June 20. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).
W. J. C.J.-The appeal in this case arose upon the following assessments by the respondents the railway property of the appellant company.
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[VOL. The contestation was in regard to the assessment the railway tracks and part of railway bridge within the limits of the town of St. Johns.
IHad this case turned on the question as to whether JOs. this bridge was or was not moveable property I should have had little difficulty in determining that question in the affirmative; so if it depended on the question as to the liability of the plaintiffs to taxation as occupiers of the bridge, and therefore of the land to which it was attached, and of which it therefore formed a part, I should have had but little difficulty in likewise determining that question in the affirmative; but the real point in controversy is whether or not anything more of the land on which the superstructure of the railroad is placed can be assessed in addition to the land itself, and it seems to me the legislature has carefully protected railways from any local assessment beyond the mere value of the land itself, apart from and independent of the value of the roadway with its superstructure.
The question then in this case arises under section 98 of the incorporation act of the respondents which imports into the chtirter certain sections of the " Town Corporation General Clauses Act " (40 Vic. ch. 29) sections 326, 327 & 370.
By section .326 of the Towns Corporation General Clauses Act (40 Vic. ch. 29):- And by section 327.
This last section 327 is not in the Ontario Act, but * though no return was made by the company, I cannot see that it makes any more property taxable thanpitchie could be taxed under section 326,. which I think in accordance with the decisions in Ontario, is confined to the lands occupied by the road, and does not include the superstructures.
Apart from the assessment on the bridge the assessment in this case would likewise be bad for assessing the railway track including the superstructure.
There is nothing whatever in my opinion in the objection that the 43 and 44th Vic., ch. 52, fixing the eastern boundary of the corporation of St. Johns at an imaginary line passing through the middle of the Richelieu river was ultra vires of the legislature of the Province of Quebec, and therefore unconstitutional.
The appeal in this case should, I think, be allowed. J.-The decision of this appeal must depend on the construction to be placed on sections 326 and
327 of the Provincial Act, 40 Vic., ch. 29.
By the 98 section of the Act, 43 and 44 Vic, ch. 62, for amending and consolidating the acts relating to the Incorporation of the town of St. Johns, these sections 326 and 327 of the former General Municipal Act are made part the latter enactment.
These sections relate to the taxation of railways for municipal purposes and are as follows:in
The proposition of the appellants is that under these provisions of the law, the respondents were not authorized to make the assessments which they have made of the appellants', property within the limits of the town of St. Johns, and that the taxes which they have levied by distress being based on these assessments are void.
These assessments are of " the railway "tracks from East Longueuil street to the bridge and "part of railway bridge within the limits of the town "of St. Johns."
As regards the property assessed under the denomination of " Railway Tracks," it is manifest that by that description we must consider the superstructure of the permanent way, consisting of the ties and iron rails, to be included, and that we cannot treat it as restricted to the mere land on which the ties and rails are laid. And as regards the bridge, it is equally beyond controversy that the structure alone is included in the valuation of the assessors.
By section 326 the return which a railway company is required to make is to be, first, of the value of the real estate in the municipality other than the road; and, second, of " the actual value of the land occupied by the road."
The first question * is, therefore, whether the words "land occupied by the road " authorises the taxation of the superstructure consisting of ties and rails.
There can, I think, be scarcely any doubt that it does not. This description of the property to be taxed, and which is to be estimated according to the average value of land in the locality,does as plainly as language can express it, confine the subject of taxation to the mere land, minus the rails and ties, laid upon it by the railway company. An analogous provision in the municipal law of Ontario has always received that construction, and without assuming that the decisions of the Ontario courts are in any way bihding authorities on the g learned judges of the court below, I may refer to the cases of The Great Western Ry. Co. v. Rouse and London v. W. Ry. Co..(2) as giving sound reasons for such a construction, which I adopt in the present case.
Section 327 contains a provision for a valuation by the valuators of the municipality in case the railway company shall itself make no return of value within the time limited by the act, and enacts that in such case the valuation of " all the immoveable property "belonging to the company shall be made in the same " manner as that of any other ratepayer."
It cannot' I think, be successfully contended that the words " all immoveable property belonging to the company were meant to make that assessable by the valuators, which was exempted in the case of a return being made by the " company itself."
