Les Écclesiastiques de St. Sulpice de Montréal v. The City of Montreal

Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal Side) reversinig the judgment of the Superior Court

This was an action brought to recover $361.90, the amount of a special assessment for a drain along the property of OFthe defendants.

The amount of the taxes was not contested, but by a special plea the defendants contended that their property was exempt from taxation, because the said property was, at the time of the construction of the drain, as it has since continued to be, an educational institution receiving no grant from the Corporation Municipality of Montreal, in which it is situated. The answer to the plea was that the exemption claimed by the defendants did not apply to the taxes and assessments claimed by the action.

Per Curiam. The case is appealable as coming within the words "such like matters or things where the rights in future might be bound " in par. sec. 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act-If the rate struck was found to be insufficient and another rate imposed, the parties would be bound by the judgment in this case.

(defendants) contended that under 41 Vic. ch sec. 26

(P.Q.), every educational institution receiving no grant from the Corporation of the City of Montreal is exempt from all municipal and school taxes, and that the words used in the Act include 'all taxes, rates or assessments. See Arts. 19, sec. 22, 712 and 713, Mun. Sir W. J. RITCHIE C.J.--I am of opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

J.-The enactment upon which the decision of this appeallurns is that contained in Statute 41 Vic. cap. sec. 26, being an amendment or addition to the Common School Act cap. 15 of Con. Stats. of Lower Canada.

It exempts all educational houses or establishments, which do not receive any subvention from the corporation or municipality in which they are situated, from municipal and school assessments (des cotisations) " whatever may be the act in virtue of which such assessments are imposed, and notwithstanding all dispositions to the contrary."

What is sought to be recovered from the appellants is a contribution or sum assessed in respect of a drain constructed by the corporation in front of the appellants' property situated in the city of Montreal. Under the Act of incorporation of the city of Montreal the appellants, like other property owners, would be liable to pay this contribution, unless they can bring themselves within this exemption in 41 Vic. The appellants receive no subvention or pecuniary aid of any kind from the city. Their exemption, therefore, must depend on the single point whether this assessment or charge in respect of a contribution to the drain is or is not a municipal assessment.

With great respect for the Court of Appeal, I think there can be little doubt on this point. The appellantsTHE ' are undoubtedly assessed" by the city in respect the contribution which it is sought to compel them to Strong J. pay, for I understand the word assessment to imply

" the assessment of a tax."

Then the appellants are taxed for this drain, for every contribution to a public purpose imposed by superior authority is a " tax " and nothing less.

The city is therefore seeking to compel the payment of this contribution in direct contravention of the terms of the enactment referred to which clearly exempts the appellants.

For these reasons, which are fully and ably set forth in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Church in the Court of Appeal, and in that of Mr. Justice

Loranger in the Superior Court, I am of opinion that we must allow this appeal with costs to the appellants here, as well as in all the courts below.

FOURNIER J.-Par son action en cette cause, 'intim6e r~clame des appelants la somme de $361 90, pour taxes et cotisations impos6es suivant la loi et les riglemcnts de la corporation de la cit6 de Montr6al, pour la contribution des appelants A un 6gout ou canal, construit en

1878, en face de leur propri~t6 portant le no1717, dans le quartier Saint-Antoine de la dite cit6.

En r6ponse i cette demande les appelants ont plaid6 qu'ils poss6daient et occupaient cette proprift6 aux dates mentionn6es en la d6claration, et encore actuellement, comme maison d'6ducation et les d~pendances d'icelle,

-ne recevant aucune subvention de la corporation municipalit6 de la dite cit6 de Montr6al oi cette propi6t6 est situ6e.

Par sa T6ponse & ce plaidoyer, l'intim6e allgue que la proprit6 en question n'est pas exempthe des cotisations muncspaie8 et scoaires e notamment de celles reclamees en cette cause.

La preuve a t6 faite au moyen d'une admission cou- J. vrant tous les faits qu'il 6tait n6cessaire d'6tablir pour la d6cision du litige.

