On ne s'associe point pour retirer Pint~rrt 16gal des mises sociales, on s'associe pour faire des b6n6fices qui exchdent le profit que l'on retire d'ordinaire de ses capitaux ; le dommage 6tant sup~rieur A

1'inthr8t 16gal, la loi a dQ donner aux associ6s une action en domma.

ges-int6rsts. S'il n'en est pas de mime dans les contrats en g6n6ral, alors qu'ils out pour objet une somme d'argent, c'est qu'il efst 6t impossible d'6valuer le montant du dommage souffert par le retard dans le paiement. Ce motif n'existe point dans la soci6t6, puisque l'ojet de la socitk indique l'emploi que les parties suraient fait des fond-;

il est done facile de calculer le dommage que la soci46 souffre quand elle ne pent pas faire cet emploi.

Aubry et Rau, Droit civil frangais (2).

Des obligations des associ6s entre eux.

10 Chaque associ6 est tenu d'effectuer sa mise au temps convenu, art. 1845, al. 1.

L'associ6 qui ne satisfait pas A cette obligation au terme fix6 pour son ex~cution est de plein droit constitu6 en demeure, et doit, A partir de cette 6poque, faire 6tat i ses associ6s des fruits ou revenus des objets compo3ant sa mise, des int6r~ts des sommes qu'il avait A verser et des profits par lui retires de Pindustrie qu'il devait pour le comite commun.

est en outre dans toutes ces hypoth6ses, passible de plus amples dommages-inthr6ts, s'il y a lieu. Arts. 1846,

1Vtass6, Droit commercial (3).

270. y a encore, en mati&e de cautionnement et de soci6t6, exception A la ragle qui dMfend aux juges d'accorder des dommagesint6r~ts exc6dant le taux de l'int&t 16gal.

La caution qui a pay6

(1) T. 26 No. 219 p. 263.

pour le d6biteur principal, a un recours contre ce dernier, non seulement pour le capital, mais en outre pour des dommages-intrts proprement dit, s'il y a lieu.

En matibre de socit6, lassoci6 qui devait apporter une somne dans la socit6 et qui ne la pas fait, ou qui a pris des somtnes dans la caisse sociale pour les employer A son profit particulier, doit non & seulement les int6rats de ces sommes, soit A compter du jour oa elles devaient 6tre paybes, soit A compter de celui oii il les a tir6es Ry. Co.

de la caisse, mais encore de plus amples dommages int~rats, s'il y a Fournier J. lieu.

Demante. Code Civil (1).

Si Papport consiste en argent, la loi, toujours eu &gard & ]a nature de ce contrat, essentiellement commutatif, consacre ici deux d6rogations aux rgles ordinaires; lo. les int6rats courent de plein droit, par cons6quent sans demande, ajoutons et sans sommation, du jour do 1'4ch6ance; 2o. leur prestation ne dispense pas de plus amples dommages-intbrfts, s'il y a lieu.

Duranton. Cours de droit Fran9ais (2).

Ainsi, dans le cas un associ6, en n'effectuant pas sa mise au jour convenu, ou en tirant de Ia caisse sociale une somme pour son avantage particulier, aurait empich6 la soci6t6 de faire une op6ration avantageuse, on lui aurait occasionn6 des frais de la part de ses cranciers, qu'elle n'a pu payer faute de cette somme, Passoci4 outre Fint&krt 16gal, devrait tre condamn6 A des dommages-interats envers la soci~tG.

Troplong. Contrat de Soci~t6* (3).

Il y a plus ; it ne doit pas seulement les int6r6ts de plein droit; il peut mime 6tre condamn6 & des rparations plus consid6rables, si son retard a fait manquer quelque bonne op6ration I socifte, ou l'a empich6 de remplir ses obligations envers des tiers qui ontobtenu contre elle des indemnit~s. L'article 1153 du Code civil est ici sans autorit6. La disposition finale do notre article place, avec raison, 'associ6 sous des rgles plus rigoureuses, qui ne sont quo des rgles de justice.

