By 38 Vic., ch. 97, the plaintiffs were authorized to build and maintain a toll bridge on the River L'Assomption at a place called "Portage," and " if the said bridge should by accident or otherwise be destroyed, become unsafe or impassable, the said plaintiffs were bound to rebuild the said bridge within fifteen months next following the giving way of said bridge, under penalty of forfeiture of the advantages to them by this Act granted; and during any time that the said bridge should be unsafe or impassable they were bound to maintain a ferry across the said river, for which they might recover the tolls."
The bridge was accidentally carried away by ice, but rebuilt and opened for traffic within fifteen months. During the reconstruction, although plaintiffs maintained a ferry across the river, the defendant built a temporary bridge within the limits of the plaintiffs' franchise and allowed it to be used by parties crossing the river. In an action brought by the plaintiffs, claiming $1,000 damages, and praying that defendant be condemned to demolish the temporary bridge, on an appeal to the Supreme Court it was
Held,-Ist, that as rights in future might be bound, the case was appealable under R. S. C., ch. 135, sec. 29 (b).
2nd-Reversing the judgment of the court below Ritchie C. J. and Patterson J. dissenting.-That the exclusive statutory privilege extended to the ferry, and while maintained by the plaintiffs the defendant had no right to build the temporary bridge, but as the bridge had since been demolished the court would merely award nominal damages and costs.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal Side), affirming the *PRESENT :-Sir W. J. Ritchie C. J., and Strong, Fournier, Taschereau and Patterson JJ.
judgment of the Superior Court, by which the appellants' action was dismissed with costs.
UI
The appellants sued the respondent in the Superior Court, alleging in substance, by their declaration, certain powers, privileges, immunities unto them granted under and by virtue of 38 Vic., ch. 97, and that under said statute they built a bridge over the river L'Assomption and kept it in good order; that in the course of the month of April, 1885, the said bridge was partly carried away by the ice; that they repaired it within the delay fixed by the Act and had it again opened for circulation on the first of November of the same year, they having during the interval accommodated the public with a sufficient ferry across the said river; that respondent, in the course of May, 1885, erected another toll bridge, which was opened for public circulation on the 1st of June, 1885, within the limits prohibited by the said Act as being within the appellants' privilege, thereby encroaching and infringing upon their said privileges; the appellants praying, by their conclusions, amongst others, that the respondent be ordered to demolish his said bridge, that he be prohibited from further troubling appellants in the exercise of their privilege, and that, on his default so doing, the appellants be allowed to demolish respondent's said bridge, and the respondent be condemned to pay to appellants the sum of one thousand dollars damages and costs.
The respondent answered the said suit, first, by a defense au fonds en fait, and further, by another plea, stating that his bridge was built only for his own use, and for such time only as appellants' bridge would remain impassable; that he allowed no stranger to pass thereon, and if any one did pass, it was without his consent and without remuneration; and that he thereby did in no way infringe upon any of the appellants' privileges.
The appellants specially replied that the respondentGUILB by constructing his bridge, had illegally acted and, moreover, violated the privileges of the appellants: that the respondent had built his bridge not only for his personal utility, but even for that of a great number persons who continued to use it, to his knowledge and with his consent, and that he was personally profiting by it.
At the trial it was proved that the bridge had been accidentally carried away by ice, but rebuilt and open for traffic within fifteen months, during which time appellants maintained a ferry across the river, and that the respondents' bridge was a temporary bridge within the limits of the appellant's franchise, upon which he allowed the public to cross the river, and the bridge was subsequently taken away.
The material sections of the statute 35 Vic., ch. 97, are the following :
Sec. 5.-At all times, so long as the said bridge is kept in good repair and open for the use of the public, no person whatever shall erect any bridge or bridges, or shall use, for purposes of ferriage, boats of any description whatever, for the passage of any person, cattle or vehicle whatsoever, for hire, across the said river, within the distance of half a mile from the said river in the direction of the flow of the river, and within the distance of two miles in the other direction, such distance being measured along the banks of the said river and following its windings, and any person who shall build any toll-bridge or toll-bridges over the said river within the limits aoresaid, or shall ferry for hire Within the limits aforesaid shall, without prejudice to any proceedings which may be instituted against him by the said Frangois Xavier Galarneau and Magloire Cl6ophas Galarneau before any court, to cause the said bridge to be destroyed, and to cause their privileges to be otherwise respected, pay to the said Frangois Xavier Galarneau and Magloire C16ophas Galarneau treble the tolls hereby imposed for all persons, cattle, horses and carriages passing over such bridge or crossing by means of such ferry or ferries."
