Reburn v. La Corporation de la Paroisse de Ste. Anne du Bout de l'Isle

June 20. LA CORPORATION DE LA PA- ROISSE DE

STE. ANNE DU

RESPONDENT. BO.UT DE L'ISLE (PLAINI IFFS)..)

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).

Where a proces-verbal of a Municipal Council directing improvements to be made on a portion of a road situated within the municipality has been duly homologated, it cannot subsequently be set aside by an incidental procedure, but, like a by-law it can only be attacked by a direct procedure as indicated in the Municipal Code (P. Q.) arts. 100-461.

Parent v. Corporation St. Sauveur, 2 Q. L. R. 258, approved. By a procke-verbal made by the Municipal Council of Ste. Anne du Bout de L'Isle a portion of the road fronting the land of one R. was ordered to be improved by raising and widening it. Upon R.'s refusal to do the work the Council had it performed, paid $200 for it and subsequently sued R. for the said $200. The Court of Queen's Bench, P. Q., on appeal affirmed a judgment in favor of the Municipal Council for that amount.

On appeal to the Supreme Court it was

Beld, Per Fournier, Henry and Gwynne J.J. (Strong and Taschereau J.J. dissenting, and Ritchie C.J. expressing no opinion on the point) that-although the matter in controversy did not amount to $2,000, yet, as it related to a charge on the appellant's land whereby his rights in-future might be bound, the case was appealable.

R. S. C. ch. 135 sec. 29 (b).

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) affirming the judgment of the Superior Court.

This was an action brought by the respondents against the appellant to recover the sum of $200 paid by the Sir W. J. Ritchie C. J. and Strong, Fournier, Henry, Taschereau and Gwynne J.J.

respondents to one W.

Bout de l'Isle in virtue of a procs- verbal duly homologated by the said Municipal Council the 20th August, To this action the appellant pleaded inter alia the nullity of the procds-verbal for irregularities and that the road ordered by the procds-verbal is a macadamized road and county councils alone have jurisdiction to order them.

The procs-verbal made by the council contained the following directions:- " 3. That the said road be raised with stones to-wit, with large stones at first and then with small broken stones, not more than two inches square so as to make an even surface six inches higher in the middle than at the sides.

" 4. That the said road be made 26 feet wide on its whole length.

"That the work to raise and widen the said front road of W.

" The said W. A. Reburn shall do alone at his own expense the whole work necessary to raise and widen his front road according to the paragraphs 3 and 4 of said procks-verbal, upon a length of 666 feet and inches beginning at the north-east line of his property and the remainder to be done by all the proprietors of land situate between the boundary of the Parish to and including the property of Joseph Petit dit Lamarche."

The appellant appealed from the municipal council to the county council and the procds-verbal was upheld.

This case depends on a single question of municipal law, namely: What was the authority of the council to alter the road under the circumstances of the case ?

SUPREMr COURT OF CANADA.

The road is a highway established from the begining of the colony on the Island of Montreal.

To the parish is assigned certain authority with respect to roads and bridges, and it has control of county roads, that is, roads between two local municipalities. In this case the road which has been opened since the establishment of the colony had never been altered; the municipality of the parish of St. Anne ordered a procs verbal to alter it. This procs-verbal remained in abeyance during the month ;of May 1877, and then the appellant petitioned the council to be relieved from the work.

Two things were asked for by the petition, the alteration of the road and relief from the work. The former was granted and the road ordered to be raised; the prayer for relief was refused.

The council appointed a superintendent of the work who made a report; this report was confirmed by the council and Reburn was ordered to macadamize the road in front of his property.

He considered this beyond the authority of the council; that they could impose such a duty on all the land owners but not on a particular one and disobeyed the order ; whereupon the council ordered the work to be sold. It was bought by a son of the appellant who, on an action to recover the amount, pleaded want of authority. The court held that the order should have been appealed from and that the father was estopped by the act of his son in purchasing.

But there was an appeal from the order. The appellant represented to the council that it was illegal. See L. N. 67.

It is submitted that this is not local, but county, work and could only be ordered by the county. Arts. 754 and 757 Mun. Code. Arts. 533-534.

It is submitted that there is no right of appeal in this case.

No future rights are involved; the appellant is merely called upon to pay $200 in consequence of not performing work ordered by the council. If he **tR does the work that is an .end of the matter.

See Le Gur6 de la St. Vierge v. Bank of Toronto

Then as to the merits. The appellant himself petitioned the County Council to have an action taken about this road and under Art a superintendent was appointed and his procs verbal was duly homologated.

The raising and widening of a road is not macadamising it and therefore the local council had jurisdiction over this matter under article 8(2 Mun. Code.

It is contended that this is a county road, but the appellant has admitted the jurisdiction of the local council, by his petition. Art. 755 Mun. Code says what is a county road.,

(Taschereau J.--We have no evidence to decide whether it is a county road or not.)

(Strong J.-The judgment in this case would not be resjudicata as to whether or not it is a county road. This point was not raised in the proceedings. (Mr. Laflamme.-It was never denied that it was a county road.)