Si l'on fait application des articles 1840 et 1841 aux faits de cette cause, le sort du pr6sent appel n'est pas douteux. Le savant conseil de l'Appelante s'6tant, lors de 1'argunient, d~sist6 de la pr6tention que l'Intim6e n'avait pas ex&ent6 ses engagements, il s'ien suit qu'en vertu des articles ci-dessus,-aussi bien quien vertu des articles 1065 et 1073 l'Intimbe a droit a des doinmages- (1) P. 15.

(2) 423, titre IX.

int6rats, autres que ceux mentionn6s dans 'article 1077 qui ne consisteraient que dans l'intirst 16gal. En vertu de Particle 1841, elle avait droit de r~clamer et l'inthr~t et des dommages speciaux, s'il en. existait. Dans ses conclusiond n'ayant pas demand

1'inthrat, il ne peut 6tre accord6, mais les dommages estim6s $100, doivent lui Atre accord6s, l'appel doit tre renvoy6 d6pens.

J.-I am of the opinion that the appeal here should be dismissed. This is not an action brought to recover money; it is brought on the failure on the part of the defendants to perform a contract they had entered into. That contract was, that in consideration certain work to be done on the road, they would give the company debentures to the extent of $200,000, as assistance to build the railway, and the county to take stock in the company to that extent, said debentures to be delivered in the proportions in which such work proceeded.

Up to a certain time the work had proceeded, and, by the terms of the agreement, the company became entitled to receive a certain portion of these bonds. They were not furnished, and the matter remained over, nothing being done.

This action was brought for the damage sustained in consequence of non-delivery of said bonds at the time and in the manner pointed out by the agreement. There was a failure then to comply with the terms of the agreement and the failure is admitted. But it is alleged that this company cannot recover damages in any case.

If they were entitled to anything, it could only be in the shape of interest, and they are not entitled to interest because the bonds or debentures had never been delivered.

That being the case, this cannot be an action for interest, and it is not an action, in my view, for the bonds themselves, or for the value of the bonds, but it is an action founded solely on the failure of the parties to deliver the bonds at the particular time in which they agreed OF to deliver them.

The question first arises: Can the parties succeed, & under the code in force in the Province of Quebec, in an action for damages in a case of this kind - In j the next place: What are the damages, and have they shown any in this action?

Under the articles referred to by my brother Fournier, viz., 1065, 1073, the obligations referred to there are the common obligations between men. But under the provisions of another chapter, title 11, under the head of partnership, we find there is a different provision, and one which does not apply to common business between one man and another.

The provision is in art. 1840 as to the liability for interest due by a partner who fails to pay a sum which he has agreed to pay the partnership. But there is another one following it, art. 1841, and it enacts that the provisions contained in the last two preceeding articles are without prejudice to the rights of partners to damages.

In the first place, I cannot bring myself to the conclusion that this is an action at all for the non-payment of money. It is an action for the non-delivery of bonds, and these bonds, when delivered, were to be placed on the market for what they were worth. But the company say " in consequence of your failure, other parties who intended to take stock have failed to do so, you having refused to carry out your agreement." The plaintiffs contend that they undertook the work and entered into engagements on the condition that these bonds were to be given, and that they have therefore sustained damages, and substantial damages, independent of the money altogether.

I think there might, under the Quebec code, be a good cause of action independent of the question of time or of interest, and although they were notT1" """ entitled to the amount of the bonds, I can see my way clear to say that they were entitled to damages.

There is another point, that when a party has & suffered wrong, and is unable to prove the damages sustained by that wrong (as is the case here) the court gl~~should not dismiss his action, but give him reasonable damages.

Here the plaintiffs did not prove the exact amount of their damages, yet as the defendants caused the loss which plaintiffs had incurred, it appears to me, that in a case of this kind the court, as a court and jury, are entitled to say that although plaintiff has not proved the amount, we will award him, under the circumstances, $100.

Now as to the position taken by my brother Fournier, it is clearly laid down by Laurent commenting on art. 1846, when dealing with the question of partnership, that besides interest the parties have the right to recover substantial damages, and he says that the article in the code referring to mere interest, has no effect whatever upon the defendants.

I think, therefore, referring to the Civil Code of Quebec, and the code from which it is taken, and the decision of the court below, and the opinion' of Laurent, that the respondents are entitled to have their judgment sustained.

