Dufesne v. Dixon

JOSEPH M. DUFRESNE at al,(PLAIN- S"

TIFFS) .PELANS...............................

P;

*Feby.20,21.

*April 30.

DAME MARIA DIXON, (PETITIONER).. .RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).

Per Taschereau J.-The provisions of Arts. 2090 and 2091 C. C. refer to a valid seizure and sale, and cannot be invoked against the registration of the deed of retrocession by the respondent. APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (Appeal Side) affirming the judgment of the Superior Court by which the appellants' contestation of respondent's petition en nullitd de dicret was dismissed.

*PAEsENT,-Strong, Fournier, Taschereau, Gwynne, and Patterson JJ. This case originated out of a judicial sale of a lot of land, situate in the city of Montreal, belonging to respondent, under a judgment in favor of the appel- DI. lants against the vacant estate of one Campbell for the sum of $8,388.60.

The lot of land in question was sold by the Sheriff of Montreal at the instance of appellants who represented the same, as belonging to the vacant estate of said Campbell, to which one Benjamin Clement had been appointed curator.

The resp dent by petition to the Superior Court sitting at Montreal, prayed for and obtained the setting aside of the sheriff's decree.

The circumstances under which the petition to annul the decree was granted are as follows :

Respondent acquired in February, 1859, by good and valid title a lot of land fronting on Papineau road, subsequently entered upon the cadastre (official plan and book of reference) of St. Mary's Ward of the City of Montreal, under the No. 857.

On the 19th of November 1874, respondent sold this lot of land to William A. Campbell, Joseph Moise Dufresne and Simbon Pagnuelo, who acquired the same, jointly and severally, for the sum of $7,000.00, on which she received $3,000.00, in cash, said purchasers binding themselves to pay the balance of $4,000 00, with interest, within ten years from the date of the deed.

On the 22nd December, 1875, with the consent of Simbon Pagnuelo, Joseph Moise Dufresne in first instance, and later, on the 1st August, 1877, of the said Sim6on Pagnuelo, sold their respective shares in the said lot of land to their co-purchaser William A. Campbell, who undertook to satisfy all the conditions and undertakings of their deed of the 19th November, 1874, and more particularly to pay for them to the respondent their share of the balance of the purchase money ($4,000 00).

On the same day (1st August, 1877) that the said Sim6on Pagnuelo thus sold his rights in the said lot of land respondent, by another deed executed between her and the said William A. Campbell, agreed to reduce in his favor the said balance of $4,000.00 to the sum of $3,000.00 of which last amount the lot of land was to remain mortgaged in favor of respondent. Subsequently, on the 22nd April, 1879, William A. Campbell being unable to pay the balance of $3,000.00, and wishing to relieve himself, as well as Dufresne and Pagnuelo, from their liability for said amount, executed another deed in favor of respondent, whereby he retroceded. the lot of land in question to respondent, who immediately took possession thereof and continued to occupy and enjoy the same. This deed was duly registered on the 28th of November, 1884. On the 27th of June, 1884, the appellants (who are the identical Joseph Moise Dufresne and Sim6on Pagnuelo, above referred to) obtained against one Benjamin Cl6ment, in his quality of curator to the vacant estate of the said William A Campbell, who had recently died, a judgment for the sum of $8,388.00, and proceeded to issue execution under said judgment by order of their attorneys, of whom Mr. Pagnuelo, above mentioned, was one.

They instructed the Sheriff of Montreal to accept from B. Cl6ment, &squalit6, a return of nulla bona and ordered him to proceed to the seizure of several immovables, and amongst others the lot of land now in question, which had been retroceded, by W. A. Campbell to respondent, on the 22nd April, 1879, as well for his benefit as in the interest of the appellants.

On the 25th of July, 1884, the sheriff seized the lot of land in question but failed to furnish the registrar of the Registration Division of Montreal-East, wherein said lot of land is situate, with the legal notification required by the Statute 43-44 Vict. ch. 25, sects. 5 D . and 14.

On the 3rd of October, 1884, date of the sheriff's sale, said lot of land was adjudicated to Simbon Pagnuelo, already referred to, for the sum of $1,400.00; but he having declared, as appears by the prochs-verbal the sale, that there was an error in his bid, the property was adjudged to one George W. Parent, for the sum of $1,350.00.

Seven months after this adjudication, on the 4th May, 1885, George W. Parent transferred his right of adjudication to the mis-en-cause Alphonse Racine, Thomas Gauthier and Cl6ophas Beausoleil, who paid the sheriff the adjudication price and obtained their title; and then for the first time respondent was informed that her property had been seized, sold and adjudicated at the instance of Joseph Moise Dufresne and Simaon Pagnuelo.