" Sec. 6.-The said Fran9ois Xavier Galarneau and Magloire Clbophas Galarneau, to entitle themselves to the benefits and advantages to them by this act granted, shall be bound to put the said bridge into a safe and convenient condition for the passage of travellers, cattle or vehicles, and if the said bridge should, by accident or otherwise, be destroyed, become unsafe or impassable, the said Francois Xavier Galarneau and Magloire Cl6ophas Galarneau shall be bound to rebuild the said bridge within the fifteen months next following the giving away of the said bridge, under penalty of forfeiture of the advantages to them by this act granted; and during any time that the said bridge shall be unsafe or impassable they shall maintain a ferry across the said river, for which they may recover the tolls aforesaid."
McConville for respondent, on the motion to quash the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The amount claimed, one thousand ($1,000), does not make the case appealable.
The case does not involve the validity of any of the acts mentioned in paragraph (a) of section 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act.
It does not relate to any fee of office, duty, rent, revenue or any sum of money payable to Her Majesty, nor to any title to lands.
Does it relate to any title to a tenement ?
I believe not, because the franchise granted to the appellants, being for the limited period of 25 years (section ch. 97, 38 Vic.) is rather a chattel than a tenement which must be permanent.
Blackstone, Kerr's edition (1); Abbott's Dictionary (2); Brown's New Law Dictionary (3) ; Tomlin's Law Dictionary (4); Bouvier's Law I)ictionary (5); Maxwell Interpretation of Statutes
Is there any annual rent or such like matter or thing where the rights in future might be bound ? I respectfully submit that there is no such thing.
If the view J have above expressed as to the true construction of the statute 38 Vic., ch. 97, is correct, it remains clear that appellants never had in the past, have not actually, and will never have the right by them claimed. Until they obtain another act from Parliament they will have no right that might hereafter be bound by the decisions of the coarts below.
Laflamme Q.O. for appellants contra contended that the case came within the sub-section (c) of section 29 of R. C.
The decision of the court on the question of jurisdiction being reserved the case was then argued the merits.
Laflamme. Q.C. and Charpentier for appellants contended that the charter or privilege granted by the general statute 38 Vic., chap 97, is a contract between the public and the grantee, which warrants to the latter, the exclusive right to build a bridge over the River L'Assomption within the limits indicated, and that according to the 5th section of the statute there is an absolute prohibition to construct any other bridge t the limits of the privilege, in favor the grantees, at all times provided the grantee executes the obligations mentioned in his grant.
See Lessee v. Douglass (1) ; Girard v. Belanger (2).
As to the damages, they contended that although it would be difficult to strictly determine the amount, it appeared however by the evidence that a great number of travellers had eluded the toll which the -appellants had the right to claim, by using the ferry constructed by respondent, which was open to the free circulation of the public.
In such a case, the court must consider the determined violation of the law, and grant to the injured party exemplary damages, or at least sufficient to cover the probable loss that the party may have suffered, and the sum of two hundred dollars would be an extremely moderate amount.
McConville for respondent contended that the only reasonable construction to be put upon sections 5 and 6 of the statute was that in case of accident the benefits and privileges granted to appellants are suspended during the fifteen months allowed for repairs. During that time they can claim none of such benefits and privileges; and the public, of which respondent is one, may protect themselves in any manner that suits them, if they are not satisfied with the appellants' ferry. Grants of this kind are always strictly construed, are always taken in a most favorable sense for the King and the public, and against the grantee. They are valid only as to what is therein precisely mentioned, are not to be extended beyond the terms expressly used. Blackstone, Kerr Edition
SIR W. J. RITCHIE C.J.-I am of opinion the appeal should be dismissed with costs.
and
JJ. concurred with FOURNIER
FOURNIER J.-En vertu du statut 38 Vict., ch. 97, les appelants ont obtenu du parlement du Canada. le privilige de construire un pont de p6age sur la rivibre . L'Assomption, dans la paroisse de L'Assomption, A. l'endroit appele "portage," ofi cette rivibre est navigable. Fournier J. Le statut en leur accordant le droit de construire un pont solide et suffisant, A la charge de le maintenir et r~parer 6 leurs frais, les autorise & recevoir et exiger les taux de p6ages sp6cifi6s dans le dit acte en se conformant aux conditions y mentionn~es.