J.-This is not an action for damages resulting from delay in the payment of money.

The obligation of this municipality did not consist in the payment of money. It had not to pay any money on the capital till twenty-five years after the issue of the debentures. And the railway company had not the right to ask any cash payment on their shares

All that it could ask were the debentures. But these de- XIV.J bentures, the municipality did not hand over, as they were obliged to do under their covenant, though they were regularly put en demeure. Are they not responsible for the non-execution of their obligation? Arts. 1065-1073 C.

To say that here the municipality's obligation was nothing but an obligation to pay money, Thr.co. and that consequently the only damages for non-execution of that obligation is the interest, would be, it seems * to me, to concede that for 25 years they might refuse to issue these debentures, and that, during all that time, all that the railway company would have the right to 'claim would be the interest. Can it be so'? Strely not.

This railway company were not capitalists who desired to invest $200,000 at 6 per cent. for 25 years. Not at all. They were a company who wanted $200,000 to build a railway, not in twenty-five years, but then and there, and as this municipality was not able to pay its $200,000'of shares in cash, it was agreed that it should give its debentures, or promissory,notes as it were, for the .amount, :said notes payable in 25 years. So thAt by negotiating these notes or these debentures either at par, at a discount, .or at a premium, the railway compay might procure the funds required for the construction of the road.

Upon the faith of that agreement, the railway company proceeded to build the railway, and when they demand the issue of the debentures according to the agreement, the municipality says: never mind we will pay you the interest during 25 years, and you must be satisfied.

Is that the contract ? Are the company to build the railway with the interest ?

The appellants' contentions are untenable.

The interest specified was for the delay given to the municipality in the.payment of the money. The damages asked are for the delay in the issue of the debent-ares, and do not fall under art. 1077 of the code.

To extend this article iu the sense that the appellants ask the court to do so would lead to grave consequences.

Suppose a man engaged in mercantite pursuits, having a note for $10,000 due to-morrow at the bank in- Montreal, goes to the telegraph office in Ottawa, hr. pays them $10,000, with commission, charges, &c., for the- consideration of which the telegraph company covenant to pay his note by telegraph, throngh their

Montreal 'office. Through the negligence or embenrlenient of their officers, the note is not paid, it is protested, this man's-financial standing is gone, the ban-k immediately calls upon him or his firm in Montreal for' an assignment.

He suffers heavy damages, it is clear. But, say the appellants, the telegraph company are not responsible for these damages, beyond the interest of the money, and if the day after to-morrow they pay his note or refund him his $10,000, all the damages they will have to pay him will be one day's interest, and- with that he must rest satisfied.

So if a man, for instance, going to New York to make purchases, goes to the Express Company's offices here, aid hands them over $10,000 to be transmitted to him at New York.

This man arrives in New York but the

Express Company fails or delays to pay him the money.. He suffers damages, but, say the appellants, the company was responsible only for the amount of the interest of the money.

If that were so it must be conceded that they might keep the money for years, and all they would have to pay would be the' interest. Can that be so ? Was it an investment that this man intended to make- in the Express Company?

So, in the present case, was it an investment of $200,000 payable in twenty-five years that this railway company intended to, make ?

YOL. XIV.]

It could not be contended that in these two instances these companies would not be liable in damages. Yet their obligations were to pay money, nothing else. The present case is still clearer. Here, as I have said, no money was due, no money could be asked, there was consequently no delay in the payment of money, and the damages are not claimed for any such delay. The payment of the shares is to be in debentures. Art. J.

1139-1148 C. C.

The municipality's obligation was to make, sign and deliver them to the company.

As to the ]point taken at the bar, on the part of the appellants, that the railway company's action does not lie because they have transferred all their rights to the Quebec government, it has not even been noticed in the judgments of the two courts below, though also raised there, and for very good reasons.

1st. There is no issue on that point raised in the pleas to the action;

2nd. It is exciper du droit d'autrui (jus tertii); 3rd. The damages claimed were never assigned; 4th. Had they been assigned, the assignee could have sued in the name of the assignor;

6th. This assignment took place since the institution of the present action.

As to there being another action pending, no proof, no plea, that there is an action pending for the debentures. Then, the demand for the debentures and the demand for damages could not have been joined in one action.