In his plea the appellant says it was a question to be decided by the county council, We claim it is not a road dividing two municipalities but only a connecting road.

(Taschereau J.-Is it held now that because a road connects two municipalities it is a county road ?) That point was raised for the first time in the court of appeal and all the judges were of opinion that a connecting road is not a county road.

See Harrison's Municipal Manual (Ont.) (2).

It is claimed that a road can only be macadamised by a majority of the owners interested but, as I have (1) C.

XV.]

said, it is not a macadamised road. When the council only raise or widen a road there is no necessity for such majority.

He may be exempted but in this case he was not exempted by the procds verbal, which is final and will not now be disturbed.

Cites Parent v. Corporation of St. Sauveur (1). Laflamime Q.C. in reply.

The appeal should be allowed on two grounds. First, rights in future are affected.

It also brings up the question of the municipal by-law. The procs-verbal when homologated by the council becomes a by-law. In our province there must be an action to quash, there is no such thing as a rule for that purpose.

Art. 802 Municipal Code must be read in conjunction with art. 533.

Sir W. J. J.--Whethei this case is appealable or not I think it should be dismissed on the merits. The appellant has not taken the proper steps within the proper time to discuss the validity of the procds-verbal and other proceedings in the case. The appellant appears to have appealed in this case and his appeal was dismissed and the procds-verbal appears to have been homologated.

It is not competent to attack the validity of the procasverbal by an incidental procedure, but, like a by-law, it should be attacked by a direct proceeding as indicated by the code municipal which puts the procks-verbal on the same footing as by-laws in matters of appeal and procedure. See Parent v. Corporation of St. Sauveur (2), and Art. 100 M. C. (P.Q).

J.-I am of opinion that this appeal should be quashed for want of jurisdiction.

J.-La sec. 29 de 1'acte 49 Vict., ch. 135, r6glant la juridiction d'appel

. cette cour pour la province de Qu6bec, met au rang des causes appelables entre autres celles d6sign6es, dans la s.s. b par les expressions suivantes

La charge ou servitude imposee a l'appelant par le by-law dont il se plaint est de sa nature permanente, J. et a n6cessairement l'effet d'affecter les droits futurs de I'appelant dans la libre jouissance de sa propri6t6. Pour cette raison je suis d'avis que la cause est appelable.

L'appelant a t poursuivi par l'intim6e pour la somme de $200.00, valeur des travaux de r6paration A son chemin de front, ordonn6s par un proos-verbal dument homologu6 le 20 aotit 1887.

Ces travaux consistaient principalement dans ceux d~crits aux articles et du dit prochs-verbal, ainsi qu'il suit:carrs, L'appelant a offert plusieurs moyens de d6fense a cette action, entre autres la suffisance du chemin alors existant pour les besoins du public, que si ces travaux ordonn6s 6taient n6cessaires ils auraient dus tre mis i la charge de la municipalit6, qu'il n'y avait pas eu de demande pour ces changements par la majorit6 des int~ress~s; irr6gularit6 de tous les proc6d6s et surtout de ceux concernant l'adjudication des travaux ordonn6s, et enfin comme principal moyen de d6fense " que le dit chemin ordonn6 par le proces-verbal, est un chemin macadamis6 lequel n'est pas dans les attributions d'un conseil de municipalit6, mais ne peut 6tre ordonn6 que par le conseil de comt6 on approuv6 par lui." XV.]

Dans une rTplique l'intimbe a allkgu6 que si le dit prochs-verbal 6tait irr6gulier et ill~gal, le d6fendeur devait appeler en temps et lieu de la d6cision du conseil de la paroisse Ste. Anne du Bout de l'Isle homologuant le dit prochs-verbal."

La cour sup6rieure dont le jugement a t confirm6 par celui de la cour du Bano de la Reine a maintenu Fournier J.la pr6tention all~gu~e dans la r6plique et prononc6 jugement contre l'appelant pour la somme demand6e. Le raglement ayant 6t6 homologu6 le 20 aoit 1877, et l'action signifi6e 6 l'appelant seulement le 21 fivrier 1881, il avait laiss6 depuis longtemps expirer le d6lai pendant lequel le code municipal lui permettait d'attaquer le dit prochs-verbal. . En effet si 1'appelant voulait contester la validit6 du procks-verbal qu'il veut maintenant faire d6clarer nul, il aurait d-i proc6der tel que permis par le ch. 7 du code Municipal-Cassation des rbglements municipaux. L'article 705 porte: toute itre et rglement, Quant aux prochs verbaux, r6les, etc., 1'article 100 d6crdte ce qui suit:et et et

Dans la cause de Simard v. la Corp. du comtd de Montmorency il a t6 d6cid6 par la cour du Banc de la Reine, que lorsqu' aucune proc6dure en cassation d'un procks-verbal ou acte de repartition n'a t6 faite, par une partie intkress~e sous les articles .100, [VO.L. IV 461 et 705 C. M., dans le d6lai de trois mois apris les avis requis par la loi et relatifs A ces documents, leur 16galit6 ne pourra mise en quese tion incidemment, sur un bref de prohibition, et ne pent 1'stre que par la proc6dure indiqu6e par le code juin 1879).