There could be no reason for such a distinction, and I refer the use of the expression " all the immoveable property " to the circumstance, that by section 326 the immoveable property of the company was divided into two distinct categories, viz: (1) that other than the road; and (2) that occupied by the road. The words in question were, in my opinion, used as a comprehensive term including both the two classes of property previously distinguished.
As regards the bridge or so much of it as is within the limits of the municipality, I am of opinion that it is in no sense " land occupied by the road," and there is, therefore, no statutory authority whatever for its taxa- (1) C. Q. B.
(2) C, Q. B. tion. The result must be that the assessment having included property not legally liable to taxation, and no distinction being made between such property and ' .
that which the statute does make liable, the whole tax s
J
The remedy adopted by the appellants comes within the literal terms of the statute 41 Vic. ch. 14 sec. 1 sub sec. 1, as being an act of a corporation beyond its powers, and I am, therefore, of opinion that this appeal should be allowed with costs to the appellants here and in both the courts below.
J.-Dans cette cause ii 8'agit de la ligalit6 de taxes imposies par l'Intim6e sur certaines propri6t6s en la possession de 1'Appelante, dans les limites de la ville de Saint-Jean.
L'une des propridt~s tax6es est la partie du pont construit sur la rivibre Richelieu avec le quai d'approche et les piliers qui so trouvent situ6s dans les limites de la ville de Saint-Jean, A partir du rivage , aller jusqu'au milieu de la riviere Richelieu. L'autre est la partie du chemin de fer de l'Appelante situ6e dans la dite ville de Saint-Jean A partir de la rue Jacques-Cartier A aller jusqu'd la rue Longueuil. Dans le r6le d'Avaluation cette propri6t6 est d6sign6e sons les termes de " Railway track."
La derniere est une construction en bois servant de bureau. L'Appelante, qui a n6glig6 d'adopter dans le temps fix6 le recours A la cour Sup6rieure pour attaquer le r6le d'&valuation, essaie, au moyen d'un bref d'injonction, d'arriver an mime but. Dans sa requ6te elle invoque entre autres les moyens suivants: Que le pont n'est pas situ6 dans les limites de la ville parce que la clause de 1'acte d'incorporation qui en fixe les limites an milieu de la rivi6re Richelieu est inconstitutionnelle, la dite rivibre 6tant navigable et comme telle sous lajuridiction exclusive du parlement du Canada; que la ville de Saint-Jean n'a pas le pouvoir de taxer les propri6t6s immobilibres, mais seulement les personnes et les propri6t~s mobilibres de la ville; 3o que le rle de cotisa- 'R Gro tion est ill6gal et exorbitant en ce qu'il taxe 1'Appelante pour une proprith qui ne lui appartient pas et qu'elle ne possede pas dans la ville de Saint-Jean, Fournier J savoir: le " railway track," la partie du chemin de fer
A partir de la rue Jacques-Cartier h aller A la rue Longueuil; 40 enfin ill6galit6 du warrant d'ex6cution, etc.
L'Intim6e a r~pondu qu'en vertu de sa ' charte elle avait droit de taxer toutes les propri6t6s immobilibres situes dans ses limites; que les propri6t~s pour lesquelles 1'Appelante est cotis~e sont occup6es par elle et qu'ello en est la seule propri6taire connue. L'Intim~e nie que 1'estimation soit exorbitante, allgue la r6gularit6 du warrant, et que 1'Appelante aurait di dans les trois mois de la date du r6le d'evaluation prendre les proc6ds indiqu6s par 1'acte d'incorporation pour attaquer le r6le.
Cette contestation souleve les questions suivantes:
10 La 16gislature de Qu6bec avait-elle le droit de fixer le milieu de la rivibre Richelieu comme limite de la ville de Saint-Jean? L'Intimbe a-t-elle par sa charte le pouvoir de taxer les immeubles situ6s dans ses limites ?
La cotisation du " railway track " de la rue Jacques- Cartier a la rue Longueuil est-elle Kgale?
La premi~re question quant an pouvoir de la 16gislature de Qu6bec de fixer les limites de la ville de Saint- Jean an milieu de la riviere Richelieu m6rite & peine d'6tre examin6e.
