'Dec. 15. ANTHYME DESSERT et al. (PETI- RESPONDENTS. TIONERS) ..........
............
ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF MR. JUSTICE HENRI T. TASCHEREAU, SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF THE JOLIETTE CONTROVERTED ELECTION CASE.* Per Gwynne J. -That it would have been competent for the trial judge to have received evidence on the recriminatory charges but his refusal to do so it was not a sufficient ground for reversing the judgment avoiding the election.
* Sir W.
Taschereau declaring the election of the member of the House of Commons for the electoral district of Joliette void by reason of corrupt practices by agents. The appeal was from the judgment upon the merits of the petition in the case and from two decisions delivered by the judge on the 12th of December, 1887, and one on the 30th January, 1888, on the application the appellant to have the petition declared abandoned and at an end and to have the said petition dismissed out of court with costs, and said appellant declared duly elected by reason of the trial of the said petition not having been commenced within six months from the time said petition had been presented.
The material dates and proceedings in the case are the following':
On the 15th February, 1887, the nomination of the candidates took place.
On the 22nd of February the election was held and appellant was returned as the member duly elected. On the 9th April the petition complaining of the undue return of the appellant and claiming the seat for the defeated candidate was presented.
Parliament met on the 13th day of April, 1887, and was in session until the 28td day of June, 1887, on which day it was prorog-ded.
On the 12th day of April, 1887, the appellant moved the court to have all proceedings suspended as well on preliminaries as on the merits during the session of the then Parliament. Mr. Justice Gill granted the motion.
A plea to the merits was fyled on the 20th September, 1887, answer to said plea on the following day, and 'on the 22nd of September 1887 an application was (made" by petitioners to have a day fixed for the trial of the election petition,
YOLi IV.]
The trial for the election petition was fixed for the 22nd November, 1887.
On the 22nd November, 1887, the petitioners proceeded with their enquete before Mr. Justice Taschereau and examined two witnesses: A. M. Rivard, the returning officer, and Urgele Faust, and the case was by the honorable judge presiding at trial continued to the 5th December following (1887), in order to allow petitioners to file another bill of particulars; the particulars then fyled being declared insufficient.
On the 3rd of December, the defendant presented two motions to have the petition declared abandoned, and the defendant confirmed in his seat.
These two motions were taken en ddlibbrd, and the court adjourned to the 12th of December and on that day rejected these two motions.
The defendant took exception to these two judgment, and the court further adjourned to the 5th January, 1888.
On that day the defendant presented another motion contending that the petition having been presented on the 9th of April, 1888, more than six months, even excluding the session, had elapsed without any trial being fixed and held.
On that motion another ddlibdrd was taken and the court was adjourned to the 30th January.
On that day the trial judge rejected the defendant's motion and ordered the trial to be proceeded with, and evidence was given on the following charges inter alia:
"Dans le cours de la dite 6lection, savoir, entre le premier janvier et le vingt-deux f&vrier dernier, le d6fendeur par lui-mame directement on indirectement et par ses agents et notamment par son agent le dit Ad61ard Barrette a donn6, fourni, et a promis diverses sommes d'argent s'61evant . la somme de huit piastres A Joseph Ratelle, fils, cultivateur de la ville de Joliette, dans le but de l'induire & voter en sa faveur on de s'abstenir de voter contre lui.
" Dans le cours de la dite 6lection, savoir, entre le premier j anvier et le vingt-deux f6vrier dernier, dans la dite paroise de Sainte-M6lanie, le d6fendeur par luimgme directement on indirectement et par ses agents et notamment par le dit Ad6lard Barrette, a donn6, fourni, prt6 et a promis diverses sommes d'argent s'61evant A cinq piastres A Frangois Xavier St-Jean, cultivateur et 6lecteur de la paroisse Sainte-M61anie, dans le but de 1'induire A voter en sa faveur on A s'abstenir de voter contre lui.
" Dans le cours de la dite 6lection, le defendeur par lui-m~me et par son agent le dit Ad6lard Barrette & Sainte-Melanie susdit, a donn6, fourni, pr~t6 ou est convenu de donner, fournir, on pr~ter, promis des r6compenses, des sommes d'argent s'61evant A dix piastres, des mets, boissons et autres consid&rations appr6ciables A prix d'argent A Nazaire Lapierre, cultivateur et 6lecteur de la Paroisse de Sainte-M61anie .susdit, dans le but de l'induire A voter en sa faveur, ou de s'abstenir de voter contre lui.
"Dans le cours de la dite 6lection, savoir, entre le premier janvier et le vingt-deux f6vrier dernier A Sainte- M61anie susdit, le d6fendeur lui mome et par ses agents et notamment par les dits Ad6lard Barrette, et Joseph Edouard Perrault, deux de ses agents, a donn6, prt6 on convenu de donner, pr~ter, a offert on promis la somme de cinq piastres A Joseph Beaudry, cultivateur et 6lecteur de Sainte-M61anie susdit, dans le but de l'induire A voter en sa faveur on de s'abstenir de voter contre lui."
On the 1st February the court having decided that corrupt practices had been practiced by A. Barrette, an agent of the appellant, upon seven voters, and that seven votes should be deducted from the appellant's votes, leaving the defeated candidate with a majority of seven votes, the sitting member be allowed to proceed with his recriminatory charges on the 16th February.
On the 11th February the petitioners fyled a declaration withdrawing their claim to the seat.
