Beaudet v. The North Shore Railway Co.

'Dec. 14. THE NORTH SHORE RAILWAY CO...RESPONDENTS. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BBNCII FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).

43-44 Vic. ch. 43 sec. 9 (P. Q.)-Award- Validity of-Faits et articles-Art. 225 C. C. P.

E. B. et at. joint owners of land situate in the city of Quebec were awarded $11,900 under 43-44 Vic. ch. 43 sec. 9, for a portion of said land expropriated for the use of the North Shore Railway Company.

Ori the 12th March, 1885, E. B. et al. instituted an action against the North Shore Railway Company, based on the award. The company not having pleaded foreclosure was granted, and on the 21st April, process for interrogatories upon faite et articles was issued, and returned on the 20th April. The company made default. On the 18th June, the faits et articles were declared taken pro confessis. On the 16th May E. B. et al. consented that the defendants be allowed to plead, but it was only on the 7th July that a plea was filed, alleging that the arbitration had been irregular and was against the weight of evidence. On the 2nd September, E. B. et al. inscribed the case for hearing on the merits, on which day the railway company moved to be authorized to answer the faits et articles and the motion was refused.

The notice of expropriation and the award both described the land expropriated as No. 1, on the plan of the railway company deposited according to law, but in another part of the notice it described it as forming part of a cadastral lot 2345 and in the award as forming part of lots 2344-2345. On the 5th December, judgment was rendered in favor of E. B. et' al. for the amount of the award.

From this judgment the railway company appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench (appeal side) and that court reversed the judgment of the Superior court, holding inter alia the award bad for uncertainty, and that the case.should also be sent back to the -Superior Court to allow the defendants to answer the fails et articles.

W.

faits APPE AL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) reversing the judgment of the Superior Court in favor of the appellants.

This was an action brought by the appellants against the respondents claiming the sum of $11,f00, being the amount of an award made under the provisions of "The Quebec Consolidated Railway Act, 1880." The notice by the North Shore Railway Company to appellants was as follows:- R.R. E. et al.

"L'An mil huit cent quatre-vingt-trois, le quinzibme jour de juin, A la requisition de la Compagnie du Chemin de fer du Nord, corps politique et incorpor6. "Je, Notaire public pour la Province de Qubbec, residant en la cit6 de Qu6bec, soussign6, me suis expris transport6 au bureau de Monsieur .Amede Auger, Secr6taire Trbsorier d'une association de construction portant le nom de Elis~e Beaudet, ou 6tant et parlant A Monsieur Jacques On6siphore Trudel, commis dans le dit Bureau, j'ai d6clar6 et signifi6 aux dits Elis6e Beaudet et autres : que la dite Compagnie du Chemin de fer du Nord requiert pour la construction et le d6placement d'une partie de son chemin autoris6 par l'acte quarante cinq Victoria 2eme section, chapitre vingt, une portion de terre de deux arpents et quarante perches en superficie tel que maintenant jalonnie et faisant partie du lot num6ro (2345) deux mille trois cent quarante cinq du cadastre pour la paroisse de St, Sauveur de Qu6bec, et portant le numbro un sur le plan. du trac6 du Chemin de fer tel que d6pos6 suivant la loi."

The award was as follows

"L'An mil huit cent quatre-vingt-trois le vingt huitisme jour d'aost.

" Ont comparu, devant le Notaire pour la Province de Qu6bec, en la Puissance du Canada, r~sidant en la cit6 de Qu6bec, soussign6.

"Monsieur Jean-Baptiste Bertrand de la paroisse de St-Roch de Qubbec, marchand de bois.

"Arbitre nomm6 par la Compagnie du Chemin de fer du Nord.

" Monsieur David Bell, de la paroiss6 de St-Sauveur de Qu6bec, manufacturier, arbitre nomm6 par 1'Association de Construction portant les noms de Elis6e Beaudet et autres, et Monsieur Joseph Grondin de la paroisse de Charleshourg, agent d'assurance, tiers arbitre nomme par Messieurs Bertrand et Bell, le tout conform6ment aux dispositions de l'acte refondu des chemins de fer de Qu6bec 1880.