Une decision du m~me genre (15 oct. 1873) avait d6ji, t rendue sur cette question par 1'hon.

juge en chef Meredith qui avait jug6 dans la cause deFurnter J. Parent v. la Corporation de St. Sauveur " qu'on ne pent attaquer la validit6 d'un raglement municipal an moyen d'une proc~dure incidente " (1).

Je reconnais cette doctrine comme correcte et applicable

, tout rbglement qui fait voir A sa face qu'il

6mane d'une autorit6 comp6tente quels que soient d'ailleurs les vices de forme dont il pent 6tre entach6, et les intdrits qui peuvent 6tre blesses.

Le r~glement on procks-verbal en question 6tait 6videmment du ressort du conseil municipal de l'intimbe, et l'appelant pour faire redresser les irr6gularit6s et les griefs dont il se plaint aurait di en appeler dans le d6lai de trois mois prescrit par le code municipal.

Cette r6ponse s'applique

6galement aux rbsolutions du conseil approuvant les changements recommand6s comme a toute cette partie de son plaidoyer dans laquelle il se plaint d'ind~gularit6s dans les procbd6s et d'injustice en le sonmettant 4. des charges qu'il considbre ex.

cessives, ce n'est que sur un appel qu'il aurait pu faire rformer le procs-verbal suivant ses pr6tentions.

S'il 6tait vrai, comme l'allague l'appelant, que le procks-verbal a de fait ordonn6 de macadamiser le chemin en question, je ne crois pas que l'on pt dans ce cas opposer & l'appelant les d6cisions ci-dessus citbes.

Le conseil. de paroisse n'ayant pas le pouvoir de faire adopter le syst~me de macadamiser les chemins que le conseil de comt6 pent soul ordonner, il serait 6vident

(1) 2 Q. L. . p.

VOL. XY.]

[FOL xV. qu'il aurait agi sans aucune comp6tence et qu'aucun tribunal ne pourrait donner d'effet quelconque & un tel r~glement.

Mais ici, l'intimbe a-t-elle substitu6 le systime de macadamiser les ciemins A celui ordinairement suivi pour leur confection ? Je ne le. pense pas. ne s'agit que d'une r6paration & un bout de chemin Jdont le sol est mar~cageux et qu'il s'agissait de rendre plus solide. On avait d'abord pens6 & changer 1'endroit du chemin, mais aprs bien des considrations pour et contre, expos6es dans le prochs-verbal du surintendant sp~cial, le conseil en a concla qu'il valait mieux conserver l'ancien chemin existant depuis plus dun sicle et qui avait cohit6 beaucoup de travail aux int6ress6s, te ordonn6 en consequence 1'exhaussement du chemin sur la terre de l'appelant, de la maniere indiqu6e ci-dessus. Cette r6paration ainsi ordonn6e ne me paralt pas 6tre 1'exercice du droit d'introduire le syst~me du macadam pour la confection des chemins. O'est tout simplement suivant moi 1'exercice de la discr6tion que peut et doit exercer le conseil dans la construction et la r6paration des chemins sous sa juridiction. Il est vrai que ce travail est on6reux, et qu'd l'endroit passe ce chemin sur la terre de 1'appelant sa longueur en est doubl~e en cons6quence d'un d6tour qu'il y a A faire.

Le code municipal a pr6vu ce cas et ordonne par 1'art. 183. qu'une moiti6 de ces travaux sera mise A la charge des autres int6ress~s.

Cette diminution A laquelle l'appelant avait droit lui a 6t0 accord6e.

Le travail de r6paration tel qu'il a &t ordonn6 me paralt 6tre dans les limites du pouvoir du conseil de l'intim6e. Quant aux irr6gularit6s dont se plaint l'appelant au sujet de 1'adjudication des travaux, il n'a pas 6tabli qu'elle lui avait port6 le moindre pr6judice. Il en a en connaissance, un avis lui avait t donn6.

D'aprbs la preuve la nature des travaux tait parfaitement connu de tons SUPREf1E COURT OF <AgADL et avait 6t6 clairement expliqu6e par Amable Vall6e,

-87 1'inspecteur des chemins.

D'ailleurs, comme l'entrepreneur 6tait son fils, 1'appelant lui-mime s'est int6ress6 A les faire approuver par le conseil municipal et a m~me fait pr6parer par un avocat la r6solution adopt6e par le municpal n conseil municipal acceptant 1'ouvrage en question. Appel renvoy6 avec d6pens.

Fommier 1. HENRY J.-I am inclined to the opinion that this case was appealable, but on the merits I think the appeal should be dismissed.

It was an imposition to oblige the appellant to macadamize the road in front of his property, and expense to which his neighbors were not subjected, but having allowed the money to be expended and the time for objection in the way prescribed to elapse, he cannot I think be permitted in this action to do so.

J.-I am of opinion to quash for want of jurisdiction, with the costs as if quashed on motion.

GWYNNE J. of opimion that the case was appealable, but that on the merits the appeal should be dismissed concurring with Fournier J.

Appeal disnissed with costs.

VOL. XV.]