S'il est incontestable que les rivibres navigables sont pour les fins de la navigation sous le contr6le du parlement du Canada, il n'est pas moins vrai non plus que les provinces out sur ces mmes rivibres le droit d'exercer tons les pouvoirs municipaux et de police, pourvu que leur 16gislation n'apporte aucune entrave la navigation.
L'acte 43 et 44 Vic., ch. 53, qui a tendu les limites de la ville de Saint-Jean jusqu'au milieu de la rivibro Richelieu ne contient CT aucune disposition de nature A affecter les int6rts de la navigation.
En vertu de son acte d'incorporation la ville de Saint- Fourr J. Jean a non seulement le pouvoir de taxer les propri~ths mobilieres, mais son pouvoir s'6tend aussi A taxer " all "lands, town lots, and parts of town lots whether there "be buildings erected thereon or not with all buildings " and erecti6ns thereon." La pr6tention contraire soulev6e par 1'Appelante est fond6e sur une omission sans importance qui se trouve dans la version frangaise de la section 86, laquelle d6clare que " le dit conseil do " ville aura le droit de prelever annuellement sur les "personnes et les propri6t6s mobilibres de la dite ville "les taxes ci-aprbs d~sign6es." Il est 6vident que ce n'est que par inadvertance que le mot " immobiliares " a 6t omis A la suite du mot " mobilieres."
Si cette partie de la dite section devait se lire sans 6gard A ce qui suit, la pr6tention de l'Appelante aurait une apparence de plausibilite. Mais la m~me section continue de suite et dans la mme phase, A d6signer les taxes qui seront imposies, et la premibre indique est celle sur tons terrains, lots de ville on portion de lot, etc., ce qui, malgre l'omission du mot " immobilieres " dans la partie qui pr&6ide ne laisse aucun doute possible sur 1'intention de conf6rer le droit de taxer les immeubles.
La version anglaise contient, il est vrai, le mot " immoveable" qui manque dans lapremibre partie de la version frangaise, mais cela ne peut constituer une diff6rence affectant 1'interpr6tation des deux textes, car tous deux confrent 6videmment le droit de taxer les immeubles.
Si cette diffrence 6tait susceptible de cr6er un doute, il faudrait, mame dans ce cas, suivant 'art. 12, C.C., interpr6ter la section 86 de maniare A lui faire remyplir son intention 6vidente de fournir A la ville de Saint-Jean par la taxe sur les propri~t~s mobilibres et immobilibres les moyens nucessaires de mettre A ex~cution tons les pouvoirs qui lui sont conferbs par son acte d'incorporation. Je conclus que le pouvoir de taxer les immeubles est clairement donne
Joas. Ind6pendamment de cette objection an pouvoir de Fourr J. taxer de la municipalit6, on a aussi soulev6 la pr6tention que les ponts de chemin de fer 6taient exempt~s du paiement des taxes, et on a mime contest6 & ce genre de propri6th la qualit6 d'immeuble.
Ces deux pr6tentions me paraissent 6galement mal-fondes.
Par 1'effet du statut, la compagnie est devenue en possession l6gale de cette partie du lit de la rivibre sur laquelle repose le quai d'approche et les piliers qui soutieninent la superstructure du pont. Gette construction faite pour perp6tuelle demeure sur cette partie du lit de la riviere,
A l'occupation de laquelle la compagnie a un titre 16gal, a en 1'effet de faire de 1'ensemble du pont une propri&6t immobilibre d'un caract~re priv6 appartenant & la compagnie et dont une moiti6 se trouve dans les limites de la ville.
est indiff&rent que le lit de la rivibre soit, comme il a 6t6 d~cide dans Holman v. Green (1) au sujet du havre de Summerside, la proprit6 du gouvernement f~d~ral on du gouvernement provincial comme
1'a d6cid6 la cour du Banc de la Reine dans Norv. la Cie du Saint-Laurent il 11'en est pas mons vrai qne dans un cas comme dans 1'autre, cette partie du domaine public appropri~e envertu des lois de chemin de fer de la Puissance, tout aussi bien qu'en vertu des lois provinciales sur le mme sujet, a cess6, au moins pour tout le temps qu'elle sera emnploy6e au passage du chemin, de faire partie du domaine public, de m~me qu'un lot de terre conc6d par la couronne cesse de faire partie de son domaine et devient propri6t6 privAe et comme telle sujet & toutes les taxes et charges de la proprit6 priv~e.