" Lesquels out d~clar6 ; *

" Que sous l'autorit6 de l'acte 45 Victoria chap., XX la dite Compagnie du Chemin de fer du Nord requiert, pour la construction et le d6placement d'une partie de sa voie ferr6e, le terrain suivant. Savoir:

" Un certain terrain situ6 en la paroisse de St- Sauveur de Qu6bec, contenant deux arpents et quarante perches en superficie, born6 an Nord-Onest, au Sud- Est et A l'Ouest par la dite association et A l'Est par les h6ritiers Tourangeau, et faisant partie des lots num6ros (2344-2345) deux mille trois cent quarante quatre et deux mille trois cent quarante cinq du cadastre pour la dite paroisse de St. Sauveur et portant le num6ro un sur le plan du trac6 du chemin de for tel que d6pos6 suivant la loi.

Qu'apris avoir au pr6alable prt6 le serment requis RY Go. par la loi ainsi qu'il appert par les certificats ci-annex6s sauf quant au certificat de M. J. Bertrand, qui n'est pas produit, ils ont proc6d6 A 1'examen du dit terrain et d6pendances et pris tous renseignements n6cessaires. " Et qu'apris avoir mihrement dlib~r6, Messieurs Bell et Grondin se sont accord6s sur le montant de l'indemnit6 qui doit 6tre constat6e par leur sentence arbitrale.

" Et proc6dant en cons~quence, par les pr6sentes, A la reddition de la dite sentence les dits arbitrees David Bell et Joseph Grondin, ont fix6 & la somme de onze mille neuf cent piastres l'indemnit6 que la dite Compagnie du Chemin de fer du Nord aura A payer i la dite association de construction pour le terrain sus d~crit.

" A la charge par ces derniers de lib~rer le terrain pr~cit6 de toutes rentes constitubes hypoth6ques, servitudes autres charges quelconques affectant le dit terrain.

Messieurs Grondin et Bell r~clament en sus de l'indeunit6 ci- haut, l'intbrat de cette indemnit6 A six pour cent depuis la possession par la Compagnie du terrain expropri6.

" Dont acte fait et pass6 A Qubbec, sous le num6ro cinq cent quarante deux des minutes de Frangois Eusabe Blondeau, Notaire soussign6.

En foi de quoi Messieurs David Bell et Joseph Grondin, out sign6 avec le Notaire, Monsieur Bertrand s'tant absent6 avant la reddition et la lecture de la dite sentence.

Sign6,

DAVID BELL.

JOSEPH GRONDIN. F. E. BLONDEAU, N. P. proper notice was given to all the arbitrators of the day on which it was to be made, viz., 14th August, but was adjourned and the award was rendered the 23th August, at Which meeting Bertrand withdrew during the sitting. In his evidence at the trial he said

As to the objection regarding the fails et articles. The default of the defendants was first recorded on 26th April, 1885, then on a formal motion the interrogatories were held pro-confessis. Over two months afterwards the defendants apply to answer, without filing their answers, without offering to pay the costs incurred, and in spite of the terms of the consent in virtue of which they had-long after the delays,-filed their plea, which they were only entitled to do condition that the case would not be delayed. There must be a certain limit to delays obtained by means omissions on behalf of parties.

Pending the long ddlibdrd, was it not the duty of the defendants to make a motion accompanied, as usual, with their answers and with the offer of paying the costs as required by law in such instances ? The defendants have not thought fit to act in that way.

Is it not probable that they were afraid of being allowed to file their answers? Then the case might have gone back on the enquAte roll and evidence might have been adduced proving that the plaintiffs' pretentions were correct.

The Superior Court was obviously right in granting some kind of protection to the plaintiffs against the extraordinary delays, omissions and defaults of the defendants.

The same court could not, on motion, reverse and annul the judgment already rendered, de- T.. claring the Jaits et articles taken pro-confessis.

Why then order the case back to the Superior Court in order that the faits et articles should be answered ? What benefit would result from that for either party? If the faits et articles are to be answered, what is the use of appointing new arbitrators ?

As to uncertainty the lot described in the notice, is exactly the same as the one mentioned'in the award, to wit: "lot number one upon the plan of the tract of "the railroad as deposited according to law."

The plan of the railroad, " deposited according to law," became the real and only legal plan and description of the lot in question. Both the notice and the award give its area: " 2 arpents et 40 peiches."

So soon as that plan was deposited it was by law substituted for the general cadastral plan, which can no longer apply to the lot of which the said plan is a parcelling out and sub-division.

The second objection raised by the defendants in their factum before the Appeal Court is that there seems to be no notice to the arbitrators of their sitting on the 28th August.

It is alleged by the action-not specifically denied, and proved by the faits et articles-that such meeting was an adjourned one, as decided by the arbitrators at their meeting of the 14th, duly called by the notice, produced in the record.