Le privilige accord6 est 6nonc6 dans les termes suivants :
En tout temps, tant que "le dit pont sera tenu en bon 6tat de r6paration, et ouvert pour 1'usage du public, dis lors aucune personne quelconque ne pourra eriger aucun pont on ponts, ni ne pourra faire usage, comme moyens de traverse, de bateaux d'aucune espice pour le passage d'aucune personne, bestiaux on voitures quelconques, moyennant rtribution, sur la distance d'un demi-mille du pont dans la direction du cours de la riviire, et sur la distance de deux miles dans
1'autre direction,... et toute personne qui coustruira un pont de p4age on des ponts de pdage sur la dite rivibre dans les dites limites, on qui traversera des passagers noyennant rdtribution dans les susdites, paiera, en outre des procds que pourront adopter contre li.
les dits Frangois-Xavier Galarneau et Magloire Clophas Galarneau, devant les tribunaux pour faire d6truire les dits pouts et faire autrement respecter leur privilige, aux dits Frangois-Xavier Galarneau
Magloire C16ophas Galarneau, trois fois la valeur des taux, etc....
Et s'il arrivait que le dit pont s'6croulit par accident on autrement, qu'il fut d~truit, que travers~e devint dangereuse, on qu'il devint impraticable, les dits Frangois-Xavier Galarnean et Magloire C16ophas
Galarneau, seront tenus de rdtablir le dit pont dans les quinze mois h dater du jour de 1'dcroulement du pont, peine d'6tre dichus des avantages eux accordis par le prdsent acte, et pendant temps que le dit pont sera impraticable et que sa travers6e sera dangereuse, ils devront entretenir un passage sur la dite rivire, a raison duquel ils pourront exiger les pdages susdits.
En 1883, les appelants out, conform6ment aux dispositions de ce statut, construit sur la dite rivibre
L'Assomption, A 1'endroit appel
" portage," un pont, qui fut emport6 par les glaces.
Ce pont ayant t6 reconstruit la mime ann6e et entretenu conform6ment A la loi fut de nouveau endommag6 par la glace dans le printemps de de maniere A le rendre impraticable. Dans le but de con- J server leur privilge de reconstruire le dit pont dans d6lai que leur accorde le statut, les appelants s'empresshrent de se conformer A la condition d'entretenir un passage sur la rivibre, dans le cas oi le pont est devenu impraticable, et 1'ont entretenu jusqu'A ce que le dit pont efit t compl~tement r6par6 et mis en 6tat d'Atre ouvert au public, ce qui eut lieu longtemps avant l'expiration du d6lai de quinze mois accord6 par le statut pour la reconstruction.
Daus le mois de juin 1885, pendant que les appelants entretenaient, conform6ment au dit statut, une traverse suffisante pour les besoins du public, en attendant la reconstruction du pont endommag6, l'intim6 a ill~galement 6rig6 un pont sur la dite rivibre dans les limites du privilige des appelants et a ouvert ce pont au public, en exigeant des p6ages pour le passage des personnes, voitures et bestiaux, an d6triment des appelants et en violation de leur privilege exclusif de percevoir des p6ages dans les limites sus-mentionn6es.
Pour obtenir r6paration du tort que leur causait l'intim6, et faire reconnaltre leur privil6ge exclusif, les appelants intent~rent leur action en cette cause pour faire ordonner la d6molition du pont construit par l'intim6 et lui faire d6fense de troubler les appelants dans 1'exercice de leur privilge et aussi pour faire condamner 'intim6 A leur payer $100.00 de dommages.
A cette action l'intim6 a plaid6 qu'4tant resident au village de L'Assomption et propri~taire d'une terre sur la dite rivibre, il est oblig6 de la traverser souvent et d'y faire traverser ses animaux; qu'apris la destruction du pont des appelants, il a construit vis-A-vis sa terre, A ses propres frais, un pout temporaire, pour son utilit6 personnelle, dont i1 s'est servi jusqu'au mois de novembre suivant.
Aprbs enqu~te et audition la cour Sup6rieure a donn6 gain de cause A l'intim6, et son jugement a 6t0 confirm6 par la majorit& de la cour du Bane de la Reine.
Les raisons de ce jugement ne se trouvent que dans les consid6rants du jugement de la cour Sup6rieure, qui sont A l'effet que Fintim6 avait droit de construire un pont temporaire, et sont une n6gation directe et formelle de 1'existence du privilge des appelants pendant la reconstruction de leur pont.
La preuve a 6tabli d'une manire certaine qu'aussit6t apris l'accident les appelants se sont conform6s A la condition qui leur est impos6e d'entretenir une traverse suffisante pendant la reconstruction, qu'A part des accidents caus6s par force majeure leur pont a toujours 6t0 tenu en bon 6tat de r6paration et ouvert pour l'usage du public.
ont aussi prouve que l'intim6 a requ des profits p6cuniaires, sous forme de p6age, de 1'exploitation de son pont. La n6gation de ces faits a 6t6 positivement contredite.
