Price v. Mercier

EVAN JOHN PRICE (TIERs OPPOSANT

APPELLANT; IN THE SUPERIOR COURT) ...........

AND

Sir W. J.-I feel very great embarrassment in arriving at a conclusion in this case in consequence of the great diversity of opinion of my brother judges from the Province of Quebec, for both of whose opinions, it is needless to say, I entertain the highest respect, and from the able manner in which both have dealt with the question at issue, and to which judgments, having been accorded the privilege of reading them,* I have given the most serious consideration.

The question, independent of the merits, seems to resolve itself very much into a matter of procedure, namely, as to the right of Price, an intervening party, to make a lierce opposition to the judgment in this case, the learned judge of the Superior Court holding that there was a manifest interest in the opposant by tierce opposition to call in question the legality of .the judgment in the present case, declaring the Seignory G-rondines, or any part thereof, belonging to or in the possession of the opposant, to be the property of Her Majesty as against the opposant who was not a party to the present action.

On appeal the majority of the Court of Queen's Bench, on the contrary, holding that to authorize a person, not a party to a judgment, to form a tierce opposition to this judgment, it was not sufficient that he may have an interest contrary to him who has obtained this judgment, but it is necessary that this interest should be founded on a right superior to that of the party who has obtained this judgment in his favor.

I cannot bring my mind to the conclusion that Price, the tiers opposant, had no interest which was affected by the judgment in this case.

lie is in possession of the land in question, and has been so for a very long time, some fifty years, adverse to the crown, and cannot think his right to this possession would not be seriously affected by the said judgment; in addition to which this judgment would bete registered and could continue in force for thirty years, during all of which time it would seriously affect the ability of the tiers opposant to sell or deal with the property, and the title under which it is fair to assume he claims to hold this possession; and in any proceeding instituted to dispossess the opposant this judgment, it appears to me, would necessarily be the basis of the plaintiff's claim.

If so, I cannot avoid thinking that he has a substantial and direct interest in having it removed, if he can show, as he alleges, that the judgment was fraudulently, improperly and illegally obtained, and therefore I cannot help thinking he had a right to file an opposition to such judgment by virtue of Art. 110 C.C P., which declares that any person whose interests are affected by a judgment rendered in a case in which neither he nor the persons representing him were made parties can file an opposition to such judgment.

My brother Taschereau, whose views feel constrained to adopt, has, in a very full and elaborate judgment, traced the history and merits of this, I may say, very extraordinary case, from its inception, more than one hundred years ago, and has discussed at length the law as applicable to it, and has, so far as I am capable of forming an opinion, shown that this appeal should be allowed.

Consequently I am relieved from doing more than concurring in that judgment which he will deliver, which, however, I must say, I do with the greatest diffidence.

I therefore think the appeal should be allowed, the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench reversed and the judgment of the Superior Court restored.

J.-La pr6sente contestation a soulev6u sur la tierce-opposition produite par l'appelant Price, au jugement de la cour Sup6rieure, en date du 14 juin 1884, accordant ]a Couronne, par droit de desh6rence, J.1a possession et ]a propri6t6 de la succession de dame Marie Piery, veuve de Jean-Baptiste Hamelin Francheville.

Cette procedure avait 6t6 commenc6e par Alexandre Gray, procureur-g6nbral, au nom de Sa Majest6, par une information en date du 9 juillet 1790, dirig6e contre J.-Bte. Gueyrault, nomm6 curateur A la succession vacante de la dite dame Piery.

Le 7 juillet 1791, Nicolas Piery, Marie Madeleine Piery et Marie Scholastique Piery intervinrent pour r6clamer la dite succession contre le curateur. Le mime jour il fut permis A Jenkins Williams, Ecr., soliciteur-g6n6ral, vu le d~chs d'Alexandre Gray, procureurg6n6ral, de reprendre l'instance an nom de Sa Majest6. Le mars 1881, 1'honorable Louis Olivier Taillon, procureur-g6n6ral de la province de Quebec, obtint de la cour Sup6rieure la permission de reprendre l'instance en cette cause en remplacement de Jenkins Williams. Le mars de la mime ann6e, Adalbert Fontaine, de Qubbec, avocat, ayant 6t0 nomm6 curateur en remplacement de Gueyrault, reprit, le 14 du mime mois l'instance comme d6fendeur.

L'intervention de Nicolas Piery et autres fut renvoy6e le 4 juin par jugement de 1'honorable juge Casault. Et la cour, le juin, consid6rant que Sa Majest6 avait prouv6 les all6gu6s de son information, d6clara par son jugement que les biens de la dite succession appartenaient A Sa Majest6 par droit de desh6rence et ordonna an curateur Fontaine, 6s-qualit6, de rendre compte Sa Majest6 de sa gestion et administration des biens de la dite succession et de payer et d6livrer A Sa Majest6 les argents, droits, cr6dits, effets, titres et si~iret~s appartenant A la dite succession, avec la possession des terrains et parties de seigneurie, etc., pour 1'usage de Sa Majest&

. L'appelant Price qui se trouve en possession d'immeubles appartenant A cette succession s'est port6 tiers- Fournier J. opposant an jugement qui a ordonn6 au curateur d'en remettre la possession A Sa Majest6 qui en est d6c1arde propri6taire par droit de desh~rence.

II base son opposition principalement sur les moyens suivants :-que dans une certaine cause pendante, savoir, le no 1796, il a 6t6 poursuivi par Tancride Toussaint Moreau, comme acqu6reur des droits appartenant A la couronne en vertu du jugement qui 1'a d~clar6 propri~taire par droit de d6sh&rence des biens de la succession Piery, le 14 juin 1884, dans la pr6sente cause, et qu'en qualit6 de cessionnaire de ces droits il r~clame du tiers-opposant, une partie de la seigneurie des Grondines, appel6e le fief de Francheville, dont celuici est en possession paisible comme propri6taire depuis un grand nombre d'ann6es, avec aussi tons les arr6rages et revenus pergus par le dit opposant, et A d6faut du paiement d'une somme de $100,000. Que le dit Tancrade T. Moreau, cherche comme acqu6reur des droits de la Couronne A priver le dit opposant de sa possession et jouissance de la dite proprith et qu'en cons6quence celui-ci a int6rit A se porter opposant an jugement qui a t6 rendu en cette cause le 14 juin 1884.