On the 20th of February, the judge sent a written judgment to the clerk of the court at Joliette,, declaring the election void by reason of corrupt practices by agents of the appellant, but without his knowledge. Cornellier Q.C. and Ferguson for appellant contended: That the order granted by Mr. Justice Gill was not made upon an application to have the time extended for the commencement of the trial under sections 32 and 33 of ch. R.S.C., but upon an application to delay proceedings under section 64, and therefore such order did not deprive the appellant of the right of claiming that in computing the time within which the trial of the present petition should have commenced the time of the session of Parliament should be included. But, even if the time of the session should be excluded, the trial did not actually commence until the 30th January, because what took place before the judge on the 22nd November, 1887, was a nullity, the court having declared that the particulars which, according to the rules of practice, had been fyled six days before the commencement of the trial, were insufficient, and that as a matter of fact the evidence in the case was given in support of particulars fyled subsequent to the 22nd November.
On this branch of the case the learned counsel relied upon the Glengarry case (1).
As to merits the learned counsel admitted bribery, but contended that the evidence of Barrette's agency was (1) C. S. R.
insufficient; and finally in any case the judgment was incomplete, because without notice the judge had deprived the appellant of the right of proving his recrim- ELow inatory charges, a right which he had under sec. 9 of ch 9, R.S.C., and of which he was deprived by the judgment. The case should be remitted back to the court below as was done in the Bellechasse case (1). Choquette and Dugas with him for respondent con. tended:
That the order granted by Mr. Justice Gill was one which in effect delayed all proceedings, including the fixing of the trial, and that the appellant who had applied for it could not now be allowed to ask that the time of the session should be included. As to what took place on the 22nd November, it was clear, that the trial then commenced; the trial judge was present and two witnesses were examined, and the trial was adjourned from time to time in order to complete the particulars, and if what took place on the 22nd November, the day fixed for the trial could, be said to have been illegal then the evidence of these witnesses which was to be found in the appeal book should not have been printed.
But as a matter of fact the judge who was present. on the 22nd November was the trial judge, and when he delivered judgment he relied as much on the evidence taken on that day as on the subsequent days. As to allowing evidence on the recriminatory charges there was nothing to be gained by it. These charges were put in and the judge allowed the evidence because, after the hearing of several witnesses, he came to the conclusion that bribery had been committed by an agent of the appellant on a sufficient number of votes to affect the majority and allow the defeated candidate to claim the seat, but upon the declaration (1) 5 Cat. S. C. R.
StUPREME COURT OF CANADA.
being fyled that we abandoned that portion of the conclusion of our petition by which we claimed the seat for the defeated candidate, all the judge had to do was to give effect to the decision he had arrived at at the closing of the enquete, viz : declare the election void by reason of corrupt practices.
As to the merits there was sufficient evidence of Barrette's agency in the appellant's own evidence to support the judge's finding. For he admits that he knew he was working for him and that all he desired was that he should not commit any illegal act. It is a finding of fact and the court does not reverse such a finding if there is any reasonable evidence to support it. Cornellier Q.C. in reply: The petition and counter petition can only be disposed of together. If not it is in the power of any petitioner to defeat the right given to a candidate whose election is contested.
Sir W. J. C.J.-The nomination of candidates was held on the 15th February, 1887, the election on the 22nd February, 1887; the petition was presented on the 9th April, 1887; Parliament met on the 13th April, 1887, and was in session until the 23rd day of June, 1887, on which day it was prorogued. The defendant, the sitting member, caused a notice to be given to petitioners' advocates of a motion to suspend proceedings during the session of Parliament, a copy of which is as follows:depuis et y compris le dit jour treize avril courant et n'expirera, qu'avec lea deux jours qui suivront la cl6ture de la dite session, le tout avec d6pens distraits aux soussign6s.
Joliette, le 12 avril 1887.
McCONVILLE RENAUD, R Avcts et Procs. du Dffendeur. RitchieC.J.
Avets. et Procs. des Ptitionnaries.
Messieurs,-Avis vous eat par le pr6sent donn6 qe Ia motion cidessus que de la part du D6fendeur nous pr6senterions A cette Honorable Cour A son ouverture jeudi le quatorze avril courant A dix heures du matin, on aussit6t que conseil pourra 6tre entendu au palais de justice en Is ville et district de Joliette..
Joliette, le 12 avril 1887.
MaCONVILLE RENAUD, Avct. et Procs. du Dffendeur. The motion was heard before Mr. Justice Gill on the 12th of April, 1887, who pronounced a judgment granting the said motion in these words:- La cour, parties oules sur is motion du d6fendeur qu'attendu 1'ouverture d'une session du parlement du Canada, le treize du courant, et vu lea dispositions de la section premibre du chap. 10 de l'acte 38 Vict., (Ottawa 1875) reproduites par Is see. 32 du chap. 9 des Statuts Revis6s du Canada 1886, tous proc&ds ult6rieurs en cette cause soient suspendus jusqu'A la cl6ture de la dite session du parlement.
Consid6rant que dans l'interpr6tation A donner au mot instruction (trial) dans la dite section de la loi, il faut comprendre tout le proc6s. Consid6rant que la pr6sence du dfendeur dans le district 6lectoral eat aussi n6cessaire pour pr6parer sea moyens de d6fense qu'elle le serait pour 1'enquite et notament dans 1'espace oii il a 4t6 affirm6 & 1'audience sans contradiction formelle de Ia partie adverse, qu'un second avis de contestation a 6t signifi6 au d6fendeur depuis son d6part pour aller prendre son si~ge au parlement et s'il eat forc6 de se d6fendre pendant que durera la session, il lui faudra revenir imm6diatement pour donner des instructions qu'iI n'a pu donner avant son d6part puisqu'il n'avait pas en Ia signification qui a 6t6 faite A son domicile, depuis.
Accorde Ia dite motion, dit que tous lea proc6d6s ult6rieurs en cette cause sont suspendus pendant la dite session du parlement et que lea d6lais pour la production de toutes d6fenses soit pr61iminaries, soit au m6rite, ne courront pas pendant la dite session du parlement; lea d6pens sur Ia motion devront suivre le sort des frais g6n6raux du procs.