La seule question qui s'61ve en cette cause est de savoir: si pendant les 15 mois de d6lai accord6 par le statut pour la reconstruction du pont dans le cas d'accidents, les appelants out encore le privikge d'empcher la construction d'aucun pout, dans les limites qui leur sont assign6es par le statut, en se conformant toutefois A la condition de maintenir une traverse tel que le vent le statut, en attendant que le pont soit rendu A la circulation.
Le jugement dont est appel a ni6 formellement cette proposition-ainsi que la d6fense-ce qui a eu 1'effet de mettre en question le titre des appelants et, partant, de rendre la cause appelable comme soulevant une question de titre A un immeuble. Cette cause tombe
6videmment sous la section d6clarant:
* et est, partant, appelable cette cour.
La question de droit A decider repose entibrement sur Fournier J. 1'interpr6tation du statut confbrant le privil6ge dont il est question.
D'apr~s la cinquibme section, ce privilige doit exister tant que le pont sera en bon 6tat de rparation et ouvert au public, et pendant tout ce temps personne ne pourra 6riger aucun pont ni ne pourra faire usage, comme moyen de traverse, de bateaux d'aucune espice pour le passage des personnes, voitures et bestiaux, moyennant r6tribution, sur la distance d'un demi mille du pont dans la direction du cours de la rivibre, et sur la distance de deux milles dans l'autre direction.
Ce privildge est transmissible aux h6ritiers et ayants-cause, et doit durer pendant vingt-cinq ans. Ce privilige, qui n'est accord6 que dans l'inthrat du public, est prot6g6 par 1'interdiction de construire aucun pont dans les limites accord6es et par l'imposition de p~nalit~s de trois fois la valeur du taux de p6age contre ceux qui traverseraient des passagers moyennant r6tribution.
Le statut leur donne en outre le droit de poursuivre devant les tribunaux pour faire d6truire les ponts qui.seraient construits en violation de leur privilge et de faire autrement respecter le dit privil~ge. La sixibme section pourvoit an cas o'x la communication serait interrompue par accident au pont et declare que dans ce cas les appelants- Cette clause loin d'autoriser l'interpr6tation de 1 cour Sup6rieure qui justifie la construction temporaire d'un pont par 1'intim6, pourvoit, au contraire, A la continuation du privilkge pendant la construction du pont, en obligeant les appelants & le reconstruire dans les quinze mois qui suivront l'accident qui l'aura rendu impassable, sous peine de perdre tous les privildges et avantages qui lui sont accord6s par le statut. Elle l'oblige aussi, pour rem6dier A l'interruption des communications, 6, maintenir une traverse pour laquelle elle 1'autorise A exiger les m~mes taux que pour le passage sur le pont. Les appelants s'6tant conform6s cette condition, leur privil6ge d'empAcher la construction d'un pont dans leurs limites n'a pas cesse un seul instant. Il doit, d'apris le statut, durer vingt-cinq ans, pourvu que les appelants remplissent les obligations qui leur sont impos~es. Ils out fait une preuve complhte de l'accomplissement de ces conditions. Si l'intim6 avait m~mo temporairement le droit de construire un pont, ce serait une n6gation du droit absolu et exciusif des appelants pendant toute la dur6e qui leur a 6t accord6e.
En supposant que l'intim6 n'aurait pas exig6 de p6ages sur son pont, il n'en aurait pas moins port6 atteinte au privildge des appelants, qui auraient tout de m~rme le droit d'en demander la d6molition pour faire respecter leur privilge.
Ce principe a 6t0 approuv6 par la cour du Banc de la Reine en appel, en 1874, par un jugement unanime, infirmant celui de la cour Supbrieure dans la cause de
Girard v. B6langer et al.
II ne paralt pas y avoir de rapport r6gulier de cette cause, mais on trouve la substance du jugement de la cour d'Appel dans 1'ouvrage de feu 1'honorable juge
Ramsay (Ramsay Appeal Cases) oft l'honorable juge fait les observations suivantes:
and where by the statute according such power it was enacted "that after said bridge should be open for the public no person should erect or cause to be erected any bridge or bridges, or maintain or cause to be maintained any means of communication for the carriage of any person, cattle or carriage whatsoever for hire, across the said Fournier J. branch of the river Yamaska, at the place above mentioned, anywhere within one mile above and one mile and a half below the said bridge, under the penalty of a fine of forty shillings currency for each person, animal or carriage conveyed across the said river on any bridge or means of communication constructed and maintained for hire, provided nothing in said act should be constructed to deprive the public of the right of crossing the said river within the limits aforesaid, by fording or in canoes or otherwise without payment." A large number of people built a subscription bridge within the limits of the said statutory privilege avowedly with the object of avoiding the use of the toll bridge and depriving the owner of the privilege of his custom.