Cette action de Tancr~de T. Moreau est encore pendante.

Price allgue encore dans son opposition que ce jugement est ill6gal, irrigulier, erron6 et non fond6 en faits et en loi, et devrait 6tre annul6, r~voqu6 et mis de c6t6, pour les raisons suivantes :- 10 Parcequ'il n'y a aucune preuve 6tablissant que Marie Pibry 6tait une enfant illgitime. 20 Parce qu'il n'y a pas de preuve que la dite Marie Piery fut propri6taire d'aucune partie de la dite seigneurie des 0-rondines, parce que si la dite Marie Piery eat 6t6 ill&gitime, sa succession vacante n'aurait pas appartenu & AIERCIER.

la Couronne de France; que tons les proc6d6s faits Fournier J. dans la dite cause depuis 1884 sont entach6s de fraude, irr6guliers et illgaux.

Que le jugement renvoyant l'intervention de Nicolas Piery et al., a t obtenu par surprise, etc., etc. Et P'opposant conclut A ce que tous les proc6dds faits depuis 1884 soient d6clar6s frauduleux et collusoires et le jugement du 14 juin 1881 d6elar6 nul.

Sur cette opposition Tancride T. Moreau a t reu partie intervenante et a produit une d6fense en droit A cette partie de la dite opposition qui se lit comme suit: That the intervention in this cause filed on the seventh day of September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-one, by Nicolas Piery, Marie Madeleine Piery, and Marie Scholastique Piery, should not have been dismissed and the judgment in this cause rendered on the fourth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, dismissing such intervention, was obtained from the court by surprise, and illegal, null and void, in as much as there was at the date of such judg- Ient legal presumption of the death of such intervening parties and of their attorneys, and that no judgment could legally be rendered upon such intervention until the heirs and legal representatives of the said intervening parties had been legally summoned to continue the said intervention.

That the proceedings taken in the name of the Crown for the purpose of forcing the said intervening parties to appoint attorneys in lieu of their said attorneys being since deceased and the judgment rendered upon such proceedings are, for the same reason, illegal, null and void and of no effect.

Parceque cette partie de la dite opposition do Popposant doit Atre retranch6e et rejet~e, en admettant que les allgus en seraient vrais.

Parce que Popposant excipe du droit d'autrui. Le dit intervenant plaida aussi au m6rite de la dite opposition les moyens suivants :- Que Popposant n'a aucun int6rt dans Popposition et dans Paction intentie par Sa Majest6 pour recouvrer les biens de la succession de feu

Dame Marie Piery et qu'il n'est pas par le jugement rendu en icelle.

Que Popposant n'a aucun droit dans les dits biens, qu'il n'en est pas, n6tait pas et n'a jamais lui ou auteurs, propri6taire et en possession des dits biens revendiqu6s par la dite action et qh'il n'allgue Fournier J. aucun titre.

Que les prltendues illlgalit&s et in formalitis al6guies par Popposant n'ont pu lui causer aucun tort et lui prfjudicier, et qu'en supposant pour un moment qu'elles seraient fondles- que F1intervenant niece ne seraient que des nullitis sans grief et dont Popposant ne peut plaindre.

Que tons et chacun des faits alligu6s dans la dite opposition,"sont faux et mal fondds, et que Iintervenant les nie tous sp6cialement, splcifiquement, et comme s'il les niait seriatim.

Que toute la proc6dure a faitc r6gulibrement et 16galement, pour et an nom de Sa Majest6 et qu'il n'y a en aucune fraude on collusion on artifice, parce que les dits intervenants Piery, seuls, pourraient invoquer les dits moyens et se plaindre des dites procidures, et que l'opposant est sans intdrdt pour le faire.

Sur la contestation, ainsi li6e, apris preuve faite de part et d'autre, la cour Sup6rieure rendit jugement le

Ter f6vrier 1887, maintenant I'opposition de l'appelant.

That the action and intervention of the heirs Piery were pending at the time the Court of Common Pleas ceased to exist, and that no evidence had ever been adduced in proof of the allegations of the principal demand or of the intervention ; that no proceedings were taken to revive the said suit before any existing Court of the Province, by and on behalf of his Majesty George III.

That the action against the defendant, Gueyrault, was a personal action to account, which, had the King established a right of property in the succession or shewn provisional possession thereof under judicial authority, a judgment to account would have condemned the defendant, Gueyrault, in the amount proved, but upon default of the Crown to prove property or possession of the estate, the action could not be maintained :

That all the parties being dead, Attorney-General Taillon could not validly move to continue the suit in lieu of Jenkin Williams, Solicitor

General to King George III

That if the case could be revived after a century, it could only done by some one representing King George III against the heirs legal representatives of J. B. Gueyrault, by means of an action reprise d'instance commencing with a writ of summons.

petita

Ce jugement ayant t6 port6 en appel A la cour du Banc de la Reine, a t6 infirm6 sur le principe que l'appelant n'avait pas d6montr6 qu'il avait un droit sup~rieur A celui de la partie qui avait obtenu jugement en sa faveur.

En effet, les moyens invoqu6s consistent principalement dans l'invocation des droits des h6ritiers Piery, s'il en existe, et de moyens d'irr6gularit6s dans la proc~dure.

La cour a d6clar6 que pour 6tre autoris6 former une tierce-opposition a un jugement, il ne suffit pas d'avoir un intrit contraire A celui qui a obtenu le .jugement, mais il faut que cet int6rit soit fond6 sur un droit superieur A celui de la partie qui a obtenu ce jugement en sa faveur.