C. G.,0J.C.S. So
Which order unquestionably suspended all proceedings and brought the case within the operation of the 32 section of 49 Vic. ch. which provides that: On the 22nd September the petitioners gave notice of a motion to fix a day for hearing of the petition and on the 10th day of October, 1887, Mr. Justice Taschereau, after having heard the parties on petitioners' motion, accorded the same and ordered that the hearing should take place at the court house in the town of Joliette, in the district of Joliette, on Tuesday the 22nd day of November then next. On the 22nd day of November, 1887, the trial commenced before Mr. Justice Taschereau,and the sheriff of Joliette,the returning officer, was examined and cross-examined; after this examination, on the suggestion of the judge and the parties consenting, the following admissions were made:l'lection One Urgel Faust was then examined and after proceeding thus far the court adjourned till the fifth of December following.
The session of parliament having been excluded by the order of Mr. Justice Gill and the trial having been commenced on the 22nd of November the petitioner was within the six months.
But it xas been contended that if the trial was com- [VO-L. menced on the 22nd of November the judge had no right to adjourn the court until the 5th of December, but was bound to proceed with the same " from day to day until such trial is over;" but without stopping Rc C.J. to enquire whether this provision, if it stood alone, is imperative or directory only, these words must be read in connection with sub-section four of section 31, which enacts that the judge at the trial may adjourn the same from time to time, and from any one place to another in the same electoral district as to him seems convenient;" and also sub-section 2 of sec. 33 which enacts that
No trial of an election petition shall be commenced or proceeded with during any term of the court of which the judge who is to try the same is a member and at which such judge is by law bound to sit.
The court having been adjourned by the judge defendant's contention must fail.
The following is the judgment annulling the election, pronounced on the 20th February, 1888.
La cour syant entendu les t6moins examin6s de part et d'autre et les parties elles-mames, par leurs procureursrespectifs, sur le m6rite de la pr~sente petition d'61eetion, et de la contestation d'icelle, ayant aussi examin6 la proc6dure et toutes les pices du dossier et sur le tout d6libbr6.
Consid6rant qu'il a t6 prouv6 que des manoeuvres frauduleuses ont 6te pratiqu~es par des agents du d6fendeur A 1'41ection dont il s'agit, mais hors la connaissance et sans le connsentment du d6fendeur, et qu'ainsi P'6lection susdite du d6fendeur est nulle.
Consid6rant que les p6titionnaires se sont disist6s de gette partie des conclusions de leur p6tition par laquelle ils r6clamaient le siege pour le candidat Neven.
Maintient Ia p6tition d'6lection en tant qu'elle demande Pl'annulation de P'6lection susdite, la rejette quant au surplus des conclusions, et en cons~quence d6clare nulle et sans effect 1P6lection du defendeur comme membre de la Chambre des Communes du Canada, pour repr6senter le district 6leetoral de Joliette, dans la province de Quebec, laquelle 6lection a eu lieu le 15 f~vrier 1887, (pour Ia pr&sentation des candidats) et le 22 f6vrier 1887 (pour la votation); d6clare aussi nul et sans eflet le rapport de ls dite Mlection, et condamne le dit d6fendeur, outre les frais dbji adjug6s pendant Pinstance, aux frais de la dite p6tition et des proc6dures sur icelle, et a tous les frais d'assignation, d'enqu~te et de st~nographie rendus n6cessaires par 1'examen des t6moins suivants des p6titionnaires Francois-Xavier St. Jean, Ad6lard Barrette, Joseph Beaudry, Joseph - Ratelle, fils, Israel B1anger, Narcisse Gendron, Hormidas Des- Ritchie C.J. marais. On6sime Clermont, Auguste Guilbault et Edouard Guilbault frais d'assignation, d'enquite et de steno. graphie devant Atre respectivement & Ia charge de chacune des parties qui les a encourus.
Et la cour accorde distraction de d6pens & MM. Champagne et Dugas, procureurs des p6titionnaires.
There can be no doubt the judge was fully justified in declaring the election void by reason of bribery by the agents of the defendant.
It is only necessary to mention the case of Adelard Barrette, a nephew of the defendant, who was clearly proved to have been a most active agent of the defendant and a most unscrupulous briber. But it is contended that though the defendant had closed his enqudte as to corrupt practices he should have been allowed to go into recriminatory proof against the defeated candidate H. Neveu, which it is claimed he had a right to do, the petitioners having claimed the seat for said Neveu. Had the claim not been withdrawn this he would clearly have had a right to do.
Sec. 5. A petition complaining of an undue return, or undue election of a member, or of no return, or of a double return, or of any unlawful act by any candidate not returned, by which he is alleged to have become disqualified to sit in the House of Commons, or at any election, may be presented to the court by one or more of the following persons :- (a.) A person who had a right to vote at the election to which the petition rilates ; or
(b.) A candidate at such election;
And such petition is, in this act, called an election petition. Pro. vided always, that nothing herein contained, shall prevent the sitting member from objecting under sec. 12 of this act, to any further proceeding on the petition by reason of the ineligibility or disqualification of the petitioner, or from proving under sec. 42 hereof, that the petitioner was not duly elected.
37 Vic. ch. 10, sec. 7. Sec. 42. On the trial of a petition under this act complaining of an undue return and claiming the seat for any person, the respondent may give evidence to show that the election of such person Section 5 applies to any case where it is alleged any candidate has been guilty of any unlawful act, but section 42 is confined to cases where the seat is claimed but election undue.
If the claim of the seat is primdfacie sustained, then the respondent may give evidence to show that the election of such person was undue in the same manner as if he the respondent had presented a petition complaining of such election.