On arguerait done inutilemeut pour soutenir que le pont n'est pas taxable, du fait qu'il est construit sur une partie du domaine .
public exempt6 de toutes taxes.
Cette exemption est sans doute incontestable pour le domaine public, mais elle cesse d'exister lorsqu'il s'agit d'une partie de domaine devenue la propri6te de particuliers.
On ne pent pas plus appliquer A un pont ce privilege du domaine public qu'on ne le pourrait aux nombreux quais construits en eau profonde.
Ces propriet6s sont comme tons les autres immeubles sujets aux taxes impos&es sur la propriet fonci~re.
est incontestable que le pont en question doit 6tre d'apres les lois de la province de Qu6bec, comme d'apres les d60isions des tribunaux d'Ontario, voir Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge Co. Gardner considr6 comme une propri6t6 immobilire et comme telle sujette ? la taxe, A moins que 'on ne justifie d'une exemption. Pour que le pont en question pxt 6tre reconuu exempt de taxe il faudrait trouver un texte de loi qui le d6clare formellement, et il n'en existe pas A ma connaissance. Cette question int6resse & un trbs haut degr6 non seulement l'Intim6e, mais encore toutes les municipalit~s, et elles sont nombreuses, dans les limites desquelles se trouvent des ponts de chemin de fer, et declarer genre de propyit6 exempt6 de taxe, ce serait leur faire perdre un revenu considerable.
En vertu de la clause 98 de 'acte d'incorporation et 44 Vic., ch. 62, la plus grande partie des clauses g~n6rales des. corporations de ville sont rendues applicables A la dite ville de Saint-Jean.
Parmi ces clauses se trouvent les 326 et 327. La premibre ordonne aux compagnies de chemin de for qui possident des biens-fonds dans la municipalit6 de transmettre an bureau du conseil, an mois de mai de chaque ann6e, un 6tat d6signant la valeur r6elle de ses propri6t6s immobilibres dans la municipalit6 autre que le chemin, et aussi la valeur r~elle du terrain occup6 par ' le chemin d'apris la valeur moyenne du -terrain dans la localit6. Cet 6tat doit 6tre communiqu6 A temps aux estimateurs. La seconde, 327, oblige les estimateurs a faire 1'6valuation d'apr6s 1'6tat fourni par la compagnie et A d~faut de transmission de cet 6tat dans le temps prescrit ils sont oblig6s d'en faire 1'estimation comme celle de tout autre contribuable.
L'6tat requis par ces dispositions n'ayant pas t6 fourni dans le temps prescrit, les estimateurs ont proc6d6 A l'6valuation du pont et des autres propri6t6s an meilleur de leur jugement, en ayant toutefois le soin de n'6valuer que le terrain sur lequel passe ce chemin et non les travaux du chemin. Les estimateurs appels comme t6moins se sont expliqus A ce sujet dans leur t&moignage de manibre A faire disparaltre le doute que 1'on aurait pu soulever sur les expressions dont ils se sont servis.
"Roadway"
pour d6signer le terruin acquis par la compagnie pour y passer son chemin ; ils disent positivement qu'ils ont fait la distinction voulue et n'ont pas tax6 le chemin, c'est-A-dire les travaux du chemin.
Si maintenant l'Appelante trouve leur estimation trop 6levie elle ne peut s'en plaindre A l'Intimbe, dont les estimateurs out agi avec bone foi.
Si l'4tat requis par la loi eit 4t6 fourni dans le temps voulu ls., estimateurs auraient 6t oblig6s d'en passer par la valeur dbclar~e par la compagnie.
Si 1'estimation est trop 61eve l'Appelante ne doit s'en prendre qu'd elle-m~me et doit subir la consequence de sa negligence.