Que l'objet de la tierce-opposition n'est pas seulement de faire annuler le jugement dont se plaint le tiers-opposant, mais de faire pronoucer le tribunal contradictoirement sur le m6rite des droits r~clam6s par le tiers-opposant et par celui qui a obtenu le jugement attaqu6 par la tierce-opposition.

Dans cette cause, le tiers-opposaut, ni par les allgu6s de son opposition, ni par ses conclusions, n'a mis en question le droit de la couronne aux biens qui out 6 d6laiss6s par feu Mario Piery lors de son deces. a simplement demand6 que le jugement fut annul6 pour des vices de forme dans la proc6dure et pour absence de preuves, et en invoquant le droit d'autrui. Ces allkgations sont tout fait insuffisantes.

Le recours extraordinaire A la tierce-opposition n'est pas accord6 pour faire declarer nul un jugement pour PRICE des irr6gularit6s, il faut, comme le dit le jugement de V* la cour du Banc de la Reine, que 1'opposant allgue et d6montre un droit sup~rieur au droit de celui qui a Fournier J. obtenu le jugement.

Ceci est confirm6 par toutes les autorit~s.

11 y a plusieurs conditions n~cessaires pour avoir droit de former opposition h un jugement.

La premibre de toutes est d'6tablir que le jugement dont se plaint 1'opposant lui cause un pr6judice.

Comment peut-il d6montrer ce pr6judice s'il n'allkgue pas son droit, s'il ne fait pas voir qu'il a aux propri6tbs r6clam~es, un titre qui, mis en comparaison avec celui de son adversaire, doit l'emporter et lui faire adjuger 16galement la proprit& C'est une condition essentielle de la tierce-opposition de mettre la cour en 6tat de.juger sur la validit6 des titres respectifs des parties.

Le droit, (dit Bioche), doit 6tre certain et 14gitine; en d'incertitude on no saurait admettre une attaque dirigde contre ducision de justice et autoriser pent-ftre une procidure frustratoire (1). Dalloz dit (2) :- Aussi la premibre conidition pour agir par la voie de la tierce-opposition est d'6pro uver unprdjudice anosdroits (art. Cette disposition repose sur principe de droit et d'6quit6 : pas d'intirtt, pas d'action. Carr6 et Chauveau (3):

n'est pas in int6rt, mais un droit quelconque compromis directement, qui est indispensable pour 16gitimer la voie de la tierce-opposition. Et plus loin il ajoute:

II faut, ainsi que 1'enseignent Favard de Langlade Poncet que lintirft qui sert de mobile an tiers-opposant soit 6gitime, en d'autres termes, que 'atteinte port6e 1'existence d'un de droits actifs autorise pemploi du recours extraordinaire qui lui ouvert contre cette sentence pour en obtenir la rdtractation (1) Vo. Tierce-opposition No.

No. in fine. Idoni Vo. Tierce-opposition No. 44.

No. 406, and No. in Vol. 4, p. 270, Q. 1, fine. Pigean, 1 Vol., pp. 484 Vol. 596.

485. Voir Forme d'Opposition Vol. p. et suivantespar tierce-partie. Thoui v. Leno 404 413.

blane L.C.R.

See

PonVet, Vol.,

Appr6ci6e d'aprbs les principes 6nonc6s dans ces autorit6s, il est 6vident que la proc6dure de l'opposant E'ER. est tout a fait vicieuse.

D'abord, parce qu'il n'a fait ~aucune all6gation qui puisse mettre la cour en 6tat de dcider le m6rite des prktentions respectives des parties -n'ayant all6gu6 aucun titre A la propri6t en litigela cour ne pent d6cider que 1'opposant a un meilleur titre que le contestant (1'intim6); qu'il ne fait voir aucun prdjudice, puisqu'il ne montre aucun titre-et le titre qu'il doit produire doit 6tre certain et 1gitime. Loin de prendre cette position, qui est la seule que puisse prendre le tiers-opposant, il ne conclut pas mime A ce que lapropri6t6 qu'il r~clame lui soit adjug6e; il conclut simplement A la nullit6 du jugement en faveur de l'intim6. C'est-h-dire qu'il fait une demande qui ne d6cide rien, ni sur le droit de la Couronne A cette propri6t6, ni sur le sien. C'est-h-dire qu'il fait comme dit Bioche:

Les droits de la couronne dans cette cause sont ceux des h~ritiers de Marie Piery, veuve de J.-Bte Hamelin Francheville, morte en 1785, sans laisser de repr6sentants.

Ces droits appartenaient, du moment de son dechs, an domaine public par droit de d6sh6rence, on succession irr6gulibre.

Laurent dit (1):

ture

Le droit de la couronne remontant A 1785, 1'appelant aurait allguer dans son opposition un titre ant6rieur on sup6rieur A celui de la couronne, on bien alle6guer et prouver qu'avant cette 6poque cette propri6t6 avait 6t6 acquise par la prescription. Mais comme on 1'a d6ja vu il n'a all6gu6 aucun titre quelconque.

Dans son opposition il n'allgue la possession de cette proprit6 que d'une manidre indirecte en disant que l'intim: n'allgue pas non plus que cette possession est anterieure au jugement qu'il attaque.

L'appelant se trouvant comme opposant dans la position d'un demandeur, c'6tait A lui A faire preuve des erreurs qui auraient t de nature A faire r~tracter le jugement. II aurait dei 6tablir que s'il eut ti partie en cause ses titres auraient empkeh6 ce.jugement d'Otre rendu; ou prouver 1'existence d'h~ritiers de madame Piery, et que partant il n'avait pu exister de d~sh~rence en faveur de la Couronne; que le fief Francheville ne faisait pas partie des biens d4laiss~s par madame Piery. Mais il 6tait sans int6rt A faire cette preuve, A moins de pouvoir aussi prouver qu'il d6rivait son titre de madame Piery, ce qu'il ne pouvait aucunement faire, car il n'a et ne produit aucun titre A la proprit6 qu'il r6clame.