Au m6rite, 1'honorable juge Loranger a rendu jugement, maintenant l'exemption de taxes invoquee par les appelants, mais son jugement a t6 infirm6 par la cour du Bane de la Reine pour la raison que i'intim6e avait le droit de faire cet ouvrage et d'en r~partir le coxftt parmi les personnes dont les propri&6ts devaient en profiter; et aussi parce que l'ouvrage en question 6tant d'un caract~re local, pour des fins tout & fait locales et h l'avantage sp6cial de la propri6t6 des appelants, la cotisation pr6lev6e pour en d6frayer les d6penses n'6tait pas de la nature d'une taxe municipale conform6ment A 1'acte 41 Vict., ch. 6, sec. 26,-mais qu'elle 6tait au contraire d'une nature purement locale. La question soulev~e par cette contestation est de savoir si 1'exemption de taxes municipales et scolaires accord6e par le 41me Vict., ch. 6, sec. 26, comprend aussi 1'exemption de cotisations sp~ciales impos6es sur la propri6t6 immobilibre pour am6liorations dans une localit6 particulibre de la municipalit6.

L'exemption dont il s'agit est 6nonc6e dans les termes suivants:

A

L'effet de cette clause a d~j& 6t6 consid6r6 par cette cour dans la cause de Wylie contre la pr6sente intimbe

La diff6rence entre les deux causes est que dans la premibre les taxes r6clam6es, ne comprenaient pas comme celles-ci une cotisation sp~ciale pour am6lioration locale A la propri6 immobilire.

La question & r6soudre se r6duit done A savoir si les expressions de la sec. 26, " cotisations municipales," coMprennent aussi les cotisations sp~ciales d'une nature locale.

Avant 1'adoption de la sec. 26, le principe de l'exemption de taxes scolaires on faveur des institutions d'6ducation 6tait d6jh introduit dans les lois de la province de Qu6bec, et notamment dans le ch. 15 del'acte des 6coles communes, sec. 77, parag. 2.

I est aussi

Anonc6 dans plusieurs autres statuts, entres autres, le ch. 24, statuts revis6s, B. C., 1'acte municipal et des chemins, dont la sec. 58 met les maisons d'6ducation dans la cat6gorie des propri6t6s exemptes de toutes taxes on cotisations impos6es en vertu de cet acte.

Le code municipal, 34 Vict., ch. 68, art. 712, paiag. 3, dans sa longue 6numbration de propri6t6s exemptes de taxes, comprend aussi les institutions d'6ducation.

Cette exemption de taxes se retrouve encore dans la

40 Vict., ch. 29, concernant les clauses g6nrales d'incorporation des cit&s et villes, ! la sec. 325, parag. 3.

Ce principe d'exemption que 1'on retrouve dans tant de statuts paralt avoir 60 adopt6 syst6matiquement par la 16gislature comme un moyen d'encouragement pour la cause de '6ducation.

Le code municipal ne s'appliquant qu'aux municipalit~s rurales, u'affecte pas la cit6 de Montr6al dont la charte avant d'avoir 6t6 amend6e par la 38&ne Vict., ch. 73, ne lui imposait aucune exemption; mais la section 3 de cet amendement a dcr&6 1'exemption des 6glises, presbythres, palais 6piscopaux, de toutes taxes, et exempt6 de taxes municipales ordinaires et annuelles les 6tablissements occup~s pour des fins de charit6.

Dans cette disposiles institutions d'Aducation n'ont pas t6 comprises -et elles seraient sans doute soumises aux taxes sans la clause 26 de la 41eme Vict., ch. 6, qui les en a exempt6es.

L'intention du 16gislateur a & 6videmment de faire pr6valoir le mime systhme par toute la Fournier j. province.

C'est pour cela qu'il s'est prononc6 d'une. manibre si g6n6rale qn'il n'est pas possible d'en limiter l'effet.