Held, that this was an indirect mode of defeating the privilege aforesaid, and that the defendants should be condemned to demolish the bridge by them constructed. Girard v. Bdlanger et al. Judgment reversing, September, 1874.-Monk, Taschereau, Ramsay, Sanborn, Belanger, JJ.
La doctrine 6nonc6e dans cette d6cision est certainement 16gale et son application A la cause actuelle est 6vidente.
Les appelants sont entr6s dans une savante dissertation et out cit6 un grand nombre d'autorit6s pour 6tablir qu'ils avaient droit pour la protection de leur privilige, d'empicher tout empitement sur la proprit6 publique dans les limites qui leur sont assign6es, et qu'ils avaient droit de les faire disparaltre au moyen de l'action populaire, ou en obtenant un bref de prohibition.
Il n'6tait gubre utile de ref6rer A toutes ces autorit6s, car le statut leur donne toute la protection n6cessaire contre quiconque enfreindrait leurs droits, en d6cr&tant ce qui suit:
And any person who shall build toll bridge or toll bridges over the said river within the limits aforesaid, or shall ferry for hire within the limits aforesaid, shall, without prejudice to any proceeding which may be instituted against him by the said (the appellants) before any court, to cause the said bridge to be destroyed, and to cause their privilege to be otherwise respected.
Cette clause leur ouvre tons les moyens de droit pour la protection de leur propri6t6.
Bien que la preuve ait 6tabli qu'un grand nombre de personnes ait pass6 sur le pont du dbfendeur, an pr6judice des appelants, et qu'en consfquence ceux-ci
-. ont souffrir des dommages; cependant le montant n'en a pas d6termin6, 1'action ayant pour but principal de faire reconaltre le privilhge exclusif des appelants, il ne saurait, dans ces circonstances, 6tre accord6 que des dommages nominaux.
En cons6quence, le jugement de cette cour devrait accorder aux appelants les conclusions de leur d~claration, moims la d6molition du pont que le d6fendeur a fait enlever dans l'automne de 1885, et le dit d6fendeur, en outre, condamn6 A la somme de $50 de dommages avec int6rit et les d6pens dans les deux causes distraits en faveur du procureur des appelants.
J.-I am unable to understand the statute 38 Vic., chap. 97, in the same way as some of my learned brethren, nor can I see that it ought to mean what they interpret it to mean.
The exclusive privilege of maintaining a toll bridge across the River l'Assomption is. given to Galarneau, who is protected by the prohibition of all other persons from transporting persons vehicles, &c., across the river for hire, either by bridge or ferry, within the specified limits, so long as the bridge is kept in good repair and open for the use of the public.
If the bridge is destroyed or becomes unsafe or impassable
Galarneau is bound to restore it within fifteen months on pain of the forfeiture of his privileges, and in the meantime to maintain a ferry.
Now his exclusive privileges are in terms extended only to such times as the bridge is in good repair and open for use to the public.
He is bound, it is true, to maintain a ferry while the bridge is not available, but
I find no exclusive privilege attached to that, nor do I perceive on what public principle there should be such an exclusive privilege.
The object of the monopoly is the bridge. The consideration for it is the providing a bridge, not a ferry. 'V.
The privilege connected with the bridge being preserved to the grantee during the time, not exceeding Patterson J. fifteen months, when there is no bridge there, it is reasonable that he should during the time furnish the public with a ferry which, though not so useful as a bridge, is the best temporary substitute.
That is the price of the maintenance of the monopoly given in respect of the bridge, which monopoly, by the terms of the statute as I read them, is suspended while the bridge is not available, but becomes again operative when the bridge is restored.
That seems to me the plain reading of the statute, and I do not see why it should be otherwise, or why as soon as the bridge is gone, any one should not be at liberty to build another and use it until the toll bridge is restored.
The public was to have a bridge. That was the object and excuse of the monopoly, and I should be surprised to find the statute fordidding the temporary use of another bridge, which temporary use might become permanent if the fifteen months elapsed without the other being restored.
I think this appeal should be dismissed.
Appeal allowed with costs. Solicitor for appellants: M. E. Charpentier. Solicitors for respondent: McConville
Renaud.
Statutes and regulations cited
-
Unresolved citations
- paragraph (a)
- section 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act
- section 29
- sections 5
- 6