Cons6quemipent les deux moyens de la demande du procureur-g&nral, que le fief Francheville appartenait A madame Piery et que sa succession est tomb6e en d6sh6rence, n'ont nullement attaqu6s. Le droit de la Couronne reste done clairement 6tabli. Il est facile de comprendre pourquoi l'opposant n'a pas all6g16 de titre au fief Francheville.

C'est parce que lors de la vente par le shfrif, en octobre 1807, A Moses Hart, de la seigneurie des Grondines, i a 6t6 fait dans le titre accord6 A ce dernier, par le sh6rif, dans 1'acte de vente pass6 par Tktu et B61anger, notaires, l'exception suivante:containing....................

........................ eighth of that part of the seigniory of St. Charles, commonly called the fief Francheville, which fief begins on the South West, at the line which separates the seigniory of St. Charles from that of Dorviliers, MERCIER. contains in front twenty-six arpents, six perches and twelve feet by the F i whole depth of the seigniory, and on the North East side at the line Fournior J. which separates the seigniory of St. Charles from the seigniory of Latesserie, commonly called Lachevrotibre, contains twenty-two arpents in front by three leagues in depth, exclusive in both parts of any right in each island and battures in front of said seigniory and is claimed by the attorney general for and on behalf of His Majesty.

Cette vente fut faite en vertu d'un ordre de la cour du Bane de la Reine dans lequel cette exception est exprimbe dans les m~mes termes.

Le 26 f6vrier 1810, Hart revendit la propri6t6 A P. Charay avec la mime exception, et le 8 juillet 1831, Charay vendit A Burnet qui revendit ensuite A l'hon. D. E. Price qui par son testament a 16gu6 la propri6t6 en question A 1'appelant.

Dans le titre de Burnet A 1'hon. D. E. Price en date du 21 dAcembre 187 1, la propri6t6 est d~crite de la m6me manibre et contient la mime r6serve, avec cette seule diff6rence que r6f6rence est faite an titre de Charay, du 8 juillet 1831, pass6 devant Campell, notaire public, dans les termes suivants :- Save and except such parts or portions of the said seigniory lands and tenements as were and as are in the said deed of sale excepted and reserved.

Plus loin il est dit que Price prend la propriet6:- Without any other or greater estate, right, title, or interest than the said Peter Burnet hath therein...

.......................... to have and to hold the premises so sold, assigned, transferred and made over to the said D. E. Price, his heirs and assigns for ever, subject to the reservations and provisions herein before mentioned and referred to and more especially in the deed of sale under which the same were acquired by the said late Peter Burnet from the said Pierre Charay. Un t6moin du nom de Lacourci&e entendu de la part de 'appelant dit que la reserve dans l'acto de vente de Burnet & Price et colle contenue dans I'acte de Charay A Burnet se rapporte au fief de Francheville mentionn6 VERCIER. dans les divers actes et proc~dures comme le fief de - Francheville r~clam6 par le procureur g6n&ral pour Sa Majest6.

Tel est le titre en vertu duquel D. E. Price s'est mis en possession de ce fief en 1871.

Ce titre ne contient aucune transmission du droit de propri6t6 ! Price et ne peut m~me servir de base Ala prescription. Tout an contraire il contient une reserve expresse du fief Francheville qui est d6clarbe appartenir h ]a couronne. L'appelaut est l'hritier de D. E. Price et n'a partant pas plus de droit que lui A la propri~t6 dont il s'agit. Il lui cut done t impossible, s'il eut t6 partie au jugement du 14juin 1884 do se faire d~clarer' propri6taire du fief Francheville auquel il n'a ancun titre. Et la cour n'eut pu faire autrement que de d6clarer comme elle l'a fait que Ie fief Francheville &tait 6chu en 1787 A la Couronne par droit de d6sh6rence.

Dans tous les cas, I'appelant ne peut se faire adjuger la propri6t en question, parce qu'il no la r6clame pas par son opposition, et qu'il n'a pas mis la cour en position de d6cider la question de titre; il ne demande que la nullit6 du jugement, qui, si e1e 6tait prononc6e, n'auraitpas plus d'effet quo le jugement n'en a maintenant, puisque n'y ayant pas t61 partie, ce jugement n'affecte nullement ses int6r6ts ni ses droits.

C'est res inter alios judicata. Cette proc6dure est tout-A-fait inutile et frustratoire. Co n'est qu'en faisant triompher ses moyens de d6fense A 1'action prise contre lui par Fontaine qu'il pourrait arriver A son but. C'est cette action qu'il aurait dft mener A jugement en cour au lieu de recourir A la tierceopposition que la loi ne lui accorde pas dans le cas actuel.

Par tons ces motifs, je suis d'opinion de renvoyer I'appel avec d6pens.

J.-Over one hundred and five years J.

ago, on the 25th March, 1785, one Marie Piery, widow of Jean Baptiste Hamelin Francheville died, at Quebec. intestate, and without leaving any then known heirs, On the same day, one Gueyrault was named curator to her vacant succession. The said curator appears to have proceeded to the inventory required by law, but an extract only of such inventory, dated the 30th January, 1787, is to be found in the record.

In this extract a portion of the seigniory of Grondines, consisting of a frontage of arpents, six perches twelve pieds by three leagues in depth is entered as forming part of the said succession.

On the 9th of July, 1790, the Attorney-General filed an information in the Court of Common Pleas, at Quebec, against this curator, claiming for his Majesty King George III., the succession of the said Marie Piery, and more particularly the aforesaid portion of the-seigniory of Grondines d litre de bastardise et deshirence. On the 16th of July, 1790, the curator filed an answer to this information whereby he alleges, 1st. That the succession of Marie Piery was not vacant, as she had left legitimate heirs in France who, as he alleges, were entitled to her succession; 2nd. That even if these heirs did not accept the succession, the crown could not, in any case, maintain its claim as to the seigniory of Grondines, because such seigniory, in law, for reasons given in the said answer, became, by Marie Piery's death, the property of one Hamelin and one Boisvert, who then were in actual possession of it; 3rd. That consequently the said Hamelin and Boisvert should have been made parties to the information, or that the King, to have his claim on the said seigniory established, should proceed against them by a direct action. The Attorney-General, on the 25th September, 1790, VERCIER. replied to the curator's plea, praying that the succession T aforesaid, in the curator's hands, should be accounted for and delivered over to His 1 ajesty's Receiver- General.