This is all reasonable enough, because so long as the seat is claimed the judge is still trying out the question of the election and the party entitled to the seat, and as to the party who should be returned by him as the duly elected candidate, but where the claim of the seat for the defeated candidate is not put forward, or if put forward in the petition is abandoned, the election of such candidate ceases to be in issue, for the simple reason that when the claim of the seat is withdrawn there is no election to try and there could be no object, in fact it would be a contradiction in terms, to attempt to show that the election of a person admittedly not elected was undue.
It follows, therefore, if the seat is not claimed, or if claimed the claim is abandoned, and a party is desirous of proceeding against any candidate for any unlawful act by which he is alleged to have become disqualified, he must proceed under section 5.
J.-I am also of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed.
Whatever opinion I might otherwise have entertained as to the proper construction of section 32 of the' Controverted Elections Act, if the question were now open, I consider I am bound by the decision of this court, in the Glengarry Case to
(1) S. C.
XV.]
hold that every election trial must be. commenced within six months from the date of the presentation of the petition unless it is expressly excluded by an order or judgment of the court or judge.
Here the petition was presented on the 9th of April, 1887. On the 14th of April an order or judgment was pronounced by the Honourable Mr. Justice Gill sitting in the Superior Court at Joliette, suspending all proceedings during the session of parliament which commenced on the 13th April and lasted until the 14th June, 1887.
The trial of the petition commenced on the 22nd of November, for on that day witnesses were examined before the trial judge and other proceedings taken. This it appears to me was clearly in time. It is true that several adjournments took place which, it is argued, were not such as the 32 section of the act requires, viz., de die in diem. I think there is a two fold answer to this objection. First, I am of opinion that this provision is entirely directory, and second, there is section 35 which gives to the judge trying an election petition the same powers, jurisdiction and authority as a judge has in all other trials, and one of these powers is the power of enlarging the time for any step or proceeding in the case, and there are often circumstances which necessitate longer adjournments than de die in diem. So that there is nothing in the objection.
As regards the merits, I do not think it possible that a case could ever have come sub judied, much less have reached an appellate court, in which the evidence of bribery was so plain and direct as in the present. Without going through all the cases, let me take that of Adelard Barrette, a nephew of the appellant, in which a clear and undeniable act of bribery is proved. The agency is admitted but the appellant seems to think that he can shelter himself under an express prohibition to his agent against any unlawful proceedings. It is surely not necessary to add that this will not do, and that he is responsible for all the acts of his agents whether they were in breach of his instructions or in accordance with them. As to the point whether the judge had proceeded regularly in avoiding the election without proceeding with the recriminatory charges, I am of opinion that so soon as the claim of the petitioners to the seat was abandoned the judge was right in not proceeding further with the petition. If the appellant wished to take any proceedings against the defeated candidate for penal purposes he could still do so, but that, should not in any way delay the rights of the electors to have the election set aside at the earliest possible moment.
The appeal should be dismissed with costs, the election declared void and the usual certificate sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.
FOURNIER J.-L'appel est du jugement final prononc6 par 1'honorablejuge H. T. Taschereau sur la contestation de l'6lection d'un d6put6 aux Communes pour le comt6 de Joliette, et de deux autres d6cisions rendues par le m~me juge sur des motions, 1'une pour faire declarer la p6tition abandonn6e et p6rim6e, parce que 1'enquate n'a pas t commenc~e et poursuivie dans les six mois, -l'autre pour faire declaTer que le juge n'avait plus de juridiction pour proc6der au procks de la dite p6tition, attendu que les proc6d6s ayant t6 suspendus sur requote de 1'appelant pendant la derniere session, ii s'6tait 6coul6 plus de six mois depuis la fin de la dite session. Le jugement an m6rite, en date du 20 f6vrier, a annul6 1'61ection pour cause de corruption pratiquie par les agents de 1'appelant.
Les deux autres decisions ont rejet6 les motions tendant A faire d6clarer que le juge n'avait plus de juridiction pour entendre la cause. YOL. XV.]
A 'lection qui eut lieu le 22 f6vrier, 'appelant fut d6clar6 61u par le vote de l'officier rapporteur. Une pititiOn se plaignant de 1'il16galit6 de son dection et r6clamant le si~ge pour le candidat adversaire fut pr6i Jsent6e le avril.
Le parlement 6tant convoqu6 pour le 13 avril, le 12 'appelant demanda par motion de cette dernidre date et obtint un jugement d6clarant:- La session commenc6e le 13 avril ne fut termin~e que le 23 juin suivant; de sorte qu'en vertu de la loi 61ectorale, sec. 32, et du jugement cit6, le d6lai de six mois fix6 pour le commencement du prochs apres la presentation de la p6tition n'a pu commencer A courir que deux jours apris le 23 juin.
Le 20 septembre 1'appelant produisit son plaidoyer h la p6tition auquel l'intim6 r6pondit de suite, et demanda le 22 septembre 1887, qu'un jour fit fix6 pour l'instruction de la p6tition.
Le 10 octobre 1881 par d6cision A cet eFet, le prochs fut fix6 au 22 novembre suivant, devant 1'honorable Juge Taschereau qui a rendu le jugement au m6rite.
En ex6cution du.jugement fixant le procks au novembre, les p6titionnaires commenchrent leur preuve et firent entendre deux t6moins: A. M. Rivard, officier rapporteur A la dite 6lection, qui prouva l'61ection et rapport de l'appelant, ainsi que la publication de son lection dans la Gazette Officielle comme d6put6 de Joliette,-l'autre, Urgel Faust, est entendu au sujet de 1'61ection.
Le mime jour, A part 'audition de ces t6moins, il se fit encore une partie importante de la preuve, consistant dans 'admission suivante donn6e par les parties:p6tition.