As to the amount of the damages, it is self-evident that they must have been very large, and they are proved to have been so. Only a small and nominal sum was given; owing, I presume, to the fact that the company has virtually ceased to exist. The amount was evidently not pressed, a verdict sufficient to carry costs only being required.

That the amount is too small does not lie in the defendants' mouth.

There was sufficient evidence to justify the verdict. In the case of non-execution of a contract, & says the Court of Appeal of Rouen, reversing the judgment of the original court, in Re Marie v. Grenet if it is evident that the plaintiff must have suffered

J. some damages, the court will not dismiss his claim altogether on the ground that it is difficult to precisely determine the extent of the loss he has suffered, or that he has not established any substantial basis upon which an amount may be arrived at, but, in such a case, the court will establish the amount according to the rules of equity. The court of first instance had dismissed the claim for damages on the ground that the plaintiff had not proved a clear pecuniary loss. I am of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

GWYNNE J.-The appellants in pursuance of the terms of a by-law of the corporation of the County of

Ottawa became subscribers for 200,000 shares of ten dollars each amounting to $200,000 of the capital stock of the Montreal, Ottawa and Western Railway upon and subject to the following conditions, namely: that the said subscription should be payable in debentures of the corporation of the county of the sum of one hundred dollars each payable in 25 years from date bearing interest at six per cent. per annum payable half yearly on the first days of January and July of every year, at the office of the Merchants Bank, Ottawa, such debentures to be accepted at par in payment of such subscription.

dred and fifty thousand dollars should be paid in monthly instalments as the work should progress so as, however, not to pay more than one half of the value of the work done within the limits of the county of Ottawa, or $3,000 per mile on the certificate of the engineer & the company which might be verified by an engineer Ry.

selected by the corporation.

j.

That the said railway should be completed and put in operation on or before the first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five. That the bridges should be constructed with stone. piers'and that the rails, if of iron, should be of the weight of sixty pounds per yard and, if of steel, of forty-eight pounds per yard and that the road and its appurtenances should be built of materials equal in quality to those of the Saint Lawrence and Ottawa Railway. The plaintiffs allege in their declaration that on the 19th January, 18T5- they had fulfilled all conditions precedent necessary to be fulfilled to entitle them to receive from the defendants their debentures for the principal sum of $112,096.70 bearing interest from that dite at six per centum, -payable on the- first' days July and January in each year in pursuance of' theterms of their subscription agreement and the bylaw in that behalf and that upon that day the plaintiffs duly demanded of the defendants the delivery of the said debentures which they refused to give and so, that upon the said 19th day of January, 1875, the defendants were put in default for non delivery of the debentures.

Now, assuming all conditions to have been fulfilled, to have entitled the plaintiffs- to receive the above. amount of debentures from the defendants, the plaintiffs under article 1065 of the Civil Code had two remedies.

They might have instituted a suit to enforce specific performance of the defendants obliga- [VOL. 11V. ,tion, by delivery of the debentures, or they might have instituted an action once for all-to recover all damages consequential upon the breach of their obligation in not delivering them, but in such an action they must, as it appears to me, allege and prove all the damages -which they are entitled to recover.

They cannot split & the one cause of action up into severail actions, in one ay. of which claiming damages for one loss alleged to have j. been sustained; in another, or others- for other and different losses alleged to have been sustained, or profits of which they had been deprived; and in another claiming nominal damages only, shewing breach of the obligation, but -not alleging and proviug any 'loss or deprivation of gain necessarily and directly consequeutial therson.

Under the provisions of articles 1073-4 and 5 of the

Civil Code, the damages recoverable for the non-execution of an obligation are the amount of such loss deprivation of gain as, being the foreseen, necessary, immediate and direct consequences of the non-execution of ithe obligation of the defendants, the plaintiffs 'had sustained. That loss or deprivation of profit, in a case like the present, appears to me to be readily ascertainable, for the debentures which the plaintiffs should

'have received, upon the assumption of -their having

:become entitled to receive them, being negotiable instruments for the payment of money at a future time