It would appear that towards the end of 1790, or in the beginning of 1791, an intervention claiming the said succession was filed by the brother and sisters Marie Piery, in answer to which, on the 7th of July, 1791, the Solicitor-General for the King, substituted that same day to the Attorney-General, filed an opposition or plea. However, neither this intervention nor the crown's said opposition or plea are now to be found in the record.

On the 13th July, 1791, the intervening parties filed an answer to the crown's opposition or plea and on the 15th the Solicitor-General filed a replication to that answer, both of which are in the record. This ends the proceedings in the Court of

Common Pleas, with the exception of the filing, on the 9th February, 1808, by the intervening parties of a copy of Gueyrault's appointment as curator; and for the next seventy-six years, no proceedings whatever were taken in the case either by the crown, or by the curator, or by the heirs Piery.

By deed executed on the 12th of January, 1884, the Quebec Government promised to sell for the sum of $300 to one Tancride Toussaint Moreau, barrister, of Montreal, all the rights of the crown in the said succession, and authorised him to continue the proceedings, in the name of the crown, upon the aforesaid information of 1790.

One Eughne Pierre Lafontaine, also a barrister, and partner as such of the then Prime Minister, Mr. Mousseau, accepted this promise of sale as agent of Moreau and in his name. It is clearly established however, by the evidence of Moreau himself, and of one Martin, to which I shall refer later on, that it was himself, Lafontaine, who was the real pur- Tasereau chaser of the crown's rights and that Moreau had no interest whatsoever in the matter.

On the 13th March the new curator promptly declared that he was willing to take up the instance. On the previous day he had gone before a notary and had passed a deed of amended inventory, giving a new description of the part of the Seigniory of Grondines that, in his opinion, the crown was entitled to, a fact of which he had not the least personal knowledge; and upon this amended inventory an amended information was subsequently, on the 20th of March, by consent, fyled in the name of the crown.

No further proceedings, it would appear, were taken on that notice; but on the 15th of April following, upon a rule nisi taken by the curator defendant, it was ordered that, upon the intervening parties' default to name a new attorney within thirty days thereafter, their intervention would be dismissed, and accordingly, upon such default, on the 9th of June the intervention was dismissed, with the consent, the judgment adds, of the plaintiff and of the defendant, A. and B. consenting that C.'s intervention be dismissed.

This rule nisi, I notice, had also been served on the intervening parties at the Prothonotary's office, the bailiff solemnly making his return upon oath that he had not been able to find the parties in the District of Quebec.

There was, it is evident, no reason to doubt the truth of this return, for, when their intervention was fyled, in 1791, the youngest of these claimants must have been at least years old, so that in 1884, when this return was made, he, if living, would have attained the respectable age of one hundred and fourteen.

Then the curator, strange to say, who so obtained, upon motion, the dismissal of this intervention, was not a party to the contestation thereon.

The crown alone had appeared and joined issue upon it. Now, what right he had to move to dismiss a proceeding to which he was not a party, or what interest he had, as curator, on a contestation between the crown and the heirs Piery, I fail to see. The present appellant, it is true, may not have the right to invoke jus tertii and to impugn proceedings which do not concern him, but I have referred to thein as evidence of the means resorted to by the interested parties to get at a final judgment on the information.

The intervention having been so disposed of in this singular way the parties interested found no difficulty, with the ready assistance of the curator Fontaine, in obtaining a judgment in their favor, and on the 14th of June, 1884, the Superior Court declared Marie Piery's succession, and more especially that part of the Seigniory of Grondines described in the supplementary inventory, escheated to the crown, with order to this curator to deliver up possession thereof.

On the 24th of July following the Quebec Government, according to the promise of sale previously passed, executed a deed of sale to Eugene Pierre Lafontaine, here again falsely pretending to act as agent for Tancr~de Toussaint Moreau, of all its rights under the aforesaid judgment for the sum of $300. Upon this sale, in March, 1885, an action in Moreau's name was brought against the present appellant, alleging that he, the appellant, by himself and his auteurs, had been in possession of that part of the Seigniory of Grondines declared escheated to the crown by the judgment of the 14th of June, 1884, and had illegally received the rents and revenues thereof for at least fifty years, with conclusions that he, Moreau, as assignee of the crown's rights, be declared to be the proprietor of the said part of the said seigniory, and that the appellant be condemned to deliver it up and to account for its revenues since 1871, unless he prefer to pay $100,000.

Upon the service of this action Price, the present appellant, filed an opposition (tierce opposition) to the said judgment of June, 1884.

On this opposition Moreau filed an intervention by which, and the moyens in support thereof, he alleged that Price had no title to the property in question, and had never been in possession thereof, and that the said property had been duly declared escheated to the crown, in whose rights he, the said Moreau, claimed to be.

This intervention and the tierce opposition were submitted together to the Superior Court, where, on the lst February, 1887, a judgment was given dismissing Moreau's intervention, maintaining Price's tierce opposition and avoiding the judgment of the 14th June, 1884, so far as the same might affect the'said opposant or the said Seigniory of' Grondines.

Upon an appeal to the Court of Queen's Bench, by the crown and by Moreau jointly, this judgment of the Superior Court was reversed, and Price's tierce opposition was dismissed.

Hence the present appeal by Price, upon which, as* in the court below, the crown joined with Moreau as respondent.

The first of these proceedings that obviously comes up for our consideration on this appeal is Moreau's intervention (though there is no reference whatever to it in the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench), and on that intervention Moreau's locus standi and right to intervene on Price's tierce opposition is the first question that suggests itself for enquiry. He, of course, alleges, as the basis of his right to intervene, the sale to him by the Government of the 24th of July, 1884. Now this sale, it seems to me, is null, of a nullit de plein droit. It was, as the promise of sale itself was, clearly a sale of litigious rights, without warranty and for a nominal price

And the sale of litigious rights to advocates or attornies practising before the courts under the jurisdiction of which those rights would fall is expressly prohibited by art 1485 C.C.