The respondent by her petition to the Superior Court prayed that she be declared to be the true and lawful proprietor of the lot of land in question, and that the seizure, sale, adjudication and sheriff's title granted under the circumstances above mentioned, be set aside and declared null; that the decree be quashed as having been made super non domino, and respondent maintained in her possession and proprietorship of the lot of land in question notwithstanding said decree. Pasnuelo Q.C. for appellant contended, -that an unregistered sale of real estate, such as the deed of retrocession by Campbell to respondent in this case, is incomplete, without effect, and confers no right of ownership to the buyer against a seizing creditor of the vendor, and that the registration of the deed of sale of such real estate after seizure has no effect when the seizure is followed by judicial expropriation, and cited and on Art. 2090, 2091, 2082 C.C. ; Arts. 644, Transcription (2); Laurent (3); Troplong, Transcription (4); Lefebvre v. Branch aud Pothier, Substitutions Charlebois v. Sauvd ; Farmer v. Devlin ; Les Ecclisiastiques du Srinaire de Montrdal v. La Socildd de Construction (9): Adam v. Flanders (10); Charland v. Faucher ; see also Aubry et Rau ; Bravard Veyribres, Droit Commercial (13); Nancy, 27th December, 1879 Rhdaume v. Bourdon ; La Soci6ld de Construction M6tropolitaine v. Beauchamp et David opposant

. Geoffrion Q. C. followed on behalf of the appellants and contended: that the respondent had been guilty laches, and that under art. 20830.0. she could not claim any right to the property against Campbell's creditors until she registered her title, and submitted that under art. 632 C. C. P. the seizure was good, as Campbell's estate had remained in possession, towards third parties, and was in possession animo domino at the time of the seizure.

The learned counsel also contended that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench should be reversed because, supposing respondent to havebeen proprietor and in possession of the said lot of land, she should have opposed the sale within the time fixed by law ; and in default of so doing, her rights of ownership resolve themselves into a privileged claim upon the proceeds of the sale ; 1st, because W. Campbell's vacant succession was bankrupt, and registration of a deed of sale after bankruptcy was illegal and has no effect; 2nd, because appellants, by registering a demand of separation patrimoine, secured a privilege on the real estate in question, which rendered ineffective the subsequent registration of the respondent's deed of sale, and which could not be affected by such subsequent registration; 3rd, because, supposing that respondent secured against the appellants a right of ownership by registering her deed of sale after the sheriff's sale she should at least pay the costs of the seizure and sale by the sheriff, and all damages caused to appellants by such tardy and late registration.

And 2nd, that the registration by the respondent of her title (the deed of retrocession by Campbell) subsequent to the seizure and sale by the sheriff, but prior to the emission of the sheriff's title, and consequently to its registration, is valid as against the claims of the purchasers at sheriff's sale. Citing arts. 2089, 2098 C. C.; Verdier, Transcription Hypoth6caire (9) ; Troplong, Transcription Hypoth6caire (10); Mourlon de la Transcription (1) ; Troplong, Vente (2); Aubry et Rau (3); Re Caya v. Pellerin (4) ; Re Dallaible v. Gravel (5) ; Re Adam v. Flanders (6); Re Begin (7) ; and that moreover the question of registration could not arise in this case if the sale was super non domino.

FOURNIER J.-Les faits an sujet desquels s'61vent les questions de droit soumises A la consid6ration de cette cour sont comme suit:- En 1859, la Requ~rante, Mme Dixon, acquit 1'immeuble en question, situ6 dans le quartier Ste-Marie de Montr6al.

En 1874, elle vendit cet immeuble AI Messieurs Campbell, Dufresne et Pagnuelo. Par des actes de 1875 et de 1877, Messieurs Dufresne et Pagnuelo vendirent leir part A leur co-propri6taire Campbell, A la charge par ce dernier de payer & Madame Dixon, 1'Intimbe, la balance du prix de vente originaire, $4,000.

Le ler aoOt 1877, par une transaction entre Campbell et Mme Dixon, cette dernibre consentit A r6duire cette balance de $4,000 A $3,000, en conservant son hypoth6que pour cette somme sur l'immeuble en question. En 1879, Campbell, se trouvant incapable de payer & Madame Dixon la balance de $3,000, a fait acte de r6trocession de l'immeuble ! la condition de lib6rer Messieurs Campbell, Pagnuelo et Dufresne, les appelants en cette cause, de la dette en question.

Campbell est d6c6d6 plus tard et Benjamin CI6ment a 6 nomm6 curateur A sa succession vacante.

En 1884, les appelants, Dufresne et Pagnuelo, ayant obtenu jugement contre le curateur C16ment, firent saisir l'immeuble en question qui fut adjug6, le 3 octobre 18i4, & M. Pagnuelo, et par d6claration d'erreur Lg.

dans 1'enchbre, Geo. W. Parent, le pr6c6dent ench6risseur, fut d6clar6 adjudicataire.

Parent n'ayant pas pay6 l'adjudication, sept mois apris, savoir, le 4 mai 1885, transporta son droit d'adjudication aux adjudicataires actuels, MM. Racine, Fournier Gauthier et Beausoleil, qui ont pay6 alors le prix d'adjudication, et auxquels le sh6rif accorda un titre. La preuve a 6tabli de la manibre la plus positive que pendant les cinq annies qui ont prbc~d6 la saisie, I'intimbe (Maria Dixon) a 6 seule ouvertement et publiquement en possession de l'immeuble en question en cette cause.

C'est elle dont le nom est port6 sur le r6le de cotisation de la cit6 de Montr.al comme propri6taire, et c'est aussi elle qui en a acquitt6 toutes les taxes pendant cette p6riode.