En d6clarant que les maisons d'6ducation seraient exemptes des cotisations municipales et scolaires, quelque soit l'acte on charte en vertu duquel les cotisations sont impos6es et ce nonobstant toutes dispositions A ce contraire, le but 6tait 6videmment d'atteindre la cit6 de Montreal, qui se trouvait la senle localit6 de la province qui n'6tait pas soumise A une semblable disposition. La cit6 ayant une charte sp~ciale, on aurait pu peut-6tre pr6tendre que la loi qui la r6git ne pouvait 6tre amend6e par des expressions g~n6rales dans une loi 6trangere, aux matibres municipales. Mais le doute est impossible en pr6sence des expressions employ6es pour g~n6raliser et sp6cialiser l'exemption: " quelque soit 1'acte on charte en vertu duquel les cotitions sont impos6es, et ce nonobstant toutes dispositions A ce contraires."

Il faut n~cessairement en conclure que la cit6 de Montr6al est soumise A l'exemption d&cr~t~e par la sec. 26 ci-dessus cit~e et qui est post&rieure & sa charte.

La distinction que fait 1'intim6e entre les taxes ordinaires et annuelles aurait pu 6tre soutenable en vertu de la sec. 3, de l'acte 38 Vic.,-oi ces expressions paraissent avoir t6 ajout6es dans le but de limiter les effets d'exemptions.

Les cotisations sp6ciales pour fins purement locales pourraient 6tre distingu6es des taxes ordinaires et annuelles, si la question 6tait soulev~e ici A propos d'institutions de charite mentionn6es dans la sec. 3, et si elle devait Atre d6cid6e d'apris cette loi.

La section 26 qui doit servir de r~gle pour la decision de

'iM cette question ne fait aucune distinction quelconque EcCLsIAs . entre les taxes ou sp&ciales ou g6ndrales, elle se sert dans Sr. son sens le plus large des mots cotisations municipales, en ajoutant quelque soit l'acte ou charte en vertu duquel elles soient impos6es. Il me semble qu'il est tout A fait MONTREAL. impossible de trouver dans ces expressions la possibilite Fournier J. de faire la distinction que l'intim6e essaie de faire pre- valoir.

Les termes employ~s sont d'une g~n6ralit6 si.

complate et si absolue qu'il n'y a pas A se m6prendre sur leur signification-" toutes cotisations municipales "

comprend toutes cotisations municipales quelqu'en soient la nature.

TASCHEREAU J.-I am of opinion that appellant's property is free from this tax for the reasons given by

Mr. Justice Loranger in the Superior Court (1).

PATTERSON J. concurred with STRONG J.

Appeal allowed with costs.*

Rinfret.

(1) M. L. R. 2. S.

*On a motion for leave to appeal made to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the following judgment was delivered on the

27th July, 1889 :- This a petition at the instance of the municipal corporation of the city of Montreal, for leave to appeal from a judgment of the

Supreme Court of Canada, by which the Seminary of St. Sulpice, which is within the boundaries of the city, has been exempted from payment of a sum of $361.90, about £70 sterling, being the proportion charged upon it, by the petitioners, of a special assessment made by them for the cost of constructing a main drain which runs in front of its premises.

The Supreme Court, by a majority of four to one (Ritchie, C.J., bebeing the dissentient judge), reversed the decision of the Queen's

Bench for Lower Canada, which was also pronounced by a majority of four to one, and restored the judgment of Loranger, J., the judge of first instance.

In considering applications of this kind, it is necessary to keep in view that the Statute of Canada,

38 Vie., ch. which established

THE the Supreme Court of the Dominion, does not give to unsuccessful litigants a direct right, either abso- Judgment lute or conditional, to appeal from of the J. U. the decisions of that tribunal. Seeof Priy tion 47 expressly declares that no appeal shall be brought from any judgment or order of the Supreme

Court to any court established by the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland by which appeals or petitions to Her Majesty in Council may be ordered to be heard;

but saves any right which Her

Majesty may be graciously pleased to exercise by virtue of her Royal prerogative.

It is the duty of their Lordships to advise Her Majesty in the exercise of her prerogative, and in the discharge of that duty they are bound to apply their judicial discretion to the particular facts and circumstances of each case as presented to them.