Subs. 18 (of said Sec. pro vides for those adjourned meetings.

But let us go a step further. The three arbitrators XV.]

appeared before the notary on the 28th of August. Bertrand, the defendants' arbritrator, who withdrew ing he sitting of the 2th, when examined as a witness by the defendants, says that they have examined many witnesses, and adds: That he had received all the necessary notices and all the proceedings had been regular.

[he third objection raised is that the plaintiffs have no juridical existence as a company.

The defendants' notice served on the plaintiffs shows that defendant had accepted them as joint proprietors ; they sued as such; no exception to the form has denied their qualities (Code of Procedure arts 116 et 119).

The defendants, not having denied the qualities assumed by the plaintiffs in the writ of summons, must be held to have admitted them and to have waived all possible objection. It is too late to have the award invalidated for defect of form.

Subs. 27 of the said section 9 is also a peremptory answer to that objection. It says: "Nor shall it be " necessary that the party or parties to whom the sum is to be paid be named in the award."

The illegalities on which we based our plea are the following :

In fact, by the notice given by the respondents to the appellants in conformity with sub-sec. 13 of sec. 9 the Quebec Consolidated Railway Act, notice which according to this sub-section must contain " a description of the lands to be taken, &c.," the respondents requested two arpents and forty perches forming part of the lot 2345 of the official cadastre for the parish of St. Sauveur. But the majority of the arbitrators without taking account of this injunction, adjudged on another parcel of land, on a parcel forming part of the lots 2344 and 2345 of the official cadastre for the parish of St. Sa-uveur.

Consequently there is no conformity between the designation inserted in the notice and the one contained in the sentence ; and on the part of the arbitrators there was adjudication on a litigation not submitted to them

It does not appear by the record that there was any such day fixed. There is in the record a notice from one of the arbitrators but this notice, which could not fulfil the prescription of the above disposition, is made for the 14th of August, and the pretended sentence has been rendered on the 28th of August. The pretended sentence of arbitrators does not mention the names of the owners on the ground expropriated and on which it is adjudged.

They are there designated in this manner " l'association de construction portant de Elisde Beaudet et autres." But this association not being incorporated has no juridical existence.

It is true that it is alleged in the declaration, " Que les mots 'Association de constrction portant les noms de Elis6e Beaudet et autres' employ6s dans les titres sont une expression de convention employ6e pour designer les Demandeurs comme propri6taires indivi des dits immeubles," but this allegation is of no value because it is not proved, and even if proved it could not cover this absence of designation of parties required by the law. One of two things, either the proceedings and the sentenes of the arbitrators have a judicial quality and thelk us doubt that the names and qualities of all the parties ought to be mentioned, at least in the sentence ; or, they have an extra judicial quality and the designation of names and qualities is still rigorously exacted by the Article 1344 of the Civil Code of Procedure of Lower Canada.

In any case the judgment of the Court of Appeal was correct in ordering the record to be sent back to the Superior Court in order to allow the respondents to answer the faits et articles, for it is in accordance with the jurisprudence and the law (Article 225 Civil Code of Procedure Bas Canada).

Sir W. J. RITCHIE C.J.-I think the judgment of the Superior Court should be restored. I think the arbitration was quite regular and the award perfectly good and binding on the parties; that there is no object whatever to be gained by sending the case back to answer upon faits et articles and that there is nothing in the objection that the award does not mention the names of the owners of the ground expropriated. The names in the award are the same as those used by the railway company in their notice of expropriation and in the arbitration throughout, and as to the considdrant:

au terrain expropri6

I think this view cannot prevail. This, in my opinion, is just a case where the maxim falsa demonstratio non nocet applies.

There is adequate and sufficient definition with convenient certainty of what was intended on the application and award, that is to say, the words of the notice and award, exclusive of the Ritchie C.J. falsa demonstratio, are sufficient of themselves to describe the property intended to be expropriated and which was valued by the arbitrators.

As has been stated the characteristic of cases strictly within the above rule is this, that the description, so far as it is false, applies to no subject, and so far as it is true it applies to one subject only; and the court, in these cases, rejects no words but those which are shown to have no application to any subject.

Now in this case the words " Et portant le numero

"un sur le plan du trac6 du chemin de for tel que.

d6pos6 suivant la loi " must be referred to for the purpose of determining the land the company sought to expropriate. Without these words it would be impossible to locate the lands to be expropriated.