Apr~s la confection de ce r6le, A l'homologation duquel l'Appelante n'a fait aucune opposition, elle avait encore en vertu de la sec. 200 des clauses g~n6rales des corporations de ville, le pouvoir d'en faire prononcer la nullit6 pour cause d'ill~galit6, n'ayant pas adopt6 proc6d dans le d61ai voulu le r6le est deveuu finalement clos et ne peut plus tre attaqu par proc6d6 auquel l'Appelante a en recours.
J
L'Appelante a soulev6 lors de l'argument devant la cour du Banc de la Reine des pr6tentions dont elle n'a fait aucune mention dans sa p6tition.
Une de ces pr~tentions est que 1'acte 43 et 44 Vic., ch. 62 a cr&6 une nouvelle corporation tout A fait diff6rente et distincte de celle qui avait exist6 auparavant; que cet acte ne contenant aucune disposition pour maintenir en force le r6le de cotisation de 1880 les taxes de cette ann6e-l ne pouvaient 6tre recouvr~es.
L'aete en question n'a pas cr66 une corporation nonvelle. C'est " un acte pour amender et consolider 1'acte " d'incorporation de la ville de Saint-Jean et les divers " actes 1'amendant."
Ce dernier acte quant A la confection du r6le de cotisation et la perception des taxes n'est que la r6p6tition de la loi ant6rieure copi6e dans la nouvelle, et qui partant n'a cess6 en aucun temps d'6tre en force.
n'tait done pas nicessaire d'une disposition sp6ciale pour d6clarer que le r6le fait ant6rieurement continuerait en force parce que la loi n'6tait pas chang~e sous ce rapport. Cette question a 6t6 d6cid6e par cette cour dans la cause de Sulte vs. Corporation de Trois-Rivibres. (1)
Je dois ajouter que dans le cas actuel cette question souffre moins de difficult6 parce que les 7e- et 117e clauses de l'acte 43 et 44 Vic., ch. 62 out maintenu en force tous les riglements existants en d&Alarant: Et la 11e clause d6clare:
A Ces dispositions sont clairement suffisantes pour maintenir en force non seulement les raglements existants en vertu des lois d'incorporation ant6rieures, mais mime les r6les de cotisation et de perception qui n'ont d'effet 16gal qu'apris avoir 6t6 confirm6 par ordre du conseil.
La mime r6ponse s'applique A l'objection faite A la 16galit6 du warrant. La loi ant~rieure 22 Vic., ch. 106, sec. 37, § donnait A la dite - corporation dans le cas de d6faut de paiement des taxes le pouvoir de les recouvrer-par warrant.
Cette mime disposition a t conserv6e par la section 101 de 43 et 44 Vic , ch. 62. Cette disposition existait 6galement dans la 40 Vic., secs. 377 et 378.
Ces pouvoirs n'ayant jamais cess6 d'tre en force les proc6d6s faits en vertu d'iceux sont de meme rest6s en vigueur. Les objections soulev~es A cet 6gard sont sans valeur. Pour se pr6valoir de l'objection faite A la collection des int6rsts dus sur le montant des taxes, si elle 6tait fond6e, l'Appelante aurait s'en plaindre par une opposition A la saisie conform6ment a 1'article 952 du Code Municipal.
Je' suis d'avis que 1'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d~pens.
J.-This case comes by appeal from the Appeal Court of Quebec.
The main question to be decided is: Whether rates levied by the municipal authorities of the town of St. Johns on a railway bridge of the appellant company over the Richelieu river-one-half of which is within the limits of the town-for the year 1880 and the two following years were authorized by law ? Provision for the assessment f railway companies by municipalities was made by sections 326 and of the act Vic. ch. 29; and it is upon the construction to be put on those sections fienryJ. and others that the rights of the parties herein are to be ascertained.
[The learned judge then read sections 326 and 327.] It will then be seen that the municipal taxes on railway companies were limited to the real estate owned by the company in the municipality, other than the road and the actual value of the land occupied by the road, estimated according to the average value of land in the locality. Taxation otherwise was totally excluded.
The bridge in question is over a navigable river, and the title to the land over which it flows is in the crown held for public uses.
The company by the erection the bridge over it obtained and have no title whatever to the soil, and therefore it is not immoveable property of the appellant company.