And by art. 14 CC. (not in express terms in the Code Napoleon), all prohibitive laws import nullity. Then, by art. 989 C.C. a contract with an unlawful consideration has no effect, and the consideration is unlawful when it is prohibited by law or contrary to public order, 990 C.C. And on this point, I may at once remark, it is immaterial whether this sale is to be considered as made to Moreau or to Lafontaine, as both are practising attornies. As well said by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in a recent case under the article of their code corresponding with our art. " The elevated standard which the learned profession must occupy in public esteem makes it the imperative duty of courts to exact a rigid compliance with a rule calculated to enhance the honor and usefulness of the profession "

It is also immaterial that this objection has not been taken.. The courts are bound to take cognizance of infractions of laws enacted in the public interest, even when passed sub silentio by the litigating parties

I have not failed to notice that this litigation is pending in the District of Quebec and that Moreau, examined as a witness, swears that he is generally practising in Montreal. But as such he is entitled, I take it, to practise anywhere in the Province before the Court of Queen's Bench and I would say in any of the judicial districts before the Superior Court.

I should judge from this record itself by the fact that, in this very case, his own action against Price taken at Quebec is signed by MM. Robidoux & Fortin, who, it is in evidence usually practise in Moutreal. Then, apart from the consideration that this sale was made to a practising attorney it seems to be unlawful and void as tainted with champerty, an offence punishable under the criminal law of the country; see arts. 14, 989, 9900C.C. Wharton, law lexicon vo. Champerty; Earle v. Hopwood (1); Gre/1 v. Levey

Upon these ground alone, the judgment of the Superior Court which dismissed - Moreau's intervention could, in my opinion, be supported. But if, in addition, we take into consideration the fact admitted by Moreau himself, that he has no interest whatsoever in the case, that the sale by the G-overnment to him was a sham to cover a sale to Eughne P. Lafontaine, it seems to me unquestionable that his intervention must, in any case, be thrown out.

To be allowed to intervene in a case an interest in the event of the suit must be shown. Art G.P.C.

Dorion v. Dorion and an intervening party who has no interest must be mis hors de cour.

I now come to the appellant's tierce opposition, One of the allegations of this opposition is, that all the proceedings taken in 1884 on the information of 1790 were fraudulent and collusive. Now, of this allegation there is, on this record, abundant and cogent evidence, as well directly from the depositions of the witnesses examined as indirectly from the proceedings themselves. I have already alluded to the fact that, as admitted by Moreau himself, he has no interest whatever in the case. It is falsely, fictitiously and withintent to deceive (no euphemism is possible) that his name appears as vendee in the deeds of January 12th and July 24th, 1884, and it was Eughne P. Lafontaine, the prime minister's partner at the bar, who was the real purchaser.

That as Lafontaine was then the law partner of Mr. Mousseau, the then prime minister, the adversaries of the prime minister, and of Lafontaine himself who might later on enter the political career, might MERCIER. have caused some trouble to the government or to Lafontaille, and T that ai the tiansaction appeared more advantageous to the purchaser j than to the Government it might be criticised by Lafontaine's or the pime minister's adversaries.

This witness, Martin, further admits that, in payment of his services as attorney for Lafontaine in this case, it was agreed between him and Lafontaine that he, Martin, would share in the profits of the suit. The following passage of his deposition leaves no room for doubt as to this

Q. Vous ites intiress6 dans le procks ? R. Oui.

Q. Voulez-vous dire a la cour quel est votre int6rit ? R. Mr. Lafontaine ni'avait charg4 de le repr6senter ici dans toutes les procidures et recherches qu'il devait faire; et pour cela, il m'a dit qu'il me donnerait une part dans le r~sultat du procks.

Q. Au lieu de vous r~nmundrer en argent pour les services que vous lui rendiez, il vous a interess6 de cette manibre ? R. Oni.

They, in other words, he and Lafontaine, agreed to a pact de quold litis and were to be associates in this traffic on litigation. Now, though this so very reprehensible conduct on the part of these two members of the bar cannot, in any way, affect the solution of the questions in controversy in the case yet the court cannot allow it to pass unnoticed.

A reference to the following authorities, inter alia, will show how strictly forbidden to advocates and attorneys stipulations of that nature have always been. Laurent, on pacte de quota litis, says (1) :

C'est toujours avilir le saint ministhre de la justice que de le souill, r par les sordides calculs de la cupidit.

And Morin, de la discipline, says (2)

Ce qui est surtout interdit, c'est toute stipulation qui impliquerait, ou sons entendrait, plus on moins, une participation rdelle aux binefices espir6s du procis.

Ou sait combien est antipathique h la profes- (1) Vol. 24, No. 60.

(2) par. 124 bis.

Favard de Langlade Repert. and Merlin Repert. vo. pacle quold litis, Marcad6 and Blackstone also condemn severely all transactions tainted with champerty, more especially when entered into by practising attorneys.

Now, to return to the case and to the fact I have alluded to, that it was Lafontaine, and not Moreau, who purchased. the rights of the crown, we have thereby unquestionable evidence from these parties themselves that, at its very inception, they resorted to simulation in the furtherance of their scheme. Let us see now what was their subsequent mode of action in the matter.

I have alluded to. It was then 91 years since the last contentious proceeding had been taken by the crown on the information (25th September, 1790), and 93 years since the last contentious proceeding upon the intervention of the heirs Piery (15th July, 1791).

So much for that aspect of the proceedings.

I now come to the merits of the judgment of the 14th June, 1884, itself.

It seems to me plain that, even if the plaintiff had been entitled to a judgment at all on this information, the description given in the amended inventory, and in this judgment, of the part of the seigniory of Grondines, left by Marie Piery at her death, is altogether unsupported by the documents of record. This judgment declares escheated to the Crown two separate parts of this seigniory, described by metes and bounds. Now, Marie Piery, as far as I can make out from the record, never had a title to any part of that seigniory, but to an undivided share of it. Her own title is her marriage contract, in virtue of which, at her husband's death, she inherited all of his estate.