Tous ces faits, tant ceux contenus dans les t6moignages que ceux 6nonces dans cette admission, comme ceux de 1'6lection et rapport de 1'appelant, tels qu'all&gus dans la p6tition, la proclamation, les qualit6s et qualifications des p6titionnaires pour se porter p6titionnaires, sont tous des faits qu'il 6tait essentiel de prouver. Il eit 6t impossible i 1'intim6 de rbussir sans en avoir fait la preuve.
Le prochs (trial) a done commenc6 au jour fix6, le 22 novembre, par la preuve de faits importants.
La loi (sec. 32) exigeant le commencement du prochs dans les six mois (shall be commenced) a done 6t respect~e.
Apris ces proc6d6s du 22 novembre, le procs au lieu de continuer from day to day fut ajourn6 an d6cembre afin de fournir aux intim6s l'occasion de produire d'autres particularit6s pour remplacer celles qui avaient t6 d6clar6es insuffisantes.
C'est alors que 1'appelant fit les deux motions dont la substance a 6t6 donn6e plus haut, A 1'effet de faire d6clarer que la p6tition devait Atre consid6r6e comme abandonn6e et p6rim6e.
Ces deux motions ayant t d6cid6es comme on 'a vu plus haut, il fut proc6d6 A l'enquAte sur les accusations de corruption contenues dans les particularit6s.
Cette preuve a constat6 de manibre A ne laisser aucun doute & ce sujet qu'il y avait eu des actes de corruption commis par des agents de 'appelant. L'honorable Juge en a d6clar6 sept cas pour lesquels il a ray6 autant de votes donn~s l'appelant.
Puisqu'un seul de ces actes l6galement prouv6 suffit pour faire annuler une 6lection, il n'est pas n6cessaire pour justifier I'annulation de celle dont il s'agit d'entrer dans le d6tail de tous ces cas.
Celui ECEOT.N rappoTt6 par le t6moin Beaudry est tellement flagrant qu'il suffit A ni seul pour faire d6clarer '6lection nulle. Fournier J.
Ad6lard Barrette, neven de 1'appelant et P'un de ses agents, s'6tant pr6sent6 chez Beaudry, eut avec lui 1'entrevue que ce dernier rapporte ainsi qu'il suit: R. II est venu chez nous, it m'a demand6 pour quel parti j'tais, j'ai dit " J'ai t6 pour monsieur Guilbault."
II a dit " A pr6sent vous 1'8tes encore." J'ai dit, " A pr~sent je crois bien que je ne voterai pas cette annie, je suis maladeje vais rester A la maison." II a dit "Vous vous levez toujours, il faut que vous alliez voter pour lui." J'ai dit 9a me coilte bien. II a pris cinq piastres ($5) et it me les a donn~es. Il a dit, "vous allez voter, travaillez pour nous autres." ga fait que j'ai pris les cinq piastres ($5).
Q. Est-ce que Perrault 6tait dans la maison, alors? R. Ils 6taient pr6sents tous les deux.
Q. Perrault et Barrette 6taient pr6sents tous les deux quand Barrette vous a donn6 les cinq piastres ($5) ? R. Oui.
Ind6pendamment de cet acte de corruption la suite du t6moignage fait preuve d'une convention entre Beaudry et les deux agents de 1'appelant pour corrompre plusieurs autres voteurs. Beaudry rapporte que s'6tant ensuite rendu & la r6sidence de l'appelant, celuici lui demanda comment allait 1'61ection, A quoi il r6pondit:
Je crois bien qu'il faudrait un peu de graissaille pour que les nuls qu'lil y avait.
LA-dessus 1'appelant dit:
Moi, je ne suis pas capable de donner d'argent, c'est d6fendu; par exemple, j'ai des agents qui pourront vous rencontrer. Je puis vous nommer 1 oil ils sont et vous aurez ce qu'il vous faudra.
Q. Les a-t-il nomm6s, ces gens-IA ? R. Oui, il a nomm6 Zbphirin Tellier, Ad~lard Barrette.
Q. Ad6lard Barrette?
R. Oui, qui est pr6sent ici; Octavien Michaud.
Q.- En a-t-il nomm6 d'autres ? R. Oui, il a nomm6 monsieur Gervais.
Q. Quel est son nom de bapt~me ? R. Je ne peux pas dire son nom; je le connais de vue, mais jo ne peux pas dire son nom. Q. En a-t-il nomm6 d'autres ? R. Monsieur Perrault.
Plus loin on lui fait les questions suivantes: Q. Bien, monsieur Beaudry, tes-vous bien positif A dire que monsieur Guilbault vous a dit de vous adresser pour de la graissaille... R. Oui, monsieur.
Q. ...... Chez Barrette ? R. Qu'on aurait ce qu'il nous faudrait et Fournier J. d'envoyer fort.
Cette preuve serait suffisante pour constater l'agence de Barrette; mais A ce t6moignage on peut ajouter celui de l'appelant qui prouve bien des faits suffisants pour 6tablir 1'agence et qui finit par cette d6claration qui ne peut laisser de doute A cet 6gard :
Q. Est-ce la seule fois que vous lui avez parl6 sur ce ton-14, A Barrette ? R. Chaque fois que je Fai rencontr6 je lui ai toujours dit de prendre garde de so compromettre et de me compromettre. C'est cela que je lui ai d6fendu de faire, et d'autres le lii ont d6fendu aussi.
La d6fense se bornait 6videmment & ne pas agir ouvertement, mais tout ce qui pouvait Atre fait secr~tetement 6tait accept6 d'apris l'appelant lui-m~me. 11 en est de mime des autres cas cit6s par 1'honorable juge, ainsi qu'il appert par son jugement du ler f6vrier La cour rend l'adjudication snivante:
En consequence des actes de corruption prouvis contre I'agent du d~fendeur Adblard Barrette aux moyens desquels les nomm6s Frangois X. St. Jean, Joseph Beaudry, Jos. Ratelle fils, Ephrem Laforest, Edmond Michaud, Israel B61anger et Narcisse Gendron paraissent avoir t6 influenc6s, la cour retranche sept votes du nombre total des votes enregistr6s en faveur du d6fendeur et retranche de plus du nombre des dits votes un autre vote A raison du fait que le nomm6 Hern. Desmarais, agent du d6fendeur, aurait vot6 bien que mineur.