Such land is therefore not, as I think, real estate belonging to the company to which the act applies. The land under the bridge may be said to be land occupied by the road; but still it could not apply to the parts or portions of it occupied by the pillars of the bridge. The spaces under the circumstances could not be deemed as in the occupation of the company, when as to such spaces the maritime rights of the public remain unaffected by the superstructure.
Nor do I believe the statute was ever intended to apply to such. What it meant was to authorize a tax on land belonging to companies exclusively occupied as the railroad, and I think we would be straining the provision in question to apply it to the bed of a navigable river.
That however is only incidentally necessary to be [VOL. 11V. considered, for the taxes were not levied on the land of the navigable river; but upon that half of the superstructure within the municipality.
It is claimed because the land under the bridge is used by the , V. company, that, although belonging to the crown, it is liable to taxation, and a question would arise if the land had been alone taxed; but it is further claimed that because the land is in the occupation of the company, the bridge built on is immovable property within the provisions of the section hereinbefore in part recited. The law as to fixtures -on immovable property is what should govern in this case, and if so, I cannot regard the bridge in question as one.
The question is raised as one determining the ownership of machinery or other property placed on immovable property to determine whether it belongs to a tenant or a landlord.
Is the bridge in question of that necessarily permanent connection with the land under it, that it would become the property of a landlord at the end of a tenant's term? It cannot be contended that a tenant during his term could not remove anything placed or erected by him on the devised property that was not a fixture.
During the term, therefore, such could not be 'deemed a part of the the real estate.
A building erected upon blocks laid on the soil may be removed by the tenant. The bridge in question must I think be regarded in the same way and I can see nothing, and know no law, prevent the company from removing it if desirous of so doing. How then can it be called immovable property, and if not how can it be rated as such?
If the company failed to return a valuation of the immovable property in the municipality, the valuators could do more than tax immovable property, they could not tax movable property, nor could they in my opinion tax the bridge in question.
The statutes exempt the rails, ties, and everything else composing a railway, on or even below the level of the railway track, including masonry in culverts, e.
bridges, and other erections on the immovable- property of companies., Then why should not the bridge in question be exempt?
If it had been built on land of the company liable to be taxed, the bridge would not be liable to taxation.
Then why should the fact of its having been built over some other party's land, liable or not to be taxed, make the slightest difference? It may be said, however, that as an appeal is given by section 331 of 40 Vic. ch. 29 from the tax roll to the council of the municipality, the appellants not having taken such appeal and the roll having been homologated, they have no other remedy against the illegal assessment.
Section 323 provides that:- The duty of the valuators is, therefore, confined to taxable property, and it is from their acts as such valuators within the scope of their authority that any person feeling aggrieved may appeal. The homologation of the roll, therefore, in my opinion, affects only taxable property.
I am, for the reasons given, of opinion that the appellant company is entitled to the remedy by injunction as sought in this action, such remedy being within the provision of the statute of Quebec in relation to injunction, with costs.
J.-As to the contention that the act extending the limits of the town.of St. Johns to the middle of the IRichelieu river is unconstitutional, because the said river, being navigable, is under the exclusive control of the federal parliament, there is nothing in it.
As to the second ground of appellants' petition, that movable property only is taxable by the charter of St. Johns. it is also untenable.
By a misprint in the French version of the act the word immoveables has been left out, but the context of that version itself TM-6&u shows that immoveables are taxable, and the English J. version contains the word " immoveables."
The appellants did not press this ground of their petition at the argument.
The third ground of the appellants' petition is that they are not proprietors, and not in possession of a part of the property assessed.
On this the judge at the trial found, and his finding is fully supported by the evidence, that the company is in possession of all the property assessed.
Now section 370 of 40 Vic. ch. 29, which is part the charter of St. Johns by section 98 thereof, specially provides that all municipal taxes may be collected from the tenant or occupant of the land.
The fourth, fifth and sixth grounds of the appellants' petition are general ones, that the corporation has acted illegally and beyond its powers in the assessment the said property and in issuing the warrant of distress. Under these general allegations, the appellants take two distinct objections, one attacking the whole of the assessments for the four years, and the second one attacking the assessment of 1880 only. The first, which applies to all the taxes claimed on the part of the appellants' road on terra firma, is that only the land occupied by the road is. taxable and not the road bed itself under section 326 of 40 Vic. ch. 29.