Now, her husband's title was a sale to him, on the 8th April, 1762, by one Langanier6, and all what that deed conveyed to him was one-fourth* of one-half of the said seigniory " indivis avec les autres h~ritiers." Further a deed of " foi et hommage," of the 15th June, 1781, by Marie Piery herself jointly with her co-seigniors, purports to be as to her for her undivided part, and an undivided part only, of the seigniory. "A cause du fief et seigneurie de Grondines dont ils R~ jouissent tous en commun et par indivis "relevant ' en plein fief de Sa Majest6 dont ils jouissent tous sans partage et par indivis," are words in that deed which it Tasereau seems to me leave no uncertainty upon that point. Two " prochs verbal de bornage " of the 15th November, 1783, were relied upon by the respondents as evidence of a partition of the seigniory between the owners thereof. But I cannot see anything of that kind in these deeds alone and by themselves.

The first is nothing but the location of a division line between the Grondines and Lachevroti6re seigniories, and the second was never completed and signed by the surveyor without which signature it is an absolute nullity, besides being, as it seems to me, unintelligible and further, not signed by Augustin Iamelin upon whose requisition it appears to have been made but most illegally only by his wife for him. Moreover no partition was ever concluded by this deed of " bornage."

It does not even purport to make any, but was probably made in view of a partition which the parties, it may be assumed, intended to proceed to later, but which was never made from the fact perhaps that Marie Piery died not long afterwards.

Then there is no evidence whatever of the possession by Marie Piery or her husband of a separate and divided part. The extract of the inventory of 1787 cannot be taken as affording such evidence.

Such an inventory could not in any case be evidence of possession or of any other fact whatever against third parties. The curator, in 1790, in his plea to the information denied that he was in possession of the part of this seigniory claimed by the crown and not only has no evidence to the contrary ever been brought forward but it appears on the record that a comparatively short time afterwards, on the 10th September, 1806, -this seigniory of Grondines was sold. by the sheriff to one Moses Hart, in a case of -E

Blanchard v. McNider under the express reserve (I assume upon an opposition by the crown) of two un- Tasereau divided parts, declared in the sheriff's deed to be claimed by the crown, and this upon a motion of the Attorney General himself, who appeared in the case for the plaintiff Blanchard. Now it seems to me that the crown, as a necessary consequence of this sheriff's sale, never had since the right, under any circumstances, to claim any part of this seigniory but the undivided parts so reset-ved in this sale, assuming they ever had any, and that the judgment of the Superior Court of 1884, which declared escheated other distinct and divided parts thereof, is, on that ground alone, utterly erroneous and would not have been obtained but for the collusion between the parties.

This judgment adjudicates upon property which has never been in the possession of either of the curators. When the first curator pleaded to the information that he was not in possession of any part of this seigniory, admitting that he was in possession of the other property claimed, the crown merely replied that he should render an account of what he had in his hands. That was equivalent to a withdrawal of the claim as to the seigniory.

The crown officers, aware, it may be presumed, of the truth of the fact pleaded by the curator, evidently saw that it would have been as useless as illegal to get a judgment against the curator ordering him to deliver up or account for a property he never had the possession of (1).

When the first curator further pleaded that not he, but Boisvert,& Hamelin,were then in possession of the property claimed by the crown, and that the crown should not further proceed upon the information as to this seigniory without bringing them in the case, the crown ought to have so brought them in, and have its claim to this property adjudicated upon contradictorily with the parties in possession of it aninzo domini. I may add further that there may be doubts as to the legality of Fontaine's nomination as curator. Can a succession be deemed vacant when the crown comes forward to claim it ? See Art. 1331 C.P.C. Arts. 637. 638, 639, 684, 687 0.C.

I simply refer for the decisions and the authorities in support of these propositions to Sirey's Code Civil Annot6, under Art. 768 Nos. 8 et seq. without further investigating the question or coming to any determination upon it.

The new curator may, perhaps, be considered as the girant charge de l'administration provisoire.

Another objection to the reprise d'instance of 1884, taken by the appellant in his factum, one which the curator Fontaine did not, of course, take, as he was appointed not to take objections, is that the action was then prescribed.

I refer on this point to Arts. 2216, 2242, 2265 0. C. and to the following authorities:- Merlin (1.)

And citing Brodeau:

Taschereau

J.

(1) 2 Vol 350, par.

(2) ler. Prescription No. 491.

(4) 32, Vol.

(5) S. V. 32. I, 67.

(6) S.

53, 1,

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA. [VOL. XVIII. La partie qui, aprbs la dernibre procidure, demeure 30 ans dans Finaction, est ceisie avoir abandonn6 son droit; aprbs 30 ans tout est pri et prescrit.

Les assignations, les jugenents, tout se prescrit par 30 ans, ind6pendamment du dicks des parties.

Aubry & Rau (1).

L'interruption (de prescription par une action) est 6galement h regarder comine non avenue, si Finstance vient A s'6teindre par la discontinuation de poursuites pendant 30 ans.

Le Roux de Bretagne (2).

Si mame il y avait eu discontinuation de poursuites pendant 30 ans, Pinstance serait 6teinte par la prescription.

And at No. 510,

La discontinuation de poursuites pendant 30 ans (teint tout la fois Pinstance et Paction.

Rodibre, Proced. (3).

L'instance, h d6faut de la piremption peut s'teindre par la prescription trentenaire.

Comment supposer, en effet, qu'une instance puisse subsister pendant une strie indifinie de

Laurent (4).

Tout droit s'6teint par le laps de 30 ans done s'il a eu discontinuation poursuites pendant 30 ans, 1'instance sera 6teinte. La jurisprudence est en sens, quoique la question soit controvers6e. Re Marconnay (5).