La cour ajoute au nombre des votes du candidat Neveu un vote repr6sentant le vote d'On6sime Clermont qui a 6t6 illigalement 6cart6 par le Deput6 Officier rapporteur au poll No. 9, paroisse Ste. Elizabeth. Sur application de la part du d6fendeur et attendu que le dit d6fendeur se trouve actuellement en minorit6 d'aprbs ]a decision ci-dessus la cour fixe le l6me jour de f~vrier pour procdder A l'enquate r~criminatoire et sur le scrutin demand6 par le d6fendeur et permet A ce dernier de produire un bill de particularit6s le 10 f6vrier et la cour ajourne au 16e jour de f~vrier courant.
Lors de l'argument, l'appelant s'est plaint que le dernier jugement, en date du 20 f6vrier, manquait de pr6cision et ne mentionnait aucun des cas de corruption A raison desquels 1'61ection 6tait annul6e; ces dtails 6taient d6jd donn6s dans le jugement du ler J. f6vrier; il 6tait inutile d'en faire la r6p6tition dans le jugement suivant.
Si ce n'ext 6t6 de la question des six mois fix~s pour le commencement du prochs, il n'aurait pas port6 le present appel. Mais cette cause n'a aucune analogie avec celle de Glengarry
Dans cette dernidre, la p6tition avait t6 pr6sent~e le 25 avril 1887, et ce n'est que le 17 d~cembre qu'un ordre fut rendu par la cour des Common Pleas fixant le prochs de la p6tition au 12 janvier 1888. Aucune proc6dure n'ayant 6t adopt6e pour faire declarer que le prochs serait suspendu pendant la session, les six mois fix6s par la sec. pour le commencement du prochs 6taient dejA expir6s depuis longtemps lorsque la demande de fixation fut faite. La cour interpr~tant les diverses sections de l'acte des 6lections au sujet des d4lais et des ajournements du prochs, comme suffisantes pour I'autoriser A fixer le procks apr~s l'expiration des six mois, rendit le jugement fixant le prochs au 12 janvier.
Ce jour-A au moment ofi allait commencer le prochs, I'avocat de Purcell renouvela devant le trial judge, l'objection qu'il avait faite devant la cour pour empicher la fixation du procks, parce que les six mois dans lesquels il aurait 6tre commenc6 6taient depuis lon gtemps expir6s.. Cette objection fut rejethe par le trial judge comme elle 1'avait 6t6 par la cour. En appel devant cette cour la majorit6 des juges a d6cid6 que les six mois fix6s pour le commencement du procks 6taient de rigueur, qu'une fois expir6s, la cour, ni le trialijudge n'avait plus de juridiction pour procder au prochs. Tant que cette d6cision ne sera pas modifi~e, elle doit (1) S. C.
Atre consid6r6e comme ayant finalement r~gl6 cette question. Aussi je n'entrerai dans aucun argument A ce sujet, me bornant A mentionner la tentative infructueuse faite devant le Conseil Priv6 pour la faire r6for- mer, et A r6f6rer pour mes motifs de confirmation du Fournier J. present jugement aux raisons que j'ai donnies dans cette cause de Glengarry et celle du comt6 de Qu6bec Les six mois 6taient incontestablement expir6s dans la cause de Glengarry. Il est aussi incontestable qu'ils ne 1'6taient pas dans la prbsente cause, parcequ'A la demande de l'appelant, la proc6dure avait t6 suspendue pendant la session, et que ce d6lai n'a commenc6 A courir que le 25 janvier, deux jours apris la fin de la session, en vertu du jugement rendu le avril. Le prochs ayant effectivement commenc6 le 22 novembre comme on 1'a vu par les proc~d6s rapportis ci-haut, il se trouve done avoir 6t0 commenc6 dans les six mois.
On a fait 1'objection que la loi obligeait le juge a proc6der de die in diem, mais cette objection est sans valeur, parce qu'ayant acquis pleine et entibre juridiction sur la cause, par le commencement du prochs, il 6tait au pouvoir du (trial judgd) juge pr6sidant au procbs, on vertu de la sec. 31 s.s. 4, d'ajourner de temps A autre.
Cette section fait voir que l'objection en question est tout A fait frivole.
L'appelaut s'est aussi plaint de ce que le juge a refus6 de proc6der A la preuve sur les accusations r~criminatoires port6es contre l'autre candidat pour lequel les p6titionnaires avaient demand le sidge. L'6lection ayant 6t6 d6clar6e nulle et la demande du sihge faite par les p6titionnaires retiree, il n'y avait plus lieu de pro- 4t7 c6der sur ces charges. Je concours compl6tement dans r68 raisons donn6es par Sir William Ritchie, justifiant le refus du juge de faire une enqu~te devenue tout & fait inutile. L'appel doit 6tre renvoy6 avec d6pens. J.-The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order of the 10th of October was made upon an application under the 64th section of the Controverted Elections Act, and therefore, although general in its terms, ordering a stay of all proceedings, it must be construed as extending only the time for the respondent in the petition filing preliminary objections thereto or answering it un the merits without at all extending the time for going to trial; but I am of opinion, that assuming the order to have been made in view of and under the 64th section, it is nevertheless a good order for extending the time for the taking of all proceedings including the going to trial, and that, therefore, the petitioners had six months from the presentation of the petition given to them to go to trial exclusive of the session of Parliament. I am of opinion also that what took place on the 30th November was a commencement of the trial which, therefore, did commence within the extended time,and that the trial was duly continued by adjournment until judgment was pronounced.