This section reads as follows:- .W ~
It is in evidence here that the company never sent to the corporation the return mentioned in this section and consequently according to the very next section of the said act, their property had to be taxed, as that of any other proprietor in the municipality, viz:the that We have been referred to the case of the Great Western Co. v. Rouse in which it was held that only the land occupied by the railway and not the superstructure is taxable. But this case has no application here, because the statute of 1853, U. C. Assessment Act, 15 Vic. ch. 182 sec. 21 does not provide, as the Quebec statute I have cited does, that if the company fails to make a return to the council the valuation of all its immovable property shall be made as that of any other ratepayer. The two cases of the Corporation of London v. The Great Western Railway Co., decided under 29 and 30 Vic., ch. 53, sec. are distinguishable on the same ground.
Now as to the taxes of 1880;- The appellants argue that for 1880 the respondent cannot claim the taxes, because the old corporation was abolished on the 24th July of that year, by 43 and 44 Vic., ch. 62, and the new one then came into existence.
I do not see any foundation for this contention. The act 43 and 44 Vic., ch. 62, does not create a new corporation.
The corporation of the town of St. Johns, as created by 22 Vic. ch. (1858), under the very same name, is continued with extended powers and extended is cntiued ithRy.
territorial jurisdiction. Section 7 specially enacts that o. all the officers then in office shall be continued until duly removed or the expiration of their functions, and 'as I read this clause, with all the powers and duties of J. their offices. -This seems to me unquestionable.
If the officers are continued, it must be with the view that they should fill the duties of their offices.
Now this valuation of 1880 must have been made after the new act was in force and after the 24th July, since in express terms it includes that part of the bridge within the limits of the town and the bridge was not within the limits of the town before that act was passed. By section 23 of 22 Vic., ch 106, there was no special date fixed to make the roll. This was left to the council, though by 37 Vic., ch. 95, sec. 1, it had to be made every year. Now the appellants not having proved that the roll of 1880 was made before the 24th July, we must follow the rule omnia presumuntur rite acta.
But even if the roll had been made before the 24th July, as it is proved that even before the new act 90 feet of this bridge were within the limits of this municipality, -and as the roll taxes part of the bridge within the municipality, we should read it as taxing these 90 feet.
As to the amount of the valuation we have nothing to do with it.. No question on it can arise before us on a writ of injunction under section 1 of 41 Vic., ch. 14. The enactments as to assessments in the new act did not come in operation until 1881, and the prior ones continued in force till then According to sections and 11 of 49 and 50 Vic., ch. 95, which are re-enactments of the Interpretation Act, made in express terms applicable to the charter of St. Johns by its last clause, doubt to cover this point.
They read as follows
As to the distress warrant to levy taxes, the enactments of the new charter are similar to those of the first.
It has been urged on the part of the appellants that this bridge is not taxable at all. But this is erroneous. It is immovable property and therefore subject to taxation.
See The Niagara Falls Suspension Bridge v. Gardner
Another objection taken by the appellants is that the interest accrued on these taxes could not be levied by warrant of distress.
By sections 368 of 40 Vic. ch. 29, which is incorporated in the St. Johns charter, interest runs on all taxes from the date that they become due.
The appellants contention is that though for the taxes themselves a warrant of distress can issue the interest thereon is recoverable only by action. I cannot accede to this proposition.
The interest is a part of the taxes due to the corporation, and it would require a very clear text, and a novel one it would be, to convince me that the mode to recover the capital is not the same as that to recover interest. In an analogous case, Baker v. kelly (2) the judge delivering the judgment of the Superior Court of Minnesota said: SUPREAfE COURT OF CANADA. " I can see no reason why the interest and costs should " not follow the tax and be collected in the same "manner."
Such is my view of the question.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the present appeal should be dismissed with costs.
J.-The assessments and rates made and imposed for the years in question from 1880 to 1883 inclusive, are, in my opinion, clearly illegal and void. By the 98th sec. of 43 and 44 Vic. ch. 62, intituled " An Act " to amend and consolidate the act of incorporation of " the town of St. Johns and the several acts amending " the same," it is enacted that sections 326 and 327 together with several other sections of The Town Corporation General Clauses Act 40 Vic. ch. 29 shall form part of 43 and 44 Vic. ch. 62.