The land valued by the arbitrators is described as

And in the award the land is described as follows:

So that whether it was part of lot 2345 or part lots 2344 & 2345, or these numbers be rejected altogether, the rest of the description specifies the land beyond all doubt as part of lot number one of the railway plan. It is therefore clear that the notice and the award refer precisely to the same parcel of arpeuts & 40 perches of land and is the same land taken possession of by the defendants, viz; lot number one upon the plan of the tracd of the railroad, as deposited according to law and which they sought to expropriate.

Under these circumstances there can be no doubt there was a good and sufficient description. The arbitrator of the company under oath says all the proceedings were regular and that he differed from the other arbitrators only as regards the amount. The appeal, in my opinion, should therefore be allowed. J.-I have read the judgment which will be delivered by Mr. Justice Fournier and I fully concur in the reasons given by him for reversing the judgment appealed from.

The appeal should be allowed with costs.

J.-L'action des appelants demandait la confirmation d'une sentence arbitrale rendue par des arbitres nomm6s en vertu de l'acte consolid6 des chemins de fer de Qu6bec, 43-44 Vict., ch. 43, pour faire 1'6valuation du terrain expropri6 pour passage du chemin de fer de la compagnie intimbe. Celle-ci a plaide la nullit6 de cette sentence, sans, cependant, indiquer par sa d6fense un seul moyen de nullit6.

Elle en a aussi attaqu6 le m6rite en pr6tendant que le montant accord6 exchde la valeur r6elle de la propri6t6 et n'est pas justifi6 par la preuve.

Quant cc dernier moyen ii est 6vident qu'en vertu des arts. 133 et 1354 du code de procedure l'intim6e n'avait aucun droit de remettre en question devant la Cour Sup6rieure le m6rite de la contestation qui avait 6te soumise aux arbitres. Elle ne devait attaquer cette sentence que par des moyens de nullit6 pouvant I'affecter, ou des questions de forme pouvant en emptcher 1'ex~cution.

Elle n'en a allgu6 ni prouve aucun, et en cons6quence la Cour

Sup6rieure a renvoy6 son plaidoyer, confirm6 la dite sentence et condamn6 1'intim6e & en payer le montant. Ce jugement a 6t6 port6 en appel 5 la Cour du Ban Fo e. de la Reine, et 1, pour la premibre fois, 1'intime a invoqu6, pour attaquer la sentence en question, des moyens de nullit6 qu'elle n'avait pas plaid6s.

Le premier est que la propri6t6 requise par l'intim6e et d6sign6e dans 1'avis qu'elle a donn6 n'est pas la m~me que celle d6crite dans la sentence arbitrale.

20 Qu'il n'apparalt pas avoir 6 dound avis aux arbitres de leur sance du 28 aofit, A laquelle la dite sentence a t6 rendue. Que les appelants n'ont pas d'existence

16gale comme compagnie.

La premibre et la deuxibme de ces questions seules m6ritent une r6ponse; car la cour du Banc de la Reine en a fait des consid6rants de son jugement, infirmant celui de la cour Sup~rieure. Quant h la troisibme, la cour d'Appel n'ayant pas .jug6 A propos d'en faire mention, je ne crois pas devoir m'y arrter. Les motifs qui out fait le base de son jugement sont: 1 le refus de permettre & l'intim6e de r6pondre aux interrogatoires sur faits et articles auxquels el1e avait fait dWfant de comparaltre.

20 Le d6faut d'identit6 de la propri6t6 requise avec celle d6crite dans la sentence arbitrale.

30 Le d6faut des arbitres d'avoir fix6 h leur premibre s6ance la date de la prononciation de leur sentence.

La plus importante de ces questions est celle concernant le refus de la cour Sup6rieure de permettre & 1intim6e d'Atre relev~e de son d6faut sur faits et articles et d'offrir ses r6ponses. En g~n6ral, il est assez facile dans une contestation s6rieuse de se faire relever de ce d6faut. L'article 225 du C. P. C. dit:but

L'art. 221 dit que les parties peuvent Atre interrog6es en tout 6tat de cause mais sans retardation du prochs jugement.

L'action est entr6e en cour le 24 mars 1884; 1'intimbe a t forc6e de plaider le 16 avril, et la cause a t6 inscrite aux enqubtes ex parte pour le 26. Les appelants avaient obtenu une ragle pour faits et articles rapportable ce jour- A laquelle 1'intim6e fit d6faut. Le 23 juin les faits et articles sont pris et consid6rbs comme:avou6s et confess6s, pro con!essis. L'enquite des appelants est close et celle de l'intimbe fix6e p6remptoirement au 26 juin sans opposition de sa part.