I am of opinion also that when sufficient evidence to avoid the election had been produced, it was competent for the learned judge to close the taking further evidence upon the petition, and to pronounce his judgment avoiding the election. It is contended, however, upon this appeal by the respondent in the election petition, the now appellant, against the judgment avoiding his election, that inasmuch as the petitioners had claimed the seat for the other candidate, and notwithstanding that the claim had been withdrawn in the progress of the case for the petitioners, and before the learned judge had expressed himself satisfied with the evidence that had been given as sufficient to avoid the election, he, the respondent, had a right before judgment avoiding the election G should be pronounced, to go into evidence upon recriminatory charges which he desired to be allowed to prove, and he contends that by reason of the learned judge having declined to receive such evidence because of the claim for the seat for the other candidate having been so as aforesaid withdrawn, it is competent for him to maintain the appeal against the judgment avoiding the election.
Although it appears to me that it would have been competent for the learned judge to have received evidence on the recriminatory charges notwithstanding the withdrawal of the claim for the seat for the candidate in whose interest the petition was filed, as was done in the Harwich Case still I do not clearly see how we can, on this appeal, make his declining to do so sufficient ground for reversing his judgment avoiding the election, which judgment, having regard to the evidence upon which it rests, is unexceptionable.
The objection in; fact is not one affecting the soundness of the learned judge's judgment avoiding the election.
It calls in question the correctness of the judgment of the learned judge upon a matter of procedure in relation to a totally different matter, namely, a counter charge which the claim to the seat made on behalf of the opposing candidate, by the petitioners, enabled to be enquired into on the trial of the election petition, and the withdrawal of which claim the learned judge deemed sufficient to warrant his refusal to receive evidence of charges which could only be entered into then in respect of the claim to the seat which had been withdrawn. The determination of those counter charges, in whatever way Ihey might have been determined, if the evidence upon them had been received, could have had no effect upon the question of the avoiding of the election.
The learned judge's J. judgment upon that question would have remained, even if the recriminatory charges had been proved. The act does not appear to me to make provision for such a case as the present.
To reverse the learned judge's judgment avoiding the election, not for any reason affecting the soundness of that judgment upon the merits, but because the learned judge did not enter upon the. counter charges for the reason above stated would not, as it seems to me, be a step in the furtherance of justice, and I do not see how we could upon this objection, reverse a judgment which upon the merits of what is concluded by it is unexceptionable.
I think, therefore, that the only course open to us is to dismiss the appeal, and report accordingly to the Speaker of the House of Commons.
J.-This election was avoided by a judgment pronounced on the 20th of February, 1888, by Mr. Justice Henri T. Taschereau, for corrupt practices committed by agents of the successful candidate Edouard Guilbault without his knowledge or consent.
The petition was filed on the 9th of April, 1887. Four days afterwards, viz., on the 13th of April the session of parliament began and it continued until the 23rd of the following June.
The 22nd of November was named as the day for the trial by an order made on the 10th of October. Guilbault who was respondent to the petition is the present appellant. His contention is thus stated in his factum:- 1st. There was no jurisdiction to try this matter. 'The petition was out of court at the time of trial and the judge should so have determined, and dismissed the petition.
2nd. The learned judge should have found in favor of the appellant on his motions of the 12th December, 1887, and the 80th of January, 1888.
3rd. The learned judge should not, on the evidenoe, and on the record, have found in favor of the petitioners on charges of bribery by agents, and should not have voided the election.
The point made under the first of these grounds of complaint is that the trial was not commenced within six months frQm the filing of the petition.
If the session of parliament is included in the computation of the six months, that period expired on the 8th of October, while, if excluded, the time would extend to the 18th of December.
It is urged that whichever computation is adopted the six months period was exceeded.
But it happens that the appellant himself procured an order the effect of which was to exclude the session.
He gave notice on the 12th of April, the day before the meeting of parliament, that he would move on the 14th to stay all proceedings from the 13th of April till two days after the close of the session, and on the 14th the order he asked for was made.
The notice was of a motion in these terms
YOL. XY.]
It was urged before us that the object of the motion was not to extend the time for the beginning of the trial but to get further time to answer or object to the iaojc
-t petition, by means of an order which the court or a Patterson J.judge is authorized by section 64 of R. C. ch. to make. The motion asked, it is true, for an order of that kind, but asked it in addition to the stay of proceedings.
The main application was for the stay during the session and the other matter seems to have been introduced to make it clear that while the petitioner's hands were to be tied as to proceedings on his part towards the trial the time was not to count against the respondent in respect to his proceedings.
The learned judge who made the order evidently understood the matter in this way. He refers in the order to the 32nd section of the act, but the direct authority for the order is section 33, and he pursues that section in giving reasons to show that the interests of justice rendered the enlargement necessary. The document is in these words
There can be no question of the effect of that order in extending the-time for the trial.
In the face of it the petitioner could take no step during the specified time, while, but for it, he could have applied under section 13 at any time after the 15th of April, which was five days from the filing of the petition, to have a time fixed for the trial, provided no preliminary objections had been taken.
It may be worth noting that if the motion of the 14th of April had in its terms asked only for an extension of time till the end of the session for taking preliminary objections, it is not likely that a judge would have made the order without also extending the time for the trial, because, by section 18, the right to apply to have the time for the trial fixed is made to some extent dependent on the disposal of the preliminary objections.
Upon these grounds we were all of opinion, and so held during the argument, that the effect of the order was that the six months limit reached to the 18th of December.
In the meantime, viz., on the 22nd of November, the election court sat for the trial of the petition, and two witnesses were examined to prove formal matters not affecting any of the charges.
Evidence being then offered in support of one of the charges, it was objected that the article in the particulars was not sufficiently specific, and thereupon the petitioner was ordered to give better particulars and the court adjourned to the 5th of December.