By these sections provision is made for the manner in which real estate, and prescribing what real estate, of railway companies, shall be assessed by the municipality in which such real estate is situated.
By these sections it is enacted.
[The learned judge then read sections 326 and 327
Now, the manner to be adopted with other ratepayers is prescribed by the 323 section, which declares it to be the duty of valuators to make the valuation of the taxable property of the municipality according to real value, and that they shall also make a valuation of the annual value of such property, and shall enter it on the roll in a separate column.
In case the return is made by the company, as directed in the 326 section, the valuators shall adopt the valuation given by the company, but if no such return be made they shall value the taxable property according to their own estimate of its real value. It is in either case only the taxable property that is to be assessed.
Now, these sections 326 and 327 owe their origin to the Lower Canada Municipal and Road Act of 1855, 18 Vic. ch. 100 sec. 4, which in its turn owes its origin to the Assessment Laws Consolidation Act of Upper Canada 16 Vic. ch. 182 sec. 21.
Under this act it was decided by the Court of Queen's Bench for Upper Canada, when the late Sir John Robinson was Chief Justice of that court, in the case of The Great Western Railway Co. v. Rouse that the language was too clear to admit of a doubt, and that it exempts, and that the intention of the act was clearly to exempt, all the superstructure, such as the iron, rails, bridges, &c., from all liability to assessment, aAd that as to the roadway, all that is assessable is the land occupied by the railway, according to the average value of land in the locality; and further, that the decision of the County Court Judge (to whom an appeal had been taken) maintaining an assessment of superstructure was not final, the question not being as to over valuation of property liable to be assessed, but whether there was any authority to assess the superstructure at all; and in London v.
The Great Western Railway Co. it was held by the same court that as the municipality had no right to assess superstructure the objection could be taken in an action, although there had been no appeal taken to the County Court Judge; that the appeal given to the County Court Judge, whose decision thereon was by the statute made final, was only for over valuation of property liable to be assessed, and that the municipality could not, whatever the form of proceeding, recover a rate illegally imposed.
These are, in my opinion, sound judgments which should be sustained. Now, in the present case it is shown in plain terms by the assessment rolls, that the assessments and rates which are objected to were imposed on superstructure, namely, on " railway tracks " from East Lougueil to bridge," and for " part of railroad " bridge within the limits of the town of St. Johns." The " railway tracks" so assessed consist not only of " the land occupied by the road," but of the wooden sleepers and the iron rail laid down thereon, which is what constitutes the " railway track."
And as J. to the bridge, which appears to be across the river Richelieu, the bed of which is vested in the crown, and is, as such, exempt from taxation, it is a structure erected for no other purpose than to bear the iron rail, which with its supports constitute the track across the river.
This structure takes the place of sleepers laid on level ground. The railway being required to cross the river (the bed of which is in the crown) had, of necessity, to be supported by a structure different from that which is required to support the rails on land.
The bridge, therefore, which is erected over the bed of the river which is vested in the crown, is in all its parts superstructure and constitutes the "railway track" over the river, and the statutable direction to estimate the value of the land occupied by the road according to the average value of land in the locality is wholly inapplicable to such a structure. Then it is clear by the 79th section of 43 and 44 Vic. ch. 62, that the process given to have the valuation or assessment rolls reviewed at the instance of persons considering themselves aggrieved by the assessment, applies only to cases of complaint as to excessive valuation, of assessable property. But the rates, which are here objected to, having been wholly illegally imposed that is to say, imposed upon property not liable to assessment, the warrant to levy rates so imposed, is void as ultra vires of the corporation St. Johns, and the proceeding by injunction to restrain the enforcement of such warrant is an appropriate remedy expressly given by the statute Vic. ch. 14 of the Province of Quebec.
Statutes and regulations cited
-
- sections 368
- sections 326
- 327
-
Unresolved citations
- section 98
- sections 326
- 327
- section 327
- section 326
- 327 of the former General Municipal Act
- Section 327
- section 86
- section 101
- section 331
- Section 323
- section 370
- Section 7
- section 23
- section 1