Ce jour 16 son enquite est d6clarbe close g6nralement sous la r6serve du droit d'entendre deux t~moins qui le sont plus tard. Ce n'est que le 7 juillet, plus de deux mois apres I'entr~e de Faction et apris la cl6ture de l'enqute que l'intimbe produit ses plaidoyers. Les parties soumettent la cause au juge le 8 juillet et le d6lib6r6 est d6charg6 le 9 sans qu'on sache pour quel motif. Le 2 septembre la cause est de nouveau inscrite pour audition finale au m~rite pour le 17 du mime mois.

Le 16 l'intim6e produit l'affidavit de T. E. Normand avec un avis de motion pour permission de r~pondre aux faits et articles.

Le 19 cette motion est renvoy~e avec d6pens.

On voit par les dates de la proc~dure que c'est plus de quatre mois et demi apris ]'enregistrement du d6faut sur faits et articles que la demande d'en 6tre relev6e a td faite, et au moment oft la cause 6tait inscrite pour audition finale.

Cette permission n'6tait 6videmment demandee que dans le but gagner du temps. L'honorable juge a compris que dans des circonstances l'intim6e avait fait preuve de taut de negligence, il ne pouvait sans violer Particle 221 accorder cette demande. Cet l6 article d6clare que 1'interrogatoire sur faits et articles aura lieu sans retardation de cause.

L'enquAte 6tant close g6n6ralement, permettre alors de r~pondre aux interrogatoires, c'4tait priver les appelants du b6n~fice de la preuve leur r~sultant du d6faut de comparntion et du jugement declarant les interrogatoires comme- J. avou6s et confess6s, et les obliger h refaire leur enquAte.

C'6tait 6videmment retarder la cause, en violation de

Particle 221. Ind6pendamment de cette objection insurmontable, il en existe encore plusieurs autres pour justifier le refus de l'honorable juge.

D'abord cette permission de r6pondre aprs le d~faut ne peut Atre accord6e qu'avant 1'auditiori de la cause, " before the hearing of the case." La cause avait d6ji t entendue lorsque la demande a .

faite, et elle 6tait au moment d'Atre entendue pour la deuxibme fois. L'art.

225 ne donne pas la facilit6 de r6pondre a l'audition, mais avant, "before the hearing," il 6tait trop tard pour faire cette demande qui, d'ailleurs, n'4tait pas faite conformInment au dit article. En effet cet article impose A l'octroi de cette permission une condition absolue, c'est celle de payer les frais occasionn~s par le d~faut "but he must bear the costs occasioned by his default " II aurait dft accompagner sa motion du montant de la diffirence de frais et honoraires entre l'6tat ofx en 6tait alors la proc6dure, et celui o il aurait fallu la remettre pour continuer 1'enqute.

L'intim6e ne s'6tant pas conform6e & cette condition, la motion ne devait pas 6tre reque.

De plus 1'excuse que le bureau de direction ne s'est r6uni que le 4 septembre pour autoriser les r6ponses est insuffisante.

Normand ne jure pas qu'il n'y a pas eu de r6union du bureau entre le

26 avril et 4 septembre, et d'ailleurs 1'absence de r6union du bureau n'est pas une excuse acceptable, c'6tait le devoir des officiers de la compagnie d'en convoquer une sp6cialement pour cet objet s'il ne devait pas y en avoir pour d'autre affaire.

Convaincu que le b6n6fice du d6faut doit rester acquis aux appelauts, et qu'il en r ute tne pruve compl6te de toutes les al.egations de sa demande, je suis d'avis que ce motif seul serait suffisant pour faire infirmer le jugement de la Cour Fournier J. du Bane de la Reine.

Si bien fund6 que soit le refus de permettre la production des r~ponses sur faits et articles, j'inclinerais probablement & les recevoir, si les deux autres consid6rants du jugement 6taient bien fond6s en fait, mais je regrette d'avoir A dire que je ne partage pas 1'opinion de la cour du Banc de la Reine A cet 6gard. Je erois que, comme quesfion de fait, l'identit6 de 1'immeuble dont il s'agit, tel quo d~crit dans l'avis d'expropriation et dans la sentence arbitrale, est parfaitement 6tablie.