In forming an opinion as to the propriety of allowing an appeal, they snust necessarily rely to a very great extent upon the statements contained in the petition with regard to the import and effect of the judgment complained of, and the reasons therein alleged for treating it as an exceptional one, and permitting it to be brought under review.

Experience has shown that great caution is required in accepting these reasons when they are not fully substantiated, or do not appear to be prim4 facie established by reference to the petitioner's statement of the main facts of the case, and the questions of law to which these give rise. Cases vary so widely in their circumstances that the principles upon which an appeal ought to be allowed do not admit of anything approaching to exhaustive definition.

No rule can be laid down which would not necessarily be subject to future qualification, and an attempt to formulate any such rule might therefore prove misleading.

In some cases, as in Prince v. Gagnon, App. 103), their Lordship have had occasion to indicate certain particulars, the absence of which will have a strong influence in inducing them to advise that leave should not be given, but it by no means follows that leave will be recommended in all cases in which these features occur.

A case may be of a substantial character, may involve matter of great public interest, may raise an important question of law, and yet the judgment from which leave to appeal is sought may appear to be plainly right, or at least. to be unattended with sufficient doubt to justify their Lordships in advising Her Majesty to grant leave to appeal.

The exemption which the Supreme Court has sustained in the present instance is a statutory one. The petitioners narrate the 77th section of the Consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada, cap. 15, and then proceed to allege that the effect of the judgment will be " to determine the future liability " (meaning apparently non-liabi- "lity) of buildings set apart for purposes of education, or of "religious worship, - parsonage "houses, and charitable and educa- "tional institutions and hospitals, "to contribute to local improve- "ments carried out in their inter- "ests and for the benefit of their "properties."

Had that statement been well founded, it might have been an important element in considering whether leave ought to be given.

But it is plainly erroneous. The statute in question, which relates to "public education,"exempts the properties above enumerated from educational rates levied for the purposes of the act, and from no other rates.

The clause upon which the judgment of the Supreme Court proceeded section 26 of the statutes of the Province of Quebec, Vic., which an act to amend the laws respecting public instruction.

" It enacts that: " Every education- "al institution receiving no grant

"from the corporation or muni- "cipality in which they are situ- "ated, and the land on which they

"are erected, and its dependencies,

"shall be exempt from municipal

"and school taxes, whatever may

"be the act or charter under

"which such taxes are imposed,

"notwithstanding all provisions to

"the contrary."

The Seminary of St. Sulpice admittedly does not receive any grant from the Corporation of the City of Montreal, and therefore within the benefit of the exemption created by section and the only issue raised between the parties whether district rate for drainage improvements, levied from that portion of themunicipal area which directly benefits by its expenditure, or not a municipal tax within the meaning of the clause.

The petition does not set forth the sources from which the petitioners derive their authority to execute such improvements drainage, and to assess for their cost.

Powers of that description are entrusted to municipal bodies, presumably in the interest of the public, and not for the interest of private owners, although the latter may be benefited by their exercise. LEs Primdfacie, their Lordships no reason to suppose that rates levied for improvements of that kind are not municipal taxes, and at the hearing of the petition their impression was confirmed by a refer-THE ence to the General Municipal Acts for Lower Canada. The Judgment counsel who appeared for the of the J. petitioners stated, however, that of Privy their powers are derived, not from Council. the General Acts, but from a charter, the terms of which were neither referred to nor explained. If the terms of the charter materially differ from those of the General Acts, that deprives the case of any general importance.

But it is quite possible that the concluding words of section may have been purposely introduced by the Legislature in order to secure uniformity of exemption, whatever might be the terms in which the power to assess conferred; and that, consequently, in construing the clause, the expression " municipal taxes " ought to be interpreted according to its general acceptation, and not according to the meaning which it might be held to bear in some charter statutes applicable to particular municipalities.

In these circumstances their Lordships are not prepared to advise Her Majesty that the petitioners ought to have leave to appeal. If such questions are, they say, of frequent occurrence in the city of Montreal, they may have the opportunity of obtaining the decision of this Board in another upon appeal from the Court of Queen's Bench for the Province.

The petition must therefore be dismissed.