Hamilton v. G. H. Evans

Under the provisions of section 40 of the "Supreme Court Act", as enacted by 10-11 Geo. V., c. 32, interest from the date of the judgment of the trial court to the date of the judgment of the appellate court cannot be added to the amount of the judgment of the trial court, in order to bring the "matter in controversy" up to an amount exceeding two thousand dollars.

MOTION by way of appeal from an order of the registrar dismissing appellant's motion to affirm the jurisdiction of this court.

The appellant moved by way of appeal from an order of the registrar dismissing his motion to affirm the jurisdiction of the court. The action was begun after the 1st July, 1920. By the judgment pronounced at the trial, the plaintiff recovered $1,974.57, including interest to the date of the judgment. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was Louis Davies CJ. and Idington, Duff, Anglin, Brodeui and Mignault JJ.

dismissed. Special leave to appeal was not asked for, and the defendant gave notice of appeal to this court. The question was as to the construction of sec. 40 of the "Supreme Court Act," as enacted by 10-11 Geo. V., c. 32, which reads as follows:

By see. 39, it is provided that:

Geo. F. Macdonnell, for the appellant, contended that "the judgment to be appealed from " is the judgment of the Court of Appeal, and that interest at the statutory rate from the date of the judgment at the trial to the date of the judgment of the Court of Appeal should, therefore, be added to the $1,974.57 awarded by the first mentioned judgment, which would bring " the matter in controversy" up to an amount exceeding the two thousand dollars. Clarke, for the respondent, argued that, since the judgment of the trial court had been affirmed on appeal, it was the judgment to be " appealed from " within the meaning of section 40, in which Parliament meant to embody the effect of the decisions of the court in Toronto Railway Co. v. Milligan (1), and like cases. " The matter is controversy in the appeal " (s. 39, former s. 48c), was that of which recovery had been awarded by judgment at the trial and did not include interest subsequently accrued. By