II en est de mime de la pr~sence de 'intimbe, on plut6t de son arbitre, lorsque la sentence a t6 prononc~e.

L'objection A 1'identit6 du terrain consiste dans le fait que l'avis d'expropriation ne fait mention que de partie du lot cadastral 2345, tandis que la sentence mentionne partie des lots 2344, 2315 du m~me cadastre.

Toutes les propri6tbs dans la province sont cadastr6es et d6sign6es par num~ros.

C'est leur d6signation officielle tant qu'elle n'est pas modifi6e en vertu d'une loi. Dans ce cas-ci elle 1'a 6t0 en vertu de 1'acte des chemins de for 43-44 Vict., ch. 43. En vertu de la section 8, lorsqu'une compagnie de chemin de fer vent exproprier des terrains pour le passage de son chemin, elle doit faire faire une carte ou plan du chemin de fer, son cours, des terrains qu'il doit traverser et qui devront 6tre expropri6s A cette fin; aussi, un livre de renvoi pour le chemin de for qui contiendra:a. Une description g6n6rale des terrains;

Ces proc6d6s doivent examin6s et certifi6s par le Commissaire d'agriculture et des travaux publics.

Daus la carte pr6par6e par les ing6nieurs de la Cie., Dans laCo.

les lots on partie de lots requis pour le passage du chemin de fer ont 6t6 d6sign6s par des num6ros particuliers.

Celui des appelants est d6sign6 par le no sur la carte du chemin de fer et il est d6sign6 par le mime no dans 1'avis et dans la sentence arbittale, et c'est maintenant sa description 16gale, il ne pent Atre connu autrement et la r&frence aux du cadastre dans

1'avis n'4tait qu'une indication sans utilit6 et nullement obligatoire apr~s l'approbation officielle et le d6p6t du plan du chemin de fer. Dans l'avis et dans la sentence la description devenue la seule 16gale et officielle est donn6e comme 6tant de deux arpents et 40 perches avec rf~rence an plan du chemin de fer et indiquant le no de ce plan.

L'identit4 est parfaite et

1'erreur impossible. Si cette objection avait quelque fondement, l'intim6e n'aurait-elle pas d-i en prendre avantage par son plaidoyer et mettre les appelants en demeure de faire la preuve de cette identit6, si elle n'6tait pas dcjh suffisamment prouv6e par l'avis et la sentence ainsi que par les autres documents en preuve?

Je considbre done cette objection comme une pure technicit6 qui ne peut aucunement affecter la sentence ni en empicher 1'homologation.

Quant au d6faut d'avis du jour oil devait Atre prononc~e la dite sentence arbitrale, la r6ponse est que la d6claratiou contient une allgation qui n'a pas t ni~e sp6cialement que cet avis a td donn6 et que la rannion des arbitres le juin avait en lieu en vertu d'un ajournement.

Si ces faits n'6taient pas amplement

6tablis par la preuve au dossier, ils le seraient dans tons les cas par l'absence de r6ponse aux faits et articles. Mais il y a plus que cela, le procs-verbal authentique de la r6union des arbitres, le 28 juin, r6dig6 par le notaire Blondeau, fait preuve de la r6u- TE nion des trois arbitres. Cette r6union n'a pu avoir lieu qu'en vertu d'un ajournement que la loi declare un avis suffisant (voir sec. 9, ss. 18). De plus la preuve de Fournier J. la presence de l'arbitre de l'intim6e faite par le prochs-verbal, est encore confirmbe par son propre t6moignage dans lequel il d6care positivement y avoir & present et n'avoir laiss6 la sance que parce qu'il diff6rait d'opinion d'avec ses colligues.

Voici ce qu'il dit A ce sujet :- Dans ses transquestions il ajoute:- Ainsi, il est 6vident que le consid6rant fond6 sur le d6faut d'avis n'est pas fond.

Par tons ces motifs, je suis d'avis que le jugement de la Cour du Banc de la Reine doit Atre infirm6 avec d6pens, et celui de la cour Sup~rieure r6tabli.

J.-This is an action to recover the am6unt of an award made by arbitrators in favor of the appellant for lands taken from him and others for the railway of the respondent company.

No objection to the appointment of the arbitrators, who were nominated by the parties, was made, but two objections were taken to the award.