-and -transferable by delivery had a money value, of a

-varying character, it is true, according as the credit the corporation was good or bad, and as the demand for such securities in -the market was great or small, but still they had an ascertainable money value, which money value constituted, in my opinion, the precise measure of the damages which the plaintiffs had sustained, and which they were entitled to recover for the non-delivery to them of the debentures in question

YOL.

assuming them to have been entitled to demand and receive them. The plaintiffs, however, instead of instituting an action in which they claimed such damages instituted an action, in which, after averring their right to receive the debentures, and the default of the defendants, - they alleged that they had sustained the damages following, namely, the putting in peril the sum $50,000 part of the $200,000 subscription, the debentures for which were issuable only on condition of the road being completed on the lst day of December, 1875; the injury to the credit of the plaintiffs and the depriving them of considerable sums that the respondents would have had the right to receive, and would have got and received as well from the City of Montreal under and in virtue of by-law No. 59,-Schedule A, of the Act 36 Vic. ch. 49, as from the government of Quebec from and out of the subsidy voted to the plaintiffs by and in virtue of the act of Quebec 37 Vic. ch. 2, and that besides these damages the plaintiffs had the right to claim from the appellants interest on the amount of the debentures due to the company upon and from the date of the protest and notification of the 19th January, 1815, which said damages and interest so composed amount, as the plaintiffs allege, to the sum of $500,000, wherefore the plaintiffs concludes by praying that the defendants be condemned to pay the plaintiff the said sum of $500,000 so made up with interest, expenses, &c. ; the whole under the express reservation of the plaintiffs' right to demand and recover all damages to accrue subsequently to the date of the present action, namely, the 19th of June, Now, as to the putting in peril the sum of fifty thousand dollars, or as to the alleged loss of credit of the plaintiffs, or as to the alleged deprivation caused to them, by the non-delivery of the defendants debentures, of considerable sums accruing to them from the city of

Montreal under the by-law of that corporation and from the Government of the Province of Quebec under the act of the Legislature of that Province, it is very clear,

I think, that none of these apprehended or alleged losses can be recovered in this action as having any natural or necessary connection with, or as being directly or at all attributable to, the non-delivery by a the defendants of their debentures. Such alleged losses cannot be held to be either the foreseen, or necessary, or natural, or immediate, or direct consequences of the non-delivery by the defendants of their debentures.

None of these alleged losses, if at all suffered, can be said to have been suffered in respect of the particular thing which was the subject of the defendants obligation which was to deliver their debentures when earned, and no damages can be recovered in this action except such as necessarily and directly arise in respect of the particular thing which was the subject of the defendants' obligation and as are necessarily and directly consequential upon the non-performance of that obligation.

Then as to the interest which is claimed on the amount of the debentures, which, as is alleged, should have been delivered to the plaintiffs on the 19th day of January, 1875, from that day until the commencement of this action on the 19th June, 1875, this interest accrues and becomes payable only under the terms of the defendants' subscription contract and the by-law in that behalf and can only be claimed in right of such contract, which contract is that the interest shall be payable half yearly on the first days of July and January, and as this action was commenced on the 19th day of June, 1875, before the day appointed for the accruing due of any of such interest, no interest in respect of that sum can be recovered in this action

The learned judge of the Superior Court before whom this action was tried has awarded the plaintiffs one hundred dollars damages, but this amount, whih is neither substantial nor nominal, is plainly not given in full Satisfaction of all damage incident upon the nonexecution of the defendant's obligation in respect of the particular breach of that obligation which is com- 4J plained of ; and no part of the amount awarded can be attributed to or allowed upon any of the items damage especially enumerated in the declaration, none of these items being necessarily and directly consequential upon the breach complained of. The one hundred dollars have been, in fact, arbitrarily awarded without reference to any allegation made or proof offered of any actionable loss or deprivation of profit sustained, and the plaintiffs' right of action, in respect of what they are entitled to recover, if they are entitled to recover anything, is left open and undisposed of by this action, and is, as was said in the argument before us, now the subject of another action.

There has been no precedent cited, nor do I think there can be any, establishing a right in the plaintiffs to recover the awarded to them in this action which can be recovered only as damages awarded in the absence of any actionable loss alleged and proved: and also the right to recover in another action substantial damages which, if entitled to recover anything, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover in respect of the one breach of the same obligation.