When it met on that day two motions against the jurisdiction based on the contention, which has been held to be unfounded, that the 22nd of November was beyond the six months' limit, were discussed and taken en delibrd, the court again adjourning till the 12th of December.
On the 12th the applications were dismissed, and the judge having to preside, as we are told, at another court on the 13th, a further adjournment till the 5th of January took place.
On that day the attack on the jurisdiction was renewed, the ground this time being that the extended time, which expired on the 18th of December, had been exceeded without the trial having been begun. This contention, in the form in which it was advanced, wanted a foundation of fact.
The trial had been begun on the 22nd of November.
What was done on that day in proving certain essential facts was not repeated when the taking of evidence was resumed on the 30th of January after the various adjournments.
If, after proving those facts on the 22nd of November, it had happened that no proof was given of any charge contained in the petition, either because the petitioner was unable or unwilling to adduce evidence, or because of the absence or insufficiency of particulars, or for any other valid reason, there would nevertheless have been a trial, and the petition might well have been dismissed.
The question of the trial having been begun on the 22nd November is, therefore, a simple one and must be decided against the appellant.
But there is another question upon the construction of section 32 that requires notice.
By that section the trial is to be commenced within six months, " and shall be proceeded with from day to day until such trial is over."
Here there were several adjournments during the interval between the 22nd of November when the trial was begun and the 30th of January when the bulk of the evidence was taken.
They were not different in character or duration from those frequently found necessary, and made without question, by all our ordinary courts.
Can it be intended by this direction to proceed from day to day, that any adjournment which interrupts the continuous sittings of a court for the trial of a controverted election shall ipso facto oust the jurisdiction and render the petition coram non judice ? If this is the effect it will be so in all cases, no matter what may be the cause of the adjournment, the illness or unavoidable absence of a witness, or of the judge himself, or any other accident beyond the control of the parties or the court.
There is nothing in the terms of the enactment, which are in form directory and not prohibitive, to make it necessary to adopt a construction involving consequences so anomalous and so calculated to do injustice, and that construction would, moreover, be at variance with the liberal spirit in which powers of amendment and of extending time are conferred by other sections of the act.
I think this is the first time the reading in question has been suggested.
Adjournments such as those in this case have always hitherto been made when occasion for them arose, and a construction has thus, in Patterson J. practice, been put upon the provision, although no court may have formally pronounced upon it. That construction treats the provision as directory. only, and I have no doubt of its being the proper construction.
It may be that this discussion of the provision is not necessary, for I am not sure that the appellant intended to raise the question.
The objections taken by him from time to time in the court below were based on the contention, which we have held to be unfounded, that the trial was not begun on the 22nd of November, and not on any assumed obligation to proceed literally day after day. That is true of the motion of the fifth of January, as well as of the earlier ones.
They all relied on the six months limit and on the denial that the trial had begun.
But the petitioner in his formal answer to the last motion, which answer was filed on the 12th of January, asserted a full compliance with the statute.
Section 33, sub-section 2, declares that no trial of any election petition shall be commenced or proceeded with during any term of the court of which the judge who is to try the same is a member, and at which such judge is by law bound to sit.
The de die in diem rule is therefore not universal; and setting aside for the moment the directory character of the mandateI apprehend that before a party can impeach a proceeding or maintain it to be void for non-compliance with the rule he must show that the case is not within the exception.
It is asserted by the petitioner in his answer to the raotion of the fiftb of January to be within the excep, tion, or facts are stated touching the engagements of the judge, tending in that direction, and some evidence in support of that statement has been read to us from Pa-on the record, yet the petitioner has not, by any evidence, nor, as I understand, by any statement, negatived the exception, and we could not assume in his favour that the exception does not apply.
There is no reason from any point of view for holding the proceedings null by reason of the adjournments in question.
What I have said disposes of the second ground of complaint as well as of the first.
The third ground as formulated impeaches the judgment on matters of fact.
From the discussion of the evidence which took place on the argument, it is clear that the finding of the learned judge on both questions, the agency of Barrette, and the act of bribery committed by him, are amply sustained by testimony on which it was the province of the learned judge to pronounce.
But under this head another objection has been urged, namely, that the learned judge refused to receive evidence of recriminatory charges which the appellant was prepared to give.
In the petition the seat was claimed for the defeated candidate. In those circumstances the appellant was entitled, by sec. 42, to give evidence to show that the election of the defeated candidate was undue, in the same manner as if he had presented a petition complaining of such election.
But the claim for the seat was withdrawn, for the reason that a scrutiny showed him to have a minority of votes, but at all events it was withdrawn. The learned judge thereupon considered that section 42 no longer applied.
I think he was clearly right. It has been argued that on this trial and on this question the status of the appellant was the same as if he had, under section 5, presented a petition charging the - candidate with corrupt practices. It is not necessary to decide whether such a petition 3. could or could not have been presented under section
* Assuming, however, that a substantive proceeding under that section or section 9, subs.b, could have been taken, it must have been within thirty days after the return, or fifteen days after the service of the papers, and upon giving security for costs. The proceeding under section 42 is authorized in order to avoid the awarding of the seat to a person who is disqualified or has not been duly elected, and can only apply so long as the seat is claimed. The language of the section creates no difficulty in this respect.
It enacts that the recriminatory evidence may be given on the trial of a petition claiming the seat for any person. But the trial ceased to answer that description as soon as the petition ceased to claim the seat.
The whole proceeding under the section has reference to the seat, and the seat is no longer in question.
I am clearly of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed, and of course with costs.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- sections 32
- 33
- section 64
- section 31
- section 2
- Section 5
- section 42
- section 5
- section 32
- section 35
- section 33
- section 13
- section 18
- Section 33
- section 9