One, that the arbitrators did not at their first meeting appoint a time for the final meeting to make their award. I will deal with this objection first. In the first place it is not shown that they did not do so. The proof of that issue was on the respondent company and not having adduced the proof of the allegation we have no right to assume it was not done.

respondent company was represented at the final meeting by their own arbitrator who attended and Hen took part with the two other arbitrators in respect to the subject matter of the reference and in the deliberations as to the award, which was made in his presence. The company having been present by their arbitrator are estopped from making the objection.

The provision in the statute upon which the respondent company relies to sustain the objection was made solely to limit the time for making the award, which by the proceedings was not otherwise done, and when the time for making the award is so limited and no award be made within the time so limited the power of the arbitrator ceases and any award subsequently made would not be binding; but if before an award should be made the parties interested should mutually extend the time in a proper manner, or the arbitrators should extend it, it would be binding. Sub-section 22 of section provides " and if the same (the award) is not made on or before such day or some other to which the time for making it has been prolonged either by consent of the parties, or by resolution of the arbitrators, then the sum offered by the company, as aforesaid, shall be the compensation to be paid by them."

I therefore think the objection on that ground must fail.

Another objection was made that the description of the lands in the award differs from that in the submission. Such an objection was not pleaded, and I am of opinion that to get any benefit from the contention it should have been.

By the statute the award might have been invalidated if it did not clearly state tb YOL. XV.]

sum awarded, or did not describe clearly the property expropriated, but think such a defence cannot be considered unless specially pleaded.

The Court of Appeal rested its judgment on two J.

That the respondent company was not present when the award was made.

I have already stated that, in my opinion, the respondent company was present by its arbitrator. We have now to compare the description of the lands in the notice of expropriation with that in the award.

The land expropriated is described in the notice for that purpose as:

The description in the award is:

There was no evidence produced to show that the land described in the award differs on the ground from that described in the notice of expropriation; there was none to show that the boundaries mentioned in the award are not exactly the same as cover the same two acres and forty perches staked off as stated in the notice quantity is the same in both.

The plan in question is referred to in both, and with it both agree as ['OL. kV. far as shown and which appears on reference to it. The only difference that can be discovered is that two numbers of the cadastre are stated in the award while but one is stated in the notice. That however is unimportant for if the plan, which the statute refers to as settling the size and shape of the lot expropriated, is Henry J. referred to in both the notice and award, there can arise no doubt as to the land mentioned in the award being the same as that expropriated in quantity and shape, and the other parts of the description in the notice and award maybe rejected as surplusage.

There is therefore no variance as contended for by the respondent company.

There was another point referred to in the argument which was that the plaintiffs could not sue jointly on the award, but I am of the opinion their action will lie. The land belonging to them was expropriated in one lot. The notice was directed to the appellant and others. It was served, we must assume, on all of them. They were treated, therefore, as owners jointly, or as tenants in common.

There is no evidence that I can see that they did not so hold. The award declares that the sum awarded should be paid to the same parties and I think that without any plea or evidence adduced we must assume them to be entitled to recover. I am of opinion that the appeal should be allowed and the judgment of the Superior Court affirmed with costs.

J.-I would dismiss this appeal.

plaintiffs' action cannot stand upon the record as it now is. They are not the parties in favor of whom the award was made.

They have not alleged nor proved that they are the association in favor of whom the award was made.

Then there is no proof of Dr. Trudel's death, as alleged in the declaration.

Even the faits et articles do not cover that fact. The 26th relates to a Dr. Dorion.

The case should be remitted to the Superior Court, with permission to the defendant to answer the fails et articles.

G J.-This is an action upon an award made by two of three arbitrators appointed under the provisions of the statute in that behalf to assess the value of a piece of land belonging to the plaintiffs and required by the defendants to be expropriated for the purposes of their railway. The declaration specially alleges the award and the performance of all matters necessary to be performed to give effect to it. Interrogatories sur faits et articles served upon the defendants were ordered to be taken pro confessis for default in answering them. The defendants having neglected to plead to the action were, by special consent of the plaintiffs, allowed to plead upon certain conditions which, however, never were fulfilled.

They filed however pleas besides the general issue to the following effect:

That the said award is completely at variance with the proof advanced before the said arbitrators and

3rd. That the award made by the said arbitrators is much more extensive than the evidence and the value of the piece of land in question warranted.

A motion made by the defendants two months after the interrogatories sur faits et articles had been taken pro con'essis, and without performance of the conditions upon which the plaintiffs had consented to the defendants pleading to the action, for leave to produce answers to the interrogatories having been refused by the court, the case was heard upon the merits.