Pendant ces cinq ann6es, le t6moin McAvoy a prouv6 qu'il avait occup6 cette propri6t6 comme locataire de l'intimbe.

Le curateur, interrog6 comme t6moin, a d6c1ar6 qu'il n'avait jamais fait aucun acte de possession de cette propri6t6 ni d'aucune autre appartenant A Campbell. Cette preuve, qui nullement contredite, 6tablit comme une certitude le fait que le curateur A la succession n'a jamais 6t en possession de cet immeuble, qui n'est pas sorti de celle de l'intimbe depuis qu'elle en est redevenue propri6taire par 1'acte de r6trocession que Campbell Ini en avait consenti en 1879.

L'article 632, C. P. est 6videmment fait pour rencontrer ce cas:

La cour a &t unanime A d6clarer la saisie en cette cause nulle, comme faite contrairement A la disposition de cet article.

A l'appui de cette d6cision, l'autorit6 suivante de Verdier (1) a 6t0 cit6e:

Par cons6quent, si Pon suppose que la vente a pr6cidi la saisie, il est certain que celle-ci est radicalement nulle, puisqu'elle porte sur un bien qui n'itait plus dans le patrinoine du dibiteur. La transcription qui surviendrait ne saurait donner la vie h un acte qui est mort-nd, selon Fournier J.1'expression de M. Dalloz.

Elle ne saurait avoir aucune efficacit6. La saisie, nulle dans lorigine, est comme non avenue.

Si la saisie a pricid6 la vente la position est la mime, et les risultats sont identiques. Tant que la saisie n'a pas ti transcrite, elle n'enlive pas au saisi le droit de vendre.

Dis lors, s'il a us6 de cette facultd, la vente a pour effet immidiat de le disinvestir, ainsi que ses ayant-cause. Or, le saisissant, n'ayant aucun droit rbel qui lui soit propre et indipendant de celui du saisi, n'est qu'un ayant-cause; il est bien obligi de subir la vente. La saisie, dit M. Dalloz, a frappie de mort par cette vente; son objet lui a ichappA; ds lors, la transcription n'a pu lui rendre ultrieurement la vie qu'elle a perdue.

Je suis d'avis de confirmer le jugement de la cour du Bano de la Reine avec d6pens.

TASCiiEREAU J.-The Superior Court in Montreal granted this petition and annulled the sale thereof on the ground inter alia that the seizure and sale had been made super non domino. The Court of Queen's Bench confirmed that judgment.

I am of opinion that these judgments were right. There can be no question as to. the law. " The seizure of immovables " says Art. 632 C.C.P. "can only be made against the judgment debtor " and " he must be or be reputed to be in possession of the same animo domini.

Pothier, Civil Procedure, says (1).

On ne pent saisir riellement que sur la personne qui s'est obligie par Pacte on qui a 4t6 condamnde par le jugement en vertu duquel on saisit, car toute exicution cesse par la mort de Poblig6 on condamn6. La saisie rielle doit se faire stir le propriitaire de Phiritage, une saisie faite super non domino est nulle.

Observez nianmoins qu'on entend par propri6taire, non pas seulement celui qui 1est dans la v6rit6, mais encore ceui qui posside Phiritage animo domini, soit qu'il en soit viritablement propri6taire, soit qu'il ne le soit pas, car il est riput6 P'tre, lorsque le v6ritable propriftaire ne riclame point.

Bugnet in a note on above, says (1):

Contre le propri6taire apparent. sauf le droit de revendication de la part du propriitaire v6ritable, qui pourra m~me, en rhgle g6nerale'

. demander la nullit6 de Padjudication.

L'adjudicataire (sur saisie immobilibre) ne transmet h Padjudicataire d'autres droits & la pro- Taschereau pridt6 que ceux appartenant au saisi.

Pigeau (2) and D'H6ricourt (3) are also in support of respondent's contention; and Guyot (4) says:

Lorsqu'un immeuble a t saisi r6ellement sur celui qui n'en 6tait pas propridtaire et que celui h qui il appartenait en est rest6 paisible possesseur jusqu'h Padjudication, la saisie rdelle, les cribes et Padjudication ne peuvent faire aucun prdjudice an v6ritable propristaire, car pour qu'un bien puisse etre valablement adjug6 par d6cret, il faut qu'il soit devenu le gage de la justice et des cr6anciers de la partie saisie.

Now as to the evidence in this case the two courts below have found as a matter of fact that the curator to the estate, Campbell, upon whom the sale was made, was not then in possession of the immovable in question; and the evidence fully supports that finding of fact. The curator himself, examined as a witness, admits that he never made any act of possession of that property.

I would dismiss this appeal with costs.

I do not allude to the question of registration raised by the appellant as, in my opinion, it cannot affect this case. Even if Mrs. Dixon had never registered the deed of retrocession, she would be entitled to get this seizure and sale set aside.

Art. 2091 C C. refers to a valid seizure-a lawful sale. Here we hold that there has been no sale, that the so-called sale is a nullity.

Appeal dismissed woith costs.

(3) P. 49,