Ind6pendarmment de la p6remption pour discontinuation tde poursuites pendant ans, les instances sont soumises la prescription de 30 ans pour d6faut de poursuites pendant laps de temps. Habitans de Langlet (6).

L'instance en cassation se prescrit par d6faut de proc6dures pendant ans. Plus de demande en reprise d'instance apris cette date. Villegonan, C. Talhouet. Cassation (7).

L'instance ne conserve 1'action qu'autant que Finstance n'est pas elleprescrite pas une discontinuation de poursuites pendant plus de 30 ans.

Le droit de demander la peremption d'instance se prescrit par 30 ans, partir de Fexpiration de ans sans poursuites

Delmas v. Bruvois

And in the Journal du Palais, 1887 Rodibre on T that case says,

In 1886, in re Boueix (3).

It follows from these authorities, that if Fontaine, instead of taking up the instance, had waited till an action en reprise d'instance was taken, and had met such action with aplea of prescription, he would have had it dismissed.

A clearer proof of collusion between him and the parties acting as plaintiffs cannot be had. The appellant, under art. 2187 C.C., has now the right to avail himself of this prescription.

As to the appellant's right to a " tierce opposition" in this case, it is not, in my opinion open to controversy. The respondents cannot argue that, because the judg. ment of 1884 was as to him res inter alios judicala, he, the appellant, is estopped from impeaching it. It is precisely against a judgment to which he is not privy, that a party aggrieved by it is given the right to a "tierce opposition," as the very name of this proceeding implies. (4).And the fact that the appellant here might,in another case, avail himself of the illegality of the said judgment, does not deprive him of his remedy by a " tierce opposition."

So to hold, would obviously be to deny the right, under any circumstances, to that proceeding. Then, it seems to me unquestionable, that the appellant here has sufficient interest and qualit6 " to impeach this judgment.

As to his " qualit6," it cannot be denied. He was clearly not privy to it. As to his interest, it is to me equally clear.

Why was it obtained by Moreau?

Or by Lafontaine and Martin rather ? If not only for the very purpose of laying the foundation of an action against him, and to enable them to impugn his rights to this seigniory of Grondines.

Would they now treat it as of no value to them, as a nugatory proceeding towards their interests, it might then well be asked why they intervened at all on the present issue between the appellant and the crown, what induced them to join on this contestation; if it did not concern them, what motives prompted them to so strenuously contend for the legality of a judgment foreign to the rights they assert?

They obtained, behind his back, a judgment declaring escheated to the crown a property of which he, the appellant, is in possession animo domini since fifty years, and they would forsooth say to him that he has no interest whatever in the matter, that it is none of his business. Their contention is untenable. The measure of their interest to uphold this judgment is the measure of his interest to have it annulled.

It is obvious that even if no action had been taken against him upon it, that judgment, as long as it stands must have the effect to cast a cloud on his title and possession, a trouble de droit. It could be registered at any time, and thereby be the cause, in case of a sale for instance, of serious embarrassment to him.

And, if no action were taken upon it how could he contest it? VE By a direct action perhaps, as in Thouin v. Leblanc (1) .

. but how much more simple and direct under the circumstances is the remedy that the law has provided the " tierce opposition."

A case in the Cour de Cassation of Commune de Lalley C'mmune de Prdbois (2), is precisely in point

Or as given in Sirey:

That decision, it seems to me, entirely supports the appellant's right to a tierce-opposition in the present The respondents argued that as a " tiers opposant" must show a right superior to the right of the party who has recovered the judgment impeached, therefore, the appellant's opposition here must be dismissed, as it is not based on any title. But the fallacy of this arugment is apparent. It is a petitio principii. It assumes that the crown has proved a title to the property declared escheated.

Now, that is precisely what the appellant controverts, and, in my opinion, has established. As to him, his possession of fifty years alleged in Moreau's action itself fyled with the "tierce. opposition" is his title, and a sufficient one to entitle him to his conclusions against a plaintiff who has neithe title nor possession.

He has established his rights the rescindant and the rescisoire.

.

In connection with that point I have not failed to notice case, of Tercinet v. Tripier though it was not cited.

In that case the Cour de Cassation held that A A This last part of the " arrit " supports the legal proposition submitted by the respondents, that a "tiers opposant " must show a right superior to the right of the party whom judgment has declared proprietor.

But this obligation imposed on a " tiers opposant " has been fulfilled by the appellant here. Having proved that the Crown has no title to the property declared escheated, and never had the possession thereof, he has the right, as I said before, to rely his actual possession alone, to have the judgment 1884 set aside. He has not got to prove a " possession 16galement acquisitive," where the party who obtained the judgment adverse to his rights had neither title nor possession, and this, aside from the further consideration, a weighty one here, that this judgment could not have been obtained but for the connivance of the defendant, a feature of this case which distinguishes it from all the authorities cited by the respondents, and upon which the appellant might, perhaps, have contended, that it was not necessary for him to show a superior right to the right of the plaintiff.

The objection has been taken by the respondents to the conclusions of the "tierce opposition," that they are too restricted, in that they do not ask that the information of the crown be dismissed.

I am rather inclined to think the point well taken, and that the appellant , might have asked more than he did. but that is not, in my opinion, a reason why we should refuse him J. what he asks.

There is one point more to which I deem it necessary to refer, from an observation made by my learned colleague, whose concurrence in this judgment, I very much regret we have failed to get. I understood the learned judge to say that Price could never have acquired the ownership of a certain part of this seigniory by perscription, because his primary title, the sheriff's sale I have alluded to, and other subsequent conveyances of the seigniory, expressly reserve a part of it to the crown. Now, there is no question of perscription raised by the pleadings, and we do not determine anything whatever on this point. I simply refer to it, with deference to my learned colleague, lest our silence should be construed as an acquiescence in what has been said on the matter.

I am of opinion that we must allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the Superior Court with costs in Queen's Bench and in this court in favor of appellant against the crown and Moreau, jointly and severally.

GwYNNE and JJ. concurred with Taschereau J.

Beique, Lafontaine 4- Martin.