The defendants examined two witnesses which were the only witnesses [VOL. offered by them in support of their pleas.

In the

Superior Court judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs upon the ground that the defendants wholly failed to support their pleas impeaching the award. The Court of Queen's Bench in appeal reversed this o judgment upon the grounds that the motion of the defendants for leave to file answers to the interrogatories had been wrongly refused, and that in the judgment of the majority of the said Court of Appeal the piece of land mentioned in the award was different from the piece of land of which the defendants by their notice required the expropriation ; and on the ground further that the arbitrators had not-, at their first meeting, appointed a day on or before which their award should be made ; wherefore the Court of Appeal set aside the award and ordered and adjudged that the parties should proceed anew to the appointment of arbitrators to determine the value of the piece of land which the defendants required to be expropriated.

It is from this judgment that the present appeal is taken.

The appeal must in my opinion be allowed, for not only was there no evidence offered sufficient to invalidate the award, but the pleas themselves contained no allegation sufficient for that purpose. To a declaration averring as the declaration in this case does, the performance of all acts essential to give validity to the award, it is no plea to say that the award has been illegally and irregularly made, or that it has no legal validity. If any thing which was necessary to give the award validity had been omitted to be done, such matter should have been specially pleaded in a plea stating what was the particular matter which was omitted, the omission of which is relied upon as making the award null and void; for if the omission should appear to have been in respect of some matter of mere form, such an omission would not make the award null. As to the plea that the award is more extensive than the evidence and the value of the piece of land warranted that was a matter not open in the present action; and if it had been, the evidence offered by the defendants upon the point, only went to this that GwynneJ. the defendants' arbitrator was of opinion that the amount awarded by the other two arbitrators was excessive. Then the grounds upon which the Court of Queen's. Bench in appeal have annulled the award are, in my opinion, neither raised upon the record, nor, if they were, are they established by the evidence. It is not pleaded that the piece of land in respect which the award was made is a different piece of land in whole or in part from that of which the defendants required the expropriation, and assuming such an objection to be open on the record there was no evidence offered in support of it. The grounds upon which the Court of Appeal arrived at the conclusion that the piece of land in respect of which the award has been made is a piece of land different from that of which the defendants by their notice required the expropriation, are quite inadequate.

The piece of land required by the defendants is by their notice declared to be a piece of land containing precisely two arpents and 40 perches and designated as number one upon a plan of the railway deposited according to law and which piece of land the notice describes as forming part of a cadastral plan No. 2345 of the Parish of St-Sauveur de Quebec. The material part of this notice is that the defendants require the piece of land designated as No. 1 on the railway plan as deposited according to law. Now the award is made in respect of the same piece of land containing just two arpents and forty perches, and designated as number one on the plan of railroad deposited according to law, and further describing it as forming parts of cadastral numbers 2344 and 2345 in the Parish of

St-Sauveur de Quebec.

Now whether the piece of land so required by the defendants, and which was T.. designated on the plan upon which they were by law ~Co.

required to designate it as number one, was situated wholly on the piece of land known as the cadastral Gw3nne J. plan No. 2345, or partly upon that cadastral lot and partly upon an adjoining lot designated as cadastral lot No. 2344 in the Parish of St-Sauveur, makes no difference whatever, the plaintiffs being, as is admitte4l, owners of the whole piece required by the defendants and designated on their plan deposited according to law as No. 1. There can be no uncertainty for the defendants could only have taken possession of, and have only taken possession of, and are by the award required to pay for, the piece of land containing the two arpents and forty perches which they have designated on their plan di-posited according to law as number one. Then again, there is no plea upon the record that the arbitrators had not at their first meeting appointed a day on or before which the award should be made nor, assuming such a plea, without more to offer a good defence to the action did the evidence warrant the conclusion that no such day had been appointed or an adjudication of nullity of the award for that reason;

in fact no evidence was offered to establish the default suggestedby the Court of Appeal, nor does the point appear to have been noticed in the Superior Court. If there had been such default and if it had been legally established, and if the effect of the fault was to nullify the award, then the judgment of the Court of Appeal was erroneous in ordering a new arbitration to be had, for in the event of the section, which directs the arbi- .

trators at their first meeting to appoint a day on or before which their award shall be made, applying so as to nullify their award if made in contravention of

XV.]

of that section, then in such a case the act directs that the amount tendered by the defendants shall be the compensation to be paid by them.

The appeal should be allowed with costs and the .

judgment of the Superior Court restored.

Appeal allowed with costs